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Abstract
This dissertation poses the question, "How does music mean?" If we acknowledge that music exists in the
material world as a complex sound wave only, we must wonder how music, as felt meaning, arises. Scholars
have often approached this question through considering music as a language. I do not employ this approach.
In fact, I criticize this analogy and the epistemology on which it is based as reductive and inconsistent with
musical experience. This analogy diminishes a whole-bodied experience to one that involves only the mind
and ears and decreases resonant, lived meaning to "content"--metaphorically an object transferred by speaker
to hearer through the representative and referential functions of symbolic forms.
Departing from this analogy, I develop a theory of whole-bodied, lived meaning based on Lakoff and
Johnson's theory of conceptual metaphor and Polanyi's epistemology of tacit knowing (bodily-based,
culturally-inflected knowing that one can feel, but cannot describe in full). Using this new theory, I analyze the
speech of young musicians at the Curtis Institute of Music, taking it as descriptive of meaningful musical
experience. I argue that enculturated listeners feel musical meaning when, employing metaphoric and
metonymic processes, they use whole-bodied imagining and perceiving to integrate dimensions of tacit
knowing with the sound wave. In so doing, they transform the sound wave's physical qualities (frequency,
amplitude, complexity and duration) into music's felt dynamic qualities and events (e.g., motion, force,
intensity, tension, relaxation, mood, gesture or momentum). In this way, musical meaning comes to life
through the energetic mediumship of listeners' tacit knowing, resonating in and throughout felt reality.
Listeners do not merely hear the music and thus grasp its meaning; rather, they live its meaning. Indeed,
listeners may also, through participating bodily in live or recorded musical performances, live tacitly known,
felt social meanings--such as a sense of identity or place--in intensified fashion. Thus, I suggest that symbolism
involves a resonant level in which participatory, lived meaning effects a connection of participants with signs,
and through signs, with each other and such transcendent social realities.
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ABSTRACT 
MUSIC AND EMBODIED IMAGINING:
METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN WESTERN ART MUSIC 
Deanna Kemler 
Christopher F. Hasty 
This dissertation poses the question, “How does music mean?” If we 
acknowledge that music exists in the material world as a complex sound wave only, we 
must wonder how music, as fe lt meaning, arises. Scholars have often approached this 
question through considering music as a language. I do not employ this approach. In 
feet, I criticize the analogy and the epistemology on which it is based as reductive and 
inconsistent with musical experience. This analogy diminishes a whole-bodied 
experience to one that involves only the mind and ears and decreases resonant, lived 
meaning to “content” — metaphorically an object transferred by speaker to hearer 
through the representative and referential functions of symbolic forms.
Departing from this analogy, I develop a theory of whole-bodied, lived meaning 
based on Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor and Polanyi’s 
epistemology of tacit knowing (bodily-based, culturally-inflected knowing that one can 
feel, but cannot describe in full). Using this new theory, I analyze the speech of young 
musicians at the Curtis Institute o f Music, taking it as descriptive of meaningful 
experience with instrumental Western art music, on which I focus. I argue that 
enculturated listeners feel musical meaning when, employing metaphoric and metonymic 
processes, they use whole-bodied imagining and perceiving to integrate dimensions of 
tacit knowing with the sound wave. In so doing, they transform the sound wave’s
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
physical qualities (frequency, amplitude, complexity and duration) into music’s felt 
dynamic qualities and events (e.g., motion, force, intensity, tension, relaxation, mood, 
gesture or momentum). In this way, musical meaning comes to life through the energetic 
mediumship of listeners’ tacit knowing, resonating in and throughout felt reality. 
Listeners do not merely hear the music and thus grasp its meaning; rather, they live its 
meaning. Indeed, listeners may also, through participating bodily in live or recorded 
musical performances, live tacitly known, felt social meanings —  such as a sense of 
identity or place— in intensified fashion. Thus, I suggest that symbolism involves a 
resonant level in which participatory, lived meaning effects a connection of participants 
with signs, and through signs, with each other and such transcendent social realities.
vii
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Introduction
I can remember the precise moment, when I was eleven years old, that music 
began to mean deeply for me. In my ballet class we had been rehearsing for weeks for 
our end-of-year performance, dancing to the regal horn fanfare from Handel’s Water 
Music Suite, no. 6.
mHomioF
Example .1
As I performed my part to the music, I suddenly felt as if the music filled my body and, 
rather than me moving to the music, the music moved me. I felt lifted by the music, 
possessed by it, my movements full of and motivated by its noble feeling. I soared along 
on top of its warm, joyful energy. Whereas before this experience, I had enjoyed 
Western art music and thought it to be a pretty thing, after this experience, I began to 
feel deeply about and for it. Quite against my character, I began regularly to sneak into 
an empty, off-limits dance studio while my older sister took her classes to listen to music 
and allow it to move me. Eventually, I quit dance to concentrate on music.
This dissertation is, in part, my attempt to understand what happened to me that 
day. How could something that had merely seemed pretty come to mean so deeply? 
Nothing in my college music classes even approached an answer to this question. In
1
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those classes, theorizing about music and its meaning seemed overly cerebral, as if 
engaging with music were a matter that involved only the ears and brain. With my 
visceral, bodily way o f experiencing music, I felt at odds with the scholarly musical 
culture I encountered there. I did not just hear music and appreciate it intellectually, I 
fe lt it deeply. Indeed, I lived it bodily. When playing music was at its best, I did not 
play the music, it played me. My experience as a flute performance major deepened the 
growing gap I felt between what was said about music in classes and how I experienced 
it. The ideas I learned in my theory classes seemed to have little to do with my goals in 
the practice room, where I struggled to transform plain notes into dynamic music. 
Although I enjoyed analyzing pieces for theory class, ultimately, those analyses did not 
even come close to touching the real power and meaning that music held for me. As a 
performer, it seemed to me that music theory — its language and approach — was a 
world somehow separate from mine.
Much later, in graduate school, while reading Steven Feld’s Sound and Sentiment 
I encountered the idea of a folk theory of music. Determined to overcome the then 
current ethnomusicological prejudice that nonliterate peoples have no music theory, Feld 
began to attend to the way that the Kahili people of New Guinea, with whom he was 
living, spoke about their music. Eliciting this language through making calculated errors 
in his own compositions, he discovered that the Kaluli theorize about music through a 
system of water metaphors:
2
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“Your waterfall ledge is too long before the water drops,” “There is not 
enough flow after the fell,” “The water stays in the pool too long,”
“There is much splashing” (164).
Reading this, I wondered if an analysis o f the metaphors Western art musicians use to 
speak about music would reveal a “folk” theory, or ethnotheory, that might somehow 
come closer to my experience with music than did the “official” theory I learned in 
college.
Shortly thereafter, I encountered newly emerging theories of conceptual 
metaphor, related to theories of embodiment, that demonstrate that understanding, 
reasoning and meaning are based in bodily experience in the world. Equipped with a 
theory that explains how meaning relates to body and suggests a methodology for 
exploring that body-meaning complex, I began my analysis. This dissertation is the result 
of that analysis. It resolves the dissonance I felt between theories of musical meaning 
and my experience o f musical meaning. My basic question is “How does music mean?' 
As ethnotheories are culturally and historically situated, I approach this question within 
the context of a specific musical culture: Western art music as it is practiced within an 
American musical conservatory.1 I focus my thoughts specifically on non-texted, 
instrumental music.2
1 Recent musical ethnographies, such as Henry Kingsbury’s Music, Talent and Performance and Bruno 
Nettl’s Heartland Excursions have established American musical conservatories, both private and 
University-based, as complex and multifaceted musical cultures.
21 do not claim that the theory described in these pages applies universally in any way; however, I do 
suspect that some aspects of this theory may apply to other cultures, as well as other Western musics. I 
explore this question in my conclusion.
3
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
On  th e  D ist in c t io n  B e t w e e n  “N o t e s” a n d  “M u sic ”
In asking about “music,” I define the phenomenon under study using a distinction 
common among practicing Western art musicians. American musical conservatory 
culture marks a clear line between “mere notes” and “music.”3 Negotiating a shared 
musical conception intersubjectively in practice sessions, master classes, and group 
rehearsals, musicians wield the power o f highly trained bodies, minds, and sensibilities to 
accomplish their primary goal: the transformation of an analyzable collection of sounds 
— “notes” — into “music,” something both more compelling and harder to analyze than 
mere notes.
The distinction between “notes” and “music” marks various important 
boundaries, both experiential and social It signals a crucial boundary in musical 
engagement: if I hear, feel or play “notes,” I do not fully engage in the musical process; 
if I hear, feel or play “music,” I engage more fully and in so doing, achieve one o f the 
highest goals of the culture. This distinction also marks the boundary between those 
musicians deemed “talented” and those deemed merely adequate. “Mediocre” performers 
and composers deal in “notes”; “talented” performers and composers do more: they 
create “music.” Based on the difference between “music” and “notes,” the distinction 
between talented and mediocre performers and composers can mark the boundary
3 Most of the time, when I use the word “music,” I am referring to instrumental Western art music. 
Occasionally, especially when I speak of music as it may act as a social symbol the scope of reference 
for “music” broadens a b it However, it never broadens beyond musics common in the Western world, 
such as popular music or jazz. In addition, I often use the term “musical sound” to mean “notes.”
4
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between those students who fulfill their goals to become professional musicians and 
those who do not.4
As an experiential distinction, the difference between “notes” and “music” may 
seem insubstantial and thus unimportant. Although very distinct in experience, this 
difference cannot easily be described, just as the difference between the tastes of a peach 
and an apricot, though distinct, cannot easily be described. One must feel the distinction 
between “notes” and “music” in order to truly understand it. Once felt, however, the 
importance o f this distinction becomes clear, as it did to me that day in ballet class when 
I first felt it.
As a member of the culture o f Western art music, I take this distinction seriously. 
In this dissertation, I endeavor to theorize how “music” means. Of course, I must also 
account for “notes,” but I do not want to merely theorize “notes.” In the text, I will 
occasionally emphasize this distinction through the use of quotes.
On  th e  N a  t v  re  o f  M u sic a l  M e a n in g
Because our understanding of linguistic meaning usually colors discussions of 
meaning in general, we commonly think of meaning as transitive in nature. If a thing or 
event means, it must be able to be glossed as something else: “the” means that a specific 
(not general) noun will follow in a sentence; “dog” means a furry mammal with four legs 
and a tail that behaves in specific, instinctual ways but is distinct from various other
4 For an interesting discussion of “talent,” see Kingsbury (1988), chapter three “Cream Rises.” 
Kingsbury also discusses how the term “music” is used in conservatory culture. Unfortunately, he does 
not give the distinction between “notes” and “music” its due importance.
5
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similarly described creatures; “winning the seat of first flute in the all state orchestra” 
means being the best high school flutist in the state, and so on. The gloss answers the 
question “What does this mean?”
However, if we examine these examples more closely, we can see that besides the 
first one (“the”), these things or events can also mean much more than their glosses. In 
American culture, dogs generally mean loyalty, friendliness, and unconditional love. For 
specific people dogs may mean danger or the hassle o f constantly cleaning shedding hair 
from furniture. Thus, in addition to its denotation, “dog” relates to cultural and 
individual connotations. However, for individuals, it can mean something that seems 
somehow beyond even individual connotations. For a dog lover whose pet has just died, 
that dog may have meant “the world” to her.s For the high school flutist, winning first 
chair in the all state orchestra may mean more confidence in her ability, more respect 
from other students, and as the beginning of the realization of her dream of making a 
career in music, a radical change in her view of her world and her place in it. This, 
indeed, means “the world” to her.
This “meaning the world” points to a kind o f meaning that does not easily answer 
the question “What does X mean?” This meaning resonates loudly in the lived feelings 
of the individual The bereft dog-lover feels the loss of her pet — the loss o f her world 
— with her whole self: in her feeling of sadness, in the way her heart, arms and hands 
feel as she aches to bend down to pet her missing dog, in her sense that the floor space
5 In this dissertation I have approached the problem of lack of gender-neutral pronouns in English by 
alternating the use of feminine and masculine pronouns in alternating chapters.
6
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of her home is just too empty and dead without this lively creature wriggling around in it. 
The proud flutist feels her triumph — the gain o f a new world — with her whole self as 
well: in the way she feels about herself and her relationship to other people, in the way 
she carries herself and moves through the physical and social world, in her expectations 
(both tacit and explicit) of the present and the future. These embodied experiences are 
not simply the results o f the meaning of “My dog died” or “I got first chair in all state 
orchestra!” They are a large part o f the meaning of these events as it resonates in the 
lives of the individuals involved.
This resonant kind o f meaning connects us with life’s larger questions and 
concerns — questions and concerns that transcend ordinary reality: “Where did this 
lovely little furry spirit go? She was so ‘here’ and then so suddenly ‘not here.’” or “How 
can I live without her unconditional love?” or “Do I have talent?’ or “Do I have a place 
in the musical world?” This meaning does not answer these questions, but raises them as 
a part of its resonance. For a time, these issues live vividly in and through the person’s 
body.
Resonant meaning means intransitively, through existing in human experience, 
not through reference to a “what.” Because of its felt effects and the connections it 
creates with larger issues, resonant meaning alters the quality of existence for a time.
By connecting our lives with larger issues, thereby putting them into a larger context, 
resonant meaning gives meaning to our lives. Resonant meaning “strikes” us, as if we 
were a gong and we resonate with it, feeling foil of it’s meaning until the resonance dies
7
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away. It is not a meaning-object that can be gotten, as if finding a meaning in the 
dictionary, but a meaning process that permeates an individual’s existence for a time — a 
meaning that lives her, that takes over her life or that she gives herself over to.
Musical meaning occurs in this intransitive, resonant manner; it does not 
necessarily mean something, it simply means. Through bodily experience, music 
resonates with and in the inner self of the individual listener. Striking like a gong or 
stroking like a feather, music permeates our existence for a time as a meaning process 
that we give ourselves over to, a meaning process that connects us to events and realities 
that transcend the scope of our ordinary lives like Beauty or Spirit, Community or 
Nation, Being female in contemporary America or Being Native American in 
contemporary America. Through this resonance and connection, music alters the quality 
o f our existence at the same time that we give it its existence.
As we conceive of it in Western musical culture, music does not exist outside 
human experience. Outside human experience, music exists only as a complex sound 
wave, a purely physical phenomenon. Each of the aspects of what we think of as music 
— pitch, melody, harmony, rhythm, and so on — arises as the result of human 
involvement with the physical sound wave. Human beings, then, are the medium in 
which music, as “music,” exists.
Human beings are also the medium in which, through musical experience (and 
other kinds of peak experience), transcendent realities like Beauty, Spirit, Community, 
Nation or Identity might come into existence. These transcendent realities are not
8
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concrete, physical realities, but realities defined and construed in a particular way 
through negotiation and consensus o f a social group. Because of the social nature o f the 
transcendent realities, connection with them connects us to society. When we live 
socially defined transcendent realities in musical experience, we live our group’s most 
important values and beliefs in intensified fashion for a time. The experience of living 
these transcendent realities contextalizes the individual life and gives it meaning, a 
meaning socially defined. At the same time, the individual gives life to these social 
meanings.
Musical meaning, then, is a very complex phenomenon, involving at least three 
distinct entities: 1) in physical reality, the complex sound wave, 2) in social reality, 
socially defined transcendent realities, and 3) in individual, psychological reality, 
individual experience, in which both music and socially defined transcendent realities 
come into being and are maintained. Such a complex phenomenon demands a 
comprehensive approach. For a complete understanding o f musical meaning, we must 
understand the interaction of all o f these entities. How do sound waves become “music” 
in human experience? How do transcendent realities live in human experience? How 
can musical experience connect the individual with socially defined transcendent 
realities? How do transcendent realities give meaning to individual lives through musical 
experience?
9
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Re so n a n c e  o f  t h is  S tu d y  w ith  Pr ev io u s S c h o la r sh ip
Given the above framing o f musical meaning, we can rephrase the central 
question of this dissertation, “How does a sense of lived meaning emerge from whole­
bodied participation in musical performances?” This question situates the work at the 
nexus of several theoretical streams: the emergence of meaningful lived social realities 
from performance, embodiment, and music theoretical concerns with meaning.
Disciplines concerned with the aesthetic dimension of social life (including but 
not limited to ethnomusicology, folklore and anthropology) traditionally located 
aesthetic meaning as the content of symbolic and textual forms (den Otter 1985, 
Densmore 1922, Merriam 1967, Moyle 1988, Nettl 1954, Tracey 1970). Understanding 
the relatively fixed  meaning of these forms consisted of gaining access to the emic point 
of view and thus gaining access to their content. A fuller understanding could be had by 
knowing the various genres of a group, as well as how they related, their history, how 
they were made and transmitted, and how they functioned in the society. Such studies, 
however, did not reverberate with the fullness o f lived reality, but sketched a reduced 
version o f it.
Beginning in the 1970s, however, studies began to better evoke the fullness of 
lived reality. At that tune, scholars broadened their view and began to see performances 
of aesthetic forms as nexuses o f dynamic processes during which participants negotiate 
and construct relatively fluid  social meanings. Resituatmg the aesthetic “text” in its 
“context” of performance (Ben-Amos 1971), scholars sought to understand not only the
10
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form and content o f the “text” but also the meta-level forms that tie text to context and 
meta-level contents that emerge from the dialectic and dialogic interplay o f text and 
context.
Studies o f meta-form— such as framing (Bateson 1972, Goffinan 1974) and 
keying (Bauman 1984) — demonstrate how meta-communicative devices signal a 
“breakthrough into performance” (Hymes 1975). This “breakthrough” alters the 
conditions of the ongoing interaction in two ways. First, since the particular genre 
employed entails a social contract, it signals a change in mode o f behavior of the 
participants. In this contract the performer assumes “responsibility to an audience for a 
display of communicative competence” (Bauman 1984, 11) while the audience assumes 
responsibility for interpreting and evaluating the performance according to the freedoms 
and constraints of the particular genre. Second, the breakthrough creates a shared 
psychological condition — a liminal “space” — that questions the boundary between the 
“real” and the “unreal” (Huizinga 1955, Bateson 1972, Turner 1967,1969, 1977,1988, 
Turnbull 1990). The paradoxical play of “real” with “unreal” creates a ludic space of 
performative potential (Austin 1962) in which normative dimensions of social life may be 
loosed from their everyday moorings and brought into symbolic relief.
In this ludic space, within the freedoms and constraints o f social contracts 
entailed by specific genres, participants may symbolically play with, question, rearrange 
and negotiate meta-content — meanings concerned with normative dimensions of social 
life. In the process, they “construct social reality” (Schieffelin 1985), negotiating
11
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personal identity and relationships o f power related to age, gender, social class, and 
ethnicity (Auerbach 1989, Basso 1989, Briggs 1988,1992, Chemoff 1979, Feld 1990, 
Kapchan 1996, Kingsbury 1988, Koskoff 1989, Mendoza-Walker 1994, Nettl 1994, 
Roseman 1989, Seeger 1987, Sutton 1989, Toelken 1991, Washabaugh 1996) as well as 
a social, political, geographical and historical sense of place (Lewis 1988, Moulin 1994, 
Roseman 1991,1996, 1998,2000, Turino 1993, Vander 1988, Waterman 1990a, 
1990b).6
While earlier studies of performance tended to take an objectified view o f “text” 
and “context,” leaving little room for human agency, more recent studies consider the 
interaction between text and context as a process under control of individual actors. For 
example, studies o f “contextualization” consider the
active process o f negotiation in which participants reflexively examine the 
discourse as it is emerging, embedding assessments o f its structure and 
significance in the speech itself Performers extend such assessments to 
include predictions about how the communicative competence, personal 
histories, and social identities o f their interlocutors will shape the 
reception o f what is said (Bauman and Briggs 1990,69).7
Also more easily understood as a process under control o f an agent are the untexted 
performances of everyday life (Goffinan 1974, Bourdieu 1977). Rather than an 
enactment shaped by the constraints and freedoms of a relatively fixed genre, these
6 The awareness of how power is negotiated in performance initiated a period in the later 1980s of 
greater self-awareness and reflexivity amongst scholars of performance in which they began to examine 
the political implications of their own ‘‘performed’’ texts. For more, see Clifford and Marcus (1986), 
and Marcus and Fischer (1986).
7 See Bauman and Briggs (1990) for a finely nuanced discussion of recent understandings of the 
processual interplay between “text” and “context,” including the concepts of contextualization, 
entextualization and recontextualization.
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improvisations arise from an internal sense of the possibilities (and impossibilities) of the 
ways in which the particularities of a situation might serve self interest.
The concerns with the individual control o f contextualization and the improvised 
performances of everyday life demonstrate a change in how scholars frame the 
performance situation. Rather than a spectacle to be observed, interpreted and thickly 
described (Geertz 1973), some scholars now frame performance as a felt process, whose 
efficacy arises, in part, through the medium of the lived body (Briggs 1994,1996,
Cowan 1990, Csordas 1994c, 1996, Desjarlais 1996, Kapchan 1994, 1995, Lewis 1995, 
Mason 1994, Ness 1992, Rappoport 1992, Rebhun 1994, Sklar 1991, Sugarman 1997, 
Williams 1994).8 A relatively new sub-field, sensory anthropology, directs our attention 
away from our tendency to know and understand through visual means and metaphors 
toward our other senses as they create a more immediate, less distanced engagement 
with the world (Howes 1991, Neustadt 1994, Stoller 1989,1996, 1997). These scholars 
remind us that in many other cultures, vision is not the preferred way of knowing.
We are realizing that, because of our tendency to know through seeing, we must 
participate bodily in our field consultants’ world in order to really understand it. Diedre 
Sklar suggests the method o f“kinesthetic empathy,” m which the ethnographer 
experiences “the interplay o f corporeality and abstraction” where “cultural knowledge 
gathers conviction and force” (1994, 13). She describes the difference kinesthetic
8 For reviews of literature about the body and embodiment, see Lock (1993) and Famell (1999). For 
dance and politics, see Reed (1998). For gesture, see Kendon (1997). Medical anthropology, in 
particular, has theorized embodiment in such a way as to allow us to see how it mediates the efficacy of 
performance. See Csordas (1989,1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c), and Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987).
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empathy made in her understanding o f the devotion to the Virgin Mary of the 
participants in the Dazante matachine dance in Tortugas, New Mexico. After a year of 
fieldwork, she thought she had come to a fairly foil understanding of this devotion when 
she found herself caught in a group of people going to kneel, one by one, before the 
image of the Virgin.
[T]he physical act o f getting down onto the ground before a feminine 
embodiment o f compassion, wisdom, and availability was profoundly 
agreeable. At the same tune, I was shocked by the sense of feeling her 
presence. It seemed as if I were melting into a deep connection with the 
being depicted in the image, meeting Our Lady of Guadalupe face to face.
The other people in the Capilla dropped away, and for a brief moment, I 
felt as if she and I were conversing, but without the lengthy process of 
forming words. It seemed appropriate to be on my knees — a corporeal 
attitude toward a divinity that was entirety alien to me; humility replaced 
academic distance (1994,17).
Thus Sklar’s body, raised Jewish, becomes a medium for the transformative power of 
this performance, bringing her to feel both a personal relationship with the Virgin Mary 
and a more complete understanding of the Dazante genre and it participants.
The growing body of literature that frames performance as a felt process 
broadens the focus of our attention from external dimensions of performance to include 
human beings as living media for social meaning. As living media, we bring these social 
meanings to life and thus share in their realities. Dorothy Noyes discusses the shared 
reality created through intense bodily participation in the Patum festival in Berga:
Communal action creates a shared reality, and over time a fund of 
common experience: it makes mutual understanding at some level 
possible. Consensus, as James Fernandez has noted, is etymologically 
con-sensus, feeling together (1988, 1-2). The Patum’s intensity of 
performance brings the individual’s senses into concert to receive strong 
impressions. Near-universal Patum participation in Berga guides the
14
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senses o f the entire community in the same direction, obliges them to feel 
together in a way that their divided everyday experience can never foster 
(1993,138).
Thus, we are coming to feel the importance o f experience in the lived body to the 
creation and maintenance of social meaning.9
It is through the medium o f the lived body that non-texted music can enter this 
stream of theory. Given that performance studies grew out of “readings” of text and 
symbol, it is not surprising that these scholars have not, in general, attended to non- 
texted music. Rather, they have treated music primarily as an accompaniment to text or 
dance, which can more easily be “read.” Non-texted, undanced music has been the 
purview of music theorists, who have dealt with it primarily in the form of reified 
notation.10 Music theoretical explorations of musical meaning have tended, on the 
whole, to draw on the analogy o f music to language. This analogy maps structures of 
experience from language onto music that simply do not ring true, creating more 
problems than it solves.11
In recent years, however, another theory borrowed from linguistics has held out 
greater promise: the theory of conceptual metaphor (discussed in detail below). In this 
theory, metaphor is not just a linguistic phenomenon, but can involve “mapping” the 
structures o f concrete lived, bodily experience onto more abstract realms of existence. 
This theory provides a clear articulation of the relationship between bodily experience
9 For more on the relationship between the emotional body (emotional feeling) and the social body 
(social feeling) see Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) and Lyon and Barbalet (1994).
10 For notable exceptions, see Hasty (1997), Meyer (1956), and Narmour (1990 and 1992). I discuss 
Meyer’s work in chapters one and three and Hasty and Narmour’s work in chapter three.
111 explore some of die problems of this literature in detail in chapter one.
15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and making sense of music. Against the hegemony of linguistic (prepositional) meaning, 
it suggests a non-propositional (or perhaps pre-propositional) dimension of the meaning 
process that does ring true to meaningful musical experience. Using this theory, some 
music scholars have begun to shed light on how music means through the medium of the 
lived body (Cox 1999, Saslaw 1996, Walser 1991, Zbikowski 1998).12 In addition, 
several studies concerned with the embodied, kinesthetic dimension of the listener have 
recently appeared (Dura 1998 and Iyer 1998). My study enters into this stream of 
thought, along with that o f the study of performance as a felt process through which 
meaning arises and is maintained in the medium of the lived body.
M eth o d s
Since musical meaning, as a complex phenomenon, exists in and through the 
medium of human experience, the theoretical framework used in understanding it must 
center on experience. Experience is a complex subject whose scope is too broad to be 
treated in depth in this dissertation. Rather than attempt a comprehensive overview, I 
limit my discussion to those aspects of experience relevant to developing a methodology 
designed to investigate musical meaning.
In the theoretical framework that underlies such a methodology, “experience” 
must be construed carefully and broadly, in a manner that includes all relevant aspects of 
being human: spirit, mind, body, intellect and feeling. “Experience” must also include
12 Studies of metaphor in the discourse of Western art music existed previous to the theory of conceptual
metaphor: Beckler (1981), Ferguson (I960), Glickman (1983), Guck (1981a and 1981b), Hansen
(1974), Krantz (1987), Smith (1976), and Solie (1977 and 1980). Without the theory of conceptual
metaphor, however, most of these make little connection between musical meaning and the lived body.
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both those aspects o f the meaning process o f which we are focally aware and those that 
might be either in peripheral awareness or out o f awareness altogether (e.g., in the act of 
listening, I am focally aware o f the musical sound, peripherally aware of my body’s 
kinesthetic involvement in that sound, and usually unaware of the neuro-biological 
transductive processes that translate sound wave into sound). “Experience” must be 
theorized in such a way that not only can music come to life in it, but transcendental 
realities can also come to life through the life of music in the individual.
Since music does not exist as music outside of human experience, an approach to 
musical meaning must take experiential reality as just as real as concrete physical reality. 
Any approach that suggests that experiential reality is less real because its “substance” is 
a matter of human energetic processes rather than concrete physical substance is 
inadequate. To begin with, the notion of “reality” is a human construction. Without 
human beings, the earth and its inhabitants would simply be as they are; questions of 
“reality” would not exist. Because of the hegemony of the scientific viewpoint, the 
prevailing Western epistemology has taken physical reality to be more real than 
psychological reality. However, to a human being experiencing a particular 
psychological reality, that reality is just as real as any physical reality. In feet, in the case 
of music, the psychological reality — the sounding music — seems more real to the 
listener than the associated physical reality — the sound wave. I know that sound waves 
exist primarily because I have been told they do by people who use instruments of 
observation that operate beyond the perceptual limits of those of the human body. To
17
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me, from the viewpoint o f my embodied experience, “sound waves” are even more 
insubstantial than “experiential reality” is thought to be from a scientific viewpoint. In 
contrast, from the viewpoint o f my embodied experience, “music” is vividly real.13 
Sound waves and music may be two different kinds o f reality, but each is just as real in 
its own way as the other. Concomitantly, each is just as insubstantial in its own way as 
the other.
As experienced, “experience” may be very real However, when one begins to 
examine it, it can become very slippery. Experience is “slippery” under examination 
because we cannot observe or measure it directly. We can directly observe and measure 
its effects, both physiological and behavioral. However, “experience” is not equivalent 
to its effects in the body.14 Those effects index experience, as a smoke indexes fire. 
However, just as the smoke is not the fire, a bodily effect is not the experience. 
Experience, rather, is a matter of being in the body, living an event in and through the 
body. For this central aspect o f experience, we cannot directly observe the experiences 
of other people, but must rely on their reports. Observation and measurement of bodily 
effects of a person’s experience can be useful in corroborating the reliability of her 
reports.
The only way that we can observe experience directly is to observe our own. 
However, even then the problem of split attention arises. If I attend to my experience,
13 In fact, because the psychological reality of “the sounding music” is so vividly real, most scholarship 
about musical meaning makes the mistake of assuming that “music” exists as music in physical reality.
14 Observable and measurable bodily effects most often do closely parallel actual experience. However, 
they do not always. On occasion, I have been told that I looked or sounded as if I were experiencing one 
thing when I was actually experiencing something quite different.
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part o f me is involved in the experience while part o f me is involved in observing myself 
involved in the experience. Because I am no longer totally involved in the experience, 
the splitting of attention changes the nature o f the very event (the experience) that I am 
trying to observe. O f course, if this splitting of attention complicates my attempts to 
observe my experience, it also complicates the attempts of other people who might 
report their experiences to me. One answer to this methodological problem is to try to 
report from memory and then to check those reports by momentarily splitting attention 
in the midst of actual experience. Another answer is to look for a consensus among 
many people.
Experience is also difficult as a subject of study because it is a phenomenon 
whose substance is “human energetic processes.” By “human energetic processes,” I 
mean the processes of the inner life, such as understanding, thinking, intention, 
motivation, intuition, deciding, resolving, desiring, reacting, imagining, feeling, emoting, 
believing, remembering, expecting, perceiving and so on. These kinds o f events make up 
the stuff of human experience. However, human beings do not experience the world 
directly. Rather, we experience it from particular “viewpoints,” which involve our 
attitudes, perspectives, values, beliefs, truths, philosophical bases, intuitions, feelings, 
and so on. Our “viewpoint” colors how we construe our experience and the kind of 
logic we see in it. “Experience” is not a given, but something that each individual has a 
hand in creating as it occurs.
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The feet that each individual does not experience the world directly, but through 
“viewpoints” that construe that experience in a certain way and lend it a certain logic 
complicates the task of examining experience. It means that we must find and analyze 
evidence not only o f an experience, but also of the manner in which the individual 
contributes to creating that experience. To make matters even more difficult, the 
individual may not be particularly aware of her viewpoint or o f the way that it 
contributes to her experience. While one can ask someone about experience directly, the 
viewpoint may not be so accessible through direct questioning. It may need to be 
obtained through less direct means.
Not only is the viewpoint from which we experience generally out of reach of the 
mental faculty and its ability to explicitly define phenomena with words, to a certain 
extent, experience may be, as well For example, in its most intense moments, musical 
experience is often felt to be ineffable — too large to be captured by mere words. We 
can try to describe the experience, but words simply feel inadequate to the task.
To summarize, two interrelated problems inhere in the task o f gathering evidence 
about experience. First, since it is not directly observable in oneself or others, we must 
rely on verbal reports o f memories of experience. Second, many facets o f experience, 
including the ways that we contribute to creating it as well as the most intense levels of 
experience, seem out o f reach of either mental awareness or the mind’s ability to grasp 
with verbal concepts. Thus the problem is that while we must rely on reports, those
20
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reports may not be reliable, since they may not fully describe all important factors 
involved.
A method, then, must compensate in some way for this problem. One way to 
compensate for questionable reliability o f reports is to look for a consensus among 
evidence. How many people report similar experiences? Do directly observable and 
measurable bodily effects parallel reports of experience?15 I have responded to these 
issues by relying not only on my own experience as a member of the culture of Western 
art music, but also on the experiences of other members of the same culture. In order to 
gain access to the experience of other members of this culture, I spent time with young 
instrumentalists at the Curtis Institute o f Music in Philadelphia.16 I observed rehearsals 
(both the large orchestra and the lab orchestra where conducting students take their 
lessons), sat in on classes (theory and sight singing) and had twenty in-depth discussions 
with students.17 Inevitably, as I was thinking about aspects of musical experience less 
accessible to examination, I also relied on my own experience, as well as my ability to 
observe it. However, having found concord with the Curtis students, I feel confident
IS Similarly, the researcher can only know this “directly observable” evidence through her own 
experience of it  This fact means that she is viewing it through a perspective that construes it in a 
particular way — sees it in light of a particular logic Therefore, her “direct experience of bodily 
effects” is as indirect as all experience is.
161 limited myself to instrumentalists because I had limited the scope of my inquiry to non-texted music.
17 Readers will recognize my basic method as ethnographic participant-observation. However, since I 
was already a member of this culture, I began with a different problem than do ethnographers who study
unfamiliar cultures. Rather than trying to become familiar with the strange, I had to make strange the
familiar. I accomplished this primarily by hearing and observing through the filter ofLakoff and 
Johnson’s metaphor theory (discussed below). In so doing, I was able to become aware of ways ofbeing
so familiar to me as to be almost unobservable.
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that my experience reasonably represents the experience o f members o f this culture.18 In 
addition, this dissertation and any publications that result from it will begin a discussion 
o f these matters that will test these ideas further among a larger population.
A second way to compensate for the difficulty of observing experience is to look 
beyond what people say — the “content” o f their utterance — to how they say it. The 
words that people use, the images they create with words, the ways that they situate 
themselves with respect to the experienced phenomenon — all these factors can give 
clues to not only what they experience, but how they experience it (their viewpoint). In 
this respect, the emerging theory of conceptual metaphor has been my guide. Briefly, 
this theory suggests that metaphor does not function merely as linguistic elaboration but 
also as a way to think about and conceptualize abstract experience by means of 
integrating the structure o f more concrete experience. I will describe this theory in 
greater detail below. In addition to metaphor theory, I draw upon linguistic and 
paralinguistic theories, since linguistic clues like aspect and deixis can reveal a great deal 
about how the experiencer situates herself with respect to the experienced phenomenon.
Finally, m order to compensate for dimensions of experience out of reach of 
awareness or verbal concepts — tacit dimensions ofbeing human, we can frame the 
situation theoretically in such a way as to be able to account for tacit phenomena. This 
dissertation is, in large part, an attempt to develop a theoretical framework that will 
account for the tacit dimension o f musical meaning. Elaborating on Michael Polanyi’s
'* By “having found concord” I mean that almost all of the time I could not only understand but also 
relate to the experiences students reported to me. I had difficulty understanding a few times because 
English was the student’s second language.
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theory of tacit knowing, along with Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, I advance a 
theoretical framework that accounts for aspects o f experience outside normal awareness. 
Along with the theory o f conceptual metaphor, especially Mark Johnson’s concept of 
image schema, these theories have the advantage o f involving a knowing body, a body 
that gives rise to and maintains meaning. Experience occurs in and through the body. If 
we are to understand a meaning that resonates loudly in embodied experience, that 
connects us in concrete bodily fashion through that experience to abstract, transcendent 
issues that give meaning to our lives, we must theorize the meaning situation in such a 
way that involves a knowing body.
My method both agrees and disagrees with phenomenology. It agrees in the 
kinds of methods employed, but disagrees in the philosophical reasons for those 
methods. My work could be called phenomenological insofar as the following are true:
1) I try to make explicit the tacit ground of my knowing about musical meaning, 2) I 
examine the objects o f intentional acts, 3) my own, largely tacit method of reflection on 
my experience corresponds with the phenomenological “bracketing of existence” and 
“free imaginative variation,” 4) I try to discover the “criteria for coherence of those 
intentional acts in which the object (or its name or description) can figure” (Schmidt, 
147), S) I take fidelity to the phenomenon under study as the concern that trumps all 
others (i.e., philosophical or methodological concerns), and 6) I try to take “the 
phenomenon precisely as it presents itself without saying that it exists precisely as it 
presents itself” (Giorgi, 203).
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
However, although my actions and concerns may correspond those of 
phenomenology in many ways, I disagree with the philosophical concerns that gave rise 
to those phenomenological actions and concerns. This may seem an odd statement, since 
according to Schmidt phenomenology is “presuppositionless”:
The phenomenologist does not frame theories; he merely examines and 
then describes phenomena as they present themselves to his unprejudiced 
view. Having no theoretical commitment and only one practical one — 
to examine all phenomena carefully and to take none o f them as familiar 
or understood until they have been carefully explicated and described — 
the phenomenologist says that his science is descriptive and 
presuppositionless (138).
As I read the Husserlian version of phenomenology, however, it accepts the premises of 
objectivist science, but where objectivist science works the “objective” side of the 
“subject/object” distinction, phenomenology works the “subjective” side. As held in 
objectivist science, the “subject/object” distinction assumes a fundamental discontinuity 
between consciousness and the world: consciousness is in the world, but not o/it. In 
contrast, I assume that, since human beings evolved in this world, our conscious is o f the 
world. This assumption would suggest that the fidelity of the connection between 
consciousness and the world is reasonably good, for the purposes under which it arose 
(which would subsume the purpose of my study). My position will become clearer in the 
first and second chapters.
In addition to ways to compensate for possibly problematic evidence, an 
examination of experience requires a test o f results commensurate with the phenomenon 
under study. Since that phenomenon is experience, the test of the truth or plausibility of
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the results should center on experiential reality. Rather than testing results in an 
objective fashion or by objective logic, we should test them by considering whether they 
ring true to past experience and whether they can be useful in shaping presently 
unfolding experience. My primary standards for this work have been the following: Do 
these ways of viewing musical meaning ring true to the experience and experiential logic 
of members of the culture? Will they help practicing musicians to understand how to 
transform simple notes into forceful music? WQl they assist teachers in knowing how to 
guide students to a deeper understanding and experience of music? Of these two kinds 
of tests — the “rings true to experience” test and the test of usefulness — I have 
primarily used the first. Tests o f usefulness will follow in the future.
On  th e  R e la tio n sh ip  B e tw e e n  L an g u ag e  an d  Ex p e r ie n c e
Using language as evidence of experience raises the question of the relationship 
between language and experience. This question is usually framed in terms of mental 
experience: Does language influence the way we think or does it merely reflect our 
thinking? Edward Sapir proposed question of linguistic relativity on theoretical grounds 
m his 1921 book, Language. However, Sapir’s student B.L. Whorf first examined it 
empirically. Whorf s pivot article, “The relation of habitual thought and behavior to 
language” (1934) contrasts the temporal systems of “Standard Average European”
(SAE) with that of the Hopi people through an examination of time-related terms and the 
temporal aspects of grammar. In brief SAE both spatializes and objectifies time, so that 
each day is a separate day that can be “moved through” or a separate object that can be
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
possessed, lost, or counted, just Uke any other concrete object. In contrast, according to 
W hort the Hopi way o f speaking about time suggests that they live in the now as it 
develops eventfully. Rather than conceiving of the sun’s daily cycle as separate, multiple 
days, they conceive of the sun’s daily cycle as the return of the same day. That day is a 
little bit different from yesterday because yesterday’s activities still inhere in it. Whorf 
likens this to the reappearance of a single person; that person may be slightly different 
because of her experience since the last time she appeared, but she is fundamentally the 
same person. Days cannot be imaginatively gathered into the same place and counted as 
objects with cardinal numbers. Rather, as successive reappearances of the same thing, 
they must be counted by ordinals: the first appearance, the second appearance, the first 
day, the second day, and so on (just as we might count appearances of the sun since we 
are well aware that only one sun exists relative to our planetary system).
According to Whorf, an affinity exists between different ways of making abstract 
time concrete and different values, beliefs and behaviors. For instance, in SAE cultures, 
since each day is different, each day is gone when it is done. This relates to placing value 
on “spending” time wisely, keeping records, knowing our past, and so on. Because days 
are discrete entities we can think of them as objects that can be exactly sequenced, 
specifically indicated and kept track o f through a system of dating and calendars. We 
prepare for the future by planning out a sequence o f steps to be taken over sequential 
time periods. In contrast, for Hopi, time is a matter o f the cyclical phasing of day to 
night to day, and so on, with the same day returning, “a little older but with all the
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impresses of yesterday” (151). This relates to a lesser interest in records and linear
history and a different notion of preparation. Rather than an emphasis on preparing for
the future over the course o f time, Hopi preparation stresses the accumulation of power
through repetition in the now as it develops into later.
Hopi “preparing” activities... show a result of their linguistic thought 
background in an emphasis on persistence and constant insistent 
repetition. A sense of the cumulative value of innumerable small 
momenta is dulled by an objectified, spatialized view of time like ours, 
enhanced by a way o f thinking close to the subjective awareness of 
duration, o f the ceaseless “Iatering” of events. To us, for whom time is a 
motion on a space, unvarying repetition seems to scatter its force along a 
row of units o f that space, and be wasted. To the Hopi, for whom time is 
not a motion but a “getting later” of everything that has ever been done, 
unvarying repetition is not wasted but accumulated. It is storing up an 
invisible change that holds over into later events (151).
Whorf characterizes the relationship between language and other aspects of culture as 
“give-and-take,” but states clearly that he believes that in culture, there is “a vast amount 
that is not linguistic but yet shows the shaping influence o f language” (147).
Still a debated question, linguistic relativity is not often tested empirically.19 This 
study of the language used to speak about music does not answer the question, but could 
add to the growing body of evidence. My working hypothesis is that the language used 
to speak about Western art music does not merely relate to the way that we think about 
it, it relates to the way that we experience it with the whole self.
In the language of Western art music, many musical concepts are metaphoric: 
pitch, lines, textures, volume, sound streams, blends, force, intensity, direction,
19 For an overview of the issue, as well as a review of the related empirical research see Lucy (1996 and 
1997).
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momentum, gesture, etc. All of these terms relate to the movement o f an object or a 
mass substance through physical space. Although all that exists of music in purely 
physical reality outside human experience is the complex sound wave, the listener 
experiences the sound wave as if it embodies the physical qualities suggested by the 
metaphors above.20 I do not simply speak of the “height” o f a note or “volume” of a 
sound, I experience “high” notes as “high,” and “big” sounds as “big.” In my experience, 
music moves, builds momentum, and strikes me with forceful intensity. These metaphors 
do not merely act as linguistic conveniences that refer to something that can’t otherwise 
be referred to; rather they describe actual experience. That experience may not exist in 
physical reality, but it does exist in psychological reality.21
The psychological reality of these terms particularly recommends them as 
evidence for addressing the question of linguistic relativity. People in various cultures 
speak o f music using different sets o f metaphors. For example, in regards to frequency, 
Temiar musicians speak of small and large tones (Roseman 1991) and ancient Greek 
texts of sharp and heavy tones (Zbikowski 1998). If most people within these groups 
experienced these metaphors as psychologically real, it would be a strong indication that 
the language does not merely reflect the experience, but shapes it. It would be highly
20 Of course, music’s physical reality continues when it enters the listener and is transduced neuro- 
biologically. At that point, however, it has entered the sphere of the listener’s experience and so it 
becomes more than a physical reality; it becomes a psychological reality, as well.
21 The degree of correlation between metaphors used to speak about music and musical experience 
varies. Some metaphors, like pitch, seem to be physically true, rather than merely psychologically true. 
The height of a very high note seems just as physically real to me as the height of a bird in the sky. 
Other metaphors do not correspond so closely to physical experience, but rather, correspond closely to 
psychological experience. When I feel transported by music, the music does not feel or even seem to 
physically take me anywhere. Rather, it transports me to another psychological reality.
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unlikely for most people in the West to experience frequency as height and most Temiar 
people to experience it as size if language did not direct their experience in these ways.22
Because of the psychological reality o f metaphorical musical terminology, 
ethnomusicologists are in a strong position to contribute to the linguistic relativity 
debate.23 However, cross-cultural analysis of single, Western-derived categories would 
produce only a crude indication that language influences experience. Indeed, in the case 
of pitch, it would be impossible to compare the category of pitch with all cultures. Not 
all cultures employ a comparable concept — a way to refer to frequency conceived of as 
a continuum of a single, specific quality. For instance, Suya Indians do not indicate pitch 
directly (Seeger 1987,93), but do evaluate singers by the size of their throats. Older 
men, whose deep, resonant voices are admired, are said to have “big throats,” while 
children, with their higher voices, have “small throats” (100). One could surmise a
22 Tones of different frequencies can also suggest other qualities that might be used to refer to them: 
bright/dark, tense/relaxed, or light/heavy. All of these ways of terming frequency make sense to me, 
since tones can, in some contexts, suggest any of these qualities. Nevertheless, having been enculturated 
in a system that conceives of frequency as consisting of height, I experience tones as primarily high and 
low and only secondarily in these other ways. By this, I mean that, for me, tones are always either high 
or low and only sometimes embody these other qualities. If in similar fashion, Temiar people 
experience different frequencies primarily as small and large and only secondarily as other qualities, it 
would suggest that language influences experience.
23 Any analysis of the musical language system of other cultures would need to be accomplished with a
thorough understanding of conceptual metaphor and the metaphoric system of the researcher’s own
musical language. Writing at a time before conceptual metaphor was widely understood, Keil explores
the musical terminology of the Tiv people in depth (1979). Although he carefully explains his methods 
for eliciting musical terms, it appears that he was not aware of the metaphors of his own musical
language. (He recognizes metaphor only as the answer to questions like, “He sings like ” [46].)
He suggests that Tiv people conceive of pitch as high and low (41). In a discussion of adverbs to 
indicate dynamics, he describes clusters of Tiv terms that indicate, in varying degrees two semantic 
clusters: “slow, soft, smooth, low in pitch” and “low in volume, low pitch, and slow tempo.” However, 
it is not clear how he elicited this information. If he asked people to describe music that he 
characterized in the above metaphoric terms and then associated the Tiv terms with his own description 
of the music, it does not indicate the Tiv metaphorically conceive of frequency change as height That 
metaphoric conceptualization could only be concluded if the Tiv also used these terms in other situations 
to indicate height
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conceptual relationship between ”big” and slower frequencies or “small” and fester 
frequencies, but such a speculation would not be sound in a cross-cultural comparison, 
since the Suya simply do not refer to pitch, per se. Another contrast to the low to high 
continuum comes from Java. According to Lindsay, from slower to fester frequency, 
Javanese musicians call their scale degrees by a collection of metaphorical terms 
referring, in part, to the human body: 1) partunggul (head), 2) gulu (neck), 3) dada 
(chest), 4) pelog (“fine”), 5) lima (five, referring to the five senses), 6) enem (six, 
referring to the Javanese sixth sense — rasa — a spiritual sense) and 7) barang 
(“unidentified thing”) (1979,29). The Javanese case suggests no association of slow 
frequencies with lowness and fast frequencies with highness, since the first three scale 
steps going from low to high travel dawn the body from head to chest. In addition, it 
includes metaphorical terms only indirectly related to each other — head/neck/chest and 
five/six, referring to human senses, as well as two seemingly unrelated terms — “fine” 
and “unidentified thing.” This collection of terms seems inconsistent with one another. 
In feet, Lindsay says that these terms have philosophical significance. Their 
philosophical connection may reveal some consistency, but it seems safe to assume that 
they still would not easily compare with terms that suggest a continuum of a single 
quality.
A clearer indication that language influences musical experience would come 
from more in-depth analyses involving comprehensive systems o f music terms. The 
Western term “pitch” does not mean in isolation, simply by direct reference to an
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experienced phenomenon. Instead, it means in the context o f a  more complex metaphor, 
which consists o f a comprehensive and consistent set o f visio-spatial metaphors that liken 
the musical event to movement through varying locations in space (an analysis of which 
is presented in chapter four). It is likely that musical terms in some other cultures will 
mean in the context o f such more complex metaphors. For example, Kahili people also 
discuss music using terms suggested by motion through space. However, their 
terminology is specified as the motion of water through space. Even if tone “height” 
were consistent from the Western art music case to the Kaluli case (i.e., last frequency = 
high, slow = low), as experienced, high and low tones might take on a different feel in 
the more specific context o f music = motion o f water over a frill than they do in the more 
general context o f music -  motion through space. In addition, Kaluli people do not only 
liken their music to water motion, they liken it to water sound. In contrast, Western art 
music terminology does not liken musical sound to the sound o f motion in any consistent 
way. The Kaluli inclusion of water sound also indicates a possible difference in 
experience.24
24 The Shoshone system of musical metaphors might provide another interesting contrast to the Kaluli
and Western cases. Vander (1988) characterizes the metaphoric system as “visual linear,” consisting of
such characterizations of songs as curved, straight, zigzagged, and dipped (as in a dip in the road). She
elaborates, “Songs, like necklaces in an overflowing jewelry box, are ‘strings’ that get intertwined and 
‘tangled.’ It is hard to pull out a single strand. The use of linear figures of speech to describe music is
consistent with Shoshone visual art, in general, where a linear style of representation, common to many
tribes on the Plains, is characteristic” (80-81). Although Vander characterizes this metaphoric system
as “visual linear” and connects it with visual art, I suspect that it may also be connected with embodied 
movement through space: Vander indicates this possible connection by saying how the Shoshone way of 
giving directions to a place differs from the way familiar to her: “City-bred, I depended on road signs 
and measurements by blocks and miles. But Shoshones gave me other kinds of directions, detailed 
topographical descriptions that faithfully recalled ail the dips, curves, tree clumps, and stream crossing 
on the way to someone’s house. Shoshones carefully observe and talk o f songs much as they do o f their
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Whorf has already contributed to the discussion of linguistic relativity and 
music/dance. As a part o f his contrast between the influence of SAE and Hopi language 
forms on their “thought worlds,” he describes European forms of art and sport in general 
as “strongly kinesthetic” while Hopi art and sport are more symbolic and ceremonial:
The dance in our culture expresses delight in motion rather than 
symbolism or ceremonial and our music is greatly influenced by our dance 
forms. Our sports are strongly imbued with this element of “the poetry of 
motion.” Hopi races and games seem to emphasize rather the virtues of 
endurance and sustained intensity. Hopi dance is highly symbolic and is 
performed with great intensity and earnestness, but has not much 
movement or swing (155).
Rather than using dance for self-expression, Hopi people use dance to cyclically prepare 
the conditions of the macrocosm for good crops and rain (149). Instead of articulating 
time with the body by moving forward and through space, as the SAE conception of 
time would entail, Hopi dance intensely and earnestly prepares the now as it becomes 
later.
Even though the question of linguistic relativity is an open one, I can say with 
surety that the language used to speak about Western art music can be used as evidence 
of musical experience. Whether or not that language reflects or influences the 
experience, in varying degrees, it still describes the experience. If those varying degrees
landscape" (69, emphasis mine). Her discussion of the equivalences of motion in the music and dance 
for straight War dances and those for Fancy dances (79) confirms my suspicion that the Shoshone 
musical language system may be connected with embodied movement through space. In fact, I suspect 
that, rather than one complex metaphor involving either visual linear terms or embodied spatial terms, 
the Shoshone may very well be using two overlapping complex metaphors involving both visual and 
embodied motion. Indeed, as I will demonstrate in chapters four and five, the language of Western art 
music involves two, complementary complex metaphors.
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are taken into account, a theory of musical meaning can still be developed using 
linguistic evidence as a basis.
M e ta p h o r ic  P r o je c tio n
The primary theoretical basis for the analyses presented in each chapter of this 
dissertation is the theory of metaphoric projection. In recent years, a growing body of 
literature has argued that, contrary to generally accepted truth, metaphor does not 
merely decorate the surface of our linguistic system but plays a deeper, more 
foundational role. Rather than considering only the figurative, poetic aspects of 
metaphor, these studies frame it as a conceptual process that underlies many aspects of 
cognitive functioning. Using this conception of metaphor, recent work in philosophy 
(Johnson 1987), cognitive semantics (Brugman 1990, Gibbs 1992, Kdvecses 1986, 1990, 
1991, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1994, Langacker 
1990, Reddy 1993, Sweetser 1990, Talmy 1975, 1988) and literary studies (Lakoff and 
Turner 1989; Turner 1990, 1991, 1994,1996) suggest that metaphor plays a pervasive 
role in our lives. This work points to the ways that metaphoric processes bridge bodily 
experience and linguistic expression, orient us, structure our experience, create 
conceptual coherence through systemic interrelation, and permit the creation of new 
concepts.
Rather than defining “metaphor” as figurative speech, this work defines it as “a 
cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system,” with poetic metaphor considered a 
special case of metaphorical expression (Lakoff 1994,43). Metaphor is a process that
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maps the structure from one realm of human experience, usually a more concrete one, 
onto another realm, usually more abstract For instance, a common conceptual metaphor 
used in everyday language is LIFE IS a  j o u r n e y .25 This has a number of entailments, 
including
1) The person living the life is a traveler.
2) Life goals are destinations.
3) Progress toward a goal is moving along a path.
4) Progress in life is distance traveled.
5) Something that moves the person toward a goal is a vehicle.
6) Impediments to progress are impediments to travel
7) Important life choices are made at crossroads.
8) Important life events are landmarks.
We use this conceptual metaphor in everyday language in the process of 
discussing and describing our experiences, mapping structure from the more concrete 
realm o f a journey onto the more abstract realm “life”: “This job is a dead end. It will 
never get me where I want to go. I feel I am at a crossroads.” Or “Although I went 
down a few blind alleys when I first began this project, at this point, I’m moving along 
nicely. Getting to the end o f this chapter will be an important landmark. However, after 
that, there are still many steps I have to take.”
This conceptual metaphor does not just provide an underlying unity to diverse 
figures o f speech, it also plays a part in our understanding of and reasoning about life, 
since not only structural patterns, but inference patterns are mapped, as well. For 
example, what if instead of LIFE is A journey , the most prominent conceptual metaphor
25 In this dissertation, I will follow formatting conventions used by cognitive linguistics scholars. Small 
capitals indicate conceptual metaphors: M OTION or p i t c h ;  italics indicate linguistic expressions that 
stem from conceptual metaphors: “This passage wends it way from low to high.”
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about life in our culture were LIFE IS A DANCE? While LIFE IS A JOURNEY emphasizes the 
importance o f plugging on, meeting long-term goals through the course of linear time, 
LIFE IS A DANCE might emphasize having fun, making the most of every moment and 
having the stamina and vigor to last the course o f the dance. L ife  is  a  d a n c e  would 
emphasize the importance of a good partner (or a whole community, as in line dancing), 
cooperation, and the centrality of enjoyment in work. Consider the different meaning of 
the sentence “There are many steps yet to be taken” if it were framed by LIFE IS A d a n c e .  
Rather than feeling a sense o f tiredness and resolve, the person with steps left to be taken 
might feel a sense of joy and exhilaration. If we considered life to be a dance, we would 
understand, reason and perhaps feel about it quite differently than we do when thinking 
of it as a journey. Life’s journey tends to be a tedious one. Life’s dance might be more 
spirited.
Note that both l i f e  is  A j o u r n e y  and l i f e  is  a  d a n c e  seem to make sense on an 
intuitive level in a way that LIFE IS A FISH does not. Although it is usual in this 
scholarship to speak of “journey” and “dance” as the concrete source domain and “life” 
as the abstract target domain, it is also recognized that the projection from source to 
target does not happen in random fashion. Instead, people recognize some similarity in 
structural patterns, thus making a connection between two domains and projecting 
further structure from concrete to abstract. If someone were to say “Life is a fish” or a 
metaphorical expression based on it, one might have fun finding similarities and drawing
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interesting conclusions about life based on them, but it would not be an exercise in the 
obvious.
LakofF suggests a hypothesis related to the above, which he calls the “invariance 
principle.” As he describes it,
Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the 
image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with 
the inherent structure of the target domain (1994,54).26
For example, in the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, the person living maps on to the 
traveler, not onto the destination, life’s goals map onto destination points, not a vehicle 
(unless buying a car is the goal), etc.
Later work by Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier (1996, 1998) further theorizes 
the reason why structure from ‘journeys” and “dances” can easily be project onto “life,” 
while structure from “fish” cannot. Turner and Fauconnier suggest that journeys, dances 
and life all share a certain abstract generic structure, which “fish” does not. That 
abstract generic structure includes such notions as states, process, change, action, 
causes, purposes, means, and difficulties. In understanding this, you can see why “life” 
can be linked metaphorically with some experiential realms, such as “chess games,” 
“weather,” or “a fishing trip,” while not as easily with others, like “chess pieces,” 
“clouds,” or “fish.” Chess games, weather, and fishing trips are all specific instances of 
the generic structure suggested by “states, process, change, action, causes, purposes, 
means, and difficulties,” while chess pieces, clouds, and fish are not.
“ For more on the invariance principle, see Brugman (1990), Lakoff, (1990), and Turner (1990).
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Another kind of metaphoric mapping, involves the projection of the structure of 
kinesthetic image schemas. This kind o f projection has been most fully explored by 
Mark Johnson in The Body in the Mind. As the title suggests, this process involves the 
projection of the structures o f bodily experience in the world (or image schemas) onto 
mental processes. By “image schemas,” Johnson means gestalt patterns that we have 
learned through our interactions with the world, such as the CONTAINMENT or PATH 
schemas. Johnson clarifies:
[Image schemas] do not have the specificity o f rich images or mental 
pictures. They operate at one level of generality and abstraction above 
concrete, rich images. A schema consists of a small number of parts and 
relations, by virtue o f which it can structure indefinitely many 
perceptions, images, and events. In sum, image schemata operate at a 
level o f mental organization that falls between abstract prepositional 
structures, on the one side, and particular concrete images, on the other.
The view I am proposing is this: in order for us to have meaningful, 
connected experience that we can comprehend and reason about, there 
must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions.
A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these 
ongoing ordering activities. These patterns emerge as meaningful 
structures for us chiefly at the level o f our bodily movements through 
space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions (29, 
emphasis in original).
Johnson stresses the fluidity o f these patterns, which can be altered in different contexts. 
They are not as much static forms that act as templates as they are part o f a dynamic 
process that forms and informs our understandings.
(1) Schemata are structures o f an activity by which we organize our 
experience in ways that we can comprehend. They are a primary means 
by which we construct or constitute order and are not mere passive 
receptacles into which experience is poured. (2) Unlike templates,
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schemata are flexible in that they can take on any number of specific 
instantiations in varying contexts (29-30, emphasis in original).
Johnson illustrates with the co n ta in m en t  schema, which structures, among 
other things, our in-out orientation. Our initial experience with containment occurs even 
before we are bom. After nine months of boundedness that becomes more and more 
extreme, part of our initial experience in this world is an extreme sense of 
unboundedness. After birth, we experience our bodies as containers into which food is 
put and out of which wastes are retrieved. As we learn to move about, we experience 
rooms and vehicles as contained spaces. Gaining more skill with our hands, we begin to 
manipulate objects, putting one kind of thing into another. We learn the words, in and 
out, that correspond to containment, and leam to apply them not only to concrete 
experiences of containment, but to abstract instances o f it as well.
Johnson emphasizes the gestalt nature of these schemas and the fact that, as 
gestalts, they are not mere outlines of wholeness, but have definite internal structure. He 
suggests five possible structural elements to the co n ta in m en t  schema.
1) The experience of containment typically involves protection from, or 
resistance to, external forces. [...] 2) Containment also limits and restricts 
forces within the container. [...] 3) Because of this restraint of forces, the 
contained object gets a relative fixity o f location. [...] 4) This relative 
fixing of location within the container means that the contained object 
becomes either accessible or inaccessible to the view of some observer.
[...] 5) Finally, we experience transitivity of containment (22).
Not all five of these elements must be present in every case of containment. For 
instance, the following illustration exemplifies containment without involving elements 
one, two, or five.
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Figure 1
As I will illustrate later, containment is an important image schema in musical 
conceptualization.
Another important image schema in musical conceptualization is the path 
schema. Our earliest experience with this schema may, once again, be birth. After birth, 
we eventually learn to track moving objects with our eyes. Once we learn to move, we 
often move with some goal in mind: a toy, a drink o f water, or to get away from mother 
who is drawing a bath. Our world is filled with physical paths that get us from one place 
to another.
The structural elements of this experiential gestalt are I) a source, 2) a path (a 
series o f contiguous locations), 3) a goal, and 4) directionality, elements which we can 
project onto more abstract aspects of life in order to give them structure. We have 
already seen one example of this above, in the entaihnents to life is a  journey : “life 
goals are destinations,” and “progress toward a goal is moving along a path.” We also 
use the PATH schema in abstract reasoning by following paths o f thought to their logical 
conclusions. The process of metaphoric projection follows a PATH schema, carrying 
structure along a mental path from a source domain to a target domain.
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As the above examples of the path  schema suggest, metaphoric projection 
accomplishes work in many different kinds o f mental realms. It works in the realm of 
polysemy: word meanings can be extended metaphorically. For example, because it is 
based on the path schema, the word “line” can apply equally to a drawn line, a group of 
people ordered in a series o f contiguous locations, a piece of fishing line, a group of 
water pipes connected in contiguous fashion, or a series o f musical pitches. Metaphoric 
processes work in grammar (e.g. nominalizations that contain  the conceptual flux of 
verbal process) and semantics. For example, different variations of the kinesthetic image 
schema for FORCE are projected from bodily experience to the meanings of modals such 
as “must,” “may,” and “can.”27
This process o f metaphoric projection does not only occur in English, but seems 
to be a general human cognitive strategy. Lakoff and his students have demonstrated 
some of the above processes in various languages.28 Eve Sweetser, for instance, has 
shown how, over time, words for different perceptual senses tend to be metaphorically 
projected in the same way in different languages. She has demonstrated, for instance, 
that m many Indo-European languages, the word for vision comes to mean knowledge 
and intellection (1990,32-33) and the word for hearing comes to mean heed or obey 
(41-42).
Lakoff and Johnson schematize the process of conceptual metaphor as one of 
“projection.” In chapter two, I integrate this theory with Polanyi’s theory of tacit
“ For more on projections of force dynamics to the semantic realm, see Johnson (1987) chapter 4, and 
Talmy(l989).
“ See Lakoff (1987).
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knowing, altering the theoretical structure from one o f “projection” to one of 
“integration.” For the purposes o f the first chapter, however, the above explanation will 
suffice.
Ch a p te r  S u m m a r ie s
In chapters one through three I critique the philosophical basis common to most 
scholarship that concerns musical meaning (chapter one), present an alternative 
philosophy I believe is more suited to the question (chapter two), and develop a theory 
o f musical meaning based in that philosophy (chapter three). That theory involves a 
notion of metonymically invoked, resonant meaning. In the musical situation, the 
physical sound wave invokes integrations in the listener on three different levels: I) the 
neuro-biological level, 2) the level of making sense of the music through image- 
schematically informed musical senses and 3) the integration of the listener with the 
music, where the listener lives both the music and the transcendental realities associated 
with it. Although the sound wave invokes these integrations, the listener plays an active 
role, using different aspects of herself on each level to create musical experience. The 
process is metonymic: the sound wave provides part o f the experience, while the listener 
integrates that part toward a bearing on the whole experience of living the music.29
29 Traditionally, metonymy has been thought of as a literary device whereby a part stands for a whole, 
e.g. “He’s a skirt chaser,” or “The ham sandwich needs more water.” However, as with metaphor, in 
recent years cognitive semanticists have realized that metonymy is a general cognitive phenomenon. 
For example, line drawings do not have to embody all of the features of a face for us to recognize the 
face as a particular person. The part stands for and invokes understanding of the whole. For more, see 
Dirven (1999), Fauconnier and Turner (1999), Gibbs (1999), Radden and KOvecses (1999a and 1999b).
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In chapters one through three I show how the seeming metaphoric “projection” 
o f concrete, physical reality onto abstract, musical reality is realty a matter o f basic, 
culturally inflected metaphors like PITCH and VOLUME metonymicalty invoking more 
complex metaphors like m usical m otion  of pitches and m usical substance that 
FLOWS. In chapters four and five, I examine more complex metaphors that relate to the 
eventfulness o f music. These metaphors organize the simpler metaphors discussed in 
part one into groups and provide the experiential context in which those simpler 
metaphors make sense. Chapter four discusses two musical event structure metaphors 
while chapter five discusses the relationship of those event structure metaphors as well as 
metaphors that require a blend o f both.
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IObjectivism:
Grasping W ords, Seeing Meaning, Building Understanding 
I n tro d u c tio n
In the following quote, Wittgenstein not only states the problem I address in this 
chapter quite clearly, his language also hints at my answer:
The aspects o f things that are most important for us are hidden because 
o f their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something — 
because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his 
enquiry do not strike a man at all Unless that feet has at some time 
struck him. — And this means: we fed to be struck by what, once seen, is 
most striking and most powerful (50).
Wittgenstein is quite correct. It is difficult to see the foundations of inquiry, the 
non-propositional assumptions that fashion our thoughts and arguments. In order to 
explain reality, we mast take certain assumptions as axiomatic, as true in and of 
themselves — assumptions about the metaphysical nature of reality and how best to 
know it. These assumptions delimit our conventional terms, the way that we “carve up” 
reality into specific, concrete, contained categories that then serve as guides to our 
experience of that reality. Those terms and how they relate to one another define the 
logic o f how we think about and explain reality. Both the terms and their logic then 
construe the nature o f our evidence and constrain our arguments to specific, 
conventional issues.1 While we may be aware of the terms and logic of our arguments
1 One can see this constraint in action when someone speaks of seeing or thinking about a situation “in
terms of______ .” The “in” of that phrase demonstrates that the “terms” contain the seeing or
thinking in some fashion.
43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
since, out of scholarly habit, we constantly examine them in an effort to better the quality 
o f our thinking, we are less often aware o f the assumptions that define them in the first 
place. If  the terms and their logic are the means by which we think, the assumptions are 
the means by which we know. The assumptions, terms and logic create the interpretive 
lens through which we view reality and come to conclusions about it.
As an implicit means of accomplishing a task, unless these assumptions arrest our 
attention in some way, we cannot see them. Ingrained in our habits of thinking and 
being, they become a part o f us — the heart of our thinking, no more visible to us than 
our physical hearts. We may feel vague discomfort or even outright frustration with the 
terms and logic that these assumptions define, but since we cannot see the assumptions 
themselves, we try to rework, once again, what we can see, that is to say, our terms and 
logic. However, as Wittgenstein suggests, every once in awhile we are struck by the 
intuition of something at the root of those terms and logic. We root it out and expose it 
to light.
In this chapter I bring to light the assumptions at the root of much, if not most, of 
the scholarship that addresses the question of how music means — the assumptions of 
objectivism. In order to expose those assumptions, I have closely examined the writing 
o f a group o f authors selected for the quality o f their scholarship and the breadth of 
interest. Based in three disciplines concerned with musical meaning, each group varies 
from the others in its approach. Deryck Cooke, Eduard Hanslick, Leonard Meyer, and 
Victor Zuckerkandl are music theorists, who ground their work in the experience of
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musical meaning 2 Laird Addis and Susanne Langer are aesthetic philosophers, who 
ground their work in philosophical logic and reasoning. Finally, Jean Bamberger, 
Stephen Handel, and Mary Louise Serafine, are psychologists, who ground their work in 
the scientific psychological methodology.
Although ethnomusicology also studies musical meaning, I have not included any 
ethnomusicologists in the group of writings to be examined. In its focus, 
ethnomusicology differs from the disciplines I have examined. While those disciplines 
find the locus of meaning in the specific, individual act of music listening or making, with 
“culture” as a background informant to the process, ethnomusicology focuses on the 
cultural aspects of meaning. The ethnomusico logical approach complements these other 
approaches and thus does not easily compare with them. Since my disciplinary 
background is the anthropology of music, my viewpoint always includes considerations 
of culture. Thus, even though I have not explicitly examined the ethnomusicological 
approach, it is implicit in my own approach to the question of musical meaning.3
In the first part of this chapter, I examine the terms that objectivist assumptions 
have defined and the logic o f how they relate, as well as how these terms and logic 
construe the evidence and constrain the issues. In this part, I will only refer to the 
writings o f the above authors only briefly and occasionally, to support a point. In the 
second part of the chapter, I will examine the writing in greater detail, showing how
2 Hanslick was primarily a critic, but wrote theoretically, as well.
3 A critique of objectivism in ethnomusicological thought already exists in the work of Pierre Bourdieu. 
“The objective limits of objectivism” from Outline o fa  Theory o f Practice critiques the use of 
objectivism by anthropologists, a critique that applies to ethnomusicologists as well.
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basing arguments about musical meaning on these philosophical assumptions creates 
arguments that are implausible, overly complex and lacking in explanatory power. I 
conclude that the unsatisfactory quality of this scholarship does not relate to the quality 
of the thinking of the writers; their intelligence and logical rigor are plain to see. Rather, 
the problem relates to their unexamined fundamental assumptions, which do not suit the 
nature o f the phenomenon being examined. Those assumptions create logical 
entaihnents that misconstrue the character of meaningful human experience from one 
that is whole bodied and formed in relatively immediate engagement with the world to 
one that is mental and formed in relatively mediated encounters with the world. Thus, 
when used to examine a phenomenon that exists only in human experience, like “music,” 
these assumptions distort the subject under study from the outset. These writers are 
disadvantaged by their own epistemological tools.
Objectivism bases its assumptions on an analogy to a particular human way of 
interacting with the world: that o f seeing objects and manipulating them with the hands. 
All o f the metaphors for knowing that this epistemology supports relate to this analogy, 
e.g. “Do you see how this works?” or “Do you grasp the fundamental ideas?” The visual 
aspect of this analogy appears in Wittgenstein’s quote:
The aspects o f things that are most important for us are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something — 
because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his 
enquiry do not strike a man at all Unless that feet has at some time 
struck him. — And this means: we feil to be struck by what, once seen, is 
most striking and most powerful (50).
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It would be logically consistent and not change the meaning to add a “grasp” to this 
quote: “One is unable to notice or grasp something — because it is always before one’s 
eyes.”
However, when I first read this quote, a different way o f knowing suggested by 
Wittgenstein’s language struck me — that of being struck by a particular feet, idea or 
event. The expression “being struck” points to an underlying epistemology based on an 
analogy to human interaction with the world. It suggests a way of interacting with, 
knowing, and experiencing the world different from that inherent in epistemologies 
suggested by “seeing” and “grasping.” In this chapter and the next, I will begin to 
develop a description of an epistemology metonymicaUy suggested by the idea of being 
“struck” by some event in the world.
Co n verg en c e  a n d  D iv e r g e n c e  in  Ex ist in g  Ex p la n a  tio n s
Existing explorations of musical meaning converge and diverge from one another 
in a particular pattern. They agree in their more concrete aspects. Whether implicitly or 
explicitly, they all describe a model of musical communication that has specific, culturally 
situated parts: a composer/player, the musical sound, a listener, and meaning. In 
addition to these concrete parts, most of the writers agree on their experiential evidence: 
the emotional, sensuous and dynamic qualities o f musical immersion, the intenseness and 
immediacy of the experience, and the expressiveness o f the music.
However, in regard to their more abstract aspects, those aspects most likely to be 
affected by the interpretive lens, the explanations diverge. Although they agree on the
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model and its parts, they do not agree on the nature of how those parts relate to one 
another and give rise to musical meaning. Does music refer? If so, to what do the notes 
refer? Each other? Something outside the music itself? Does music represent? If so, 
what does it represent? Does music express a meaning that comes directly from the 
mind of the composer? The player? Or is musical meaning more impersonal in nature? 
Does music have intellectual content? Emotional content? Intellectual content about 
emotions? Is music a language of the emotions or a language about emotions? Very 
little consensus exists on any of these questions, all of which are a matter o f construal 
and interpretation o f the evidence.
Re la  tio n sh ip  b e t w e e n  Pr o b le m  a n d  E piste m o lo g y
The lack o f consensus on interpretive aspects of the problem after at least 150 
years of discussion (Hanslick, 1854-Addis, 1999) by intelligent and perceptive writers 
suggests a problem with the interpretive lens through which they view the evidence and 
the framework that undergirds their arguments. Two aspects of this interpretive lens and 
framework are germane to my argument: the epistemology and the specific model being 
used.
The nature o f an epistemology should be consistent with the nature o f the 
problem it addresses. Human lives have many different aspects that require many 
different ways of knowing: the way that I know about the desk I write on differs from 
the way that I know I love the people to whom I write. Objectivism bases its 
epistemology on an analogy to looking at and grasping things in the world, an analogy
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that has brought great success to the Western world’s quest for understanding and 
controlling material reality. However, just as it would be inappropriate to question 
knowledge o f human love using objectivism, it is inappropriate to apply it to questions of 
meaning.4
Human meaning does not exist objectively in the physical world. Without a 
human being to interpret an event as meaningful, the event simply occurs, with no 
judgment or feeling of meaningfulness attached to it. As a phenomenon that arises in 
terms of human experience, the epistemology used to explore it should operate primarily 
in terms of human experience, not in terms of objective existence in the physical world.
An epistemology requires a set of standards for testing the explanations it gives 
rise to. In examining a human experience, the test o f plausibility should be consistent 
with the epistemology used. As a phenomenon o f human experience, we should test 
explanations o f meaning not by whether they match objective truth, but by whether they 
match our experience. Since “objective truth” is itself a human experience, some aspects 
of explanations accomplished in terms of human experience will match objective truth.5 
However, the primary test of plausibility should not be “Does this look like objective 
truth to you?” or “Is this true to the logic of objective reality?” Rather, it should be
4 In anticipation of possible objections, I will not be proposing that the proper epistemology with which 
to think about musical meaning is subjectivism. Although I believe that a distinction between objective 
and subjective can be useful, when it is turned into a strict dichotomy, it is false. The epistemology that 
I will be using proposes a third alternative.
5 We saw an example of this above, in the fact that the “objective” (concrete) parts of the listening model 
converge amongst many different accounts.
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“Does this ring true to your experience?” or “Does this ring true to the logic of your 
experience.”6
Some kinds o f meaning may be known and judged through the objectivist 
epistemology. For instance, if my husband asks me to pick up milk on the way home, 
spoken in an even tone, with no particular emotional tone, I see or grasp that the 
objective meaning that we need milk. However, if he says it with a particular emotional 
overtone — anger, for example — the meaning of what he says can no longer be known 
and judged solely by the objectivist epistemology. I may see what he is saying, but be 
struck by his tone o f voice. The tone of his voice may resonate with aspects of our 
history and the nature o f our relationship, which then may become the primary meaning 
of his communication for me.
I ask the reader at this point to consider the question, “Do you see or grasp 
musical meaning or does it strike and resonates in you?” For myself I have always felt 
that music strikes me, resonates within me, and moves me. For me, any model of 
musical meaning worth considering (and therefore the epistemology at its base) must be 
consistent with this experiential feet.
The model used in most scholarly writing about musical meaning is that of 
communication as a conduit, which I wQl explain more fully below. Briefly, it involves
6 The logic of experience does not always match the logic of objective reality. For instance, consider the 
exaggerations that might be used in the midst of a heated argument While exaggerations might not be 
true to the objective reality of the situation, they are true to the feelings of the individual who is 
exaggerating. Ifjudged in terms of the logic of objective reality, they are false. If judged in terms of the 
emotional reality ofthat individual, they are true. They may not be true, but they fee l true. They are a 
logical expression of feelings, but an illogical expression of objective reality.
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the notion that meaning is a thing that exists in a person’s mind that he can pack into 
words or musical sounds. The words or musical sounds are sent through a conduit 
(sound or writing) to a listener/reader, who mentally unpacks the meaning and sees or 
grasps the first person’s meaning. In this way one person transfers “content” to 
another.7
This model may work to a limited degree as a way to think about the “objective” 
aspects o f language. In the example above, it does seem as if my husband had a 
“meaning” about the absence of milk in his mind that he “transferred” to me via words. 
However, as a model o f music that strikes and resonates within a listener, it simply does 
not ring true to experience. Although I can listen to music in a way that involves 
mentally naming some aspect of it — “Ah, there’s the dominant going to the tonic” — I 
would not call this an aesthetic listening, but a music-theoretical listening. As the results 
of reflecting on experience, music-theoretical meanings differ from more direct, 
experiential aesthetic meaning. Aesthetic meaning resonates within me and moves me. 
This resonance cannot be explained by way of a schema that packs, transfers, and 
unpacks meaning objects.
In this section, I have described one o f the basic assumptions on which my 
argument rests — the nature o f an epistemology and the models it engenders should be 
consistent with the nature of the problem to be explained. I now turn to a more fully 
developed description o f the objectivist epistemology.
7The scholars I examined varied in their awareness and acceptance of this model, as I will detail below.
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Ob je c t iv ism
A fully developed critique or description o f objectivism is beyond the scope of 
my project. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, whom I mentioned in the introduction in 
connection to conceptual metaphor, have written extensively on the subject.8 In 
addition, Pierre Bourdieu has critiqued objectivism in Outline o f a Theory o f Practice 
horn a more anthropological viewpoint. For the purposes of my critique, I will quote 
extensively from Lakoff and Johnson (1987).
Objectivism Related to Visual/Manual Behavior
Objectivism is based on an analogy to visual and manual behavior in the world, 
specifically to the behavior o f building larger structures from smaller parts. Some of our 
most common expressions for the process of understanding index this underlying 
analogy: “The way I see it...,” “I can’t quite grasp what is going on here,” “I’m trying to 
wrap my mind around it,” “I’m trying to assemble these ideas into a coherent thought.”9 
In this analogy, the mind is like a little person, a homunculus, inside the head of the 
person that reaches out through the senses, sees aspects of reality, and pulls them inside 
the person through grasping.10 Since this homunculus has only two hands and can only 
deal with a few bits o f reality at a time, a large part of understanding consists of 
assembling smaller bits into larger wholes.
* See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987, and Lakoff and Johnson 1999.
9 The idea of grasping is also present in words like “comprehend” and “apprehend.” The morpheme 
prebend” relates to grasping, as in a prehensile tail. Grasping is also present in “concept,” which I will 
discuss below.
10 Although we do not usually consciously think of the mind as a homunculus, when the mind 
malfunctions we treat it as a separate entity: “My mind is playing tricks on me.”
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Objectivism treats reality as if it were a complex object, like a building or a 
machine. Similar to understanding a structure or machine, the process o f understanding 
reality consists o f taking it apart until it consists of parts that can’t be further subdivided, 
that themselves have no internal structure: the “elements.”11 Once the elements are 
determined, understanding that reality-object consists of finding out the nature of the 
elements, how they relate to one another, how they cohere, and how they form the 
whole. This process produces a working knowledge of reality-objects.
Explanation, then, consists o f describing the nature of the elemental parts and 
how they fit together into the whole. An important tool in explanation is the use of 
visual diagrams, which make the parts and their relationships clear to see (literally and 
figuratively) and easily grasped by the student. As part of the learning process, students 
create hand-eye oriented mental representations of these parts and their relationships. 
Once students have grasped these parts and relationships and can represent them to the 
teacher in some fashion, it can be said that the student has gained an objective 
knowledge of the reality in question.
Note that, although the initial process o f understanding begins with the whole, 
the process of teaching generally begins with the parts and proceeds to the whole.12 This 
path of explanation suggests that in objectivism, the parts are logically prior to the 
whole. This can be seen in the feet that these explanations generally include ideas about
11 The idea of elements presents itself in music-theoretical scholarship in the form of the “parameters of 
music.”
12 Of course, a teacher usually presents the whole first, so that the student understands where the process 
of understanding is aimed. However, the process of understanding itself begins in earnest with full 
descriptions of die parts and proceeds to the relationship of those parts and how they form the whole.
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how the parts cohere. Coherence of the parts is only an issue if they exist before the 
whole and so must be “glued” together in some fashion.
These parts are often termed “basic” — the basic elements. Basic can be defined 
as “o f relating to, or forming the base or essence”: “basic elements” become the 
“building blocks” of the whole. However, “basic” can also be defined as “constituting or 
serving as the basis or starting point.” These basic elements not only form the building 
blocks o f the whole, they serve as a starting point for objectivist arguments. Although 
scholars must determine these basic elements, that preliminary work goes on “behind the 
scenes” — in journals or at conferences. Textbooks, the “stages” that present 
understandings o f reality, begin their stories with “the elements,” not with all o f the work 
that went into defining those elements. The “real” (not preliminary) work of objectivism 
begins with an already established set o f basic elements and proceeds to argue from 
there.
The preferred objectivist evidence also relates to the analogy to building 
structures. Objective evidence should be “hard” — able to be directly observed, 
“grasped” and “measured.” More qualitative evidence may be admitted, but is best 
converted to a form more consistent with physical measurement. “Purely subjective” 
evidence is the least reliable.
The visual/manual analogy shapes objectivist models, which tend to be 
mechanical in nature, with clearly defined (graspable) parts that relate to one another
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through physically moving parts or forces.13 Using this kind of model makes the 
different parts and their relationships easy to see and grasp.14 Alternatively, objectivist 
models may be structural in nature, represented by static, two-dimensional drawings, like 
a blueprint. Mechanical models entail mechanical logic, while structural models entail 
geometric logic. When applied to real life, human situations, the mechanical or structural 
logic of these models may distort the logic o f the situation under examination. For 
example, geometric logic, with its clearly defined boundaries, erases the fuzzy edges of 
categories made through and used in pragmatic, everyday interaction in human situations 
in the world.
Consider, for instance, calendars o f different seasons. Bourdieu describes the 
impossibility o f capturing in a synoptic, geometric diagram the varying accounts he heard 
from Kabylian people of their seasons (which are based mainly on environmental changes 
and agricultural concerns). Some of the people marked the beginning of a season by a 
particular date, others by agricultural activities, such as the first ploughing. The fuzzy 
edges of these seasonal periods did not concern the Kabylian people, since as categories, 
they functioned to guide the people in interactions with the environment and each other. 
As such, they worked well without clear boundaries. Bourdieu realized though, that his
13 In his critique of objectivism, “The objective limits of objectivism” from Outline o f a Theory o f 
Practice, Bourdieu recognizes the mechanical nature of at least one objectivist model. In his discussion 
of the practice of “gifting,” he characterizes the objectivist model of gifting as a “mechanical 
interlocking of preregulated actions” (8). In Knowing and Being, Michael Polanyi also recognizes the 
objectivist tendency to create distance where none exists: “Dwelling in our body clearly enables us to 
attend from  it to things outside, while an external observer will tend to look at things happening in the 
body, seeing it as an object or as a machine. He will miss the meaning these events have for the person 
dwelling in the body and fail to share the experience the person has of his body” (148).
14 Although we tend to relate the term “mechanical” to “machine,” in the form “mechanic,” it also 
relates to working with the hands.
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diagram not only could not capture these seasonal categories, it distorted them through 
the application of its own geometric logic. The Kabylian people did not think about 
these categories as existing all at the same time, but applied them in practice 
successively. The diagram necessarily juxtaposed them simultaneously. As Bourdieu 
states it, the diagram effects a totalization
by juxtaposing in the simultaneity o f a single space the complete series of 
the temporal oppositions applied successively by different agents at 
different times, which can never all be mobilized together in practice 
(because the necessities of existence never require this sort o f synoptic 
apprehension, tending rather to discourage it by their urgency)... The 
establishment o f a single series thus creates ex nihilo a whole host of 
relations (of simultaneity, succession, or symmetry, for example) between 
terms and guide-marks of different levels, which being produced and used 
in different situations, are never brought face to face in practice and are 
thus compatible practically even when logically contradictory. The 
synoptic diagram takes all the temporal oppositions which can be 
collected and assembled and distributes them in accordance with the laws 
o f succession (Le. (1) y  follows x” excludes “x follow s/’; (2) ify 
follows x and z follows y, then z follows x; (3) either y  follow x or x 
followsy). This makes it possible to apprehend at a glance,... 
monothetically, as Husserl put it, meanings which are produced and used 
polythetically, that is to say, not only one after another, but one by one, 
step by step (106-07).
Because of the conversion from lived experience to synoptic diagram, Bourdieu 
necessarily took a fluid situation and made it static.
Objectivist models not only impose geometric logic on lived situations that have 
nothing to do with geometry, they also subtract temporality from situations in which time 
and the change it entails produce important meaning. In effect, this procedure skews the 
meaning of these situations. Since static structures do not change over time, it seems 
obvious that objectivist models based on static structures would have a detemporalizing
56
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
effect. But what about models based on machines? Machines accomplish processes, 
which require time. Simpler machines not involving feedback mechanisms accomplish 
tasks in linear fashion. More complex machines may involve feedback mechanisms, 
working in a nonlinear fashion. However, even with feedback mechanisms that allow for 
synchronic nonlinearity, machines do not allow for diachronic change. They accomplish 
predetermined tasks using predetermined parts, motions and forces. As a system, they 
are closed to change, temporally static and cannot cope with mutable events that unfold 
diachronically. In addition, since mechanical models represent predetermined motions, 
forces and tasks, any human being represented as a part of a mechanical model lacks 
agency.
Objectivist epistemology begins with a nonpropositional assumption that reality is 
a complex structure to be known. Therefore, the best path to knowing reality is through 
an analogy to understanding a structure. This analogy dictates the path of discovery, the 
kind o f evidence that counts, the path of explanation, and the models used to explain 
reality.
LakofT and Johnson's Description of Objectivism
If building a structure is the path to objective knowledge, then words are the way 
that human beings traverse and negotiate that path. In the objectivist system of logic, 
words carve reality into its elemental parts, allow those elements to cross the barrier 
between “out there” and “in here” in the form of mental representations, permit us to
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mentally manipulate representations o f the elements o f reality in order to build more 
complex understandings, and assist in separating the true from the untrue.
Lakoff and Johnson’s description o f objectivism clarifies how words act to 
negotiate the path to understanding reality. Modeling their explanation o f objectivism on 
objectivism, they begin with the basic elements: the objects in the world and their 
properties, divorced o f human existence.
The world is made up of objects. They have properties independent of 
any people or other beings who experience them. For example, take a 
rock. It’s a separate object and it’s hard. Even if no people or other 
beings existed in the universe, it would still be a separate object and it 
would still be hard (186).
The objects in the world are the basic elements from which reality is built. Each object 
has an essential nature that defines its part in the whole.15 Note that the objectivist 
account begins with a reality that divorces human beings from reality proper: “Even if 
no people or other beings existed in the universe, [a rock] would still be a separate object 
and it would still be hard” (186). We are in reality, but not o f it.
Given that human beings are in reality, but not of it, how do we obtain 
knowledge o f the elements of reality?
We get our knowledge o f the world by experiencing the objects in it and 
getting to know what properties the objects have and how these objects 
are related to one another. For example, we find out that a rock is a 
separate object by looking at it, feeling it, moving it around, etc. We find
IS It might be argued that the objectivist “building blocks” of reality are not the “objects” encountered in 
reality, but atoms and molecules and the like. Atoms and molecules are the building blocks of a special 
case of objectivism: scientific objectivism. They are the basic elements of scientific reality, and require 
special equipment to observe. Objectivism proper begins with ordinary objects as they can be observed 
with unenhanced senses.
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out that it’s hard by touching it, trying to squeeze it, kicking it, banging it 
against something softer, etc. (186).
Since understanding reality involves finding its elemental parts and assembling them, we 
must somehow get those elemental parts from “out there” into the mind. We begin this 
process by using our bodies to observe. From such observation, we get data from “out 
there” to “in here.”16
If data enters the mind through the senses, then how do we understand that data?
We understand the objects in our world in terms of categories and 
concepts. These categories and concepts correspond to properties the 
objects have in themselves (inherently) and to the relationships among the 
objects. Thus, we have a word “rock,” which corresponds to a concept 
ROCK. Given a rock, we can tell that it is in the category rock  and that a 
piano, a tree, or a tiger would not be. Rocks have inherent properties 
independent o f any beings: they’re solid, hard, dense, occur in nature, 
etc. We understand what a “rock” is in terms of these properties (187).
The mind sorts data into categories and concepts, which are meaningful in a way that 
“raw” data is not. Raw data has no clear correspondence with the world, except for the 
fact that it originates in the world. Because they sort raw data into contained packages 
that refer back to the world, categories and concepts fashion experience of the world 
into “graspable” packages o f meaning.
Categories and concepts are packages o f meaning — meaning-things — used to 
re-present the external world in the mind-space. The mental homunculus uses them to 
bring the building blocks o f the world into his workspace. As ways in which we, as a
16 A note about the term “data.” I realize that the prescribed use of the term is as a countable noun, and 
that “data” is plural and “datum” singular. However, usage in American English has changed the term 
into a mass noun, so that “data” is a singular mass that needs to be packaged to be made countable, i.e. 
“bits of data.” Since the prescribed usage sounds very awkward to me, I will follow current American 
English usage in this dissertation.
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group, “carve up” reality into its “building blocks,” categories exist more in the external 
realm. The etymology o f “category” shows its public nature: from Greek, kata- (in 
accordance with) + agora (public assembly). In contrast, concepts seem to exist more in 
the mind’s space: from Latin conceptus, from com (with) + capere (to take). Categories 
carve up the world, while concepts allow the homunculus to grasp the world.
Categories and concepts are encapsulated in words. What, then, is the nature of
words?
Words have fixed meanings. That is, our language expresses the concepts 
and categories that we think in terms of. To describe reality correctly, we 
need words whose meanings are clear and precise, words that fit reality 
(187).
This is the theory of “classical categories,” which Lakoff describes in depth in later work 
(1987). This theory suggests that in order to define a category, one must describe the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for inclusion of an item in the category. This 
procedure produces categories with clearly defined membership and sharp boundaries, 
well contained and easily graspable. The homunculus mind may then grasp and 
manipulate these word-objects into larger, more complex meanings.
In order for a statement (a complex meaning-thing) to be objectively true, its 
words must re-present reality with as precise a “fit” as possible.
People can be objective and can speak objectively, but they can do so 
only if they use language that is clearly and precisely defined, that is 
straightforward and direct, and that can fit reality. Only by speaking in 
this way can people communicate precisely about the external world and 
make statements that can be judged objectively to be true or false (187).
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The words o f an objectively true statement match reality; those of an objectively false 
statement do not.
Given that some statements may be true and others may be false, we can see that 
although an objective world exists that we can know through words, we may, at times be 
in error. Therefore some method must exist in order to come to know ultimate truth.
[A]s human beings, we are subject to human error, that is illusions, errors 
of perception, errors of judgment, emotions, and personal and cultural 
biases. We cannot rely upon the subjective judgments o f individual 
people. Science provides us with a methodology that allows us to rise 
above our subjective limitations and to achieve understanding from a 
universally valid and unbiased point of view. Science can ultimately give 
a correct, definitive, and general account of reality, and, through its 
methodology, it is constantly progressing toward that goal (187).
This aspect o f objectivism places human subjectivity and individual human experience 
squarely in a questionable light when it comes to the question of truth. The objective 
scientific method factors out o f ultimate truth the possible errors o f individual 
subjectivity and experience. In this way, science and objectivism become allied with 
truth and individual experience and subjectivism with falsity.
In summary, words play an important role in objectivist epistemology. We can 
grasp the building blocks o f reality through words, which symbolize those building 
blocks (re-present them) in our minds. Words refer to what they represent and therefore 
are forms that carry meaning-content. Through words, we may grasp particular 
meanings and assemble them into new, more complex meanings. True word 
representations match the world, false ones do not.
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The Conduit Metaphor
The conduit metaphor, first written about by Michael Reddy (1979), models the 
objectivist communication process. It involves the transfer from one person to another 
o f meaning-objects.17 The conduit metaphor gives meaning to such expressions as “I’m 
having trouble putting my meaning into words,” “I haven’t yet been able to convey my 
meaning very clearly,” or “I’m trying to unpack what this writer is saying.”
In this model, a speaker creates meaning in his mind and then packs it into words. 
Translated into sound or sight signals, the words travel through a conduit that bridges 
the gulf of space/time and subjective separation. The listener’s ears/eyes receive the 
“raw” sound/sight signals and the brain assembles them into word meaning-packages. It 
then unpacks the word meaning-packages and grasps the meaning. The unpacking of 
meaning involves knowing what object in the world the words refer to, as well as the 
rules of grammar.
As the image of a conveyor belt suggests, this metaphor is mechanical in nature 
— mechanical both in that it involves mechanical parts and actions and in that it involves 
working with the mind’s hands. The mechanisms of meaning are reference and 
representation.
17 Given the central act of conveyance in this schema, it might have better been named the “conveyor” 
metaphor.
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The Logical Constrnal of Parts, Processes, and Experiences in Objectivism
Taken together, objectivism and the conduit metaphor form a system of logical 
possibilities and impossibilities. They constrain and construe the nature o f the “building 
blocks” and processes o f communication in particular ways. If a writer wants to go 
against the gram of the logical possibilities inherent in the system, he must justify that 
action with strong evidence.'8 Conversely, an argument consistent with the grain o f the 
logical possibilities o f the system, does not required as much evidence, since in its 
consistency it seems self-evident. In my description below, I develop the logical 
constrnal o f parts and processes as suggested by the objectivist system of thought, 
without taking an agreed upon exceptions into account. This operation produces a 
stereotyped and unnuanced picture. I do not mean to describe these parts and processes 
as they are used by any particular discipline at the present time, only to describe how the 
system logically constrains their interpretation.
In addition to being a system of logical possibilities and impossibilities, the 
objectivist/conduit system of knowing involves a specific set o f terms, among which are 
representation, form/content, subject, object, meaning, mind/body, grasp (and related 
terms), see (and related terms), literal/figurative, expression, and reference. When used 
in a clearly objectivist context, these terms do not just mean by iconicalfy matching their 
dictionary definitions. Rather, they mean in relation to one another and to the entire 
schema set up by the objectivist/conduit epistemology. Using one of these terms
18 Occasionally, over the coarse of scholarly debate, when certain exceptions to the logic become 
accepted as exceptions, they no longer require extra evidentiary force.
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metonymically accesses the entire schema, with all o f its logical possibilities and 
terminological relationships.
Writers sometimes work very hard to divorce a term from the whole by 
redefining it. Since the redefined term is part of a complex whole, and means in relation 
to that whole, in order to truly redefine a term, the whole should be redefined along with 
the part. However, most writers do not redefine the whole, but only the part. Given that 
feet, even if the writer has gone to great lengths to clearly define the term, that 
redefinition will likely feil. Since readers have experienced the term as a part of the 
whole system time and again, they have literally incorporated it as a part of the whole 
schema. Redefining a term cannot cut the reader’s corporeal ties from the single term to 
the entire schema. When a reader encounters the term, the term will still mean, in part, 
in relation to and by invocation of the entire schema that constrains its logic. If the new 
definition logically contradicts the schema, the results will be confusion, not clarity.
Implicit in the objectivist set o f terminological relationships and logical 
possibilities is a portrait o f the nature of human beings, their relationship with the world 
and the kind of meaning they find in living.
The Nature o f the People Involved
As the image o f a mind-homunculus suggests, objectivism construes human 
beings as minds relatively independent of the bodies that carry them around. As the 
primary aspect o f the mind/body system, the mind directs the activities of the body and 
remains relatively unaffected by those bodily activities. Most importantly, the mind
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transmits messages, encoding and decoding them, performing the computations involved 
in communicating.
As secondary to the mind, the body figures in the processes o f exploration and 
explanation only when it directly affects the work of the mind. When explaining 
communication, only the eyes and ears, as conduits or portals through which signals 
travel to reach the mind, may be considered.19 Given the relative independence of mind 
and body, no other part of the body is important to consider.
Objectivism models perception as mechanical in nature — as a conduit. Its three 
parts are linear in both space and time: 1) raw sense data enters the body through the 
“portals” of the ears or eyes, 2) travel up nerve conduits and finally 3) reach the brain, 
where it is sorted into percepts by the mind-homunculus. As a mechanical model with 
predetermined parts, motions, and tasks, this model o f perception is synchronically 
dynamic, but diachronically static.20 Furthermore, as just another mechanical part, 
human beings have no agency. This model o f perception does not allow for more
19 With exceptions given for sign language.
20 The expression “synchronically dynamic” may appear to be an oxymoron, but it is not. “Dynamic” 
can refer to continuous motion. That motion may follow a particular pattern that repeats over and over 
or the motion may describe a pattern that changes over time. “Synchronically dynamic” refers to a 
repeated pattern of motion; “diachronically dynamic” refers to a pattern of motion that changes over 
time. In their inner workings, machines are synchronically dynamic. They move, but the pattern of 
motion remains the same. Even sophisticated machines that might adjust to different tasks are still 
limited in their patterns of motion. They may have multiple sets of motions that can respond to different 
situations, but they cannot, of themselves, adapt to extremely varied conditions over time. (What does 
change in synchronically dynamic machines are the specific materials that are fed through them.) If you 
think of a car, its parts must interact with one another in a predetermined fashion in order fix it to 
operate. In and of itself it is synchronically dynamic — if it were running while lying on its “back” it 
would stay in the same place. The action of a car becomes diachronically dynamic only when a human 
agent becomes involved in the mechanical system and drives it to varying places. However, the car 
itself does not become diachronically dynamic (except for the feet that it eventually wears out), but its 
action in the world does.
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complex kinds o f sensing of the world, as when a person senses another’s emotional 
state by using his own emotional system as a sensory apparatus or when a observer 
entrains with a dancers on stage through using his whole body as a sensory apparatus. I 
will discuss a model that does allow for more complexity in the next chapter.
This model o f perception isolates the process o f perception to specific parts of 
the body, compartmentalizing it in an experientially unreal way. When I listen or observe 
actively, I bring my whole self to the situation, like a tennis player who bounces around, 
ready for action when the ball gets to his side. If I am prevented from listening with my 
whole self, I am not able to “get into” the music as well. My ears and brain may 
encounter sounds and translate them into notes, but I do not engage with music. If we 
want to know about “music” (as distinguished from “notes”), this model of 
perception/cognition is insufficient.
In addition to acting as a means for accomplishing encoding and decoding 
procedures, the mind-brain acts as a place where encoding and decoding procedures 
occur. The characterization o f the mind-brain as a place can be seen in the notion of 
“states of consciousness.” The phrase “states o f consciousness” relates to the common 
conceptual metaphor STATES ARE CONTAINERS. Through this metaphor, a state becomes 
something to be “in,” e.g. “I’m in a good mood today.” As containers, states of 
consciousness, then, may “contain” something: “[SJtates o f consciousness are or contain 
natural representation, that is, entities that by their intrinsic nature represent something 
else” (Addis 54). Projected onto consciousness, the static nature o f the CONTAINMENT
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schema hides the dynamic, interactive nature of consciousness. Consciousness becomes 
a static space in which the mind-homuncuhis works.
Calling the dynamic process o f consciousness a “state” objectifies it so that it can 
mentally be pulled away from one’s own experience and viewed, as an object, from afar. 
Thus objectified and viewed from afar, the scholar can think, mistakenly, that a “state of 
consciousness” is a “thing” that can be argued about scientifically, as if it can exist 
independent o f individual, subjective experience.
[W]e may conclude from the scientific argument that every state of 
consciousness has a property that specifies what that state of 
consciousness is a consciousness o f and another property that specifies 
what mode of awareness it is (Addis 51, emphasis mine).
As an object, the “state of consciousness” can “possess” (have) properties, rather than 
being one quality or another (as would a dynamic process).
Objectivism sees intelligence as an essential, inborn, mental trait of the individual 
person. It may be connected to the intelligence levels of their parents, but, logically 
speaking, its development does not relate to the person’s bodily interaction with the 
environment. Intelligence relates to the quickness o f the brain in doing its computational 
work, as well as its capacity (the amount o f available mental “space”) for memory. The 
body, dumb, brute and unreasoning, acts only as a vessel for holding and carrying the 
mind-brain. Its only intelligence lies in its ability to follow the directions of the brain.
Objectivism does not logically support the idea of bodily intelligence. Although a 
trained pianist’s “quick-witted” fingers demonstrate not only mere muscle memory, but 
sometimes novel movement in response to new situations, they only do so at the brain’s
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direction. Intellect — “the power o f knowing as distinguished from the power to feel 
and wQT — is located solely in the brain. At best, quick-witted fingers constitute “body 
knowledge,” never real, creative intelligence.
Consistent with the location of creative intelligence in the brain, objectivism 
locates imagination purely in the mind, tying it logically to the process of mental 
representation. Even Mark Johnson, who champions the idea of an embodied mind in 
The Body in the Mind, does not escape the equation of imagination with mental 
representation:
Imagination is our capacity to organize mental representations (especially 
percepts, images, and image schemata) into meaningful, coherent unities 
(140).
Although I do believe that imagination sometimes involves mental representation, it often 
does not. Explanations of imagination usually involve an example like imagining 
something concrete, like a dog. I can imagine the concept “dog” and have the feeling of 
some sort of image in my brain (although I lack any ability, while awake, to actually, 
intentionally bring an image to my “mind’s eye”). However, in the course of my daily 
life, when a dog that I know occurs to me (as in “It occurred to me that...”), that 
occurrence is not isolated to a mental image or a feeling of a mental image. The image 
will resonate with my emotional and bodily systems as w ell21
21 An “occurrence,” as in “It occurred to me that..,” can be glossed as “having a thought” but should 
not necessarily be. It might be argued that the “it” of “It occurred to me...” is a thought I would argue 
that “it” might be a thought, but it might also simply be a recollection. In fact the “it” of “It occurred to 
me...” simply refers generally, not to anything specific. I want to distinguish “occurrence” from 
“thought” hoe, since the way that we use “thought” is so thoroughly mental in character. The 
etymology of “occur,” ob- in the way + currere to run, suggests that “experiencing an occurrence” is
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For example, if my friend Simone’s dog, Max, occurs to me, I may feel a relaxed 
and playful feeling. I may happily anticipate seeing him again. If  my brother Kris’ dog, 
Molly, occurs to me, I will feel a degree of tension and sadness, since Molly, who is 
getting old, blind and deaf quite unexpectedly and uncharacteristically bit me the last 
time I visited her. Before she bit me, if asked whether or not Molly would ever bite me, 
I would have answered, “I can’t imagine ft!” It is not that my mind could not imagine 
this happening, but that my body-emotion system could not imagine ft. Now that Molly 
has bitten me, the “image” of her biting me resonates throughout my body-emotion 
system and, that image being present and active in me the next time I visit her, I will 
behave with greater caution. The point is that images and imagination are not limited to 
mental representation but occur to and throughout the whole person, and occur in the 
course of interacting with the world.
In the objectivist system of logic people, and such faculties as perception, 
intelligence and imagination, are construed as mainly mental in nature. The most 
important part o f a human being is his brain-mind, which is the central hub of bodily 
activity and the mediator between inner and outer worlds.
The Nature o f the Relationship Between Person and World
The objectivist assumption that reality consists o f “budding blocks” that must be 
assembled to make a whole extends to the constrnal o f the nature o f the relationship
different from “having a thought” It suggests the image that when something “occurs” to us, in the 
course of our daily lives that “thing” (image or thought) is in the way and we run into it. When we run 
into i t  it strikes us and resonates in us in various ways. I will discuss this further in the next chapter.
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between a person and the world. Not only are mind and body, senses and brain 
compartmentalized, person and environment are as well The way that the person is 
construed in objectivism— as a relatively passive mind that registers and manipulates 
representations of the world, a mind connected to the environment only through the 
“portals” o f the senses — suggests a relative disconnect from the environment. The 
main interactions with the world occur through grasping and seeing of the mind's bands 
and eyes. The bodily hands and eyes may interact with the world, but only at the 
direction of the mind and only to satisfy the mind.
Given the relative disconnect between body and mind in objectivism, the only 
possible constraint on meaningful individual experience is that received through the 
mind, usually in the form of words — “culture.” We pass on “culture” primarily through 
books and other word based education.22 Through the set of shared mental 
representations that we call “culture,” we share experience. If it were not for shared 
“culture,” individuals might experience the world in wildly different fashions. 
Concomitantly, individuals with different cultural backgrounds may experience the world 
in wildly different fashions, since they share nothing that constrains that experience.
Since objectivism construes human beings as primarily mental in nature, and as 
experiencing the world primarily through mental representation of it, the rest of the body 
plays little part in constraining the nature of experience. In other words, the operation of
22 In the objectivist/subjectivist way of thinking, word-based education is the only way to ensure that we 
share similar, “true” mental representations of reality. If education were experience based, how would 
we know that the students’ experiences were similar enough to constitute a shared knowledge base?
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individual minds cannot be constrained by the feet that human beings share a vast amount 
o f experience interacting with the world through a similar medium — the human body.
The image that “cultural background” suggests accurately portrays the part that 
culture plays in objectivist explanations: a relatively passive backdrop, put in place by 
the process of education, against which the drama of individual meaning unfolds. At 
best, a relatively unchanging culture “informs” the meanings an individual derives from 
mental representations. The diachronically static nature of “culture” in the 
objectivist/conduit schema stems from the mechanical nature o f the model As parts in a 
mechanical system, the roles of both human beings and “cultural background” are 
predetermined and not open to change.
The objectivist “feet” o f the probability of wide variation in individual experience 
relates to the objective/subjective divide. Since only “cultural background” constrains 
subjective experience (usually construed as the inner life of the individual), and since only 
the individual in question can observe subjective experience, it can never be reliably 
treated in an objective fashion. For instance, speaking o f emotional response to music, 
Meyer states:
[T]he response with which we are concerned is profoundly and 
permanently subjective and hence of necessity concealed from the 
scrutiny o f even the most scrupulous observers (12).
As “slippery,” varying enormously from person to person, unseeable and unmeasurable, 
subjective experience cannot be validly known. Since individuals vary a great deal in 
their ability to “put” subjective experience “into” words, personal reports are not to be
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trusted. The strict divide between objective and subjective shows the severe 
compartmentalization between the inner and outer in objectivist logic.
In objectivist thought, “out there” and “in here” constitute two different “places.” 
Given that “places” are locations and, by a conceptual metaphor generally used in 
English, LOCATIONS ARE CONTAINERS, these “places” have boundaries around them that 
must be breached in some fashion. The senses act as a “portal” between the outer and 
inner worlds. Meaning enters the body through the senses in the form of 
“representations” that refer to the outer world. This logical system sets up levels of 
mediation that do not necessarily exist. Even if an experience feels immediate, like 
“getting into” music, immediacy is logically unlikely and explanations must include 
mediation.
Besides the feet that inner and outer worlds are two different “places,” objectivist 
logic spatializes the process o f communication in a way that is experientially unreal. It 
posits a meaning in my interlocutor’s mind and a gap between us that needs to be 
“bridged.” The meaning leaves my interlocutor in the form of sounds that bridge that 
gap. I receive those sounds, reassemble them into words, and then unpack the meaning 
o f the words. This spatialized model sets up levels o f mediation that do not necessarily 
exist. No room exists for “getting into” what my interlocutor is saying, for entraining 
with his thoughts, for knowing through that entrainment what he will say next.
The compartmentalization of inner and outer worlds presents severe impediments 
to explaining experiences like “getting into” music and other expressive events and to
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understanding the variation and similarity between the experiences of individuals. 
“Objective” experience does not vary from individual to individual; “subjective” 
experience varies wildly, constrained only by cultural similarity. No middle ground exists 
within cultures or between cultures.
The Nature o f Meaning
In objectivist thought, meaning is first, and foremost, linguistic. Other kinds of 
meaning, like the meaning of a stock market drop that halves a person’s retirement 
account or the meaning of a child’s first kiss, cannot be considered. In addition, only 
certain kinds of linguistic meaning fit into the system and thus may be considered.
Literal meaning is admitted, figurative is not. Literal meaning acts in the manner 
prescribed by the conduit metaphor — a mental representation that refers to reality and 
models it exactly. Figurative meaning does not fit this model, referring to reality in ways 
that may approximate reality, but do not fit it exactly. Objectivist accounts of meaning 
do not consider figurative language and meaning. They are left to poets and humanities 
scholars.
Concomitant to the literal/figurative split is the true/untrue split. In the 
objectivist system of thought, meaning must be either “true” or “untrue”; meaning may 
not be neither true nor untrue. Since meaning consists of words mentally representing a 
state o f affairs in the world, then true meaning consists of words that match the state of 
affairs, while false meaning consists o f words that do not match the state o f affairs. 
Meanings may be partially true, if they partially match objective reality, but meaning may
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not be divorced from objective truth and falsity. Objectivism does not admit meanings 
that are experientially true, but objectively false (like exaggerations). Nor does it admit 
meanings like the meaning of the fragrance of a flower, unless its meaning refers back to 
some memory the individual associates it with. If  an individual smells a flower and 
simply feels a wonderful sense o f well-being and gratitude for life, the meaning involved 
in the situation is neither “true” nor “untrue” (although beautiful) and thus cannot be 
explained objectively. Along with “figurative” meaning, meaning that is neither true nor 
untrue is left to poets, musicians and humanities scholars.
Objective meaning is an “object” transferred from speaker to listener. Although 
it ends in “-mg,” suggesting that it was originally a verb, the word “meaning” has come 
to be a noun. It is used in the gerund form, rather than in the present progressive, which 
also uses “-ing” and would suggest action on the part of the speaker or the listener. In 
the process o f the communicative transfer, the meaning-object begins its life in subjective 
form, converts to objective, and then converts back to a subjective form. This 
conversion process makes the communication process unreliable. Because of human 
fallibility, problems may occur in either of the “subjective” phases o f the process:
“putting meaning into words” or “grasping and unpacking meaning.”
Meaning is also entirely mental in nature, arising in the form o f thoughts, ideas or 
mental images and packed or unpacked through the mental processes of computation, 
representation and reference. The meaning of an utterance may have ramifications that 
play out in emotional or physical ways. However, these ramifications are not the
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meaning proper o f the utterance; the meaning proper is the idea or thought the utterance 
represents.
As we have seen above in descriptions of the conduit metaphor process, meaning 
involves a split between form and content. Since a word’s meaning consists of its 
referential content, its sound form becomes insignificant, as easily discarded a gift box. 
Besides the form/content split, objectivism inextricably links meaning to the processes 
and logics o f reference, representation and personal expression. These terms define the 
processes o f meaning; any writer who does not want to be taken to task must address 
them in some fashion.23
The objective system o f logic and terms admits only literal meaning-objects that 
are either true or false and can be mentally packed, transferred, re-presented, grasped, 
unpacked and that refer exactly to reality. It does not admit meanings that strike a
23 For example, Langer takes Hanslick and others to task for rejecting the form/content split “(T)he 
most vehement critics of the emotive-content theory seem to have caught a germ from the doctrine they 
attacked: in denying the very possibility of any content of music, they have fallen into the way of 
thinking about it in terms of form and content. They are suddenly faced with the dichotomy: significant 
or meaningless. And while they fiercely repudiate the proposition that music is a semantic, they cannot 
assert that it is meaningless. It is the problem, not the doctrine, that has infected them. Consequently 
they try to eat their cake and have it too, by a logical trick that is usually accepted only among 
mathematicians — by a statement which has the form of an answer to the question in hand, and really 
commits them to nothing. Musical form, they reply, is its own content; it means itself. This evasion 
was suggested by Hanslick when he said, ‘The theme of a musical composition is its essential content' 
He knew that this was an evasion;* but his successors have found it harder and harder to resist the 
question of content and the silly fiction of self-significance has been raised to the dignity of a doctrine” 
(668). At the asterisk, Langer inserts the following footnote. “See Hanslick, op. cit., p. 133: ‘In the art 
of music there is no content opposed to form, because music has no form over and above its content’ 
This is an effectual repudiation of the form-and-content dichotomy, a rejection of the problem, not of its 
answers.” Langer simply accepts the objectivist terms and seems to believe that this is the only way to 
frame the problem. Hanslick, more loyal to musical experience than to this set of terms and logic, tries 
to find a way around them, but is taken to task.
Note that, because she perceives meaning from an objectivist standpoint, thereby equating 
meaning with linguistic, referential meaning, Langer cannot conceive of meaning that is intransitive in 
nature. By her logic, if something means it must mean something else (it must refer in some fashion).
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person, like the occurrences of a falling stock market, a first kiss, a tone o f voice, the 
beauty of a fragrance, or the beauty of a symphony.
Summary
Based on an analogy to seeing and manually manipulating objects in the world, 
objectivism treats reality as if it were a complex object to be understood. Thus the path 
of knowing involves finding the smallest parts o f that complex object, discovering their 
individual natures, as well as how they relate and cohere. Consistent with the logic o f 
humanly built structures, the parts of reality are logically prior to the wholes. Parts are 
“basic” in that they form the base o f the more complex structural whole, as well as form 
the starting point for discovery and argument. Objectivism prefers measurable evidence 
and structural or mechanical models, which do not admit diachronic change or human 
agency.
If objective knowledge is gained by building complex structures from simple 
elements, then words are the primary building tools. Words corral possibly ambiguous 
aspects o f reality into neatly contained categories that can easily be grasped and 
manipulated by the mental homunculus. Words allow aspects o f reality to travel from 
objective reality to subjective reality in the form of mental representations. Necessary 
truth or falsity depends on how well mental representations match the situation they 
represent Words allow us to communicate with one another by packaging ideas into 
meaning-objects we can send through aural or visual signals.
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Objectivist logic construes the communication situation, its parts and processes in 
very specific ways that are logically consistent with one another. As people are primarily 
mental in nature, so are intelligence and imagination. The mind acts as both an 
homunculus that accomplishes encoding and decoding procedures and as a place where 
the homunculus accomplishes these procedures. Objectivism compartmentalizes 
perception and cognition to include only the sensory portals and the mind, ignoring any 
possible role that the body may play. In addition, it compartmentalizes the external and 
internal worlds, so that they are separate “parts” o f the whole person/environment 
system. As mechanical, this system does not allow for diachronic change or for human 
agency. Thus, “culture” becomes static “background” or “context” that at best informs 
the system. Objectivism construes meaning as linguistic, an object with content, tied to 
the processes o f reference, representation and personal expression.
Ob je c tiv ist / c o n d u it  M e a n in g  A pplied  to M u sic a l  M e a n in g
Having developed a detailed account o f the logic and terms of the objectivist 
system of meaning, I now turn to a close examination of the application of that system to 
the musical meaning situation. In varying levels of detail, I will examine the writing of 
music theorists Deryck Cooke, Eduard Hanslick, Leonard Meyer, and Victor 
ZuckerkandL philosophers Laird Addis and Susanne Langer, and psychologists Jean 
Bamberger, Stephen Handel, and Mary Louise Serafine. Objectivism informs the work 
of each of these authors in some way. The philosophers base their arguments on 
objectivist assumptions and the psychologists base their studies on objectivist
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methodologies (which are based on objectivist assumptions). The music theorists, as a 
group, vary most in their use of objectivism. Meyer accepts psychological methods and 
definitions, thereby defining his approach as at least partially objectivist. Cooke,
Hanslick and Zuckerkandl all eschew some aspects of objectivism, while they accept 
other aspects without questioning them.
In certain respects, music seems like a communication system, so many authors 
apply theories o f linguistic communication to it. Through this analogy, they map the 
conduit metaphor, with all o f its terms and logic, onto musical meaning. In this mapping, 
the following set o f equivalences arises. The speaker becomes the composer, who 
possesses musical content. He puts that content into a musical form, which, by the logic 
of the conduit metaphor, becomes less significant than the content.24 From the written 
form, the player rediscovers the content in the process of learning the piece. In playing 
the piece, the player “expresses” the composer’s meaning-content through the musical 
form. The form then re-presents the meaning to the listener’s ears and mind, which 
decode and grasp the meaning, in part by discovering to what the musical sounds refer. 
This drama of meaning transfer plays out against the backdrop of or is informed by the 
cultural background of all the people involved.
When mapped onto the musical situation, the logic of the objectivism dictates the 
nature of the parts and processes in the same fashion as described in the previous section. 
Musical meaning becomes logically tied to personal expression (of either the composer
24 That form is logically less significant than content can be seen in Langer’s term “significant form” 
(651). She needs to modify “form” with “significant” only because, by the default logic, form is 
insignificant
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or the player), the form/content split and the processes of representation and reference. 
When writers explore and explain the musical situation using this logic, the logic acts as 
a form into which they try to fit experiential evidence. The places where the experiential 
evidence “rubs” against the “form” that constrains it define some of the issues of greatest 
contention (the “sore spots”) in the discussion about musical meaning: Is musical 
meaning intellectual or emotional? Is it a personal or impersonal expression? Is it a 
matter of reference or representation? What is the content of musical meaning? Is its 
form significant?
Objectivism in W riting about Musical Meaning
The above authors vary in the use they make of this frame of reference. Some 
make explicit use o f the terms and logic defined by the conduit metaphor; others confine 
their use mainly to the broader logic o f objectivism. Of the authors who use the terms of 
the conduit metaphor, only Deryck Cooke accepts the analogy between musical 
communication and linguistic communication literally. In The Language o f Music,
Cooke presents a “glossary” of musical terms (defined as specific phrases characterized 
by series of particular melodic scale steps) that refer to specific emotions.
Although most o f the authors do not accept the analogy between music and 
language literally, they still look to objectivist thought about linguistic communication 
for ways to think about musical meaning. For example, the psychologist Handel poses 
an explicit analogy between music and language: “(T]he understanding o f music has the 
same arbitrariness between sound and content, and the same search for meaning, that
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occurs in the understanding of speech” (183). However, he does not accept the analogy 
as naivety as Cooke does, but uses it as a tool for exploration, carefully explaining what 
aspects o f the analogy he accepts and what he rejects.
Langer makes use of the conduit model of communication, but places its action 
at a more abstract level than Cooke does. This can be seen the way that she 
conceptualizes the process o f artistic symbolization. According to Langer, through the 
process o f making a symbol, a symbol producer becomes aware of his experience and 
articulates it by objectifying it (similar to becoming aware o f an idea and articulating it in 
words). That objectification produces the symbol (as putting ideas into words produces 
language). The symbol consumer, then, can witness the symbolic object and contemplate 
the experience it articulates, becoming aware of that experience, thereby gaining insight 
into it. Although the process seems to be more abstract than the process of literal 
linguistic communication modeled in the conduit metaphor, this formulation of the 
process of symbolization follows the logic o f the conduit: experience-meaning is 
packaged, transmitted through the medium of the symbol, then unpacked and 
seen/grasped.
Langer continues with the analogy in more explicit terms, modeling her definition 
of the “structural requirements for a symbolism” on language:
Furthermore, there is no doubt that musical forms have certain properties 
to recommend them for symbolic use: they are composed of many 
separable items, easily produced, and easily combined in a great variety of 
ways; in themselves they play no important practical role which would 
overshadow their semantic function; they are readily distinguished, 
remembered and repeated; and finally, they have a remarkable tendency to 
modify each other's characters in combination, as words do, by serving
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each as a context. The purely structural requirements for a symbolism are 
satisfied by the peculiar tonal phenomenon we call “music” (659-60).
By this description, symbolism has the same requirements as language: minimal units of 
meaning (phonemes/morphemes), “building blocks,” that can be combined and modify 
each other (syntax/grammar) in order to create larger meaning structures. However, she 
does object that music “is not, logically speaking, a language, for it has no vocabulary” 
(660), and that it “has no literal meaning” (663).
Even those authors like Zuckerkandl who, on the whole, reject the analogy 
between music and language are compelled to speak o f this analogy due to its hegemonic 
force.
Music and language, then, have one thing in common—that tones, like 
words, have meaning and that the ‘being in’ of the meaning in the word, 
like that of the musical significance in the tone, is of a nonmaterial nature.
But beyond that, the relations that connect the word with its meaning, the 
tone w/ its musical significance, are quite different (67).
However, even though he rejects the idea that the mechanisms of meaning are similar in 
music and language, Zuckerkandl does not reject every aspect of the analogy. He 
accepts the idea that music is a communication of personal “thoughts” from composers:
What creates difficulties for the uninitiated in the late Beethoven, in 
Bruckner, in Stravinski, is not the language but the person, the personal 
nature of the thoughts formulated in the language (41).
Like Zuckerkandl, most of the other authors use the analogy between music and 
language inconsistently, accepting parts that suit their argument but rejecting parts that 
do not.
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On the whole, the music theorists accept the terms o f the conduit metaphor as 
basic to their argument — as terms that must be inchided in some fashion. However, 
they do not automatically accept the validity o f these terms, but try to stay true to 
musical experience and either alter the terms to suit their explanations of that experience 
or, if those terms cannot be thus altered, they argue against them. In contrast, the 
philosophers never argue against the validity of these terms, but do try to rework them to 
suit the experiential evidence. In contrast to both the music theorists and the 
philosophers, the psychologists do not attend to the terms dictated by the conduit 
metaphor, but do take care to stay true to objectivist methods of testing and thinking.
In this last regard, Meyer’s writing is more like a psychologist than a music 
theorist. Although his writing is clearly informed by a concern for musical experience, 
the objectivist framework still dictates the issues he addresses and the theories he draws 
on. For instance, as he sifts through the different kinds of evidence available to him, he 
characterizes them as objective and subjective, a dichotomy central to objectivism. He 
takes objective evidence as self-evidently more valid, but suggests that subjective 
evidence is actually necessary. In order to counteract the unreliability of subjective 
evidence, he proposes that it be examined in the light of a scientific theory of emotion.
Meyer then presents what he calls the “psychological theory of emotion,” whose 
central thesis is “Emotion or affect is aroused when a tendency to respond is arrested or 
inhibited” (14). This definition is central to Meyer’s thinking, shaping it in an objectivist 
fashion. In his application o f this theory, he frames the listening situation as “stimulus ->
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response,” which suggests a passive listener. He counteracts this suggestion by saying 
that the listener brings education and intention to the listening situation. However, his 
continued use o f the basic “stimulus -> response” frame works against him, since 
inherent in the frame is a passive listener who is being acted on by the music.
However, Meyer’s use of the “psychological theory of emotion” (emotion or 
affect is aroused when a tendency to respond is arrested or inhibited) creates a more 
important problem. When I test this theory in my experience, it frills short in its lack of 
comprehensiveness. In other words, it describes one kind of situation in which emotion 
or affect may be aroused, but does not describe many others. For instance, for me, 
emotion may be aroused simply by looking at a beautiful flower, empathizing with a 
character in a drama unfolding in a movie, or realizing that I forgot my wallet at home. 
None of these situations consists of a tendency to respond being arrested. The 
narrowness of Meyer’s psychological theory of emotion constrains his theory of music 
and emotion. The emotions it explains relate directly to a tendency to respond being 
arrested or inhibited: expectation, uncertainty, suspense and surprise — a rather short 
list o f the feelings music may invoke. Although Meyer’s theory does ring true for me in 
many ways, its narrow focus limits its usefulness.
Whether directly affected by the terms of the conduit metaphor or indirectly 
affected by concerns for objective methodology and evidence, this scholarship about 
musical meaning has been thoroughly conditioned by objectivism. The objectivist
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framework is problematic for music, in part, because simply has no place for certain 
important aspects o f musical experience. I now turn to this problem.
Aspects of Musical Experience Excluded by Objectivist Meaning
Sensuality, emotion, dynamism, and the intensification of experience are all 
important aspects of musical experience — aspects that converge in its meaningfulness. 
The objectivist system o f thought not only does not provide a way to understand these 
aspects, it logically excludes them. Given this exclusion, if the authors whose work I 
have examined for this chapter are employing this system of knowing, one could expect 
them to have trouble explaining these logically excluded aspects. At the very least, one 
might expect a definite lack of consensus on how these aspects fit into the system of 
meaning. And indeed, this is the case.
Sensuality
Given the mental nature of objectivist meaning, the sensual aspects of musical 
experience — by which I mean such experiences as the physically pleasurable enjoyment 
o f a ravishing flute timbre or a jolly, bouncing horn passage — would logically be 
excluded. Not one of the authors I have examined commented on purely sensual aspects 
of the music. Instead, those who admitted sensuality did so in the form of sensuousness 
— aesthetic pleasure. For example,
Every art sets out from the sensuous and operates within its limits. [...]
[0]ur imagination, which is so constituted as to be affected by auditory 
impressions [...], delights in the sounding forms and musical structures
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and, conscious of their sensuous nature, lives in the immediate and free
contemplation o f the beautiful (Hanslick 290).
The locus of sensuousness is the imagination, which, in this system of thought, is mental 
in nature. The locus of sensuality is the body. Therefore, sensuousness falls within the 
boundaries o f this system, while sensuality does not. I do not deny the validity of the 
sensual/sensuous distinction. Rather, I deny it as a strict dichotomy. In my experience, 
sensuousness necessarily involves a level o f sensuality, since “getting into” music 
requires a certain level o f pleasurable bodily involvement (real or imagined).25
Emotion
The place of emotion in the objectivist system of logic is also problematic. 
Although linguistic utterances are often emotionally laden, this system would place the 
emotion as a subject o f the words — a mental meaning unpacked from the words, while 
the emotional feeling becomes a ramification o f the mental meaning. Those aspects of 
speech that carry emotional force — paralanguage and prosody (variations in intonation, 
stress, vocal timbre, volume, rhythm and quality o f articulation) — do not logically fit in 
this system. Despite that feet, linguists do study these aspects o f language. However, 
the amount o f attention given to aspects o f language that are included in the objectivist 
system o f logic for outweighs the amount given to paralanguage and prosody. A recent 
search of the MLA database revealed 112,000 entries for those aspects of language
25 The sensual/sensuous dichotomy also relates to the hegemonic set of values, consistent with 
objectivism, that dichotomizes and then evaluates mind over body, spirit over body, intellect over 
emotion and reason over imagination.
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logically included in the objectivist framework (morphology, lexicology, grammar and 
syntax), but only 7,900 for prosody and paralinguistics.
That emotion has only an indirect place in the objectivist system of understanding 
may relate to the striking variation in explanations about emotional aspects o f musical 
experience. Music is called, variously, the language o f emotion (Cooke), the logical 
expression of feelings (Langer), the content of music (Handel) or the symbolic content of 
music (Langer). Music either expresses the emotions of the composer (Cooke) or it 
does not (Hanslick, Langer). Music represents feelings (Addis). Music does nor 
represent feelings, but their dynamic properties — it awakens feelings (Hanslick). Music 
stimulates emotion in a listener through anticipation and surprise (Meyer).26 Since 
emotion does at least fit the logical system indirectly, it seems as if a thoughtful scholar 
should be able to find a place for it. But since its place is not obvious, the results of 
these thoughtful “fittings” vary widely.
Dynamism
Another dimension of musical experience that does not fit easily into the 
objectivist system o f logic is its dynamic quality — that quality of music analogous to 
physical motion: “speed, slowness, strength, weakness, increasing and decreasing 
intensity” (Hanslick 268-69), or “patterns o f motion and rest, o f tension and release, of 
agreement and disagreement, preparation, fulfillment, excitation, sudden change”
(Langer 659). Although the dynamic quality o f music has no obvious place (direct or
26 Of these writers, only Meyer theorizes about “emotion.” The rest do not and easily conflate emotion, 
mood and feeling.
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indirect) in this system o f thought, it plays such an important and obvious part in musical 
experience that not one o f these writers denies its reality. However, even though they do 
not exclude dynamism, the writers do not agree on its place in the process of musical 
meaning.
Hanslick reasons that, through its dynamic qualities, music can represent the 
dynamic properties o f a feeling, but not the feeling itself. Langer agrees with this 
position, but added an extra level of abstraction, stating that through its dynamic 
qualities, music “reveals the rationale of feelings, the rhythm and pattern of then- rise 
and decline and intertwining, to our minds” and so is “a force in our mental life, our 
awareness and understanding, and not only our affective experience” (669, emphasis 
mine). Both Hanslick and Langer locate these dynamic qualities outside of the listener, 
“in” the music “out there.”
Bamberger locates dynamic qualities inside the listener, in the realm of bodily 
experience and connects them with the act of perception and conceptualization:
I suspect that the processes through which we actively organize incoming 
pitch-time phenomena are closely linked w/ the very basic, sentient 
organizing o f our bodies as we move through space and time — gestural 
direction (up-down; right-left), stance, sequences of periodic movements 
(breathing, sucking, walking), equilibrium, as well as vectors of tension 
and relaxation (9).
However, Bamberger’s philosophical framework constrains her idea o f perception and 
conception to those aspects that fit the conduit metaphor — sound waves hitting the 
eardrum, changing to neurological signals, moving up the nerve conduit to the brain, 
which decodes them in the process of cognition. Nothing in this model admits the kinds
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o f “basic, sentient organizing of our bodies as we move through space and time” that 
Bamberger lists. Therefore, although she recognizes them, she cannot include them in 
her methods or her interpretation of evidence.
Serafine also locates dynamic qualities inside the listener, as a part of the process 
o f musical thought (or cognition). She describes an example of a musical “thought 
path”:
The rhythm of vertical formulations creates areas of instability, 
movement, and tendencies toward change, as well as stability, repose, and 
closure. Rhythmic and dynamic activities also create patterns of 
movement and closure (72-3).
Although her description indexes qualities o f the body that music embodies (instability, 
movement, etc.) her philosophy constrains her understanding to mental processes. Thus, 
she categorizes these bodily perceptions as “thought paths ”
The dynamic quality o f music is at the heart o f Zuckerkandl’s theory. Rather 
than simply recognizing and naming some of music’s dynamic qualities, as did Hanslick 
and Langer, Zuckerkandl locates dynamism as a quality of tones in the context o f 
tonality. In that context, tones acquire a “dynamic quality”: “a state of disturbed 
equilibrium, as a tension, tendency, almost a will” (19). Each scale step has its own 
particular dynamic quality. For instance, the tonic has the quality of “perfect 
equilibrium, of relaxation of tension and satisfaction,...of self-affirmation” (20). Each 
scale step points toward the tonic, but in a way unique to that particular scale step (33).
What takes place here between the two tones is a sort o f play o f forces, 
comparable to that between magnetic needle and magnetic pole. The 
activity of the one is a placing itself in a direction, a pointing toward and
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striving after a goal; the activity of the other is a dictating of direction, a 
drawing to itself” (20).
Zuckerkandl equates the dynamic qualities with music’s meaning:
It is this different gesture, which gives each tone its particular and 
distinctive dynamic quality, which sounds in it and which we hear in it, 
when we hear it as a tone in a melody. This and nothing else is the 
content, the meaning, o f its utterance, its musical meaning (35).
In the course o f his argument, Zuckerkandl tries to locate these dynamic qualities 
exactly. His argument looks for them in the material world, but does not find them 
either as a quality o f the sound wave or as a quality of the relations between sound 
waves. He then looks for them in the inner world — the psychological world — in the 
theory of associationism. This theory suggests that we learn, for example, that the 
supertonic moves to the tonic at cadence points simply through a process of association. 
Through this association, the supertonic acquires its dynamic quality of pointing toward 
the tonic for individual listeners. However, Zuckerkandl argues against this notion 
effectively.
Having looked for and not found the dynamic qualities o f musical tones in either 
the external material world or the internal psychic world, Zuckerkandl proposes the 
existence of a third alternative — an “external psychic.”
The ‘external psychic’ would then prove to be something purely dynamic, 
not feeling but force—a force for which the physical would be as it were 
transparent, which would work through the physical without touching it 
(63).
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According to Zuckerkandl, the “external psychic” is a “nonmaterial, purely dynamic 
phenomena” (63). It does not appear to the eye, hot the ear has a special capacity to 
perceive it.
Although he does not explicitly use the term “ether,” Zuckerkandl seems to be 
working with a notion o f a forceful ether that is neither strictly “material” nor strictly 
“psychic.”
Tones...have completely absorbed their meaning [the dynamic quality] 
into themselves and discharge it upon the hearer directly in their sound.
The non-material ‘being in’ of the meaning in the tone is no mere ‘being 
signified’; it is complete, actual presence (68, emphasis mine).
He suggests that religious symbols deal in this “forceful ether,” as well. “The symbol is 
the representation of a supermaterial — that is, physically indemonstrable — force in a 
material form” (69). He cautions that this “supermaterial” is not supersensual or 
supernatural.
Unable to locate the dynamic quality of musical experience in the external 
material world, where Hanslick and Langer locate it, or the internal psychological world, 
where Bamberger and Serafine locate it, Zuckerkandl posits the existence of a third 
alternative: an external psychic world of supermateriality. Positing the existence of a 
new aspect of reality that no one else has noticed and that relates to no other known 
phenomenon is a rather extravagant (and implausible) step to take in an argument. 
Zuckerkandl’s writing shows him to be a reasoning and intelligent individual, not one 
who would take such a step lightly or easily. These two facts, 1) that Zuckerkandl had 
to take this step and 2) the general lack of agreement amongst these authors as to where
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these dynamic qualities are located, suggest a problem fitting the experiential evidence of 
dynamism into the model being used to explain it. If  it had a logical “place,” it would be 
located there most of the time by most authors.
Intensification o f Experience
The final aspect of musical experience that does not fit logically into this system 
is its intensity. Assuming that a listener listens actively, musical experience can be more 
intense than other, more ordinary forms of human experience. In feet, for many listeners, 
achieving an intensified experience — “getting into” the music — is the paramount goal 
of listening.
Musicians often link this experience to the difference between “notes” and 
“music.” As a subjective distinction, this difference has no place in the 
objectivist/conduit metaphor system of meaning. Almost all of these accounts o f musical 
meaning do not even try to account for it. With his concept of “dynamic qualities,” 
Zuckerkandl tries to, but ends up positing the existence of an external psychic, 
supermaterial realm — a place somewhere between objective and subjective, outer and 
inner, material and spirit. The other accounts may mention the intensity of musical 
experience — mainly through discussions of aesthetic pleasure or beauty. However, 
these accounts tend to be descriptive or to attempt to define what is beautiful in music, 
rather than to explain how aesthetic pleasure or beauty may arise.27
27 If we take this argument to the extreme, not only does objectivism not admit the difference between 
music and notes, it does not logically admit “music,” either. Logically, the system admits sound waves, 
since they are a measurable, material reality. In contrast, as something that exists only in human
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In addition, these authors do not mention, much less account for, the 
intensification o f experience that may occur over repeated listening to the same piece. 
Because they are working within an epistemology that supports mechanical models, they 
account for music’s synchronic temporality, but cannot fully account for diachronic 
temporality. The main way that they take diachronic change into consideration is to say 
that past education plays a part in musical understanding. However, they often add 
education almost as an afterthought, presenting it as a “back drop” that “informs” the 
current listening situation, more than an active part o f the process. Additionally, they do 
not connect education with intensification of experience, only with musical 
understanding, usually defined as grasping the music in some fashion.
The objectivist system of logic either does not admit or does not easily admit 
certain vital aspects o f musical experience: sensuality, emotion, dynamism and 
intensification o f experience. The inadmissibility o f this evidence contributes to 
arguments that are implausible and lacking in explanatory power.
Negative Effects o f Objectivism on Arguments
The objectivist framework has not allowed the contributors to this discussion to 
come to a general consensus about the more abstract aspects of the problem of musical 
meaning. In addition, trying to fit the musical evidence into a framework ill suited to 
explaining it creates arguments that are overly complex, implausible, and lacking in
experience, ‘‘music” cannot be witnessed or measured by an objective observer. Objectively, only sound 
waves exist
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explanatory power. The objectivist framework shapes both the issues discussed and the 
logic used to discuss them.
The Presentation/Representation Tension
A thread of tension runs throughout many of these arguments that connects to 
the following questions: Does music represent? or does it simply present? Each of these 
terms suggests a different schema that, while sharing certain terms, logically excludes 
others.
Viewed morphemically, the term “represent” suggests a subsequent presentation 
o f something that has been present or presented before: re + present. If the term were 
linked only to the meanings o f its morphemes, then the sun rising in the morning would 
be a representation o f the sun that rose the day before. However, “representation” 
means what it does not only by direct, iconic reference to its morphemes. It also means 
by metonymic access to the whole conduit metaphor schema. Given its entanglement 
with the conduit metaphor, the term logically requires reference to a pre-existing 
“subject” different from the “representation.”
If you consider only the dictionary definition of “subject” that applies to this 
situation (“something represented or indicated in a work of art”), no obvious reason 
exists why it could not be called “object” instead of “subject.” However, once again, 
“subject” means by metonymically accessing the whole conduit schema. Given that 
entanglement, the subject o f a piece o f music is of logical necessity located in the 
internal, subjective realm o f the composer. It must connect to his subjective life —
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emotions, ideas, insights, observations of the world, etc. “Subject,” then, involves not 
only the represented “thing,” but also the feet that that represented “thing” exists 
because of and under the control o f an agent. If “representation” involves “subject” and 
“subject” involves an agent, then “representation” involves an agent (which is one of the 
reasons it is so odd to think o f today’s sun as a representation of yesterday’s sun).
In addition, the representation itself is not a subject, but an object, because it has 
left the control o f the agent who made it in the first place. Once it enters the mind of the 
audience, however, it becomes a “mental representation.” No longer the original subject, 
nor the public object, it has again entered the realm of the subjective and come under the 
control of a new agent, transforming it from an “objective” feet into a “subjective” one. 
Through its involvement in the conduit schema, representation is clearly more complex 
than its mere morphemes suggest.
In contrast, “presentation” is not entangled in the conduit metaphor. It is a 
simpler schema, using only two of the three terms of the representation schema. Unlike 
the representation schema, “presentation” requires no reference to an original subject. 
Nor does it require an agent who does the presenting.28 Its time schema is also simpler, 
logically occurring entirety in the “now” and not referring to another time/space. The 
“presence”./*//.? the present time/space, rather than referring to another. This schema
28 It is true that some versions of the presentation schema, such as “making a presentation in a class or 
at work” require an agent doing the presenting. However, as it is used in this literature, the schema is 
divorced from the presenting agent so that the observer’s focus is on the “presence” itself. In feet,
linguistically, the presentation schema is often used in the following fashion, “Music presents ,”
so that the music, “itself” becomes an agent. Thus divorced from human agency, this schema could be 
called die “presence” schema, rather than the “presentation” schema.
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consists simply o f a present thing — or “presence” — gaining the attention of an 
observer by calling attention to itself Le., by being extraordinary in a field of ordinary.29 
Given that this schema is being applied to music, I will make a distinction here between 
presentations that involve “presence” and those that do not. In this way of thinking, 
music involves “presence,” while an ordinary object in its usual context, like a desk lamp, 
does not. The two differ in that a “presence” calls attention to itself in a way that an 
ordinary object does not, as when we say a person has presence or speak of “stage 
presence.”
The presentation and representation schemas share two terms, the present thing 
(called the “presence” in the presentation schema and the “sign” in the representation 
schema) and the observer. However, despite some shared structure, certain aspects of 
the presentation schema logically contradict the corresponding aspects of the 
representation schema. The primary relation in the presentation schema is between the 
presence and the observer, with the observer attending directly to the presence. In 
contrast, the primary relation in the representation schema is between the observer and 
the subject, with secondary relationships between observer and sign, sign and subject. 
The sign in the representation schema acts only to point toward the subject, which may 
not be present in time and space; it does not primarily act to draw attention to itself.
The observer attends from the sign to the subject, not to the sign itself. In contrast, in
29 With this definition, I am speaking of “a rt” It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve into 
what artistic presence entails.
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the presentation schema the presence is o f intrinsic interest to the observer, opaque in its 
lack o f reference.
The nature and direction o f action differs in these two schemas, as well. 
Reference, which defines the representation schema, points the observer’s attention away 
from himself from the representation to its subject. In contrast, attraction defines the 
presentation schema. The presence brings itself to the attention of the observer, so that 
there is a dual direction: “calling forth” (from the presence to the observer) and 
attending (from the observer to the presence).30 Thus, the nature and direction of these 
two schemas are logically incompatible. The sign points away attention from itselfr while 
the presence calls forth and brings itself to our attention.
Depending on the context, i.e. how, when and where the music is heard, as well 
as how the observer attends, using these schemas as analytical tools, we could say that 
music can either bring itself to attention or point away from itself. For example, in a 
concert hall, if the observer attends directly to the music, h presents itself to attention.
In an audition, the observer not only attends to the music, but from the music to the 
subject o f the skill level of the performer, so that both schemas might apply, depending 
on what aspect o f the situation is being explained. When a person walking down a street 
hears a particular kind of music coming out of a store, the music may represent the 
image that the store and its customers want to project. In that case, both schemas apply,
30 The representation schema also involves a necessary level of attention to the sign by the observer. 
However, what is important here is the defining action of each schema that will determine which 
schema fits specific experiential evidence.
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with the music calling attention not only to itself, but also calling attention and referring 
to the store/customer image.
In the literature on musical meaning, however, the examined context is one in 
which the listener attends directly to the mush:, not past it to the skill level of the 
performer or to an image. In terms of the experiential evidence, of these two schemas, 
the presentation schema fits better. Of the two groups that address this question — the 
music theorists and philosophers — the theorists, who show more loyalty to experiential 
evidence, choose the presentation schema as primary, while the philosophers, who show 
more loyalty to the objectivist/conduit frame of reference, choose the representation 
schema as primary. Zuckerkandl rejects the notion that music represents and does not 
discuss it. Cooke rejects it, with some exceptions, although he goes on to use a fairly 
literal analogy between music and language and thus uses it implicitly. Hanslick rejects 
representation, but still uses the term in his exploration of beauty in music. Langer and 
Addis use both schemas at the same time, building complex arguments to overcome their 
logical inconsistencies. Given Zuckerkandl and Cooke’s lack of discussion of these 
concepts, I will confine my comparison to Hanslick, Langer and Addis.
Ha n sl ic k  o n  P r e s e n t a t io n /R e p r e s e n t a t io n
Hanslick makes pragmatic use of the representation schema for the sake of 
argument. However, he ultimately declares that the representation involved has nothing 
to do with aesthetic enjoyment or understanding of music, depriving the representation 
schema o f any practical significance in the process of musical meaning.
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Hanslick begins his discussion with the question, “Does music represent 
feelings?” He conceptualizes feelings/emotions as very complex, involving memories of 
contrasting emotions, as well as physiological and conceptual/intellectual aspects. 
However, he identifies the intellectual aspects o f a feeling as the feeling proper. He first 
argues that feelings are connected with specific conceptions. For example, “The feeling 
of hope is inseparable from the conception of a happier state which is to come.” He then 
states:
On excluding these conceptions from consciousness, nothing remains but 
a vague sense of motion which at best could not rise above a general 
feeling of satisfaction or discomfort. The feeling of love cannot be 
conceived apart from the image of the beloved being, or apart from the 
desire and the longing for the possession of the object of our affections.
It is not the kind o f physical activity but the intellectual substratum, the 
subject underlying it, which constitutes it love (267, emphasis mine).
Given this distinction between the bodily and intellectual aspects of emotions, and the 
identification of the emotion proper with the intellectual, Hanslick can conclude, 
“Definite feelings and emotions are unsusceptible o f being embodied in music” (266).
Hanslick does not deny that the dynamic (or physical/physiological) properties of 
emotion can be represented in music:
[Music] may reproduce the motion accompanying physical action, 
according to its momentum: speed, slowness, strength, weakness, 
increasing and decreasing intensity (268).
He also states that, although music does not represent feelings, it nonetheless can 
awaken them in the listener (267).
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Although Hanslick admits that music can represent the dynamic aspects of 
feelings, he continues by arguing that, as “subjects,” the dynamic aspects o f feelings are 
not actually in the music. All that the music actually embodies is musical movement that 
plays out in various formal and rhythmic ways. For instance, part o f his description of 
Beethoven’s Overture to Prometheus:
[T]he notes of the first bar, after a M  into the lower fourth, rise gently 
and in rapid succession, a movement repeated in the second bar. The 
third and fourth bars continue in wider limits. The jet propelled by the 
fountain comes trickling down in drops, but rises once more, only to 
repeat in the following four bars the figure of the preceding four (271).
Hanslick identifies this kind of musical motion as the true subject o f music.
Any subject other than the one alluded to [the example above] we 
absolutely fail to find in the theme, and still less could we state what 
feeling it represents or necessarily arouses in the listener (271, emphasis 
mine).
He goes on to say that this is true for all examples of instrumental music.
To summarize Hanslick’s argument thus far, music can represent the dynamic, 
physical aspects of feelings, and arouse feelings in listeners. However, since a specific 
piece of music does not necessarily arouse the same feeling in different listeners, the 
subject o f musical representation is not the actual feelings that listeners experience. 
Instead, the subject of musical representation is dynamic motion in sound.
Hanslick calls dynamic motion in sound “musical ideas,” which originate in the 
composer’s imagination:
The object o f every art is to clothe in some material form an idea which 
has originated in the artist’s imagination. In music this idea is an acoustic
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one; it cannot be expressed in words and subsequently translated into 
sounds (292).
This statement would suggest that Hanslick believes that the musical sound re-presents 
and therefore refers the listener to a specific musical idea that exists in the mind of the 
composer previous to the actual musical sound.
However, Hanslick rejects outright the notion of reference to the composer’s 
state o f mind.
[W]e shall find that the thrilling efiect o f a theme is owing, not to the 
supposed extreme grief o f the composer, but to the extreme intervals; not 
to the beating o f his heart, but to the beating o f the drums; not to the 
craving of his soul, but to the chromatic progression o f the music. [...]
[W]e must remember that a scientific inquiry into the effect of a theme 
can deal only with such musical factors as have an enduring and objective 
existence, and not with the presumable state of mind in which the 
composer happened to be. The conclusion reached by arguing from the 
composer’s state o f mind directly to the effect of the music might, 
perchance, be correct; but the most important part of the syllogism, the 
middle term, i.e., the music itself would thus be ignore (294).
Hanslick thus severs the necessary referential link between the musical sound and the 
composer’s state o f mind. Once he has severed this link, he shows the whole 
representation schema to be moot to the question of finding out how music affects 
listeners.
Although he does not use the terms, Hanslick seems to prefer the presentation 
schema.31
31 Since Hanslick does not give a specific term to his schema, except to say that it is not representation, a 
number of different terms might apply. However, for the sake of argument, since Langer does use 
“presentation” (below), I have chosen to use “presentation.” Hanslick’s argument could equally apply to 
the schema of embodiment, in which music embodies patterns of motion, which I will develop in the 
next two chapters.
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Every art sets out from the sensuous and operates within its limits. [...]
[0]ur imagination, which is so constituted as to be affected by auditory 
impressions [...], delights in the sounding forms and musical structures 
and, conscious o f their sensuous nature, lives in the immediate and free 
contemplation o f the beautiful (290).
“Presentation” does not inherently involve the levels o f mediation involved in 
“representation.” Music that “presents” does not act as a medium for conveying 
something other than itself. It may be engaged with in and of itself. Hanslick recognizes 
that representation logically requires that music be a medium for re-presenting a subject, 
pointing the listener away from the music and toward the subject. As the above quote 
shows, he does not experience music as a sign that indexes something else more 
important. Rather, music’s importance lies in engaging with it in and of itself.
In the preface to the seventh edition of this book, Hanslick makes it clear that he 
thinks of music as something like an expressive presence, rather than a representation. 
He protests against critical characterizations of previous editions of the book that 
suggest that he believes that “music is absolutely destitute of feelings.” The main point 
of his book, according to Hanslick, was to protest the “widely accepted doctrine that the 
office o f music is ‘to represent feelings.’” He explains with an analogy:
The rose smells sweet, yet its subject is surety not the representation of 
the odor; the forest is cool and shady, but it certainty does not represent 
“the feeling of coolness and shadiness” (4).
The rose is a presence of sweetness, the forest a presence of cool shadiness.32
32 Or the rose embodies the quality of sweetness, the forest embodies the quality of shadiness.
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Hanslick then takes a clear stand against the idea that representation has anything 
to do with “the beautiful in music.”
It is no mere fencing with words to protest most emphatically against the 
notion of “representation,” because this notion has given rise to the 
greatest errors o f musical aesthetics. To “represent” something always 
involves the conception of two separate, distinct things, one of which 
must first be given, by a specific act, as explicit relation o f reference to 
the other (Langer’s translation, 657).
La n g e r  o n  P r e s e n t a t io n /R e p r e s e n t a t io n
In her direct reply to the quote above, Langer protests:
His statement o f the conditions for representation can, o f course, be 
challenged in the light o f a better knowledge of symbolism. What he says 
applies generally to literal, especially to scientific, expression; but it is not 
true of some other modes, which serve rather to formulate knowledge 
than to communicate its finished products (657).
Langer protests that Hanslick’s analysis of the representation schema states does not 
apply to her understanding of symbolic expression, which is more nuanced than mere 
literal referential representation:
[M]usic is ... formulation and representation o f emotions, moods, 
mental tensions and resolutions — a “logical picture” of sentient, 
responsive life, a source o f insight (654).
However, as I stated earlier, her explanation of the process of symbolism does involve 
the representation schema, exactly as Hanslick describes it, even though she raises it to a 
higher level o f abstraction.
The first step o f the conduit-representation schema is to pack meaning into a 
form. According to Langer, using his “artistic perspective,” a composer distances and
102
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
objectifies his own personal emotional experience and composes the distanced and 
objectified forms o f emotion in music.
A composer not only indicates, but articulates subtle complexes of feeling 
that language cannot even name, let alone set forth; he knows the forms 
o f emotion and can handle them, “compose” them (655, emphasis mine).
Music “indicates” (refers to) the non-personal forms o f emotion that the composer has 
composed in the music. In this way, music becomes the “logical expression” of the 
forms o f emotional life — “a ‘logical picture’ o f sentient, responsive life....” Through 
the form o f music, artistically distanced forms o f feelings are “presented directly to our 
understanding, that we may grasp, realize, comprehend these feelings.” In this way, 
music becomes “a source o f insight” into emotion for listeners (654, emphasis mine).
All o f the logical requirements of the reference schema are present in this 
formulation — a presently existing object that refers to a pre-existing subject enters into 
the minds of listeners. Even though Langer seems unaware of it, as her protest of 
Hanslick’s analysis of the representation schema shows, she is still bound by that very 
same schema. She says that the schema does not apply to symbolic expression, but she 
clearly bases her exposition of symbolic expression in music on the very same schema.
However, all o f that said, at the center o f Langer’s formulation of the process of 
symbolic expression is an interesting inconsistency with the logic of the representation 
schema — the notion of direct presentation.
Feelings revealed in music are essentially not “the passion, love or 
longing o f such-and-such an individual,” inviting us to put ourselves in 
that individual’s place, but are presented directly to our understanding,
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that we may grasp, realize, comprehend these feelings, without pretending 
to have them or imputing them to anyone else (654, emphasis mine).
In direct opposition to her statement that “A composer... indicates... subtle complexes 
of feeling,” she describes the central moment o f this experience as a direct presentation. 
Logically, (/‘feelings can be “presented directly” to a listener, then those feelings must be 
in the music itself not something that the music indicates. In direct presentation, no 
longer the medium for the message as required by the representation schema, the music 
becomes the message itself.
Langer’s use o f the term “reveal” in the above quote points directly to the logical 
inconsistency of her argument. “Reveal” has a number of synonyms that she might have 
chosen: display, disclose, manifest, divulge, disclose, etc. However, she chose “reveal” 
in this case and consistently uses the same term to express the same idea. The etymology 
of “reveal” is re- (meaning back, backward as in “recall”) + velare to cover, veil. If the 
morphemes are taken literally, “reveal” means pulling back a veil. The biblical use of 
“revelation” employs this sense: made known through divine inspiration — the “veil” of 
mediation between human existence and divine draws back so that knowledge may be 
gained through direct, immediate presence of the divine. Thus, “reveal” indicates an 
engagement with “direct presence” in a way that none of its synonyms do.
And yet, at the same time, Langer’s formulation preserves the structures o f the 
representation schema. If music “reveals” the logical forms of feelings, they must in 
some way already exist so that they can be seen when the veil is pulled away. The 
imagery of “reveal” suggests that the logical forms of feelings are not simply in the music
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as it plays in real time. “Hidden” somewhere, perhaps in the composer’s mind, music, as 
a medium, reveals them.33 Through her use o f the term “reveal,” Langer herself reveals 
the tension in her argument between the representation and presentation schemas.
Langer seems aware o f this tension on some level In order to mediate it, she 
uses the concept “psychical distance.” At one and the same time, “psychical distance” 
unhinges the music from the personal realm of the composer and reattaches it to the 
personal realm of the listener. According to the concept of “psychical distance,” when 
composers objectify and distance their personal experiences, they project those emotions 
out of their personal specific and concrete contexts. Although it removes the personal 
thus making them non-personal this projection from the ordinary does not make them 
general or impersonal, as the notion of “distancing” might imply.
The notion o f “psychical distance” as the hall-mark of every artistic 
“projection” o f experience,... does not make the emotive contents 
typical general impersonal, or “static” (655).
Instead, by removing the distractions of the personal contexts, “distancing” makes these 
experiences more directly conceivable, more directly present:
[Distance] makes them conceivable, so that we can envisage and 
understand them without verbal helps, and without the scaffolding o f an 
occasion wherein they figure (as all self-expression implies an occasion, a 
cause — true or imaginery [sic] — for the subject’s temporary feelings.)
(655).
33 Note the suggested connection between music as a medium and a psychic or spiritual medium.
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Although Langer does not use these terms, she implies that rather than making personal 
experiences general, “distancing” in artistic perspective “purifies” the experiences to their 
essences.
Encountering these artistically conveyed essences, listeners (which includes the 
composer/player) can “grasp” them in a more direct manner. Because o f that directness, 
the experience can feel, to the listener, extremely personal Langer quotes Bullough:
[D]istance does not imply an impersonal purely intellectually interested 
relation.... On the contrary, it describes a personal relation, often highly 
emotionally colored, but o f a peculiar character. Its peculiarity lies in 
that the personal character of the relation has been, so to speak, filtered.
It has been cleared of the practical concrete nature of its appeal.. (655- 
56).
The concept of “psychical distance” is an ingenious solution to the problems 
caused by using both representation and presentation schemas at the same time. It 
detaches representational reference from the subjective, personal life o f the composer 
(although Langer reattaches it to a hidden “content” that is “revealed”).34 It nullifies the 
referential action of pointing away from music to a subject and allows the listener to bask 
in direct presence. It “purifies” personal experience to its “essence” (my terms) so that it 
can be experienced more directly, not mediated by specific context or by the structures
34 “* Psychical Distance’ is simply the experience of apprehending through a symbol what was not 
articulated before. The content of art is always real; the mode of its presentation, whereby it is at once 
revealed and “distanced,” may be a fiction’ (656). Langer’s use of “a fiction” is unclear, both out of 
context as I have presented it and in its original context Given the first part of her sentence “The 
content of art is always real” it would seem passible that she means that the mode of presentation may 
be unreal or untrue (fiction, as opposed to non-fiction). However, her next statement “”It may also be 
music, or, as in the dance, motion” makes it seem that she does not mean that the mode of presentation 
is unreal or untrue. She simply means that one mode of presenting the content of art is through fictional 
stories. Alternatively, she may mean that the mode of presentation is a “fiction” in the sense of 
“something invented by an imagination.”
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of the representation schema. As a bonus, it manages to mitigate against the construal of 
meaning in the conduit metaphor as purely intellectual, since experiencing the directly 
meaningful essences o f emotional experiences would be highly moving.
With the concept o f psychical distance, Langer manages to preserve the terms of 
the conduit metaphor (she uses them freely, especially form and content) but seemingly 
escape their bounds at the same time. She has at her access all of the logic and terms of 
both the representation and the presentation schemas. However, even though she has 
both schemas at her disposal, in the final analysis, the presentation schema is primary.
As much as she criticizes Hanslick, quite vehemently at times, on a concrete level, she 
seems to be saying very much the same thing: that music is not a personal expression of 
the composer, but that it is expressive in nature and it affects listeners in a very personal 
way.
Aoois o n  P r e s e n t a t i o n / R e p r e s e n t a t i o n
In O f Mind and Music Laird Addis, who characterizes his work as an extension 
of Langer’s, also displays the tension between the schemas of “presentation” and 
“representation.” However, he mediates this tension differently than Langer does.
Langer begins with a representation schema, nuances it with the notion o f “psychical 
distancing,” and in general characterizes music as a “presentational” symbol rather than 
“representational.”35 While Langer manages to circumvent the logical tension between
35 Note, however, that, because Langer’s understanding of “symbolization” is entangled with the 
representation schema, the term “presentation symbol” entails both the presentation and representation 
schemas.
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the presentation and representation schemas with relative ease and elegance with a single 
mediating concept, Addis does not He tries to negotiate between them by redefining 
“representation” so that it subsumes “presentation.” This strategy creates a very 
complex argument, since the distinction between the two schemas is simply blurred, 
rather than mediated with a clear structure or pivot concept. In my brief presentation of 
his argument, I can neither do justice to its complexity, nor to all o f the nuances he 
displays in his discussions of specific key terms.36
In his third chapter, “Representation,” Addis presents his rationale for choosing 
the language o f “representation” over “presentation.” As he sees it, the word 
“representation”
has its disadvantages, especially in its suggestion that whatever is doing 
the representing somehow only “again” or “indirectly” brings before the 
mind something that could be simply presented. This is a disadvantage 
for two reasons...:
1) (Tjn the fundamental form of representation, which is that of
consciousness itself there is of necessity no distinction between 
presentation and representation except in an altogether different sense.
Indeed, to regard consciousness itself as a form of representation... 
invites unfortunate associations with theories of perception known as 
representationalism..., which are rightly discredited for positing some 
kind o f intermediary, whether called an “idea” or a “sense” or “sense 
data,” between the act of awareness and its object.
36 As I see it, due to the feet that he is working within a system of logic and terms that does not suit what 
he is trying to understand, despite his clear intelligence, Addis sometimes contradicts himself without 
even realizing he has done so. In addition, these conditions (the necessity of remodeling structures of 
thought that do not relate well to the subject of thought) create an argument that is overly complex, quite 
frankly frustrating to read and make sense o f and ultimately unsatisfying. Although it demonstrates his 
command of the philosophical concerns, it neither rings true to experience nor satisfactorily explains 
experience.
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2) Langer herself characterizes symbols in the arts as “presentational,”
contrasting them, to be sure, not with “representational” but with 
“discursive” symbols (33).
However, according to Addis, the term “representation” has two advantages that 
override its disadvantages:
1) The mam advantage to the language of representation is its indifference to 
the notion of truth. Paintings represent people and ruins and bowls of 
fruit without thereby being either true or false. Representation as such is 
not assertion or affirmation, although... one can assert that a certain 
representation is or is not faithful to its object or that its object does or 
does not exist.37
2) The other relevant advantage is that, in anthropological fact, the language 
of representation is the broadest and most common (33-34).38
Given the above recognition that “representation” is problematic, Addis must, of course,
redefine it in order to overcome those problems. He describes three problems that must
be overcome: 1) representation’s indirectness of reference — the fact that the
representation schema is inherently three term, with a sign that represents a subject to a
person — when a simple two term relation, like presence, might suffice; 2)
37This concern with truth or falsity is probably connected to the fact that not everyone who hears a 
specific musical piece will characterize it in the same way. The same piece may seem sad to person A 
but not to person B. If we think that the music “presents sadness, then person B can say that the 
statement “the music presents sadness” is false. If we think that the music “represents” sadness, person 
B can only say that it is a poor representation. This point of view, of course, totally disregards what 
person B actually does experience upon hearing that music. The strategy inherent in this concern with 
truth or falseness is not aimed toward explaining the experience of everyone who hears a particular 
piece, but toward defending a specific, individual interpretive experience of the piece. An adequate 
account of musical meaning would be able to explain multiple interpretations, so that persons A and B 
could better understand each other’s interpretation and each would be valid, within constraints made 
clear in the account In addition, an adequate account of musical meaning would include a description 
of the constraints on the meaning process, so that it would be possible to explain why some 
interpretations ring true and others strike insiders to the system of meaning with a resounding thud.
3S It probably goes without saying that while I agree that the language of representation is quite broad 
and common in this literature, in and of itself, this feet does not particularly recommend it as an 
epistemological tool.
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representation’s inherent repetition in time/space of something that has already existed in 
another time/space and 3) its inherent involvement in levels o f mediation not apparent in 
presentation.
Addis solves these problems with his general definition o f representation, which 
reverses the direction of the action of the representation schema, in which the sign points 
away from itself to its meaning, to a direction o f action that is more like the presentation 
schema, in which the sign (or presence) calls the attention of the observer to itself.
A representation is anything whatsoever that serves to bring to mind, in 
either conscious or unconscious awareness, something (whether existent 
or not) other than itself (35).
Addis’ action of the sign, described in the terms “brings to mind,” is more like that of a 
presence which, in “calling forth” to an observer’s attention, does bring itself to that 
observer’s mind. The only difference in action between Addis’ sign and that of a 
presence is that the sign brings something other than itself to the attention of the 
observer.
In addition, Addis’ definition of representation remodels its schema to be more 
like presentation by creating a two-term relationship from a three term one. 
“Presentation” involves two terms: 1) a thing and 2) a person’s awareness of that thing, 
which in objectivist thinking would be cast as a “mental representation” of the thing 
present. “Representation” usually involves three terms: 1) a sign, which refers to 2) a 
subject/object, and 3) an awareness, through the sign, o f the subject/object. By defining 
a representation as “anything that serves to bring to mind... something other than itself”
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Addis conflates the subject/object with its mental representation (similar to Saussure’s 
signifiant [signifier]-57gn//?e [concept signified], and unlike Peirce’s object-sign- 
interpretant). In other words, his schema accounts for the sign (“anything that serves”) 
and interpretant (“to bring to mind something other than itself’), but not the object.
This conflation creates many problems. For example, if you interpret the schema 
in this definition literally, a representation o f a cat can bring an actual cat into the mind 
o f the observer. Additionally, it allows for the members of strings o f free association to 
serve as representations of one another. For example, since cup -» (brings to mind) 
saucer —> milk —> cat -» dog —> hair -» brush —> comb —» cock —> barnyard —> bam —> 
red -> blue -► sky, etc., each word would be the representation of the one following it, 
since the first brought the second to mind. In addition, this definition would allow the 
sensation o f hunger to be a representation o f a particular food, since the hunger brought 
the food to mind. Having read the rest of his argument, I doubt seriously that Addis 
intended to set up a definition of representation that would admit these kinds of 
examples. Presented with my analysis, he might protest that he did not intend the 
interpretation I have given. However, without giving voice to its problems, he takes full 
advantage of this definition.
The definition serves the purpose o f overcoming the problems with 
representation noted earlier. The first problem he noted with “representation” is that 
“whatever is doing the representing somehow only ‘again’ or ‘indirectly’ brings 
[something else] before the mind....” By conflating the subject/object and the mental
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representation, he solves both the problem o f necessary repetition o f one by the other 
and the problem o f indirectness o f reference. Since the subject/object “out there” is not 
explicitly a part o f the schema, the representation can bring the mental representation 
directly to mind. With this definition, “anything that serves to bring to mind... 
something other than itself” Addis also manages to rid himself o f unwanted levels of 
mediation, since the action o f“bringing to mind” is direct in a way that referring outward 
in order to bring to mind is not.
In addition to allowing Addis to overcome his initial problems with “reference,” 
this definition allows him to create a typology o f reference that includes two types that 
involve three terms (conventional and quasi-natural) and one that involves only two 
terms (natural). He does not explain how he can logically move from a two-termed 
general definition to three-termed specific types. He just does it, which suggests that he 
did not realize that his general definition is two-termed, because he generally is careful in 
his argument to address such problems. However, its unexplained nature is not the main 
problem with this move. The main problem is that, even though he proposes two 
different types of three-termed representation, they are based on the general definition, 
which suggests the presentation schema in all its directness. He simply conflates the two 
schemas, using the parts o f each that are convenient to his argument and ignoring the 
logical contradictions involved.
Beyond this chapter on representation, however, in presenting the answers to the 
question that framed his whole argument, Addis uses the term “presentation.”
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The quasi-natural signs that music contains on my account present to us 
those states o f consciousness that are the having of emotions, the being in 
certain moods, the awareness of sensations and (possibly) other kinds of 
awarenesses. Music does so by having the forms and contents it does 
have and it presents both the forms and the contents of those kinds of 
states o f consciousness (75, emphasis mine).
Although Addis insists on using the language o f representation, in the final analysis the 
language of presentation prevails.
D is c u s s io n  o f  P r e s e n t a t io n /R e p r e s e n t a t io n
Both Langer and Addis manage, although in different ways, to mediate between 
two schemas that are logically incompatible. The logical tension central to these 
arguments requires a great deal of intelligence and creativity to overcome. This strategy 
of combining the incompatible creates very intricate arguments fraught with the 
possibility o f logical inconsistency. The strategy requires redefining words that mean not 
only through iconic matching of their dictionary definition or their morphemes, but also 
through metonymic access to entire logical schemas. It asks too much of a reader to 
require them to keep in mind a new dictionary definition while at the same time, they are 
unable to erase the metonymic activation in themselves of familiar logical schemas. It is 
very confusing to keep in mind that A = B, when the experience that is recorded in you, 
body and mind, tells you that A = A. As the common phrase, “I’ve got a feeling in my 
gut that something is wrong with this argument,” shows, the gut often knows the 
problems in an argument before the mind does. In the final analysis, combining the 
incompatible does not serve to explain to the reader, but rather to index the intelligence 
and creativity required to create the argument.
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If combining the two schemas is not the answer, what is? Choosing one o f these 
two schemas or Aiding another. Even though two of these three writers tried to 
incorporate the representation schema, they all ended up using presentation. It simply 
fits the experiential evidence better than does representation. Music does call forth to 
listeners. They attend to the music itself, not to something beyond it that it refers to.
Even so, I do not particularly like the presentation schema either. This schema 
paints music as a thing present in front of the listener that he then takes into himself.
This portrait does not fit my experience particularly well, since it suggests both that 
music is a static object and that a spatial gap exists between the music and myself that 
must be overcome. To be sure, a spatial gap exists between the source o f the music and 
myself and that spatial gap inheres in the experience of hearing music in that I can locate 
the source outside myself in a particular place. But when I am “into” the music itself I 
am not particularly aware of its source and the sonic experience of the music is entirety 
immediate. Music invades me and becomes a part of me in a way that a “present thing” 
could not. It is not a “thing” “out there”; rather, it lives in and through me.
The presentation schema is based on visual experience, more than aural 
experience. Seeing involves a gap between the seer and the seen. Indeed, if something 
is too close, it must be pulled away so that the eyes can focus properly. Stephen Handel 
describes the different relationships between world and person created by listening and 
seeing:
Listening puts me in the world. Listening gives me a sense o f emotion, a 
sense of movement, and a sense of being there that is missing when I am 
looking. I am more frightened by thunder than by lightning, even though
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I know that thunder is harmless and lightning is deadly. I feel far more 
isolation living with ear plugs than living with blinders. Listening is 
centripetal; it pulls you into the world. Looking is centrifugal; it 
separates you from the world (xi).
When I “get into” music, I feel a merging with the music, an immersion in it that does 
not match the “thing before oneself* aspect of the presentation schema. It is true that 
music calls for my attention, but once I give my attention over to the music, it no longer 
seems like a presence out there, but rather an internal activation of parts o f myself that 
cannot be activated in the same way without music. In short, the music plays me.39
In the next two chapters I will propose a schema with epistemological metaphors 
based on aural and tactile experience that accounts for the sense of being played by 
music. In addition to accounting for the prototypical listening situation — listening 
attentively to a concert or recording — this schema can also account for those situations 
in which music is background, but still affects mood.
Having shown the tension between presentation and representation, I now turn to 
reference, which is a logical entailment of representation.
39 Gadamer (1982) relates the merging of self with a work of art with its mode of being, which he likens 
to the mode of being of play. He finds that the sense of “play” that stays consistent across its different 
uses (play of light and dark, play of forces, play on words) is a “to-and-fro movement which is not tied 
to any goal which would bring it to an end.... The movement which is play has no goal which brings it 
to an end; rather it renews itself in constant repetition. The movement backwards and forwards is 
obviously so central for the definition of a game that it is not important who or what performs this 
movement” (93). Thus, Gadamer wrests agency from the players and gives it to the game. “The 
structure of play absorbs the player into itself and thus takes from him the burden of the initiative” (94). 
“[A]I1 playing is a being-played” (95). Czikszentmilhalyi (1982) relates the merging of self with art to 
the psychological state he calls “flow,” in which an individual experiences a level of challenge roughly 
equal to his skills (17). This roughly equal ratio produces optimal experience in which action merges 
with awareness and self awareness dissipates (22).
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Music as Referential
Representation entails the notion that meaning arises through reference. 
However, as the above confusion between “representation” and “presentation” 
demonstrates, experientially, music does not seem to refer to something other than itself. 
Instead, it calls attention to itself Nevertheless, scholars who write about music still 
sometimes raise the issue o f reference in relation to musical meaning.
Given their positions on representation, the position of those writers whom I 
discussed above is fairly easy to predict. According to Hanslick, who does not believe 
music represents, music and other arts can infer wider realms of experience, but that 
those wider realms of experience are not the referred-to subject o f the art, in the sense 
that they the art represents them (268). Through the process of symbolization, Langer 
believes that composers both indicate (refer to) and articulate “subtle complexes of 
feeling that language cannot even name” (655). Addis centers his discussion on 
representation and acknowledges that representation entails reference, since he refers to 
representation as “the domain of reference, symbolism, aboutness, intentionality, and 
ofhess” (33, emphasis mine). However, he does not treat reference explicitly.
Cooke’s position is rather contradictory. Although he rejects, with some 
exceptions, the notion that music is a representative art, he also believes that it expresses 
the composer’s subjective experience, as well as universal emotion.
[Mjusic is, in feet, ‘extra-musical’ in the sense that poetry is ‘extra- 
verbal’, since notes, like words, have emotional connotations; it is, let us 
repeat, the supreme expression o f universal emotions, in an entirely 
personal way, by the great composers (210-11).
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In the way that Cooke uses it, “expression” entails reference. If  he only claimed that 
music expressed universal emotion, we might be able to see music as simply “expressive” 
of certain qualities that awaken emotion in listeners. That kind of “expressiveness” does 
not entail reference. However, since he insists at length (189-203) that this is a personal 
expression, logically, the music refers to the subjective lives o f the composers.
Me y e r  o n  R e f e r e n c e
Of these authors, Meyer treats reference most directly and at greatest length. He 
uses it to distinguish between different kinds of musical meaning: music that refers 
outward to aspects of the extramusical realm and music that refers only to other aspects 
of the intramusical realm. He then constructs a complex schema of intramusical 
reference that consists o f a musical stimulus, a listener’s expectation, and a musical 
consequent.
Meyer distinguishes between absolutists and referentialists. This distinction 
focuses on the boundary between intra- and extramusical, and the nature of musical 
reference within those systems. Absolutists believe the meaning of music lies totally 
within the musical realm, in the perception of musical relationships, Le., that musical 
meaning is “purely” musical in nature. In contrast, referentialists believe that although 
musical meaning may be “purely” musical, it may also refer to the extra musical world of 
“concepts, actions, emotional states, and character” (1).
Meyer later clarifies the differences in the nature of reference (indication) m these 
two positions.
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A stimulus may indicate events or consequences which are different from 
itself in kind, as when a word designates or points to an object or action 
which is not itself a word. Or a stimulus may indicate or imply events or 
consequences which are of the same kind as the stimulus itself as when a 
dim light on the eastern horizon heralds the coming of day (35).
The referential position entails musicals elements that indicate something different from 
other musical elements. The absolute position entails musical elements that indicate 
other musical elements.
Meyer states that he believes that both kinds of reference may occur. However, 
his theory only deals with intramusical reference. In speaking about intramusical 
reference he does not use the term “refer” but rather “indicate.” In feet, he uses no 
terms that suggest the representation schema. Instead, he uses terms borrowed from 
behaviorist psychology: stimulus-response.40 The music becomes a stimulus, to which 
the listener responds.
What, then, is the nature of reference (or indication) in the stimulus-response 
schema? How can a stimulus indicate events? In a simple stimulus-response schema, the 
only way that the stimulus points is toward the person being stimulate. Central to the 
stimulus-response schema is the stimulus, which etymology links to “stylus.” In all of its 
meanings — writing or marking instrument, needle, or tool for cutting grooves in vinyl 
records — “stylus” relates to an object with a sharp point. Etymologically speaking, 
that sharp point o f “stylus” metonymically transferred to “stimulus.” If a stimulus is, 
indeed, a sharp point, then it literally points at the person. In addition, even if not
40 This language is not surprising, given the fact that behaviorism was in its prime while Meyer wrote 
this book.
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literally a sharp point, it indicates a subsequent response from the person. In either case, 
the stimulus points toward the person, not toward a non-human event.
However, Meyer’s stimulus seems to point not to the observer, but to musical 
events, which he calls the “consequent.” His schema of indication is more complex than 
a simple stimulus-response schema. Even though he does not use terms from the 
representation schema, he melds the stimulus-response schema with Peirce’s familiar 
semiotic triad, which is consistent with the representation schema: meaning is a triadic 
relationship between object, sign and interpretant (which occurs in a conscious 
observer).41
Meaning... is not in either the stimulus, or what it points to, or the 
observer. Rather it arises out of... the “triadic” relationship between (1) 
an object or stimulus; (2) that to which the stimulus points — that which 
is its consequent, and (e) the conscious observer (34, emphasis mine).
This complex formulation alters the temporal aspect of the representation schema and 
also appears to change the nature o f the stimulus. Rather than being something that 
stimulates the observer directly, the stimulus is treated as if it were a sign that refers. 
However, that sign does not refer to something that exists before it in time (Peirce’s 
object), but to something that will exist after it ceases to exist — the consequent. 
Temporally, the consequent is similar to the mental representation (or “interpretant”) of 
the usual representation schema, since it occurs after the musical stimulus, just as the
41 Meyer does not attribute this schema to Peirce, but to Cohen and Mead. He does not provide a 
citation or a bibliography, so I do not know if there is a connection between Peirce and Cohen and 
Mead. However, Peirce writes extensively of triadic relationships of meaning.
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mental representation occurs after the sign. Nevertheless, as stated above, it is not a 
mental representation but a musical sound.
However, with the introduction of “expectation,” it becomes apparent that 
Meyer's schema is more complex than the above description suggests. “Expectation” 
makes it clear that what occurs consequently to the stimulus is not only a specific, 
concrete musical sound, but a mental representation of that possible sound, as welL 
Through conditioning, the listener learns to expect certain musical sounds to follow 
others.42 If Z very often foDows Y, then the listener comes to expect Z after Y. When Y 
is heard, it stimulates an expectation of Z: a mental representation that suggests the 
strong possibility o f Z. With the addition of expectation into the schema, its time-line 
becomes stimulus — expectation — consequent (which either satisfies the expectation or 
frustrates it).
Adding expectation into the schema clarifies Meyer’s use of “stimulus” above, 
where “sign” seemed more appropriate. In Meyer’s complex formulation, “stimulus” 
becomes multivalent. From the point of view of an objective observer, the musical 
stimulus excites in the mind of the listener the possibility o f a certain musical relationship 
— an expectation. From the point of view of the listener, who attends more to the music 
than to his responses to it, the musical stimulus simply points to the possible consequent.
In summary, Meyer’s schema of intramusical meaning involves a triadic 
relationship between 1) the musical sound, which stimulates 2) the listener’s expectation,
42 Note again the connection to behaviorism in this definition of learning as conditioned response.
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based on past experience that 3) a specific musical consequent will occur. As he states 
it,
I f  on the basis of past experience, a present stimulus leads us to expect a 
more or less definite consequent musical event, then that stimulus has 
meaning.
From this it follows that a stimulus or gesture which does not point to or 
arouse expectations o f a subsequent musical event or consequent is 
meaningless (35).
With this complex schema, Meyer explains how music means in the intramusical or, as he 
sometimes terms it, the “purely” musical realm.43
D is c u s s io n
The question now becomes how “pure” is this musical realm? What and where 
are the boundaries of the “purely” musical? Of the music “itself,” it might be relatively 
easy to draw the boundary at the particular playing that the listener hears. It is not so 
easy to draw boundaries around the listener, though. What is the nature of the listener 
and what parts of himself does he bring to the task of making music mean? Meyer sums 
up the listener’s part in the term “expectation,” which he says arises from past experience 
with music, experience that he casts as a conditioned response. He characterizes
43 Zuckerkandl’s concept of “dynamic qualities” refers intramusically in a way that is coherent with 
Meyer’s account Recall that, according to Zuckerkandl, in a tonal context, each scale step has its own 
particular dynamic quality in relation to the tonic: “a state of disturbed equilibrium, as a tension, 
tendency, almost a will” (19). In other words, each scale step points toward the tonic, but in a way 
unique to that particular scale step. “It is this different gesture, which gives each tone its particular and 
distinctive dynamic quality, which sounds in it and which we hear in it, when we hear it as a tone in a 
melody. This and nothing else is the content, the meaning, of its utterance, its musical meaning” (35). 
The difference between Meyer and Zuckerkandl is that Meyer’s schema locates the referring power in 
the interaction between the listener and the musical sound, while Zuckerkandl locates it in the 
“supermaterial” world.
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expectation and learning as mental in nature. This characterization suggests that he 
would draw the boundary o f the “purely musical” aspect of human beings between the 
mind and the body.
Meyer does raise the possibility ofbodily involvement in the process of musical 
meaning, but ultimately rejects it.44 Referring to the body’s part m musical meaning as 
“anticipatory motor attitudes,” he identifies a correlation between the kind of motor 
attitudes that a listener experiences and the kind of music being listened to.
Motor attitudes and responses involve the voluntary muscle system, and, 
aside from a general tensing o f the muscles related to all feelings o f effort, 
o f which listening to music is a special kind, they are more or less specific 
to particular styles and forms and tend to change with changes in the 
stimulus conditions (79).
However, Meyer does not relate the correlation between music and motor 
response to any kind o f direct connection between body and music, but to the following 
kinds of clues, which provide less direct means.
Anticipatory motor attitudes [...] are brought into play on the basis of:
(a) information as to composer, style, or form which leads the listener to 
expect a repetition of past motor experience evoked by the particular type 
of work; (b) program notes or other statements as to tempo, volume, 
mode, mood, and so forth that supply information as to the appropriate 
motor attitude; and (c) visual clues provided by performers m the form o f 
gestures and postures, which lead the listener to assume a like attitude...
(79).
44 Charles Keil (1994 [1966]) also critiques Meyer’s dismissal of the body’s part in musical meaning.
He links Meyer’s dismissal of the body with theoretical notions of music as form and product and offers 
a complementary view gleaned from his experience with jazz. From the point of view of lived, bodily 
meaningful experience of jazz, Keil offers a complementary view of musical meaning — one that is 
more processual and feeling in nature. He argues that this embodied view of meaning from jazz is more 
likely to be applicable to many world musics, since they, too, tend to be more improvised and 
spontaneous than Western art music. I would suggest that much of Keil’s view applies to Western art 
music as well as it does to jazz, since it remedies the lack ofbody in Meyer’s work.
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Meyer does not address what grounds these connections — how they can be made in 
first place. The third chie — visual entrainment with the performer’s gestures — does 
not need further grounding. Human beings are “wired” to entrain with people and other 
events around them, as the dance of entrainment that occurs between parents and their 
babies shows. However, in reference to a) expectations based on repetition of past 
motor experience evoked by the same style and b) program notes that suggest the 
appropriate motor attitude, I would ask, What grounds these clues to begin with? In the 
learning o f style, how does one ever experience a motor response in the first place? If 
motor response is based solely on past learning, then it has no way to arise in the first 
place. In regards to program notes, how does one know what motor attitude is 
appropriate to a given program? What grounds the connection of appropriateness?
One might think that the two problematic “clues” are grounded in the one that is 
not: bodily entrainment with performers. Even if this is partially the case, I do not 
believe it can explain bodily involvement in musical meaning in its entirety. Most of the 
movements that performers make relate mainly to sound production and so are 
constrained by the physical act of playing then1 particular instrument. Some visual 
aspects o f the sound production match the actual sound, others do not. If it were 
possible to turn off your hearing and predict what the music sounded like from visual 
clues only, certain aspects o f the musical sound might be apparent, others would not. 
Most concretely, you can see the beat, and through it, the tempo. You can sometimes 
force and momentum through the specific kinds o f movements made to produce tone and
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body swaying, respectively. If  you viewed force and momentum in combination, you 
might be able to see the general tenor o f the music — if it is calm and soothing or fast 
and aggressive. However, a great deal o f the musical “landscape” would be difficult to 
predict, especially aspects related to “up” and “down,” volume, line, texture, and 
harmony. In feet, instrumentalists sometimes produce “up” and “down” in music by 
moving sideways on their instrument or even in the opposite direction: down for “up,” 
etc. These aspects of music, especially “up” and “down” are a part of “anticipatory 
motor attitudes.” If they can’t be grounded by looking at performers, how are they 
grounded?
My answer to these questions, developed in the remainder of this dissertation, is 
that our understanding of music is grounded in metaphors based on aspects of bodily 
experience in the world, like motion through space and experience with fluid substances. 
These metaphors ground the connection between music and motor response. For 
instance, the bodily response to a high, fast, sparsely textured flute piece like the scherzo 
from Mendelssohn’s “Midsummer Night’s Dream” feels “light” and “airy” because we 
understand the flute sound to be moving in the higher levels o f musical space and 
because, since its motion is fast and fluid, its “body” must be light and responsive.
Even though Meyer raises the issue o f bodily engagement in the meaning process, 
he ultimately evaluates its importance as secondary to and uninvolved with mental 
engagement.
In conclusion we may say that there appears to be nothing autonomous 
and independent about the motor response to music. Everything which 
occurs as a motor response can be accounted for in terms o f mental
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activity and, since the converse of this is not true, music is best examined 
in terms of mental behavior (82).
Meyer’s understanding of the relationship between body and mind is true to the 
objectivist frame. The body is not property part of the equation and therefore is 
exchided from the “purely musical”
This exclusion of the body creates the conditions for the false dichotomy — 
between intra- and extramusical realms — on which Meyer bases the absolute/referential 
distinction. If, as I have suggested above and will argue in the remainder of this 
dissertation, embodied experience in the world grounds the understanding o f intramusical 
meaning, then no clear line exists between intra- and extramusical. The “purely” musical 
simply does not exist. Absolute music may not refer directly to the outside world, but it 
is nonetheless inextricably linked to it through its grounding in listeners’ embodied 
experience. If we recognize the bodily grounding of musical meaning, then the falseness 
o f the intra-/extra- dichotomy becomes clear.
A stance that includes the link between musical meaning and embodied 
experience in the world does not require this false dichotomy. Briefly, because this 
music is grounded in metaphors o f lived, bodily experience, it can embody patterns of 
that experience and evoke them in sound. Listeners may relate those patterns to a 
specific program, thereby allowing them to invoke that program in their memory. Or 
they may allow the patterns to invoke what they will, without links to anything specific. 
Although music may refer to a program, it does not represent that program, but rather
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evokes it. This kind o f meaning is not tied to reference, but to evocation of patterns of 
lived experience in the listener. I will develop this further in later chapters.
Although Meyer is still clearly thinking within the objectivist framework, with the 
notion of expectation he takes a major step outside that frame. It is a step toward an 
experiential account of meaning, in which meaning is characterized “in terms of the 
nature and experience o f the organisms doing the thinking* or in this case, doing the 
listening (Lakoff 1987,266, emphasis in original)- Expectation takes into account the 
experience of the listener. However, since, as developed by Meyer, it excludes bodily 
aspects of experience, it does not take full account of the nature o f the listener. Because 
of this exclusion, the only aspect of the listener that can resonate with musical meaning is 
the disembodied mind. I suggest that, although his account rings true to some degree, its 
disembodied nature is, in part, why Meyer’s account of musical meaning lacks the power 
to probe the great depths of the experience of musical meaning.
Objectivist thinking dictates that meaning is a matter of reference, an action that 
points attention away from the sign to its subject. As we saw in the section on 
representation above, a schema in which music points away from itself presents 
problems, since attention tends to be on the music itself. Meyer manages to create an 
account that is true to the experience of attending to music and not beyond it, but also 
maintains the idea that meaning is a matter of reference. Although his explanation rings 
true to some degree, since it is tied to reference, and reference that is entirely mental in 
nature, it accounts only for meaning related to feelings o f satisfaction and surprise. He
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does not account for reference that is bodily in nature, reference linked to its original 
meaning: re + ferre — to carry. Music can sometimes ferry a listener away to seemingly 
transcendental realms. Satisfaction and surprise do not sufficiently account for the 
intensity of this meaning. I will speak further o f Meyer and the expectation schema in 
chapter three.
The Relationship between Listener & Music: Addis’ “Timeless, Changeless Worlds” 
The listener and music together form a system in which meaning arises. In the 
objectivist system o f logic, the part is prior to the whole. Thus, good explanation 
requires an account o f both how the parts relate to one another and how they cohere 
with one another in forming the whole. In the logic o f objectivism, then, one might raise 
the issue of how listener and music cohere to form a single system.
The question of coherence is at the heart of Addis’ argument. He explicitly 
locates “music” outside human minds: “Music is indubitably a product o f minds; but, 
like most artifacts, it is ontologically independent of them” (57). In his preface, he states 
the main concern of his argument.
The mam contribution of this study is to formulate and defend a theory 
about what might be called the ontological affinity o f mind and music.
Somewhat more precisely, it is sounds and conscious states that I assert 
to have the affinity, a kind of similarity that grounds the process whereby 
music represents to us certain emotions, moods, and other states o f mind 
(xi).
Addis’ concern with the coherence of listener and music can be seen in his use of the 
term “affinity” to relate mind and music. “Affinity” [ad- + finis end or border) suggests
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the joining o f two unlike things: a relationship by marriage (as contrasted with 
relationship by blood). It also refers to a force that attracts two things together. In his 
exploration of the affinity between mind and music, Addis follows the objectivist path of 
discovery — locate the building blocks, then find their essential natures thus discovering 
how they relate and cohere.
In order to answer the question of the relationship between listener and music, 
Addis redefines representation. Based on the general definition discussed above, he 
creates a typology of three kinds of representation. Note that, in this typology, he is 
most concerned with the natures of both the representation and its user. In other words, 
he is interested in what in their nature recommends them to each other so that they can 
relate to each other as representation-user.
A conventional representation is one in which there is nothing in the 
nature o f the representation and nothing in the nature o f its user that 
indicates or specifies or determines that it shall represent what it does 
represent. ... [A] natural representation is one in which the 
representation, by its inherent nature, determines both that and what it 
represents. Finally, “between” conventional and natural representation, a 
quasi-natural representation is one that, with respect to some species, is 
such that, given both the nature of the representation and the nature of 
the species, it does in lawful necessity represent what it does represent to 
the members of that species (35-6).
Addis calls music a “quasi-natural” representation, which means that “given both the 
nature o f the representation and the nature o f the species, it does in lawful necessity 
represent what it does represent to the members of that species.” His next move, as 
dictated by both this definition and the objectivist path of discovery, is to discover what
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in the essential natures of music and listener (which he reduces to “states of 
consciousness”) creates this relationship o f lawfully necessary representation.
In subsequent chapters, titled “Consciousness,” and “Time and Sound,” Addis 
explores the nature of both music and mind. In this exploration he tries to discover the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the ontological existence of music and mind. 
Discovering necessary and sufficient conditions is the objectivist strategy for defining 
categories. According to Lakoff, “On the objectivist view, things are in the same 
category if and only if they have certain properties in common. Those properties are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for defining the category” (1987, xiv). Addis wants 
to find the ontological properties that mind and music have in common. He sets about 
discovering how they are in the same ontological category so that they are no longer 
separate components, but can be seen to relate and cohere. Thus, he looks for the 
necessary and sufficient ontological conditions for their existence.
Addis considers three conditions for existence: time, space, and change. 
Curiously, he does not consider any aspect o f physical materiality to be a required 
condition for existence. He then makes various moves that question whether music and 
mind require these three conditions for their existence. In the process, he poses 
hypothetical worlds that are timeless and changeless and considers whether or not 
“sound” and “states of consciousness” (to which he reduces music and mind) can exist in 
them.
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Having explored their necessary and sufficient ontological conditions, Addis 
argues that, ontoIogicaDy speaking, both music and states o f consciousness have an 
unusual relationship to time and change. First he reasons that “contrary to received 
opinion, there can be time without change. Change entails time, so to speak, but time 
does not entail change.” He suggests that this is so because sound can exist over time 
without change: “(.A) lone among physical phenomena known to us, sounds require 
duration but do not require change” (68). He then notes that “[Sjtates of consciousness 
too are such as to require time but not change” (69). According to Addis, this shared 
quality— to require duration but not change — creates the ontological affinity between 
states o f consciousness and sounds that grounds their connection and the possibility of 
musical representation:
[S]tates o f consciousness and sounds alone are such that, while they 
require time for their existence, they do not require change. This 
ontological affinity of consciousness and sound that sets them apart from 
everything else in this crucial regard suggests that, so to speak, 
consciousness might fold in sound an “image” of itself not merely in the 
feature that we have just identified, but in more complicated ways as well 
(69).
Having thus placed sound and states o f consciousness in the same ontological category, 
Addis continues his argument using that similarity as a philosophical base.
D is c u s s io n
Setting aside a full discussion o f the merits of this argument, my purpose is, 
rather, to show how the lack o f fit between the experiential evidence and the objectivist 
framework both misconstrues the evidence and creates such roadblocks in the process of
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discovery that arguments either become implausible or overly complex. In Addis’ 
objectivist argument, in order to get at its essential nature, “music,” which embodies 
change, is reduced to “sound,” which Addis declares does not require change.43 “Human 
beings,” who also embody change, are reduced to “states of consciousness,” which 
Addis declares do not require change.46 In the process of making this argument, Addis 
poses the hypothetical existence of timeless and changeless worlds. He recognizes that 
neither o f these conditions really exist on earth, yet he finds it necessary, in the course of 
an argument about a very earthly phenomenon, to take the argument “off world” to 
hypothetical worlds. This is a creative argument, but it reduces its subject beyond 
recognition and, in so doing, becomes overly complex and implausible.
In Addis’ statement of purpose for his book, he promises to describe a similarity 
between mind and music, a “similarity that grounds the process whereby music 
represents to us certain emotions, moods, and other states of mind” (xi, emphasis mine). 
The question is, in this statement, what does he mean by the term “grounds?” As an 
intransitive verb, which is how Addis uses it, “ground” has three groups of meanings. 1) 
Members of the largest group relate to the actual, earthly ground: to bring to or place 
on the ground, to connect electrically with a ground, or to restrict to the ground. 2) A 
meaning clearly metaphorically related to these is “to instruct in fundamentals.” Through 
the objectivist framework, this sense of “ground” means to give the foundations for 
subsequent structures of arguments or to instruct in how argument structures are tied to
43 Of course, sound does require change, since air must vibrate in order for sound to exist
46 Although some experienced meditators may be able to reach an unchanging state of mental quietness, 
normal states of consciousness do entail change.
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their logical bases. 3) The final sense o f the term “ground” is “to provide a reason or 
justification for.” At first glance, this sense does not seem to relate to the more 
concrete senses. However, given the metaphor a r g u m e n t s  a r e  st r u c t u r e s  apparent 
in the second sense, it can be seen that “to provide a reason or justification for” means 
tracing an argument back to its logical bases. This is how Addis uses the term. He 
argues that the similarity between mind and music provides a logical basis fo r  the 
process of musical representation.
However, in the process o f looking for a basis, Addis grounds his own argument 
not in experience in physical reality, but in disembodied reason. In fact, on at least one 
occasion, he acknowledges that he ignores physical reality because that physical reality is 
“irrelevant” to his argument. He asks,
But can there really be time without change? Sounds that do not change 
their timbre or volume or pitch illustrate just that possibility. For a sound 
requires a duration yet may not involve any change (except, again, in the 
irrelevant causal sense) (68, emphasis mine).
The “again” o f the last phrase above refers to the previous paragraph, where he 
dismisses as irrelevant the findings of physicists that the atoms and molecules o f leaves 
move as the leaves change color.
Because he is looking for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
ontological existence of sound and states o f consciousness, Addis feels justified in 
proposing hypothetical worlds and ignoring the real one. After reducing music and 
human beings to sound and states o f consciousness, it does not seem such a stretch to 
ignore their fundamental material nature. Instead of grounding the connection between
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music and human meaning in the world in which it exists and operates, he “grounds” it in 
the possibility o f a non-existent world with duration, but without change. This argument 
may be grounded logically, although that is debatable, but it is utterly ungrounded 
existentially. The lack o f existential grounding is ironic, given his goal o f ontological 
grounding. In searching for the ground of their relationship, he has objectified music and 
human beings beyond their need to exist in the material world. It is a very odd and 
implausible turn, indeed. Although he is clearly intelligent, and uses his objectivist 
philosophical foundation and its epistemological tools in a creative manner, in the end, 
they lead him astray.
Conclusion
In this section, I have explored the effects of the objectivist framework on the 
ways that evidence is construed and arguments made. I have concentrated more in this 
section on the authors with more philosophical sophistication: the philosophers Langer 
and Addis, the music theorists Hanslick and Meyer. I did so because these authors apply 
the objectivist framework more rigorously and I wanted to show how the objectivist 
framework distorts both evidence and arguments, leading to unsatisfying results — 
implausible, overly complex, and without the power to account for much of meaningful 
musical experience.
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I now turn to a group of authors who rely less on argument and more on 
experiential evidence and methodology. I want to explore what is effective in these 
approaches so that those elements might be adopted in a new approach.
Contrast of Musical and Psychological Approaches
The problems with Addis’ ungrounded argument demonstrate the importance of 
choosing the ground of an argument, and the study it is based on, wisely. The ground of 
an argument/study constitutes both the starting point and the point to which the scholar 
may return again and again, to check and see if he is on the “right track” or if his work 
“rings true.” The ground is an overriding concern that, when problems or contradictions 
arise, trumps other concerns. It is a point to be kept true to. For example, as is true of 
philosophers in general, Addis is concerned with logic and reason and so uses logic and 
reason as his touchstone. As we saw above, this ground made for an experientially and 
materially ungrounded argument.
What are, then, the different ways to ground an argument? What do scholarly 
arguments consist of? They begin with a phenomenon to be explained or accounted for. 
The phenomenon must be explored in some fashion and that exploration must begin from 
some point o f view — a philosophical framework and its epistemo logy. As I have 
argued above, the framework and epistemology influence the way that evidence of the 
phenomenon is viewed — how it is construed, what is and is not acceptable. The 
framework and epistemology also influence the kind of logic used to view, interpret and
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argue about the evidence. Allied with framework and epistemology is methodology, 
which dictates the way that evidence is gathered, interpreted and presented.47
So where in all o f this do we locate the ground of the study/argument? Certainty, 
all arguments have philosophical grounds, but as we saw with Addis, an argument based 
on the major concerns of philosophy — logic and reasoning — can easily become 
implausible. Should we ground the study/argument, then, in methodology or in the 
phenomenon to be explained? In the music theorists and the psychologists, we have 
good examples o f both o f these.
The music theorists — Cooke, Meyer, and Zuckerkandl — all ground their work 
in the phenomenon o f music. They use many musical examples and in so doing, ask their 
readers to re-experience musical meaning, either through singing or playing the 
examples, or imaginatively. As a reader, I find this to be an extremely effective strategy. 
Even if I find problems with the logic, methodology or conclusions of their 
study/argument, if writers present examples that support their points well, it goes a long 
way toward convincing me that they have at least made some valid observations about 
musical meaning. I find these studies to be more interesting and enlivening to read.
471 am struck as I write this by how much of the language we use to speak of arguments is objectivist in 
origin. I have already noted the relationship of “framework” to objectivism, but even “evidence” is, as 
well: evident — e- out, on the outside + vident-, videns, prp. of videre to see. “Evidence,” the noun 
form of the adjective evident, cuts the flux of experience, what we “see” in our “exploration,” into 
something that can be grasped and gathered- What if instead of “evidence”, we spoke of “testimony,” 
which is given in the dictionary as a synonym for evidence? (Testimony: from L testis witness.) For the 
phenomenon of musical meaning, we are, after all, dealing with “testimony” as evidence. “Testimony” 
actually situates the evidence we are dealing with in the voices of real, living people. It turns an 
objectified, visually oriented word into a subjective, aurally, bodily oriented one. Voices come from 
human beings with bodies, not from thin air.
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Even if other aspects o f their work are problematic, their observations ring true and 
provoke thought.
For example, even though Zuckerkandl’s argument that dynamic qualities are 
located in a supermaterial world seems implausible to me, the idea of dynamic qualities 
rings true. As he explains it, the dynamic quality o f a tone is “a state of disturbed 
equilibrium, as a tension, tendency, almost a will” (19). He gives the example of the 
tonic and supertonic. The tonic is a state o f “perfect equilibrium, o f relaxation of tension 
and satisfaction,...of self-affirmation.”
What takes place here between the two tones is a sort of play of forces, 
comparable to that between magnetic needle and magnetic pole. The 
activity of the one is a placing itself in a direction, a pointing toward and 
striving after a goal; the activity o f the other is a dictating of direction, a 
drawing to itself (20).
Although I would locate this dynamism in my experience o f the tones rather than in the 
tones themselves or in a supermaterial world, each scale step does seem to me to have a 
particular dynamic quality.
Although Cooke’s argument that music is a “language of the emotions” and that 
specific pitch sequences refer to specific emotions is quite problematic in many ways, his 
observations about music also do ring true. For instance, he says the following about the 
pitch sequence ascending major 1-3-5:
We have postulated that to rise in pitch is to express an outgoing 
emotion; we know that, purely technically speaking, the tonic is the point 
of repose, from which one sets out, and to which one returns; that the 
dominant is the note o f intermediacy, towards which one sets out, and 
from which one returns; and we have established that the major third is 
the note which ‘looks on the bright side o f things’, the note of pleasure, 
o f joy. All of which would suggest that to rise from the tonic to the
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dominant through the major third — or in other words to deploy the 
major triad as a melodic ascent 1-3-5 — is to express an outgoing, active, 
assertive emotion of joy (228-29).
He illustrates his point with a good number o f examples, all of which, when I sing them, 
feel the way that he describes. I can, perhaps, think of counterexamples, as when this 
pitch sequence is framed as ironic. But in my recollection, it is often true that this pitch 
sequence relates in some way to “an outgoing, active, assertive emotion of joy.”
However, even though Zuckerkandl and Cooke’s observations ring true, their 
explanations of those observations do not. Their explanations are unsatisfactory for 
many reasons, but one they share they hold in common with many music theorists. Even 
though they make good observations about music, they begin their explanations of music 
by turning to objectifications of music — Le., tones, scales, chords, etc. — to explain 
music. For instance, Zuckerkandl’s first question is: “What is it...that is meaningful in 
tones, that allows us to distinguish sense from nonsense in successions o f tones?’ (16, 
emphasis mine).48 Cooke also begins his explanation with notes, making statements like 
“the major third is the note which ‘looks on the bright side of things.’” Beginning an 
exploration of musical meaning with the theoretical objectification of music, notes, posits 
meaning as a quality o f the sound, rather than a product of the interaction between the 
sound and the listener. The idea that musical meaning is a quality o f the notes does not
** Interestingly, Zuckerkandl’s first question concerns notes, even though he states earlier that his central 
question concerns die a much larger field: “What must the world be tike, what must I be like, if 
between me and the world the phenomenon of music can occur?’ (7). I believe he began his exploration 
with notes because notes are often thought of as the basic elements of music. Although he explicitly 
rejects a positivisdc or scientific approach to music, he implicitly uses the objectivist path of discovery: 
begin with the basic elements, discover theft essential natures, and find out how they relate to one 
another.
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ring true to my experience. If  it were a quality of the notes, how could it be true that 
sometimes the same recording will fell flat, striking me as “just notes,” while at other 
times it engages me in a meaningful way? Since musical meaning is a product of listener 
and sound, it is methodologically unsound to begin the exploration o f musical meaning in 
notes alone.
In contrast to the music theorists, the psychologists begin their explorations in a 
way that includes both the musical sound and the listener. Rather than objectified 
physical reality, they begin with observations about phenomena that are psychologically 
real — real in terms o f human experience. For instance, Bamberger states the unifying 
question of her book: “What are the circumstances that generate fundamental 
ontological shifts associated w/ perceptual/conceptual restructuring — how do we ever 
come to see/hear in a new way?” Her central interest is with the psychologically real fact 
that the same recording o f a set of notes or rhythms can be heard in multiple ways. 
Similariy, Serafine does not begin her study with notes, scales or chords, which she calls 
the results of reflection about music, not music themselves. Instead, she identifies the 
basic unit o f her study as “generic cognitive processes,” such as succession (e.g. motivic 
chaining) or transformation (e.g. ornamentation).49 Both Bamberger and Serafine, 
whatever other problems their studies may have, try to begin at a point that includes both 
musical sound and listener. As Bamberger states, it “a hearing... is both creative and 
responsive — a conversation back and forth between the music, as material, and the
49 Note that Serafine’s basic unit of study is problematic in that she is trying to identify pan-stylistic 
cognitive processes, which leaves out cultural aspects of the meaning process.
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hearer as he or she shapes its meaning and form in some particular way” (9, emphasis 
mine). Since they begin with both o f these aspects o f the system, one might think that 
their conclusions are more valid than the music theorists, who begin with notes alone. It 
would seem that an approach that includes both notes and listener as fundamental to the 
equation would be able to explain the phenomenon of “music.”
However, the psychological approach presents a different set of problems that 
influence its conclusions negatively. Psychological understandings and methodology are 
thoroughly conditioned by objectivist interpretations of human beings. As I argued 
above, the concepts of perception and cognition are entirely consistent with the schemas 
of the conduit metaphor. In perception, raw sense data enters the person through the 
portals of the senses, travels up the nerve conduits and is “assembled” into percepts by 
the mind-homunculus. In cognition, the mind sorts perceptions algorithmically and 
makes sense o f them. Given this set of schemas underlying its thought and methods, 
psychology characterizes human beings as mainly mental and looks to the disembodied 
mind for answers. For example, Serafine construes music as “the activity of thinking in 
or with sound” (69). Bamberger’s study concerns the organizing process of the mind 
during active listening.50 Even though they begin with a stance that involves both sound
50 Bamberger comes tantalizingly close to including the body in her thinking: “I suspect that the 
processes through which we actively organize incoming pitch-time phenomena are closely linked with 
the very basic, sentient organizing of our bodies as we move through space and time — gestural 
direction (up-down; right-let), stance, sequences of periodic movements (breathing, sucking, walking), 
equilibrium, as well as vectors of tension and relaxation” (9). However, she does not follow up on her 
suspicion in any substantial way. She also talks about “felt paths,” which are “sequences of actions that 
we internalize in learning to perform a piece on an instrument, sequences that we both make and follow 
with each new performance.” These are “our most intimate ways of knowing that piece” (10).
However, neither of these comments seems to inform her methodology or conclusion.
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and listener, their philosophical ground requires that they consider only the disembodied 
mind. Thus philosophically truncated, their studies cannot approach “music,” but only 
“notes.” Music requires the whole body in order to exist.
Their methodology also mitigates against studying “music.” Scientific 
methodology requires that the evidence gathered be measurable and directly observable. 
For instance, Bamberger’s methods require children to represent a rhythm in drawing, 
build a tune from “tune-blocks” (phrases), and understand name references to tune 
blocks. These methods produce data that is directly observable and quantifiable, but that 
is mental in nature, aimed more at finding out about mentally grasping notes than about 
experiencing meaningful music. Serafine’s evidence is similarly obtained through 
methods that make it quantifiable.
In my view, psychologists ground their study in their scientific methodology. It 
is then: overriding concern, the aspect of study that trumps all others.51 Unfortunately, 
with the case o f music, the methodological requirement that data be quantifiable and 
directly observable ends up excluding the subject of study before the study is even 
begun. Just as Addis’ grounding in reason required that music and mind be reduced to 
something that fit his philosophical methods, the psychological method requires 
reduction as well. While “notes” and brain waves or other aspects o f human physiology 
may be quantifiable and observable, “music” is not. The effects of musical experience
51 The grounding aspect of these different disciplines can be seen in the apportionment of attention each 
aspect receives in the training of students. Psychology students spend an enormous amount of time 
learning methods to make their data quantifiable, just as music students spend time learning about the 
music “itself” and philosophy students about logic and reasoning.
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can be observed by outsiders or reported on by listeners. The “music” cannot be directly 
observed or quantified, since it occurs in the inner lives o f individual people. If  we take 
the distinction between music and notes seriously, and it is a psychologically real 
distinction, the most direct way we have to get at “music” is the testimony of individuals 
who have experienced it. This feet is why the use o f musical examples by the music 
scholars can be so effective. Through these examples, the authors obtain testimony for 
their own arguments directly from the readers themselves.
Since Meyer’s work fits neither the musical nor the psychological approach, I 
have not yet mentioned him in this section. His approach combines the positive aspects 
of both music and psychology. He grounds his work in musical experience, providing 
many musical examples and eliciting good testimony from his readers. He also begins 
with a schema that involves both musical sound and listener, treating musical meaning as 
a product o f the two elements. Because his approach combined the best of both musical 
and psychological approaches, his study was a breakthrough in understanding.
Co n c lu sio n : Pr o b le m s  t h a t  N e ed  to b e  A d d re sse d  in  a  N e w  A ppro ach
In this chapter I have described objectivism and the conduit metaphor and 
examined the ways that they logically construe the parts and processes of 
communication. I have shown how the use o f this philosophy in thinking about musical 
meaning distorts evidence and produces arguments and conclusions that are implausible, 
logically inconsistent, overly complex or lacking in explanatory power. In addition, I 
have argued that the most effective aspect o f the musical approach is that it is grounded
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in musical experience. The most effective dimension o f the psychological approach is 
that it begins its argument with a schema that includes both musical sound and listener.
In addition, we have learned from the philosophical approach to be very careful o f the 
epistemological metaphors we choose, since they construe evidence and constrain logic 
and reasoning.
An effective theory o f musical meaning would include the following factors. The 
nature of the epistemology would be consistent with the nature o f the question of 
musical meaning. Since musical meaning exists only in human experience, the 
epistemology used to investigate it should be consistent with the best ways to know 
about human experience. Additionally, the primary standard used to test it should be 
consistent with human experience: “Does this ring true to experience?’ The theory 
should take into account the findings o f the physical sciences, but not be guided by their 
epistemology, methodology or standards.
Concomitant to making the epistemology consistent with the problem, the nature 
o f the specific model should be consistent with the nature o f the phenomenon it is used 
to explain. Meaningful musical experience is primarily aural and involves the body a 
great deal A model like the conduit metaphor, based on seeing and manipulating objects 
and involving a mind packing, unpacking, and grasping, is simply inconsistent and should 
be replaced with a model more based in aural, tactile, and kinesthetic experience.
The philosophical base o f the theory should allow for human beings to function in 
their entirety, including the role o f the body in perception, cognition, imagination and
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intelligent processes in general It should allow for the following: 1) an active part for 
both bodies and cultural influences, 2) a reciprocal influence between individuals and 
social groups, 3) the diachronicaQy temporal aspect of meaning, and 4) the logical 
possibility that wholes are prior to parts, along with an understanding o f parts that are 
not mechanical in nature. Methodologically, the approach should begin with a schema 
that includes both musical sound and listener and allow the listener to be an entire, 
complex human being. It should be grounded in musical experience and the evidence 
that comes closest to that experience: the testimony of individual encuhurated listeners.
A theory of musical meaning should be able to account for all kinds of music and 
musical experiences: program music, abstract music, various responses to music, 
including intellectual physical and emotional music’s dynamic quality, the intensification 
of experience in music. In addition, it needs to be able to account for the social 
meanings of music, like the meaning of Elvis Presley to his fens, the meaning of the Star 
Spangled Banner to American prisoners of war, and the meaning of music in religious 
settings, shopping malls and auditions. Clearly, such a theory has a great deal to account 
for.
I was driving my car recently when Rossini’s “Overture” to “The Barber of 
Seville” came on the radio. I had a grand time listening to it, such a good time that I 
momentarily wondered what other drivers might think of my physical expressions of the 
musical gestures — bouncing body and waving head. This piece resonates in me in 
multiple modes: as abstract music, as program music, as a cultural connection to the use
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ofRossini’s music in cartoons, and as a personal connection to playing the flute in the 
all-county band in High school I hear the overture primarily as abstract music, since I 
am not familiar with “The Barber of Seville.” And yet, it strikes me secondarily as 
program music, since it has an Italian flavor and the title suggests the antics of a 
humorous barber. The image of a humorous barber blends with the general feeling I 
have about Rossini’s music that can be rather caricature like, a feeling gotten from its 
association with the Saturday morning cartoons I watched on television as a child. Even 
without a caricature of a barber, parts o f the music feel somewhat hyperbolic to me. In 
addition, having had the facility to play all of the little flute riffs with ease during my high 
school and coDege performing days, but being unable to play them so easily now, a 
feeling of wonder at the players’ facility blends into the mix of musical meaning. A 
theory o f musical meaning should be able to account for how I resonate with this music 
in all o f these multiple modes.
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n“On the Hither Side of Words”:
Tacit, Invoked Meaning
In tro d u c tio n
If we cannot frame problem of artistic meaning usefully with objectivism, how 
can we better frame it? Weighing in on using a language-based epistemology to 
understand art, Husserl indicates a way:
To treat a work of plastic art as a discourse intended to be interpreted, 
decoded, by reference to a transcendent code analogous to the Saussurian 
“longue” is to forget th a t... the work of art always contains something 
ineffable, not by excess, as hagiography would have it, but by default, 
something which communicates, so to speak, from body to body, Le. on 
the hither side o f words or concepts, and which pleases (or displeases) 
without concepts (quoted in Bourdieu 1977,1-2).
Husserl guides our attention to art’s ineffability — meaningful qualities that cannot be 
expressed in words. Interestingly, he distinguishes between two different kinds o f 
ineffability — one “by excess, as hagiography would have it,” the other “by default, 
something which communicates... from body to body.” Placing ineffability in the realm 
ofhagiography, we usual assume it to be something “excessive” — transcendent of 
human reality and therefore insusceptible of being “captured” and “put” into words. 
Husserl rejects this assumption and points to a different kind of ineffability, one that may 
be partially, although perhaps not entirely, in human control. He places this ineffability 
squarely and concretely in the realm of being human — “from body to body,... on the 
hither side of words” — and suggests that this kind o f ineffability occurs “by default.”
145
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Events that happen “by default” occur because of a M ure of explicit action. For 
example, a computer operates by default settings unless the user changes them. The 
default settings work silently, outside the user's awareness. By saying that the 
ineffability o f art occurs “by default,” Husserl suggests that it occurs silently, behind the 
scenes, or “from body to body” as he states it, in the realm of the tacit.
The realm o f tacit epistemology involves meaning that “strikes” a person and 
“resonates” or “rings true” to experience. In contrast to objectivist knowing, this kind of 
knowing reverses the agent/patient relationship: rather than the person-agent grasping 
the meaning-patient, the meaning-agent “occurs to,” “strikes” or even “grabs” the 
person-patient. Occurring without the benefit o f the clarity of words and the seeing 
mental homunculus; this knowing “gropes” toward understanding and meaning instead of 
seeing it clearly and grasping it.1
That this way o f knowing relates to aesthetic experience can be seen in terms that 
might be used to describe its results: struck dumb, awe struck, thunderstruck, wonder- 
struck, staggered, bowled over, speechless, breathless, gasping, open-mouthed, agape, 
gaping, wide-eyed, gazing, transfixed, rooted to the spot, lost in wonder, lost in the 
music, rapt (L, pp. of rapere to seize — being seized by the experience). These terms
1 In the attempt to communicate clearly, writers usually eliminate this “groping” from those well-lit 
objectivist stages — textbooks — presenting knowledge clearly and with precise beauty, as if the 
knowledge-structure sprang from the earth in full flower with no untidy or confused labor by its 
producer. Thus, many students misunderstand the process of producing understanding and have little 
tolerance for the floundering around it sometimes entails. What they miss, and what our educational 
system tends to obscure, is the pure fun and ultimate productivity of exploring in timinal realms of 
possibility.
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suggest both the disconnection of aesthetic meaning with words and its fully embodied 
nature.
In this chapter I will explore this tacit, embodied way of knowing. I will argue 
that meaning located “on the hither side o f words” occurs by metaphoric and metonymic 
transfer and activation of patterns and schemas. This transfer and activation occurs in 
the tacit realm of human existence, through bodily imagining and perceiving. I begin by 
describing the philosophical foundation of the study, a philosophy that endeavors to 
correct the problems found in objectivism. This philosophy centers on the idea of a 
human being who has evolved in the earthly environment for meaningful action in that 
environment. Thus, meaning does not occur only in the mind, but in the whole body. 
Elaborating on Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing, the latter part of the chapter develops 
a theory of meaning as tacit and rooted in bodily knowing, imagining and perceiving. 
This approach posits the individual person as a maker o f meaning and the process of 
meaning making as one that metonymically connects the individual as a part of her whole 
socio-psychological environment.
P h ilo so p h ic a l a ssu m p tio n s: Em b o d ie d  R e a l ism
Rather than grounding this exploration of musical meaning in a particular set of 
philosophical assumptions (as did the philosophers in chapter one) or a particular 
methodology (as did the scientists in chapter one), I ground it in the meaningful
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experience of music (as did the musicians in chapter one).2 However, although I do not 
ground this exploration in a set o f philosophical assumptions, clear thought requires 
them nonetheless.
I do not view the musical situation as an objective process of communication, but 
as a communing both personal and sociocultural in nature. I do this in an effort, in part, 
to divorce communication from the conduit/representation schema. The etymology of 
“communicate” (L pp. of communicare to impart, participate) suggests that the image of 
communication as a communing may have existed prior to any association with the 
conduit/representation schema. As John Dewey states it,
Communication is the process of creating participation, of making 
common what had been isolated and singular; and part o f the miracle it 
achieves is that, in being communicated, the conveyance of meaning gives 
body and definitiveness to the experience of the one who utters as well as 
to that of those who listen (244).
This participatory communing creates meaning tied to the fullness o f experience — a 
meaningful integration with present circumstances rather than an existence and transfer 
of meaningful “presence.”
I base my philosophical assumptions on that of “embodied realism,” a version of 
Putnam’s internal realism developed by LakofFand Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980 & 
1999, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987). The assumptions Lakoff and Johnson make explicit 
in their exposition of this philosophy are implicit in the work of Polanyi and Bourdieu,
21 am using “ground” here as I did toward the end of the last chapter (see p. 134). A ground is the 
concern that trumps all others, the touch point that must be returned to again and again, the concern to 
which the exploration must remain true.
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whose work I will draw on in this chapter. What follows is my own elaboration o f the 
terms and logic suggested by Lakoff and Johnson’s work. After discussing the 
grounding of embodied realism, I will elaborate the natures of the relationship of parts to 
whole, the concomitant path of investigation, models and explanations, objectivity and 
subjectivity, human beings, and meaning.
Grounding
The idea of human engagement with the world grounds embodied realism. In 
this context, “world” and “environment” refer broadly, not only to the physical, but also 
to aspects created by and for human beings, such as social, emotional, educational, 
artistic, spiritual, culinary, etc.3 Similarly, “experience” refers broadly, not only to 
individual experience, but also to experience within and through a group.
Embodied realism takes seriously the notion that human beings evolved in the 
earthly environment. Rather than being compartmentalized from the world, we were, in 
a sense, created by it, through environmental conditions that favored specific 
adaptations; we evolved in order to take adaptive action in the environment we are 
adapted to. Thus created by and for the environment, we are already at one with it. As 
Lakoff and Johnson state it,
3 By including the spiritual in this list of aspects of the human environment created by and for human 
beings, I do not mean to suggest that spiritual aspects of human life exist only as human creations and 
have no reality or existence beyond human life. Here, and throughout this dissertation, I discuss the 
spiritual and other transcendent realities as aspects o f human life only. In so doing, I am not taking a 
stand on their reality or existence as seen from a God’s eye view, I am simply limiting my thinking to 
the way that they appear and operate in human life.
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Embodied realism... rejects a strict subject-object dichotomy.
Disembodied scientific realism [objectivism] creates an unbridgeable 
ontological chasm between “objects,” which are “out there,” and 
subjectivity, which is “in here.” Once the separation is made there are 
then only two possible, and equally erroneous, conceptions of objectivity: 
Objectivity is either given by the “things themselves” (the objects) or by 
the intersubjective structures o f consciousness shared by all the people 
(the subjects).
The first is erroneous because the subject-object split is a mistake; there 
are no objects-with-descriptions-and-categorizations existing in 
themselves. The second is erroneous because mere intersubjectivity, if it 
is nothing more than social or communal agreement, leaves out contact 
with the world. The alternative we propose, embodied realism, relies on 
the feet that we are coupled to the world through our embodied 
interactions....
The problem with classical disembodied scientific realism is that it takes 
two intertwined and inseparable dimensions of all experience — the 
awareness of the experiencing organism and the stable entities and 
structures it encounters — and erects them as separate and distinct 
entities called subjects and objects. What disembodied realism... misses 
is that, as embodied, imaginative creatures, we never were separated or 
divorcedfrom reality in the first place (1999,93).
The commitment to the ground of human engagement with the world suggests 
that meaning, and associated concepts — truth, understanding, categories, concepts, etc. 
— relate to human experience in interacting with the environment. In the course of 
everyday living, human beings make and use meaning and truth as parts of the energetic 
matrix o f understanding and motivation in and through which we conduct our lives. As 
matter of human engagement with the world, we must understand and characterize 
meaning in terms of the nature and experience of human beings, not as an objective 
relationship between words and things in the world or as a meaning-object packaged and
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conveyed in words. Rather than asking, “How does meaning work?’ we need to ask, 
“How do we create meaning in our lives?”
Basic Level Categorization
LakofFs work on basic level categories (1987) exemplifies scholarship that 
understands and characterizes an aspect of meaning in terms of the nature and experience 
of human beings. Words often relate to one another through nesting taxonomic 
hierarchies, which involve varying levels of specificity or generality. Lakoff locates basic 
terms m the middle o f these hierarchies, so that the levels from “bottom” to “top” 
become subordinate, basic and superordinate. For instance, while the subordinate 
categories o f jonquil and rose specify types of “flowers,” the basic level category 
“flower” generalizes to the superordinate category “vegetative reproductive organ.”
This view does not defined “basic” as structurally simple as objectivism might; rather it 
defines basic as psychologically simple. Basic level concepts have the kind o f structure 
that, in the context o f interaction with the world, human beings find easiest to leam, 
remember, process and use.
For instance, the objectivist view defines basic musical concepts as structural 
primitives like the musical parameters (pitch, rhythm, timbre, harmony, texture, etc.) or 
the compositional primitives reflected in our notation system (notes, chords, harmonic 
progressions, rhythms, scales, keys, dynamics, etc.). In contrast, the embodied realist 
view would define basic musical concepts as those that are easiest to learn, remember, 
process and use — melody, gesture, momentum, mood, dynamic motion, and rhythm (in
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the uncomplicated sense that people untrained in music tend to use it, to indicate the 
musical articulation of the beat and how it invites the body to participate in the music).
Recent work in psychology (summarized in Lakoff 1987,31 -57) indicates that 
basic level categories arise from human interaction with the world. Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999,27-28) suggest four conditions that define basic level categories: 1) “the highest 
level at which a single mental image can represent the entire category”: although many 
different kinds of flowers exist, they can all be represented by an image that involves 
petals clustered around a center, with a stem projecting from the bottom; 2) “the highest 
level at which category members have similarly perceived overall shapes”: in the human 
view of shape, flowers consists of a head and a stem; 3) “the highest level at which a 
person uses similar motor actions for interacting w/ category members”: we interact 
with flowers by bending over and sniffing, by gazing admiringly or by cutting the stem 
and arranging them; and 4) “the level at which most of our knowledge is organized”: 
we know more about “flowers” than we know about “roses” or “vegetative reproductive 
organs.”
As characterized in the above list o f conditions provided by Lakoff and Johnson, 
human nature and experience in the world seem very objective and concrete, stemming 
from the interaction of human bodies and minds with concrete objects in the world.
Their list of conditions does not include aspects o f human interaction with the world that 
we think o f as “subjective” — emotions, moods, motivations and aspects of human 
agency in general— and “social” I would add some conditions to the above list in
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recognition o f the fact that some aspects of bask; level categorization are mediated not 
just by mind and body, but by human purpose and emotion. Lakoff provides one 
example, the purpose o f economic exchange, but does not include it in his list of 
conditions:
When something is categorized it is regarded as equivalent to certain 
other things. For what purposes equivalent? How are all dimes 
equivalent or all flowers or all cats?... Dimes are equivalent in that they 
can be exchanged for certain newspapers, or cigars or ice cream cones or 
for any two nickels. In feet, they are equivalent for all purposes of 
economic exchange (Brown 1965,318-19, quoted in Lakoff 1987,31).
Lakoff and Johnson tend to exemplify their thought processes with nouns. The inclusion 
of adjectival categories, such as the basic level distinctions good/bad and clean/unclean 
(in the biblical sense), demonstrates that, in addition to motor routines, the use o f similar 
emotional routines (or reactions) will determine inclusion or exclusion in a category. We 
know that something is “good” or “bad” based, in part, on our emotional reaction to it 
(which relates to social value systems). However, similar emotional routines can also 
determine some basic level nouns, e.g. “boss.” Although specific bosses employ many 
different styles of managing, their employees all relate to them through the same power 
structure o f subordinate to superordinate. This power structure and the similarity of the 
feelings it engenders across varying instances categorize certain human relationships as 
“boss” to “employee.” Whether the world is the world o f concrete objects, subjective 
emotional situations or abstract social conditions, however, the point remains that basic 
level categorization is a matter o f human interaction with the world.
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The mutability o f “basic level” also demonstrates the dependence of basic level 
categorization on human interaction with the world. People in specialized training 
programs change undergo a transformation in basic level For example, even if they 
don’t know the words for them, most people entering a college music class have a 
working familiarity with the basic level concepts o f melody, gesture, momentum, mood, 
and rhythm. However, in order to use the objectivist categories (the parameters or 
compositional categories) intelligently and appropriately, in order for them to feel easy 
and basic, people need to undergo a specialized training environment: years of classes in 
music theory and listening skills. The point here is that “basicness” resides in the 
relationship o f the individual to the concept, as that relationship arises from interaction 
with the environment; “basicness” does not reside in the relationship of the concept to 
the physical reality.
Path of Investigation, Relationship of Parts to Wholes
Lakoff and Johnson’s definition o f basic as grounded in human interaction with 
the world suggests a path of investigation different from that prescribed by objectivism. 
As we saw in the last chapter, the objectivist path o f discovery mandates that one find 
the elemental parts, discover their essential natures, and explore how they relate to and 
cohere with one another. Objectivism considers parts as logically prior to wholes. In 
contrast, embodied realism treats wholes as logically prior to parts. This difference 
suggests a different path o f discovery, one that is dependent upon the nature of parts in 
relation to each other and to the whole.
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As logically prior to the whole, objectivist parts relate to one another 
mechanically — each separate in and unto itself until it is added up with other parts to 
form a larger, more complex structure. As logically already part of the whole, embodied 
realist parts relate to one another differently: part of their essential natures consists of 
their relationship and coherence with each other and with the whole. Rather than 
mechanical, these parts are metonymic in nature. Zuckerkandl’s description of dynamic 
qualities of scale steps and their relation to the tonal context exemplifies metonymic 
parts. In his theory, each scale step has a different dynamic quality, which it receives 
from its place in the whole tonal system. In his view, tonality is
[a] system in which the whole is present and operative in each individual 
locus, in which each individual locus knows, so to speak, its position in 
the whole, its relation to a center... (36).
In this view, within a context of systematic stability provided by both parts and 
whole, the interactive parts stand in co-creative relationship to each other and to the 
whole rather than simply being added together as essentially discrete elements to form a 
composite whole. For instance, tonality involves both stable factors and co-creative 
factors. As the parts o f the tonal whole, scale steps lend stability through relating to one 
another by stable proportions. If sounds do not consist of those stable proportions, 
listeners will not hear them as scale steps. As the whole, tonality lends stability through 
specific predictive possibilities (more commonly thought of as “rules”) for the use of 
scale steps: tonal music tends to include certain tones and use others sparingly; it tends 
to employ specific harmonic progressions, but not others. Within these forces of
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stability, scale steps and tonality actively co-create each other. Without the holistic 
context o f tonality, tones are no longer scale steps; without scale steps o f specific 
frequencies, tonality cannot exist.4
The reciprocally creative action of parts and whole suggests a path of discovery 
different from that of objectivism. Logically, one would need to begin with the whole, 
but tack back and forth between the different parts and between parts and whole in order 
to understand their complex, co-creative relationship. In addition, because the different 
aspects o f reality stand in co-creative relationship to one another, one would need to 
realize that the relationship between “part” and “whole” is not always clear and simple. 
At first glance, we see human beings simply as a part of a large, complex environment. 
Upon closer examination, we can see that the human environment also becomes part of 
individual people, as well As individuals, we take the environment into ourselves and 
make it a part of us: we eat, drink, breathe and take in our social environment in the 
form of attitudes and feelings. In co-creative relationship, we are a part o f our 
environment, but it is also a part of us.
Objectivism has handled the co-creative relationship between parts and wholes 
through the notion o f “context”: parts add up to the whole and in so doing, acquire 
meaning in the context of the whole. The problem with “context” is that seems to entail 
the use of geometric or mechanical models. Given the totally static quality of geometric 
models and the diachronically static quality of mechanical models discussed in the last
* This explanation of tonality presupposes the existence of an enculturated person in whose experience 
the tonality exists. Without such a person, tones are simply vibrations of air. More precisely, without a 
hearing person, “tones,” as meaningful entities within a coherent system, do not exist
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chapter, context cannot change in response either to outside forces or the forces of any 
of its parts. The lack of diachronic change makes clear why “cultural context” so easily 
slips into “cultural background.” While “cultural context” may suggest three dimensions 
(as in mechanical models) and “cultural background” two (as in geometric models), they 
are both diachronically static and thus equivalent in terms the way that they obscure the 
action of change over time.
Embodied Realist Models and Explanation
In contrast, embodied realist models center on dynamic human beings who stand 
in co-creative relationship with their environments, rather than merely existing within 
them. Since reality and meaning are explained in terms of the nature and experience of 
human interaction with the world, all models must include one or more hypothetical 
persons, with all the possibilities for diachronic change that human adaptation entails. In 
addition, as open systems, embodied realist models accommodate stresses from both 
inside and outside the system.
Since they are centered on human experience, explanations based in embodied 
realism demand a reading different in kind from that given to objectivist explanations. 
Rather than holding the models away from themselves, trying to grasp and internalize 
their meanings, readers should imagine themselves at the center of the explanation or 
model Rather than looking to see if explanations and models seem logically correct, 
they should ask if it is true to their experience — does it “ring true”? Would then- 
personal testimony support or impugn the argument?
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“Objectivity” and “Subjectivity” in Embodied Realism
This way o f reading does not entail discarding “objectivity” and applying purely 
“subjective” standards. Rather, it recognizes the logical impossibility of the “God’s eye 
view” standard of objectivity and the logical necessity that any possible objectivity must 
be a matter o f human behavior and experience. As Lakoff states the case,
Objectivity cannot be a matter of conforming to a God’s eye point of 
view, since the very existence o f such a point o f view is impossible on 
logical grounds. But that does not mean that there is no objectivity.
Objectivity involves rising above prejudices, and that begins by being 
aware that we have those prejudices. The primal prejudice is our own 
conceptual system. To be objective, we must be aware that we have a 
particular conceptual system, we must know what it is like, and we must 
be able to entertain alternatives. Practical standards of objectivity are 
possible in a great many domains of human endeavor. Acknowledging 
alternative conceptual schemes does not abandon objectivity; on the 
contrary, it makes objectivity possible (Lakoff 1987,264).
Just like truth and meaning, “objectivity” relates to the epistemology and conceptual 
system used to arrive at it. Lakoff suggests that we may compensate for the biases of 
our thinking by being aware of them, bringing us closer to relative objectivity.
In a complementary fashion, just as “objectivity” in embodied realism is relative, 
“subjectivity” is constrained. As we saw in the discussion of objectivism in the last 
chapter, the epistemology and philosophy we leam from the people around us and from 
our experiences constrains the way we construe evidence and the kind of logic we use to 
explain it. In addition, the use of language in everyday interaction constrains subjective 
meaning. This statement contrasts directly with many post-structuralist theorists, who 
suggest that linguistic meaning consists of words referring to other words. The endless
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chain o f reference paints an image of meaning as a giant hot-air balloon, moored to the 
earth by only a few tenuous tethers. This schema has the tendency to make tenuous the 
connections between people, who use language to communicate their inner, subjective 
lives. If words are unhinged from everyday, lived, reality, how can people know that 
their subjective reality is anything like that o f other people? How can we know that we 
are actually communicating? The feet that we do communicate successfully suggests 
that language does not consist simply o f words referring to other words. Rather, it 
involves people interacting with each other as they negotiate their lives in the world.
Our words, and the schemas to which they belong, shape the way we view the world and 
think about it. While individual variation in subjective experience exists, a shared 
language places constraints on that variation.
Shared epistemology and language explain m/racultural constraints on 
subjectivity, but do not suggest in/ercultural constraints. As the ground of human 
meaning, embodied experience constrains subjectivity intracutturally. According to the 
theory o f kinesthetic image schemas described in the introduction, structures understood 
through bodily experience in the world (“image schemas” e.g., co n ta in m en t  or FORCE) 
participate in mental processes, forming and informing our understandings. Barring 
unusual physical disabilities, human beings encounter the world with similar bodies and, 
in so doing, learn a similar set of kinesthetic image schemas that inform the meaning they 
make. They also have similar brain structures and so have a tendency to make sense of
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the world in similar fashions. This embodied grounding constrains the kinds o f meaning 
that can be made by human beings both within and across cultures.
The Nature of Human Beings in Embodied Realism
The understanding o f the relationship between wholes and parts described above 
extends to human beings. As Johnson’s kinesthetic image schemas clearly illustrate, 
embodied realism entails no problematic splits between body and mind. Nor does it 
entail the splits between emotion and intellect, body and intellect, or imagination and 
rationality that emerge within the objectivist framework. Rather, the terms that make up 
these “splits” describe parts that stand in co-creative relationship to each other and the 
whole.
However, simply because embodied realism does not entail the mind/body split 
does not mean that vestiges o f it do not exist in scholarship associated with it. For 
instance, consider Johnson’s characterization of imagination as a matter of mental 
representation. In this view, the body informs the workings of the mentally located 
imagination. Contrast the view of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, whose position seems more 
in line with a fully developed version of embodied realism. She suggests that the body 
does not just inform the imagination, but physically participates in imaginative 
processes, as welL Bodily participation in imagination can be seen in the slight 
conducting actions o f conductors as they imagine the music before beginning a piece.
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These movements create a more vivid and sustained sound image, showing that mental 
imagination requires not only a functioning brain, but a participating body, as well5
Because human beings evolved for action in the environment, the various aspects 
o f our being must work in tandem. Speaking o f the relationship between body and brain, 
Kelso states
It is important to keep in mind... that the brain did not evolve merely to 
register representation of the world; rather, it evolved for adaptive action 
and behavior. Musculoskeletal structures coevolved with appropriate 
brain structures so that the entire unit functions together... [T]t is the 
entire system of muscles, joints, and proprioceptive and kinesthetic 
functions phis appropriate parts o f the brain that evolves and functions 
together in a unitary way (Kelso, 1995,268).
All parts evolved in a situation that required the adaptive action of the whole. Thus, all 
parts evolved to participate together in the whole.
Meaning
Similarly, human meaning and truth have evolved in the course of and are relative 
to whole-bodied, adaptive interaction with the environment. As human constructions 
made and used in the course of everyday living, meaning and truth relate to many 
different dimensions of being human constructed in the same fashion: understandings, 
thoughts, intentions, motivations, attitudes, philosophical bases, perspectives, decisions, 
resolutions, desires, actions, intuitions, impulses, values, beliefs, perceptions, imaginings,
5 The reader may be more convinced by this idea by trying the following experiment. Try imagining a 
piece you know well as vividly as you can in the following two ways. First, allow your body to move in 
whatever way feels natural to the task. Second, place your body in a situation in which your muscles are 
quite relaxed, such as lying down. Do not allow your body to move while you imagine the piece. Can 
you imagine the piece as vividly without movement as with? Can you sustain the imagination as long 
without movement as with?
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emotions, feelings, interests, expectations and memories. These dimensions of human 
life stand in co-creative relationship to each other and form the energetic matrix in and 
through which we conduct our lives.6 Subsidiary aspects o f being human, they converge 
focaUy in both who we are and what we do.
If we are to understand meaning as an aspect o f the energetic matrix in and 
through which we conduct our lives in a fully embodied fashion, we need to understand 
it as both a linguistic and a non-linguistic phenomenon. Thus, we require a theory of 
embodied meaning that encompasses both the linguistic and the non-linguistic. Lakoff 
and Johnson have contributed a great deal toward this goal, showing us how structures 
learned in bodily experience may participate in both linguistic and non-linguistic meaning. 
Their work points us away from long-standing, problematic dichotomies (such as 
body/mind, imagination/rationality, relativism/absolutism, and objectivism/subjectivism) 
toward a path that incorporates these dichotomies into a co-creative whole. By locating 
meaning in the body lived in interaction with the environment, they create a theoretical
5 The term “energetic matrix” should be understood in distinction to “biological matrix,” in which it is 
rooted. Aspects of the energetic matrix have physical components, but are only sometimes experienced 
as primarily physical in form. Examples of aspects of the energetic matrix are understandings, 
thoughts, intentions, motivations, attitudes, philosophical bases, perspectives, decisions, resolutions, 
desires, actions, intuitions, impulses, reactions, values, beliefs, truths, perceptions, imaginings, 
emotions, feelings, interests, expectations and memories. These aspects of a person direct her physical 
energy in the course of everyday living. They also immediately cease to exist when the person dies 
(although traces of them will be left in the environment). (In saying that the energetic matrix “ceases to 
exists when the person dies,” I do not mean to take a stand on any metaphysical issue, such as the 
existence of an afterlife. I simply mean to indicate those aspects of a person that are no longer 
perceptible in material reality when she dies.) Note that the different aspects of the energetic matrix 
may be experienced as occurring primarily in one part of the person or another — e.g., attitudes in the 
mind, emotions in the body. However, as aspects of the whole that stand in co-creative relationship to 
one another, while they may be felt to occur focally in one part of the person, they cannot be isolated to 
that part of the person.
Largely tacit, the energetic matrix is only partially within our control. We operate in and 
through it, but in a sense, it also operates in and through us, seemingly with a will of its own.
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space for non-linguistic phenomena to be meaningful and lay the foundation for 
understanding meaning that occurs “from body to body.” However, although they lay 
the foundation for a theory o f “body to body” meaning, they do not develop such a 
theory because they concentrate on examples o f meaning that seem to be primarily 
mental in nature: Johnson on imagination as mental representation and Lakoff on mental 
categories and concepts.
For example, after a thorough identification of the problems with Putnam’s 
internal realism, Lakoff states
Mark Johnson and I have developed a strategy for expanding internal 
realism to deal w/ these issues. We have taken meaning to be the central 
issue. The central question, as we see it, is how linguistic expressions 
and the concepts they express can be meaningful (Lakoff 1987,266, 
emphasis mine).
Although Lakoff brings embodied experience into his consideration of linguistic 
meaning, meaning is still primarily linguistic and mental in nature. He lays an excellent 
foundation for understanding the meaning communicated “from body to body,” but his 
theory does not extend far enough to accomplish the task.
Likewise, Johnson’s theory of meaning still seems primarily mental in nature. He 
argues for a “non-Objectivist semantics o f understanding f  in which the three central 
notions are understanding, imagination, and embodiment (1987, 173), conceiving of 
imagination as “mental representation.”
Imagination is our capacity to organize mental representations (especially 
percepts, images, and image schemata) into meaningful, coherent unities 
(140).
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Image schemas learned from the lived body inform the mental process of imagination, 
but imagination, itself is still primarily mental in nature.
Likewise, Johnson's discussion of understanding indicates that he conceives of it 
as mental in nature. He considers understanding to be central to a non-objectivist 
semantics:
For the non-Objectivist, meaning is always a matter o f human 
understanding which constitutes our experience o f a common world that 
we can make some sense o f A theory o f meaning is a theory o f 
understanding (174, emphasis in original).
To sum up: a non-Objectivist theory of meaning is a semantics of 
understanding. Understanding is treated as a historically and culturally 
embedded, humanly embodied, imaginatively structured event. (176).
Johnson's use of “humanly embodied" suggests the schema of the vital aspect of 
understanding as contained by the body, not as permeating and functioning within the 
body. He does make clear elsewhere that this is no mere containment, but that the body 
informs the understanding. And yet he does not give the body credit for understanding 
on its own. This does not ring true to my experience. For instance, my fingers 
understand the keyboard on which I type much better than my mind does. If I had to 
produce a diagram of where each letter is placed on the keyboard, without visual 
reference to an actual keyboard, my mind would have to consult my fingers, which 
understand exactly where each letter is. The focal point of Johnson's understanding and 
imagination, embodied though they may be, is mental
While I agree completely that mental understanding can be an important aspect of 
meaning, mental understanding cannot always explain life’s most meaningful events. For
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a parent, the meaning of a child’s death does not equal an understanding of what caused 
it, but would transcend any mental understanding by far. Less dramatically, music may 
be understood mentally through analysis, but its meaning exceeds the analysis. Although 
meaning may relate in many ways to mental understanding, the two cannot be equated. 
Therefore, the statement, “A theory of meaning is a theory of understanding” misstates 
the relationship between meaning and understanding. Given the pervasive notion that 
understanding is a mental phenomenon, this theory of meaning does not allow for 
meaning communicated “from body to body.” If  we accept the possibility o f a bodily 
understanding, ineffable and able to be only approximated in words, then perhaps the 
statement would be more accurate.
And yet, not all meaningful situations may be understood, even in an ineffable 
fashion. A parent whose child dies might never understand it in any fashion, but the 
death would continue to be quite meaningful, reverberating broadly and deeply 
throughout her life. In that reverberation, the death might greatly affect other aspects of 
her lived energetic matrix: understandings, thoughts, intentions, motivations, attitudes, 
philosophical bases, perspectives, decisions, resolutions, desires, actions, intuitions, 
impulses, reactions, values, beliefs, truths, perceptions, imaginings, emotions, feelings, 
interests, expectations, and memories. Meaning relates not only to understanding, but to 
all o f these dimensions of being human.
As an aspect of the energetic matrix in and through which we conduct our lives, 
meaning cannot be located primarily in the mental field. It stands in co-creative
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relationship to aspects o f being human that are related to language (i.e., prepositional in 
nature, such as beliefs and understandings), to embodiment (e.g., actions, impulses), and 
to emotions (values, resolutions). Although these we may feel these dimensions of living 
primarily in one part o f the body, subsidiarily they function in the whole body. A 
comprehensive theory of meaning —  one that includes not only linguistic meaning, but 
meaning that occurs “from body to body” — cannot discard or ignore that subsidiary 
function.
Summary
I base my philosophical assumptions on Lakoff and Johnson’s embodied realism, 
a philosophy grounded in the idea that human beings evolved in the earthly (and later 
social) environment for the purpose of adaptive interaction with the environment. This 
ground places human interaction with the world at the heart of all philosophical 
concerns: models and explanations, the path of investigation, and truth and meaning.
Given their grounding in human interaction with the world, embodied realist 
models and explanations are not geometrical, mechanical or primarily visual in their 
orientation. They do not require the reader to take a mental view of the phenomenon 
into the mind through mental representation. Instead, they center on human interaction 
with the environment, and so require the imaginative placing of the self in the model. 
With adaptable human beings at their center, they are diachronically dynamic.
Rather than beginning with the elemental, mechanical parts, as does objectivism, 
the path of investigation suggested by embodied realism begins with basic as defined by
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psychological simplicity. As we interact with the environment, we generally encounter 
the world as phenomenon of wholeness. Objects and experiences seem whole and 
seamless and can only parsed into parts in retrospect. (Even the experience of parsing is 
seamless, unless reviewed in hindsight.) This suggests that wholes be treated as logically 
prior to parts, with parts imaged as metonymic in nature — participating with one 
another and the whole in co-creative fashion. This image of logically prior wholes 
extends to human beings, whose different dimensions are seen as participating co- 
creatively with one another and the whole through their relationship in the energetic 
matrix.
Having made explicit the philosophical ground o f my thinking, I now turn to two 
aspects o f the human energetic matrix important to making meaning in our lives: 
imagining and perceiving. I will re-center the theoretical ground of these processes from 
the mental field to the whole self.
B o d il y  Im a g in in g  a n d  P e r c e iv in g
According to a recent survey of theories o f imagination, current theories are 
“narrowly preoccupied w/ imagistic notions like imagery (mental & figurative images), 
imaging (image making), and imagistic thought (thinking dominated by images).” They 
tend to be “theories o f imagery, not o f imagination” (Jones 1995,313). Consistent with 
the objectivist representation schema, the central notion of “image” focuses these 
theories on the mimetic, mental representation o f states o f affairs in the world. 
Imagination is also often associated with the “unreal” (fantasy), the not yet real
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(possibility), and creativity (defined as novel, not merely a matter of creating something 
from parts).
The above set of theoretical associations with imagination all serve to define it as 
a special realm, apart from everyday, lived reality. Since imagination occupies our minds 
with mimetic images, it cannot be a part of everyday, lived reality (unless that reality calls 
for creativity). Everyday, lived reality tends to require that our minds be occupied in 
ways other than imagery. If imagery enters the mind during the day, it is called “day 
dreaming” and thought to be unproductive and thus avoided. Likewise, imagination as 
the not (yet) real has little place in everyday reality, which tends to be mostly concerned 
with the currently real and concrete. Only creative novelty has a place in everyday 
reality, a place marked as “special.” Some situations require creative novelty, but they 
are generally the province of specialized professions (e.g., artists, marketing specialists, 
etc.).
Thus set aside from everyday, stable, lived reality, imagination is not theorized as 
a quotidian function o f normal, stable, adult human beings, but as a function of people in 
certain stages of life (e.g. children) or unstable situations of life (e.g. mentally ill people), 
people who are often considered to be liminal in some fashion. Current theories of 
imagination posit it as a liminal function, not as a function of normal, stable adults in 
everyday reality. Rather, they “visit” the “space” of imagination as a temporary break 
from everyday reality, “escaping” the everyday grind with a hobby, an engrossing work 
of fiction or a movie. Thus marginalized from the flow of everyday reality, the
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objectivist imagination is theoretically rendered relatively powerless to affect people’s 
lives. Although we recognize that experiences in the imaginative realm can be quite 
powerful, a theoretical path to understanding how that power might be brought to bear 
on everyday life does not exist in objectivist logic.
If, as embodied realism suggests, human faculties evolved as a function of and in 
order to function in daily interaction with the world, and i£ as current performance 
theory suggests, the power o f imaginative activities extends beyond the set aside space 
and time of performance, we need to rethink our theory o f imagination. We need to 
theorize imagining as part o f the on-going, immediate interaction between self and 
world. Amongst other things, this would involve showing the constraints that 
objectivism places on imagination — limitation or containment to the process of mental 
representation, to the realm of fantasy or unreal, and to the creation of novelty — to be 
false.
Embodied Imagining
Although official theories of imagination do not recognize the place of imagining 
in everyday life, folk theory does. According to this theory, the way a person imagines 
the world to be creates a “lens” that guides the way she perceives and thus reacts to the 
behavior o f others and events in the world. I suggest that the guiding image may not be 
located primarily in the mental field, but in the bodily and emotional systems. For 
example, I once knew a woman at work who had been abused as a child and was in an 
abusive marriage. She seemed to imagine every person she met as a potential abuser.
169
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
She habitually sat or stood in a pose that was very close to a full body cringe, wringing 
her hands together in front o f her chest. With her chin pulled in toward her chest, she 
had to look up at whomever she spoke with.
Although I did not learn of her history of abuse until later, she behaved so much 
like an abused dog that I suspected she had such a history. In my interactions with her, I 
consciously tried to be gentle and encouraging. However, most o f the time she still 
adopted her habitual cringing posture when she spoke with me.7 I doubt very seriously 
that her image of me as threatening played out as a mental representation. Rather, I 
suspect that it played out as an emotional and bodily feeling — a sense that I was 
threatening. Thus, the way that she imagined the world to be — threatening — created a 
“lens” that distorted the way that she perceived me. I never behaved in a threatening 
manner, but she nonetheless found little clues in my behavior to support her continuing 
image o f me as threatening. I can think of only two such possible clues: 1) I was about 
5 inches taller than she and 2) I was in a social position o f slight, but indirect authority 
over her. For someone who did not imagine the world to be threatening, these clues 
would not be enough to cause such an extreme defensive posture.
The image of the world as threatening affected this woman’s perception of the 
world; that image seemed to be located more in her bodily and emotional systems than in 
her mental field. As such, although she was probably aware of the image of threat as a 
feeling, she probably had no awareness of it as an image. The feeling  of threat was quite
7 On the rare occasions when she did not behave in a threatened manner, she overcompensated and 
adopted an officious, almost pompous tone.
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real to her, even if observers might have told her that no actual threat existed. If told 
that she was imagining the threat, she would probably have objected to the 
characterization o f that threat as imagined or “unreal” And in fact, although it did not 
correspond to my behavior, the image itself was quite real in two ways. 1) Her past 
history had lodged this image o f the world as threatening in her bodily and emotional 
systems and that image was real — just as real as a photographic image. Although a 
photograph does not equal the reality it copies, as an image, it is real This woman’s 
body and emotions had recorded and stored her past history into itself as if it were a 
digital camera. Her body and emotional system had been molded by and to threat. 
Looking at her, one could literally see an image of the quality of “threatened,” a quality 
made concrete by her body. 2) As I later found out, there was nothing unreal about her 
past and current history with abusive family members. These bodily and emotional 
images of “threat” had been created by very real circumstances.
And yet, to see me as threatening was not related to real circumstances. I had no 
intentions of harming this woman, nor did I behave in a manner that might suggest such 
intentions. The grand majority, if not all, o f the other people in this work situation did 
not experience me as threatening. The image, as formed in the past but applied in the 
present, was paradoxical — real yet not real at the same time. This paradoxical quality 
o f images stored in the body and emotional systems would suggest that reality or lack 
thereof truth or falsity, may not realty be at issue when theorizing imagining. The
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question of reality, o f the true or false, may perhaps be a red herring created by the 
objectivist framework.
Certainly, the reality o f threat was so very strong in this woman, that on one 
occasion in my dealings with her, her behavior almost elicited the very behavior that she 
imagined was already occurring. One day, when I had had a particularly trying day and 
she approached my desk in her habitual cringing posture, I felt an impulse to strike her 
and yell, “Straighten up and stop being so scared o f me!” Of course, I did not follow 
through on that impulse. However, her imagination of me nearly elicited a behavior that 
would have been quite uncharacteristic of me, but totally characteristic of the way that 
she imagined everyone to be. Bodily and emotional imagining can be just as creative as 
mental imagining. However, that creativity is not necessarily linked with novelty. If I 
had followed through on my impulse, although the situation would have been totally 
novel for me, it would not have been novel for her.8
I have dwelled at length on the story of this unfortunate woman because it vividly 
exemplifies the bodily and emotional imagining of an individual as she interacts with the 
world. It may seem to be a relatively unusual case and for this reason suspect as an 
example for arguing that imagining occurs on a bodily and emotional level in most 
people on a daily basis. However, the unusual intensity o f this example does not negate 
the proposition that human beings operate in and through a system of bodily and 
emotional images. It simply demonstrates a maladaptation of that system, thus putting
8 In feet, just feeling the impulse was totally novel to me. This episode, unusual and striking for me, 
made a big impact on my understanding of how people can elicit the very behaviors they fear.
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the system itself into sharp relief. With most systems of human meaning, especially those 
that operate outside focal awareness, we can often observe and understand them more 
easily when they foil.
Expectation
Through an analysis o f expectation, we can see the operation of a more adaptive 
bodily and emotional imagining. Expectations are ways of imagining people or situations 
based on past experience with those people or situations. That past experience may be 
direct, but it may also be indirect, in the form o f cultural myths and stereotypes.
Whether gained directly or indirectly, expectations are embodied images that influence 
the present situation as it unfolds into the future. They inform our understanding of the 
trajectory of present events and therefore guide our actions, which tend to create the 
imagined trajectory. In this way, expectations do create, because they focus attention 
and intention and affect motivation and understanding.
Generally, expectations unfold without our conscious awareness of them. If a 
situation goes as expected, or a person behaves as expected, we generally have no 
awareness o f the expectations; we simply live in and through them in the moment. 
Awareness arises when events do not occur as expected. In that situation, we may not 
be able to explicitly identify the thwarted expectations, but through a gut feeling of 
frustration, can clearly identify that things are not going as expected. However, lack of 
awareness o f expectations does not mean they do not exist and operate in a productive 
manner. It simply means that their productive capacity is not novel, as they reproduce
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the past in the present. We are not necessarily aware of this kind of imagining; rather, it 
is generally tacit, usually out o f focal awareness and often difficult, if not impossible, to 
articulate.
Summary
I have suggested that imagination is not limited to special times and places or to 
the process o f mental representation, but functions in everyday reality in the form of 
bodily expectations and images of “how the world is.” These expectations and images 
affect how we perceive and respond to the actions of others. They serve, in part, to help 
us make sense of the world. If true, this idea suggests a strong link between imagination 
and perception. In order to understand how imagination and perception function co- 
creatively, we must first look at how objectivist logic separates them.
Embodied Perception
Since objectivism conditions a view of human beings as compartmentalized from 
their environment, the sensation-perception-cognition process answers the question of 
how the environment breaches the boundaries of the individual. The constraints of the 
conduit metaphor appear in models o f this boundary breaching function. The logic of the 
conduit metaphor limits sensation-perception-cognition process to senses, nerve 
pathways, and the brain. The five senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch) act as
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“portals” where the boundaries o f the individual may be breached.9 This model 
preserves the basic objectivist notion of grasping and building larger structures from 
smaller mechanical parts: particles of sensation travel over nerve conduits to the brain, 
which sorts and combines them into percepts. For example, Handel states,
Today we know that acoustic and visual energy stimulate nerves and that 
it is the nerve firings that are transmitted to the brain. Each nerve 
responds to one type of energy, and the firing of that nerve is presumed 
to result in one sensory quality, regardless of the way it was stimulated.
These qualities are the sensation, the simple conscious experiences like 
red, salty, or high pitch. The sensations are the bits and pieces of the 
perceptions.... Perception is the necessary second stage, the process by 
which these elements are bound into objects and events. During 
perception, the conception of an external event is constructed (3, 
emphasis mine).
Objectivist thought sees perception as a technical function of the human senses and brain 
— a way to get particles of reality past the boundary of the individual, into the inner life 
and reassembled. It is, literally, the technical act o f “making sense.”
Although we use “perceive” in a broader manner, e.g. “how one perceives the 
world,” objectivist thought would categorize the broader use of the term as 
metaphorical, extending the idea of “making sense through the senses” to “making 
sense” in general. Remember that objectivist thought opposes “metaphoric” to “literal.” 
Thus metaphoric extension of words suggests a tenuous connection between the original 
word and its extension. While the original “perceive” is technical, its metaphoric
9 Science recognizes other senses, such as the kinesthetic sense. However, these senses are primarily 
concerned with information internal to the person— they detect information about the internal 
environment, such as hunger, thirst and tiredness, and relay that information to the brain. Some of 
these senses may also give information about the environment, such as when the sense ofbalance alerts 
a person to unstable ground. In that case, these internal senses become “portals” that relay outside 
information to the brain.
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extension is not. Rather, it conveniently describes a process that could be called many 
other things; viewpoint, worldview, perspective, philosophy, belief system, bias, etc.10
I propose that the broader use of the term “perceive” is not “merely” 
metaphorical Rather, if we readjust the frame to include the whole person in interaction 
with the world, it describes a process just as “technical” as the objectivist definition does. 
A higher level process that incorporates lower level perception by the five senses, it can 
be observed linguistically in the phrase the/a “sense of x.”
“Sense o fX ”
Bourdieu suggests the term “a sense of x” to describe dispositions culturally 
inculcated into the body, mind and emotions, and gives the following examples:
the sense o f necessity and the sense of duty, the sense o f direction and the 
sense of reality, the sense o f balance and the sense of beauty, common 
sense and the sense of the sacred, tactical sense and the sense of 
responsibility, business sense and the sense of propriety, the sense of 
humour and the sense of absurdity, moral sense and the sense of 
practicality, and so on (124).
He argues that the objective conditions a person grows up in creates in her a set of 
dispositions, “senses o f x,” which tend, in turn to recreate the objective conditions that 
created them in the first place.
For instance, Bourdieu describes at length the Kabylian peasant world, to which a 
sense of honor is central The adult Kabylian has a well-developed sense of honor,
10 In this use of “technical,” technical:metaphorical::literal:figurative. Since cognitive linguistics has 
debunked the literal/figurative distinction (Gibbs 1989, Lakoff 1986), I suspect that in the cognitive 
linguistics framework, the technical/metaphorical distinction might dissolve, as well.
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which gives her a tendency to feel certain emotions and feelings, think certain thoughts, 
carry her body in certain manners, behave in certain ways, and interpret the behavior of 
others in certain ways. In other words, Kabylians live life in terms o f the sense of honor 
and in so doing, inculcate the sense o f honor in their children, as well. In the terms that I 
am developing, the sense of honor involves embodied perceiving and imagining. The 
sense o f honor, an inculcated trait in Kabylians, guides how they imagine, perceive and 
react to the world.
Does “Seme o f’ Equal “Sem e”?
It might be argued at this point that a “sense o f’ does not equal a sense. A 
“sense o f’ is a feeling people have about themselves and their world that cannot be 
equated in any way with the sense of hearing or the sense of smell. A sense of humor 
does not breach the boundary between the outer and inner worlds. It is simply an 
internal feeling of readiness to laugh.
I would argue that we must relocate the idea of “sense” from the objectivist 
framework to the embodied realist framework. In that framework, senses would not be 
defined as portals that breach the boundary between outer and inner worlds, but rather, 
as organs o f awareness, alertness, and attention — faculties used in the process of 
directing our energy (mental, physical, emotional and spiritual) as we interact with the 
world. For instance, a person with a well-developed sense ofhumor attends to chies of 
humor in the world with greater frequency and energy than does a person with a poorly 
developed sense ofhumor.
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As organs of awareness, alertness and attention, the “senses o f’ connect us with 
events outside our bodies, as do the “portal” senses. They accomplish this through 
imaginative entrainment. We entrain imaginatively with many different kinds of events in 
the world: another person’s thoughts or emotions, the movements and strategies of a 
tennis opponent, or the development o f a sonata-allegro form. We dwell in and live 
these events by imaginatively matching our inner selves with them. However, we do not 
accomplish that matching randomly, but through the mediation of the “sense o f’ the 
situation. We can best imaginatively entrain with another person’s thoughts or emotions 
when we have a well-developed “sense o f’ that person.
Similar to the “portal” senses, imaginative entrainment not only connects us to 
the outer world it also tracks developing events. A “sense o f’ a situation provides 
expectations) — a sense o f the developmental tendencies of the situation. Through 
those expectations, imaginative entrainment channels the energy of awareness, keeping 
the observing person engaged in the event. For example, the sense of Baroque musical 
style engenders engagement in a never-before-heard Bach piece, since the listener 
embodies the developmental tendencies of the music and thus becomes personally 
involved as those tendencies manifest in the musical moment. In this way, the embodied 
sense of Baroque style tracks the music, just as eyes track a cat running across the street 
or ears track the sound of a siren moving closer.
“Senses o r  also resemble “portal” senses in that they help us to make sense of 
the world. In the objectivist explanation, when the brain sorts sensations into percepts
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they become patterned so that they “make sense.” Not merely a matter of sorting, this 
process selects which bits of data to emphasize or de-emphasize. For instance, a listener 
can hear a polymetric piece in 3/4 or 6/8, depending on how she patterns the sounds into 
successive beats. An objectivist explanation of the perceptual shift would involve 
primarily the sense o f hearing (including the ears, nerves and brain), with the actual 
perceptual difference created by a change in the way that the brain “sorts” and thus 
emphasizes the data. In contrast, an embodied realist viewpoint would also include the 
embodied sense of rhythm. Thus, the way to facilitate the perceptual shift from 3/4 to 
6/8 is not to appeal directly to the brain, but to appeal to the whole body, reorienting the 
whole embodied perceptual apparatus in the process. In feet, as practical teaching 
experience has shown, most students need to visually entrain with clapping hands and 
clap the different meters before they can actually hear the metric shift on their own 
without clapping. Through the sense of rhythm, the whole body (not just the brain) 
makes sense of this perceptual puzzle.
As human beings live in their environment, they come into contact with various 
levels o f data, both elementary (material) and more complex (emotional, behavioral, 
intellectual, artistic, social, political, and so on). While detecting and making sense of 
elementary material data like sound and light waves involve the “portal” senses, 
detecting and making sense o f these more complex kinds of data involve the embodied 
“senses of.” However, these two levels of complexity are not separate, but work 
together, as we saw above when the senses of hearing and rhythm worked in concert.
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As these more complex kinds o f data (emotional, intellectual, artistic, etc.) are culturally 
inflected, the “senses ofx” will be culturally inflected. To the extent that the culturally 
inflected “senses o f x” work in concert with the “portal” senses, the “portal” senses will 
be culturally inflected, as welL11 For example, since I have been enculturated in the 
discipline of ethnomusicology and have incorporated a feeling for polymeter into my 
sense of rhythm, I now hear it in music that I probably would not have noticed it in 
before.
In contrast with the “portal” senses, rather than concentrating function in a 
particular sensory organ, the “senses of x” function by way of the entire self. Different 
aspects of the self may come to the fore in different kinds of situations — the body in 
sensing the moves of a tennis partner, the emotions in sensing the mood of a class, the 
thoughts in sensing the philosophical framework of a writer. However, even if the 
function seems focused in one dimension, the entire self functions subsidiarily to that 
focal dimension. We are usually not aware of these senses, just as we are not usually 
aware of the working of our “portal” senses. We only become aware of them when they 
malfunction.
For example, as I watched swimming in the last Olympics, I began to note a 
pattern of reaction amongst the men who won that differed from the women. In general, 
the women, and some of the men, seemed very happy, sometimes surprised — an 
understandable reaction. However, I could not, for a while, fathom the reaction of some
11 For sensory anthropologists, the relationship between the culturally inflected “senses of” and the 
“portal” senses argues for the inclusion of the “senses of” in the concept of the sensorium.
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of the other men: they looked angry to me. After puzzling over this reaction for a 
while, I finally made sense o f their reaction by imaginatively entraining with their bodies, 
actually physically formed my face into an image o f theirs. Once I did that, I realized 
that what they were feeling was triumph — a mixture of extreme happiness and 
aggression — which did make emotional sense. The point is that in this situation, my 
sense of empathy (which is what draws us to situations where people win or lose) failed 
me. Because of that failure, I had to go consciously through normally unconscious 
steps— entraining imaginatively and making sense through that entrainment. I even had 
to add the extra step of actually forming a triumphant face, because purely imaginative 
entrainment did not work. But note that the act of moving my facial muscles into a 
particular shape is what clinched the process of making sense. I made the face, felt a 
glimmer of the feeling o f triumph and finally understood what these men were feeling.
Summary
In this section, I have introduced the notion of the “sense of x” as a higher-level 
perceptual interface between the individual and her environment. In and through the 
“sense of x,” the individual’s embodied imagination and perception work in tandem to 
sense and make sense o f higher-level patterns in the environment. Like the five “portal” 
senses, the “senses o f’ are organs o f awareness that direct energy and track events in the 
world. Unlike the “portal” senses, the “senses o f’ cannot easily be isolated to a specific 
set of bodily parts. Rather, they require the whole self.
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Em b o d ie d  P e rc e ivin g /I m a g in in g  <& M e a n in g  “On  t e e  H it h e r  S id e  o f  Wo r d s”
The objectivist view of imagining and perceiving sees human beings as objects, 
divides them into elemental parts — body/mind, rationality/ imagination, 
emotion/intellect, etc. — locates these faculties in those parts, and shows how those 
parts accomplish these tasks. In the process of objectification, the structure o f the 
human being becomes the issue. In contrast, embodied realism does not objectify human 
beings, but sees human experience in interaction with the world as the central issue to be 
understood. Therefore, the relevant structure would be the structure o f human 
experience, rather than the structure o f human beings as objects.
Polanyi’s Structure of Tacit Knowing
Michael Polanyi provides a theory of the structure of human experience as it 
relates to knowing. He theorizes a distinction between tacit knowledge — things we 
know but cannot verbalize — and explicit knowledge — things we know and can 
verbalize. Examples of tacit knowledge are how to ride a bike (or any other kind of 
body based skill), how to see (hear, smell, etc.) how to read an x-ray, how to predict a 
tennis partner’s next move, or how to recognize the music o f a particular composer. For 
tacit knowing, we can try to describe how we accomplish a skill or know something, and 
may be successful in describing some aspects o f the knowing, but cannot impart its sum 
total in words. The sum total o f the knowing lies out o f the reach of words: it is tacit.
Rather than basing his epistemology on an analogy to a mental homunculus who 
sees, grasps and manipulates mechanical objects into larger systems, Polanyi begins with
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the experience o f interacting with the environment with the lived body. From this 
experience, he abstracts two kinds of awareness: subsidiary and focal. As we interact 
with our environment, we attend focally to things outside ourselves, but with a 
subsidiary awareness o f the workings o f the body. For instance, if I am chopping onions 
for a dish, I attend focally to the act of cutting the onion with the knife, but am 
subsidiarily aware of the relationship o f the fingers of my left hand (which holds the 
onion) to the blade of the knife, my right hand and arm as it executes the chopping 
motion, my body as it stands next to the counter, my eyes as they tear up, and so on.
In the task of chopping an onion, focal awareness is a greater level of awareness 
— a focused attention on the larger meaning of the situation (Le., getting the onions 
chopped). At the same time, subsidiary awareness is a lesser level of awareness — a 
more diSiise attention in peripheral vision and body awareness to the particular objects 
and motions involved in the task. However, although Polanyi acknowledges that the two 
kinds of awareness vary in intensity, he distinguishes between them not as a matter of 
intensity but offunction in the process o f tacit knowing.
Polanyi argues that the functional relationship between subsidiary and focal 
awareness rests on a co-creative relationship between the two that produces meaning. 
Like chopping an onion, the execution o f any skill requires the integration of many 
different particulars into a coordinated whole. The particulars are subsidiary not only in 
awareness, but to the functioning of the whole. As Polanyi terms it, the integration of 
subsidiary particulars bears on the focal whole. At the same time, the whole creates the
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meaning of the subsidiary particulars; each of these subsidiary particulars means exactly 
what it does because it functions in a particular way as a part o f that particular whole.
For instance, when chopping onions, one of the subsidiary particulars involved is an 
intent stare. This stare means one thing if it functions as subsidiary to the act of 
chopping an onion, but would mean something entirety different if it functioned as 
subsidiary to the act of flirting. Thus, the distinction between subsidiary and focal rests 
on the co-creative relationship between parts and whole: the integration of subsidiary 
particulars creates a meaningful focal whole, while the whole determines the meaning of 
the subsidiary particulars.
Polanyi notes a spatial structure in the relationship between subsidiary and focal: 
we attend from  subsidiary particulars as they integrate in our bodies to the focal whole. 
For instance, a blind person using a cane attends from the subsidiary feelings in her hand 
to the features of the terrain she traverses. Her focal attention on the terrain extends 
outward from the matrix o f her subsidiary awareness: the feeling o f her hand on the cane 
as well as how the terrain feels underneath her feet. She attends from  her body to the 
terrain. This same from-to structure can be seen in verbal communication: we attend 
from the subsidiary particulars of the words to the focal whole of the idea they jointly 
create.12
12 The meaning structure of language clearly is more complex than simply attending subsidiarily from 
words to the ideas that they communicate. If this were the case, we could understand any language we 
heard. However, while the particulars of linguistic meaning appear to be more complex than the 
particulars of meaningful skills, the overall general structure still applies. This general meaning 
structure can be seen in the case of homonyms, where the idea context dearly determines the meaning of 
the specific word. I will further discuss how words mean later in this chapter.
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Up till this point, I have connected “subsidiary” with “part” and “focal” with 
“whole.” It might be objected that it is quite possible to be focally aware of parts. This 
objection can be answered in two ways. First, whether I attend to a whole or to one of 
its parts, some sort o f integration ofsubsidiary particulars must occur fo r that attending 
to be meaningful. I f  I attend only to the first note o f a symphony, I am still integrating 
the complex sound wave with my culturally inflected sense of music toward a bearing on 
hearing timbre, duration, volume, pitch and location.
Second, although it is true that one can attend to a part o f a whole focally, that 
fact cannot be used to impeach the validity ofPolanyi’s theory. Rather, it can be used to 
further support its validity. In this theory, meaning emerges from the integration of 
subsidiary particulars into a bearing on a meaningful focal whole, which determines the 
meaning o f the subsidiary particulars — a complex, seemingly circular relationship. If 
this idea is true, then one would expect that if anything disturbs the relationship, meaning 
would disintegrate. And in feet, when one attends focally to the subsidiary particulars of 
a whole, meaning does dissipate, if not disintegrate totally. For instance, on a homemade 
card, I recently saw pictures o f an ear and a pair of eyes cropped in rectangular shapes 
from a photograph. They meant nothing to me, except in the context of the text that 
accompanied them. Only when I was shown the whole picture they were taken from did 
I recognize them as my own.
Polanyi places this possible disintegration o f meaning in the context o f the lived 
body and its from-to relationship with the external world. Recall that we attend to the
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focal whole from the subsidiary particulars as they integrate in the lived body. As when I 
could not recognize my own eye and ear, focusing on a subsidiary particular externalizes 
it imaginatively from the integration lived in, by and through the body. Thus, meaningful 
integration entails imaginative interiorization o f subsidiary particulars. As Polanyi states 
the case,
[T]o attend from  a thing to its meaning is to interiorize it, and that to 
look instead at the thing is to exteriorize or alienate it. [...] [W]e endow a 
thing with meaning by interiorizing it and destroy its meaning by 
alienating it (146).
The recognition that meaningful integration occurs in, by and through a living body 
suggests a very different relationship between internal and external realities than the 
compartmentalized schema suggested by objectivism. The subsidiary particulars that we 
integrate to a bearing on a focal whole are not only located physically within the body, 
they are also located outside it. Interiorization is the process of bringing those 
subsidiary particulars located outside the body into the internal integrative process.
The process o f interiorization suggests that as we dwell in the world, aspects of 
the world dwell in us. Not only do these aspects of the world dwell in us, we live our 
lives in and through them Subsidiary body awareness extends into the world and 
incorporates aspects o f the external world into the internal meaning process. As Polanyi 
explains it,
I have shown how our subsidiary awareness o f our body is extended to 
include a stick, when we feel our way by means o f the stick. To use 
language in speech, reading and writing, is to extend our bodily 
equipment ami become intelligent human beings. We may say that when 
we learn to use language, or a probe, or a tool, and thus make ourselves
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aware o f these things as we are o f our body, we interiorize these things 
and make ourselves dwell in them (148).
With this understanding o f the relationship of human being to world, it is difficult to tell 
where human being leaves off and world begins.13
The process o f interiorization should not be considered merely part of a formal 
schema — a matter o f getting subsidiary particulars from “out there” to “in here.” To 
consider it as such would be to objectify the human meaning process. Rather, it should 
be understood as a lived process:
Such indwelling is not merely formal; it causes us to participate feelingly 
in that which we understand. Certain things can puzzle us; a situation 
may intrigue us — and when our understanding removes our perplexity, 
we feel relieved. Such intellectual success gives us a sense of mastery 
which enhances our existence (148-49).
I might add that “things that puzzle us” occur not only in the intellectual realm of life, 
but other realms as well, e.g., emotional and physical.
Polanyi’s Tacit Knowing Related to Embodied Imagining/Perceiving
In Knowing and Being, Polanyi presents his ideas about tacit knowing in a 
relatively detemporalized fashion. He does occasionally tackle processes that occur over 
time, like language acquisition, but he describes the elements o f the structure of tacit 
knowing in a fashion that emphasizes synchronic processes over diachronic ones. If we 
relate Polanyi’s structure o f tacit knowing to some o f the ideas I introduced in the last
13 Note the resonance of this idea with the embodied realist stance that human beings were created in 
and by the earthly environment for adaptive action in it
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section — imaginative entrainment, expectations and “senses of x” — we can begin to 
better understand the diachronic operations o f tacit knowing.
Imaginative entrainment is another way to speak of the interiorization of 
subsidiary particulars in the external environment. However, while “interiorization” does 
not suggest any particular time frame, “imaginative entrainment” involves both 
synchronic and diachronic processes. In and of itself ‘Imaginative entrainment” 
indicates the individual's present engagement with an unfolding event. In addition, as a 
process, it entails those aspects of the individual created over time through multiple 
exposures to like events: an embodied sense of the situation she entrains with, as well as 
feelings of expectation and desire that arise from that embodied sense. The 
diachronically interiorized embodied sense o f a situation, and the feelings it gives rise to, 
engender the individual’s engagement with the present event. For example, if I entrain 
imaginatively with a Bach concerto grosso that I have not heard before, I am integrating 
a multiplicity of chies: those already internal to me from past experiences with Baroque 
concerti grossi, as well as those I am interiorizing from the present concerto grosso as it 
unfolds. The already interiorized chies are in me as a sense of the concerto grosso style, 
which I experience as bodily feelings o f expectation and desire. This sense of style has 
arisen in me diachronically, as I have integrated various hearings of concerti grossi.
Thus, the process o f imaginative entrainment involves an individual who interiorizes 
events over time, not just in the moment.
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The interiorization that bears on imaginative entrainment creates physical changes 
in the human body over time. Having a sense of the concerto grosso style changes not 
only structures in my brain, but the coordination of brain with bodily and emotional 
systems (especially if I am playing or conducting the style). Because each interaction 
with the environment is a new subsidiary particular that integrates with like subsidiary 
particulars already encountered, human beings constantly evolve to become better 
adapted to functioning in their particular environment. In a sense, the environment 
molds us to its demands.14 This molding occurs as a result of diachronic interiorization.
The relationship between synchronic and diachronic interiorization can be seen 
clearly in language. In language, general concepts result from diachronic interiorization, 
while referential use of those general terms results from synchronic interiorization. (Of 
course, each synchronic use of a term feeds into the diachronic interiorization, either 
maintaining it or changing it.) In the diachronic process of concept formation, a new 
quality emerges from the integration of parts, similar to stereoscopic vision:
We fuse the two different pictures of an object cast on the retina of our 
eyes by forming its stereoscopic image. Here perception resolves a 
contradiction by revealing a joint meaning of conflicting clues in terms of 
a new quality. A similar synthesis is achieved when we hear a sound as 
coming from a definite direction by combining its impacts that reach the 
first one ear and then the other. This is also what happens in the 
formation o f a general conception (167-68).
As we acquire language, we encounter objects or acts of specific types over time, 
interiorized them, and integrate them toward general concepts or a sense of the
14 More accurately, we mold ourselves to the demands of the environment
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predictive possibilities of language use. As we use language in the moment we integrate 
these dimensions of language acquired over time with aspects o f the specific situation 
toward a bearing on understand or acting in the specific situation.
One final point important to Polanyi’s structure of tacit knowing also relates to 
diachronic interiorization: “the questing imagination.” The questing imagination 
answers the question of grammar acquisition. While an analogy between stereoscopic 
vision and general concept formation may be valid, grammar is too complex to be 
entirety explained in this manner. Polanyi quotes Chomsky’s description of grammar’s 
complexity:
It seems plain... that language acquisition is based on the child’s 
discovery of what from a formal point o f view is a deep and abstract 
theory — a generative grammar of his language — many of the concepts 
and principles of which are only remotely related to experience by long 
and intricate chains of unconscious quasi-inferential steps (196).
Polanyi sets about answering the question of grammar acquisition through 
analogy. He describes an experiment with an optical device that inverts the field of 
vision. After a period of time in which subjects try to move about the environment, and 
manage to do so only with great effort and clumsiness, a new tacit integration occurs and 
subjects can once again make their way about the environment with relative ease. Their 
vision does not reinvert; rather they reintegrate the visual clues with kinesthetic and 
proprioceptive clues toward a bearing on a new sense o f navigation. It is absolutely 
essential that these subjects try to move about; without stumbling attempts to navigate 
the environment they do not experience the reintegration.
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Polanyi explains this reintegration by way o f the questing imagination.
We must conclude then that it is the effort o f our imagination, seeking to 
re-interpret our vision in a way that will control the scene before us, 
which produces the right way of seeing inverted images. This is the 
dynamics o f tacit knowing: the questing imagination vaguely 
anticipating experiences not yet grounded in subsidiary particulars 
evokes these subsidiaries and thus implements the experience the 
imagination has sought to achieve (199-200).
Readers may be able to relate to this better by casting their imaginations back to a tone 
when they learned a skill, riding a bicycle, perhaps. The physical subsidiary particulars o f 
riding a bike are extremely complex. As the body tries to ride through trial and error, 
using the knowledge of how it looks to ride a bike as a focal whole, the questing 
imagination keeps those movements that work and discards those that do not.
Eventually, it finds the right combination of movements and the body achieves balance. 
Note that the questing imagination can occur mentally, as in learning grammar, bodily, as 
in learning to ride a bike, or emotionally, as in learning the emotional motivations of a 
friend.
In conclusion, I would like to describe the relationship between Polanyi’s 
structure of tacit knowing, the energetic matrix, and Bourdieu’s habitus. Bourdieu’s 
writing about habitus has been criticized for the impression it gives of lack of agency.15 
With “habitus,” he clearly points to the tacit, bodily, subsidiary aspect of Polanyi’s
tsIn the first chapter of Outline o f a Theory o f Practice, Bourdieu gives the impression that his model 
gives agency to individuals: “[0]nly a virtuoso with a perfect command of his ‘art of living’ can play on 
all the resources inherent in the ambiguities and uncertainties ofbehaviour and situation in order to 
produce the actions appropriate to each case, to do that of which people will say, ‘There was nothing 
else to be done’, and do it the right way” (8). However, as he develops his argument in later chapters, 
that impression fades and one of relatively agentless, unthinking people emerges.
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structure of tacit knowing.16 However, he does not utilize the entire structure of tacit 
knowing (in which meaning emerges from the integration o f subsidiary particulars into a 
bearing on a meaningful focal whole, which determines the meaning of the subsidiary 
particulars.) Rather, he includes only the ineffable, bodily aspects. It is true that, to 
some extent, we are at the mercy of the habitus, since it can be so difficult to bring to 
focal awareness (as we saw with some of the writing in the last chapter). However, even 
though difficult, it is possible, when an aspect of the habitus is not serving well, to bring 
it to focal awareness and work to change it. Had Bourdieu been aware of and included 
the whole structure of tacit knowing, he might have solved the problem of agency.
The “energetic matrix” is similar to “habitus,” but includes both subsidiary and 
focal aspects, and also utilizes the structure o f tacit knowing. The events that occur as 
dimensions o f the energetic matrix — understanding, thinking, perceiving, remembering, 
feeling, believing, etc. — can occur subsidiarily or focally and can be experienced tacitly 
in peripheral bodily awareness or explicitly in central mental awareness. When one 
aspect is in the mental foreground, the other aspects constitute some of the subsidiary 
particulars that integrate toward a bearing on the foregrounded aspect. Thus, they co- 
create one another.
16 Since “habitus'’ is so resonant with “tacit knowing,” and since Bourdieu wrote relatively shortly after 
Polanyi and spoke of “tacitness,” I thoroughly expected to see Bourdieu cite Poianyi. Surprisingly, he 
doesn’t
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Summary and Discussion
Polanyi resituates knowing as an active, interactive aspect o f embodied living in 
and adapting to an environment. In so doing, he solves many of the problems of 
objectivism. Unlike the objectivist epistemology, Polanyi’s epistemology is not based on 
an analogy, but on lived, embodied experience. His thinking rests on the special 
character of how we know our bodies and how the body interacts with the environment:
Our body is the only assembly of things known almost exclusively by 
retying on our awareness of them for attending to something else. Parts 
of our body serve as tools for observing objects outside and for 
manipulating them. Every time we make sense o f the world, we rely on 
our tacit knowledge of impacts made by the world on our body and the 
complex responses o f our body to these impacts. Such is the exceptional 
position of our body in the universe (147-48).
From this observation, he abstracts the structure of tacit knowing, suggesting that all 
knowing proceeds similarly to the knowing of the environment by the body.
The logical relation that links life in our body to our knowledge of things 
outside us can be generalized to further instances in which we rely on our 
awareness o f things for attending to another thing. When we attend from 
a set o f particulars to the whole which they form, we establish a logical 
relation between the particulars and the whole, similar to that which exists 
between our body and the things outside it. In view of this, we may be 
prepared to consider the act of comprehending a whole as an 
interiorization o f its parts, which makes us dwell in the parts. We may be 
said to live in the particulars which we comprehend, in the same sense as 
we live in the tools and probes which we use and in the culture in which 
we are brought up (148).
He terms this embodied knowing — a knowing that proceeds without words, and 
sometimes in spite o f words — tacit knowing. He demonstrates that tacit knowing does
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not oppose or even complement explicit knowing. Rather, all explicit knowledge is 
rooted in tacit knowing.
From a position o f familiarity with the theory of tacit knowing, we can recast 
some of the problematic aspects o f objectivism in a way that shows that, while it misses 
the mark, it aimed at something real This is most evident in the structural aspects: 1) 
the spatial structure of tacit knowing and 2) the distinction between subsidiary and focal 
awareness.
Since all knowing is rooted in the relationship of subsidiary awareness of the 
body with focal awareness of the outside world, knowing has a from-to spatial 
structure.17 Stated as an abstraction, subsidiary awareness forms a dynamic matrix out 
o f which focal awareness extends. Objectivism indexes this from-to structure with the 
notion of the mental homunculus, analogous to the subsidiary matrix, and “seeing” or 
“grasping” parts of the outside world, analogous to the extension of focal attention from 
the subsidiary matrix. The relationship of mental homunculus to the actions of seeing 
and grasping is iconic with the relationship of subsidiary awareness and focal awareness. 
“Grasping” also indexes the process of synchronic interiorization of subsidiary 
particulars. If Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing is valid, objectivism correctly assigns a 
spatial structure to the knowing process that extends from the body to the outside world. 
However, it characterizes that spatial structure incorrectly.
17 This structure is not necessarily concrete, but may be abstract, as when we attend to our thoughts.
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From the viewpoint of tacit knowing, we can see that the objectivist split 
between mtnd and body also indexes a real aspect o f the knowing process. The 
mind/body split is analogous to the distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness. 
Rather than indexing and theorizing them as two different but interdependent 
epistemological functions, objectivist terminology (and its underlying schema) indexes 
and theorizes the locations o f those two kinds o f awareness: body based subsidiary 
awareness and mind based focal awareness. Aware only o f focal awareness and unaware 
of its basis in the matrix of subsidiary awareness, objectivism places all activities of 
knowing (including imagination, perception, intelligence and meaning) in the mental field 
and focuses on the bright, visible products of focal awareness. In so doing it proceeds to 
overlook the subsidiary, creating a skewed understanding of knowing and meaning.
Objectivist theories of imagination, perception, and intelligence are based on how 
we experience these faculties in their focal aspect. However, as I argued earlier, these 
human faculties occur in bodies as well as minds, occurring in a subsidiary aspect as well 
as a focal one. Thus, in addition to subsidiary awareness, we may speak of subsidiary 
imagination, perception, and intellect. Operating in the tacit realm of human experience, 
they may be harder to observe than their focal aspects; however, even if difficult to 
examine, they still exist and operate during the process o f living meaningful lives.
Given its dependence on an interaction between the seemingly intangible 
subsidiary and the apparently more tangible focal, meaning suffers great harm when 
forced into the objectivist schema. Since that schema does not recognize the subsidiary
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realm, meaning becomes a “tangible” object packaged by word-forms and passed from 
mind to mind. Objectivism thus dismisses aspects o f the meaning process directly 
connected with the elusive tacit realm as irrelevant, unreal, or unreliable: an insight or 
intuition bubbling up into focal awareness from places unknown, a fleeting sense that 
you’ve almost figured out the solution to a problem, or the necessity of groping in the 
dark for answers to problems before they come.
Through his perceptive insights into the experience of knowing, Polanyi has 
clearly outlined a new schema with which to think about knowing and meaning. While 
aspects of the objectivist schema may be structurally analogous to aspects of Polanyi’s 
schema, he does not base his thinking on them, but begins anew, creating a new 
terminology that accesses a new schema. In so doing, he has freed us from the 
constraints o f objectivism and laid the ground for a new understanding of meaning.
Still, more work remains to be done. Like Lakoff, when Polanyi writes most 
explicitly about meaning (in Knowing and Being) he bases his thinking on a 
consideration o f language. Although he creates his general epistemological theory 
without reference to the objectivist schema, when he speaks specifically of meaning, he 
refers to a schema that metonymically accesses the objectivist representation schema. 
Integrating his structure of tacit knowing with Peirce’s semiotic triad — A stands for B 
to C — he arrives at a semantic triad — “The person A can integrate the word B into a 
bearing on C.”
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While this formulation may work well enough for words, it falls short when 
applied to music: “The person A can integrate the musical phrase (musical figure, 
musical gesture) B into a bearing on C.” Music may invoke other meanings, such as a 
feeling or memory, but it does not become subsidiary to them. Experiential^, particulars 
that become subsidiary to focal wholes seem transparent — unnoticed in the meaning 
process, unless som ething goes awry. Music does not become transparent; indeed, as 
the meaning process deepens, it can become more vividly present. Clearly, Polanyi’s 
schema of meaning must be expanded if it is to help us understand how music means.
Invoked  M e a n in g
Extending Polanyi’s Theory of Meaning
Although Polanyi’s theory relates to adaptive human interaction with the 
environment, he tends to limit his thinking to events abstracted from the unfolding of 
everyday life and time: vision, riding a bike, playing chess, or feeling the terrain with a 
cane as conceived generally, without a bearing on specific people, places or times. In 
feeling tone, these examples are analogous to a general term, e.g., the concept “dog” as 
contrasted with the concrete, grounded feeling o f “dog” when it bears on guiding 
attention to a specific dog. As Polanyi points out, terms are experienced with a different 
quality when they are used generally than when they are used specifically.
[T]here is ... an important difference which faces u s .... It lies in the 
curiously unsubstantial character of the joint meaning ascribed to a 
group of objects by a general term. Compared with optical illusions or 
stereoscopic images, general conceptions are abstract, featureless. The
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focus in terms of which we are aware of the members o f a class appears 
vague and almost empty (168).
The focus of the events Polanyi describes as examples o f meaningful integration are 
similarly vague and empty: riding a bike, speaking a sentence. He does not consider 
how these acts arise, who accomplishes them and for what purpose, even though all 
meaningful integrations always involve very specific situations and purposes. Rethinking 
Polanyi’s model in light of specifics may extend it in a way that makes it more powerful. 
The first question to address in resituating meaning in lived experience is how does 
meaning arise in the first place? What invokes the meaning process?
Invoking the Meaning Process through Intention and External Occurrences
Polanyi’s decontextualized version of riding a bike pertains only to the physical 
act of learning to ride a bike. In real world contexts, once one can ride a bike one may 
ride for many different purposes: to get somewhere particular or to enjoy a beautiful 
day. The skill o f riding a bike becomes a subsidiary particular to other intents and 
occurrences.
An intention is an internal occurrence, itself the focal outcome of a meaning 
process. As an invocation to meaning, it accomplishes several important processes. It 
establishes the focal whole toward which subsidiary particulars are integrated: the goal 
o f getting somewhere particular on a bike or taking in a beautiful day. Since intention 
establishes the focal whole, it must also establish the specific subsidiary particulars that 
must be integrated toward that focal whole: the particular roads one takes and dress one
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wears while riding. Intention also guides attention — what kind of attention and the 
manner in which it extends: focused attention toward rushing to get to a meeting on time 
or diffuse attention toward a beautiful outdoor setting and one’s joyful response to it. 
Finally, intention acts as an impulse to meaningful action in the first place.
External occurrences may also act as in impulse to meaningful action: if a pack 
of feral dogs chases me while I am riding my bike it changes the meaning o f my ride. I 
begin to ride to get away from the dogs, attending in a very focused manner to the goal 
of getting away safely, pumping my legs fester and harder, with a tremendous adrenaline 
rush. External occurrence may, too, invoke a focal whole and the subsidiary particulars 
necessary for integration, including a particular kind of attention.
As an invocation to meaning, intention parallels Polanyi’s function of the 
questing imagination in situations where the focal whole is known, but the subsidiary 
particulars and how to integrate them are not.
This is the dynamics o f tacit knowing: the questing imagination vaguely 
anticipating experiences not yet grounded in subsidiary particulars 
evokes these subsidiaries and thus implements the experience the 
imagination has sought to achieve (199-200).
In general, intention anticipates subsidiary particulars already grounded in experience 
and thus implements the experience the intention seeks to achieve. Occasionally, 
however, we have an intention we do not know how to achieve, in which case, intention 
is equivalent to the questing imagination. Like the questing imagination, intention 
invokes the process o f meaning.
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Extending Polanyi’s Schema to Include both Intentional and Occurrent Meaning
For intentional actions, Polanyi’s meaning schema (the person A can integrate the 
word B into a bearing on Q  might be restated, “The person A (hereafter, Bob) 
integrates a set o f subsidiary particulars B as a means to focal whole C.” Bob rides a 
bike as a means to going to the store. One could also use this formulation for actions 
where an outside occurrence invokes the event: Bob rides a bike as a means to getting 
away from a snarling dog. However, stating the case in that manner seems rather 
inaccurate, sounding as if Bob controls the situation. It misstates the agent/patient 
relationship of the situation; in reality, the dog-agent controls Bob-patient. A more 
accurate description of this situation might be “a snarling dog invokes m Bob the 
integration of a set of subsidiary particulars B into a bearing on getting away from the 
dog.” Abstracted, this would be “event X invokes the integration in person A of a set o f 
subsidiary particulars B into a bearing on (or as a means to) focal whole C.” This 
statement o f the event corrects the agent/patient relationship, but does so in a way that 
Bob seems curiously uninvolved in the situation — he is a puppet in whom subsidiary 
particulars bear on a focal whole. We know that Bob is much more in control and 
involved than this statement makes out. In order to understand the problem, we need to 
examine the notion o f “subsidiary particulars bearing on a focal whole.”
We have an idea in this situation of some o f the specific subsidiary particulars: 
the marling sound and menacing look o f the dog, fear flooding Bob’s system with 
adrenaline, putting his body and mind in high gear, his desperate search for a means of
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escape, the sight o f and flight to the bike, his mind racing to think of the best escape 
route, scrambling on the bike and riding. The notion “integration of subsidiary 
particulars” seems quite well grounded at this point. But what does it mean for these 
particulars to “bear on a focal whole?” We know that the whole in question is the goal 
of getting away from the dog. But how do the particulars bear on that whole and how is 
the whole focaP
From Polanyi’s structure of tacit knowing, we are already familiar with one kind 
of focus — focal awareness — that places the power of focusing in the mental field of 
the individual in question. I alluded to focal awareness earlier when I said that intention 
focuses attention. In this case it is the attacking dog that focuses attention. However, if 
we look at the list of subsidiary particulars, we can see that attention is not the only thing 
that is focused in Bob’s flight from the dog. Bob’s very being is focused by the 
attacking dog — perceptions, emotional and physical systems, instincts, imagination, 
mental acuity, and decisions — all aspects o f what I earlier termed the “energetic 
matrix.” This observation locates the focus not just as a matter of attending to a whole, 
but of attaining the whole through the focus of subsidiary particulars. We may mentally 
be focused on the whole we wish to attain, but we are also bodily focused in that 
manner, as well, with mental focus in focal awareness and bodily focus in subsidiary 
awareness. We may not be as aware of the bodily focus as focus, yet it exists.
Taking this fact into account, we can now restate Bob’s situation: a dog 
menaces Bob, invoking and focusing the integration o f a set of subsidiary aspects of his
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energetic matrix, B, toward the goal o f getting away from the dog. Stated abstractly, 
this would be “event X occurs to person A, invoking and focusing the integration of a set 
o f subsidiary aspects o f her energetic matrix B toward a focal whole C.” This 
formulation makes clearer that the focus does not reside only in the ultimate whole, but 
occurs as part of the process o f reaching that whole and in so doing, creates the bearing 
o f the subsidiary particulars on the focal whole; “focuses B toward C” states the 
relationship o f bearing.
This statement o f the expanded meaning schema — “event X occurs to person A, 
invoking and focusing the integration of a set o f subsidiary aspects of her energetic 
matrix B toward a focal whole C” — can apply to intentional situations as well as those 
situations that are focused by something outside ourselves. “Event X" can be an 
intention. Therefore, the invocation to meaning (event X) can occur either internally or 
externally.
Linguistic Meaning
We must consider whether or not the extended version of Polanyi’s meaning 
schema is general enough to apply to most meaning situations. We have seen that it 
applies to non-linguistic meanings. Let us consider language now, starting with a simple, 
non-volitional case o f language.
Imagine that Bob, walking down the street, was alerted to the dog by hearing 
someone shout, “Watch out for the dog!” Hearing these words invokes in Bob the 
integration of the following subsidiary aspects o f his energetic matrix: his ability to
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recognize these particular words from the stream of sounds around him and his 
knowledge of the general meaning o f these particular words and how they integrate 
through English syntax. In addition, the urgent tone with which they are spoken invokes 
in Bob the desire to attend to the words. These subsidiary particulars integrate in such a 
manner that they focus Bob’s attention and physical behavior so that he quickly scans the 
visual environment for a specific dog. Thus, the event (hearing “Watch out for the 
dog!”) has invoked and focused the integration of a set o f subsidiary aspects o f Bob’s 
energetic matrix toward the focal whole o f the dog’s presence and specific condition. 
This illustrates a case in which language has been interpreted.18
Will the schema work for cases in which we “put an idea into words?” Let us 
consider Gisela, who yelled to warn Bob about the dog. Sitting in her study, she 
happened to look out of her window at just the right time to warn Bob. In this case, the 
sight of the dog invokes the focusing and integration of a different set of subsidiary 
particulars: her concern for her fellow human beings, her desire to help Bob, her 
knowledge of the general terms involved and her understanding of English syntax, her 
vocal cords and the other aspects of her linguistic apparatus. The sight of the dog, then, 
occurs to Gisela and invokes and focuses her integration of this set of subsidiary aspects 
o f her energetic matrix toward the focal whole of warning Bob.19
It appears, then, that the extended schema — event X occurs to person A, 
invoking and focusing the integration of a set of subsidiary aspects of her energetic
18 This process is the same as Polanyi’s “sense-reading,” although I have theorized it differently.
19 This process is the same as Polanyi’s “sense-giving,” although again, I have theorized it differently.
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matrix B toward a focal whole C — applies both to situations where a person interprets 
language and where she puts a focal whole into language. Will it apply to other kinds of 
meaning, such as symbolic meaning?
Symbolic Meaning
In Meaning, Polanyi and Prosch theorize symbolic meaning. Building on 
Polanyi’s schema, they characterize symbolic meaning in terms of intrinsic interest. In 
the new schema, the subsidiary clues are o f lesser intrinsic interest to the individual and 
the focal whole is o f greater intrinsic interest. (This is easily exemplified by a prose 
sentence, in which the words are of lesser interest, but the idea they express are of 
greater interest.) They diagram this structure of meaning in the following way:
-u +ii (“iT = intrinsic interest)
S -» F
Because this meaning schema begins as internal to the individual, they call it “self- 
centered.”
Polanyi and Prosch contrast “self-centered” meaning with “self-giving” (or 
symbolic) meaning, in which “it is the subsidiary clues that are of intrinsic interest to us, 
and they enter into meanings in such a way that we are carried away by these meanings” 
(71). They explain:
Suppose we look at a flag, or a medal, or the tombstone of a great man.
As objects, these things have substantially no interest to us; but what 
functions subsidiarity in bearing on, say, a flag is o f great intrinsic interest 
to us, for it includes our total awareness o f our membership in a nation.
When we look at our country’s flag on a solemn occasion, this otherwise 
meaningless piece of cloth becomes for us a moving spectacle and to
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some people even a sacred object. Recall bow linguistic from-to 
relationships are similar to the integration of parts to a whole. A name 
becomes attached to its object to some extent and comes to form part of 
it. There is a similar link between a nation and its solemnly unfolded flag: 
the nation’s existence, our diffuse and boundless memories o f it and our 
life in it, become embodied in the flag — become part o f it. The structure 
o f meaning found in medals, tombstones, and other things o f this kind is 
quite the same. Such intrinsically uninteresting objects o f our focal 
attention do not indicate something, as other intrinsically uninteresting 
things do, for example sounds used subsidiarily as words for denoting an 
interesting object. Flags and tombstones denote a country or a great man 
but they do not bear upon them as words bear upon their objects; they 
rather stand for  such interesting objects, which is to say they symbolize 
them (71-72).
They diagram this structure o f meaning 
+ii -ii 
S -> F 
and continue:
The focal object in symbolization, in contrast to the focal object in 
indication, is o f interest to us only because of its symbolic connection 
with the subsidiary chies through which it became a focal object. What 
bears upon the flag, as a word bears upon its meaning, is the integration 
of our whole existence as lived in our country. But this means that the 
meaning o f the flag (object o f our focal attention) is what it is because we 
have put our whole existence into it. We have surrendered ourselves into 
that ^>iece of cloth” (which would be all that the flag could be perceived 
to be were we to try to view it in the indication way o f recognizing 
meaning). It is only by virtue of our surrender to it that this piece o f cloth 
becomes a flag and therefore becomes a symbol o f our country (72-73).
Some o f the subsidiaries, then, that bear upon the flag and give it meaning 
are our nation’s existence and our diffuse and boundless memories o f our 
life in it. These, however, not only bear upon the flag as other subsidiary 
chies bear upon their focal objects, but they also, in our surrender to the 
flag, become embodied in it. The flag thus reflects back upon its 
subsidiaries, fusing our diffuse memories.... This is how the symbol can
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be said to “carry us away.” In surrendering ourselves, we, as selves, are 
picked up into the meaning o f the symbol (73).
Their final diagram o f symbolic meaning is 
+ii -ii
S ~ o —> F (where indicates the embodiment of the self in the flag).
Although I have felt a meaningful integration of self with flag on patriotic 
occasions, characterizing it in terms of “surrendering” aspects of myself to the flag, 
which then “embodies” those aspects, does not ring true to my experience. According to 
the logic of SURRENDER, if I gave aspects o f myself over to the flag, patriotism would 
feel like a process of emptying. In this situation, I do not feel empty, but rather, full. In 
addition, while the image schema o f surrender suggests a direction of meaning extending 
from internal to external, the experience feels more like the external flag strikes me and I 
resonate internally
In Polanyi and Prosch’s schema, “surrender” is consistent with being “carried
away”:
This is how the symbol can be said to “carry us away.” In surrendering 
ourselves, we, as selves, are picked up into the meaning of the symbol 
(73).
Although I do sometimes have a sense of being carried away by a symbol, am I carried 
away by the symbol itself or by the transcendent reality the symbol stands for? Polanyi 
and Prosch do say that we are picked up into the meaning o f the symbol, but in keeping 
the direction of the meaning process from internal subsidiary particulars to external 
symbol, they do not allow that symbol to stand for anything. The meaning process as
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they describe it involves only person and symbol, with no mention of the place of the 
transcendent reality. They do suggest “total awareness of... membership in a nation” as 
one subsidiary particular internal to the viewing individual. But does that awareness bear 
on the meaning of the flag, or does the sight of the flag activate that awareness, bringing 
our attention to the feeling of being a part of the transcendent reality for which the flag 
stands?
These problems can be solved by considering the flag example in terms of the 
extended version of Polanyi’s structure of meaning: event X occurs to person A, 
invoking and focusing the integration o f a set of subsidiary aspects of her energetic 
matrix B toward a focal whole C. The sight of the flag invokes and focuses a set of 
memories and associated feelings toward an awareness of one’s membership in a nation.
And yet, a patriotic feeling, a sense of being “carried away,” does not simply 
arise at the sight of the flag in stimulus -> response fashion. I sometimes look at the flag 
and experience nothing but its factual association with patriotism. In order for this 
deeper response to occur, we must allow the flag to activate subsidiary particulars in 
such a way that they bear on the experience of feeling patriotic. Rather than 
surrendering aspects of ourselves over to the flag, we open ourselves to its ability to 
invoke a sense of connection with our nation.
It is not the flag, but that sense of connection that carries us away. We can 
understand this case more easily if we view it in terms of metonymic processes, which 
occur on at least two levels of this meaning process. On a lower level, the embodied
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sense o f patriotism has developed as an experiential gestalt over time through in 
integration o f various associated experiences: the sight o f the flag, the sound of the 
national anthem, fireworks on a national holiday, or the sight of a military vehicle in 
wartime. As an experiential whole, an understanding o f “patriotism” may be 
metonymically invoked by any of its parts. However, simply invoking the sense of 
patriotism does not necessarily create a feeling o f patriotism. Creating that feeling 
involves a higher-level metonymic integration.
The higher-level metonymic integration occurs when we, as parts, participate 
feelingly in the whole for which the symbol stands. The flag stands for dimensions of the 
external world that we have interiorized as the patriotism schema. When the sight of the 
flag invokes the sense of patriotism and we permit ourselves to be further “carried 
away,” we merge with what the flag stands for — we feel ourselves a metonymic part of 
the larger external whole. For that brief moment in our lives, we actually live our “part” 
in the larger patriotic scheme of our nation because we have momentarily lost our sense 
of self to the larger whole. The focal whole at this point is not the larger external 
schema ofpatriotism, or the internal sense ofpatriotism, but the merging o f self with 
that larger schema. In other words, the meaningful integration is between the individual 
and the transcendent reality o f patriotism, not between the individual and the flag.20
20 This integration actually occurs both internally to the individual and externally, in the world. As the 
individual experiences it, she feels a part of the larger whole as she imagines it to be. From an outer 
perspective, this individual is at that moment one of the aspects of the larger patriotism schema to which 
all members of the schema have access individually.
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The following diagram summarizes these relationships: patriotic aspects o f the 
world > flag -> internal, embodied patriotism schema MO patriotic aspects of the
world. This would read “Patriotic aspects of the world are stood for by the flag, which 
invokes the integration o f  the internal, embodied patriotism schema, which creates a 
metonymic integration o f the individual with patriotic aspects of the world. Note the 
similarity o f this schema with the expanded version of Polanyi’s meaning schema — 
event X occurs to person A, invoking and focusing the integration of a set o f subsidiary 
aspects o f her energetic matrix B toward a focal whole C. In this case, the only major 
addition is the aspect of the world being stood for. And in feet, a general schema of 
symbolic meaning does not even need to include that element. The symbol does not 
actually stand for an aspect of the world, but for our understanding of an aspect of the 
world. That understanding of the symbolized aspect is what integrates in the initial sight 
and recognition of the flag. The chain of meaning, then, would be the sight of the flag 
invokes and focuses the integration o f the “patriotism” set of subsidiary aspects o f the 
energetic matrix toward the recognition of the flag; the recognition of the flag invokes 
and focuses the “patriotism” set o f subsidiary aspects of the energetic matrix toward the 
metonymic integration of self with patriotic aspects of the world.21 Thus, the symbolic 
meaning process is not different in overall structure from the kinds of meaning we 
examined earlier.
21 We can see here how meaning becomes a flow of integrations toward a series of focal wholes. In 
addition to the two meaning links I have suggested here, one more can easily be seen — the meaningful 
integration of subsidiary particulars leading to the initial sight of the flag. In fact, within each 
individual, multiple meaning processes are occurring all the time, as our bodies function to keep us 
alive, as we move, think and feel.
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Symbolic meaning and the kinds of meaning discussed earlier, then, differ 
primarily in the kind of final outcome. Symbolic meaning involves the usual integration 
of subsidiary aspects of the energetic matrix toward a focal whole. However, in the case 
of symbolic meaning, the focal whole is an integration in and of itsel£ a meta-level 
integration: the integration of self with some reality that transcends the individual.
It would appear, then, that just as the invoking event varies in kind (either 
internal or external) and the from-to direction varies in kind (either internal to external or 
external to internal), the “focal whole” varies in kind. Let us examine the notion of 
“focal whole.”
Focal Whole
If you recall the tale of Bob and the attacking dog, you will remember that Bob 
focused his very being — involving multiple aspects of his energetic matrix — in the 
attempt to flee the dog. We noticed at that point that “subsidiary particulars” could be 
rephrased “subsidiary aspects of the energetic matrix,” since everything that was pulled 
together and focused in the get-away was an aspect of the energetic matrix.22 I would 
like to suggest now that “focal whole” can also be experienced and thought of as an 
integrated whole of one or a few aspects of the energetic matrix.
Please recall the list of examples of aspects o f the energetic matrix: 
understandings, thoughts, intentions, motivations, attitudes, philosophical bases, 
perspectives, decisions, resolutions, desires, actions, intuitions, impulses, reactions,
22 Actually, all meaning processes are also a matter of integrating aspects of the biological matrix in 
which the energetic matrix originates.
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values, beliefs, truths, perceptions, imaginings, emotions, feelings, interests, 
expectations, and memories. If you think about each o f these examples, you win find 
that each one can be the outcome of a meaning process that involves the subsidiary 
integration of some set o f the others. In the flag example, the fecal outcome o f a feeling 
o f patriotism combined with a larger perspective o f oneself as a part of a larger whole 
was the result o f the integration of a patriotic attitude, a philosophy that supports 
patriotism, a decision or impulse to open oneself to the experience, an image o f oneself 
as a part of the larger whole, and memories o f patriotic occasions in the past. The feet 
that these aspects of being human relate to one another in this fashion in the meaning 
process is what makes them a matrix, a matrix that converges focally in who we are.23
Thinking again about these examples o f aspects of the energetic matrix, we can 
see that they may manifest in different levels o f awareness. Some of them do generally 
occur in fecal awareness: actions, thoughts, intentions, decisions, and resolutions.
Some generally function either in very low levels of subsidiary awareness or out o f 
awareness altogether, perspectives, and philosophical bases. Most of the remaining 
aspects generally function in subsidiary awareness, but can be brought to focal awareness 
with varying degrees of ease: understandings, motivations, attitudes, desires, intuitions,
23 That “who we are" is a focal convergence of aspects of the energetic matrix can be seen in the 
following ways. If yon ask someone to describe a person they know, John, making clear that you are 
interested in a description of them as a person, not as a physical specimen, you will elicit a long list of 
aspects of the energetic matrix. E.g., John works hard and is determined, understands people well, etc. 
That these subsidiary aspects of ourselves convergefocally in the sense o fself can be seen by the fact 
that, when focal attention is lost momentarily, we ask ourselves “where was 1?” When we lose focal 
attention, we lose our selves. For an analysis of metaphors used to conceptualize the self see Lakoff 
1996.
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impulses, reactions, values, beliefs, truths, perceptions, imaginings, emotions, feelings, 
interests, expectations, and memories. Thus, if the focal outcome o f a meaning process 
can be any o f these aspects o f being human, and if some of these aspects of being human 
occur regularly outside o f focal awareness, then “focal outcome” does not necessarily 
occur within focal awareness.
For example, occasionally, if we are open to such experiences, we might 
experience an event that changes our perspective in a brief moment. This kind of 
experience can feel very full o f meaning, even though that meaning does not easily 
present itself in focal awareness. Such an experience recently occurred to me when my 
daughter, Beth, who was home on a visit from college, said something to me. Formerly 
a very messy teenager who had kept a sign on her door that said “A clean room is a sign 
of a sick mind,” Beth offered to clean up some piles of books and other items that I, in 
the midst of great momentum in writing my dissertation, had put off dealing with. When 
I heard her offer, I felt tremendously happy and a feeling of meaningfulness. Her offer 
struck me, resonating within me, and I occasionally replayed it pleasurably in my mind 
for some time afterward. It was not until I was doing some free writing for my 
dissertation, thinking about meaning that strikes and resonates, that I pulled the focal 
outcome of this meaning process out o f subsidiary awareness and into focal awareness. 
At that point, I wrote that this offer “means that she is generous, has internalized good 
standards o f neatness, has grown up, is loving, thoughtful and helpful, that she loves and 
understands me.” Before her offer, although I had noticed some changes in her that
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indicated that she was maturing, I still thought o f her as that teenager who preferred a 
messy room. When she made her offer, my perspective o f her changed radically from 
that of a teenager to that o f a mature, young adult24 As this occurred, I felt a feeling of 
happiness and a sense of awe at the wonderful young adult she was becoming, but I did 
not realize that it was my perspective of her that was being reintegrated. The feet and 
details of my reintegrated perspective did not come to focal awareness until I made the 
effort to bring it there.
That the focal outcome of a meaning process can occur largely in subsidiary 
awareness suggests the necessity of theoretically severing function in the meaning 
process from levels o f awareness. Although Polanyi makes clear that the distinction of 
subsidiary from focal rests on function and not on levels of awareness, he still melds 
function and awareness in his statements describing how meaning proceeds. For 
example,
It is our subsidiary awareness of a thing that endows it with meaning: 
with a meaning that bears on an object of which we are focally aware 
(182).
In this description of the meaning process, which is typical of the descriptions in 
Knowing and Being, we can see that the subsidiary function is melded with peripheral 
awareness and the focal function with central attention.
24 Although “perspective” is a single concept, I’d like to point out that it involves multiple aspects of the 
energetic matrix. One’s perspective on a person or situation involves understandings, attitudes, values, 
beliefs, truths, imaginings, emotions, and feelings. A changed perspective can alter other aspects of the 
energetic matrix, such as perceptions and desires. Therefore, an event that changes one’s perspective 
changes many aspects of foe energetic matrix and their relationships at foe same time. It is a radical 
restructuring that can thus feel very foil of meaning, and yet is not easily available to focal awareness.
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The equation of kind o f function with levels of awareness also incorporates the 
notion of particulars and whole, which can be seen in Polanyi’s statement, “the 
appearance of a thing [the focal whole] at the centre of my attention depends on clues 
[the subsidiary particulars] to which I am not directly attending” (139). Further evidence 
that Polanyi melds the function of subsidiary particulars with levels of awareness is the 
feet that he suggests a typology of subsidiary particulars that depends on levels of 
awareness. Of subsidiary particulars, he recognizes two kinds: I) subliminal — clues 
we cannot observe directly, like our bodies working to see or hear and 2) marginal — 
clues we can observe peripherally.
As I have explored understanding meaningful situations in my life by using 
Polanyi’s schema and my extended version of it, I have found that, thus far, the links 
between subsidiary function with particulars and between focal function with wholes are 
valid (if we recognize that a focal whole from one meaning process can become the 
subsidiary particular for the next or that focusing on a subsidiary particular can make it a 
focal whole).25 However, as with the change in perspective that occurred when my 
daughter offered to clean for me, the link between subsidiary particulars and lower levels 
o f awareness and focal whole and higher levels of awareness does not stand up to 
scrutiny. Sometimes focal wholes occur in lower levels of awareness and subsidiary 
particulars occur in the center of our attention. For instance, if I pour too much hot
25 The way that Polanyi uses it, “whole” is not based in materiality, but in experience. The usual way of 
imaging parts and wholes is through a diagram of material objects whose connection forms a single 
whole. Polanyi uses the term to indicate an experiential whole, which is the result of the integration of 
subsidiary particulars. Those subsidiary particulars may not be evident in the focal whole, as in vision, 
but the focal whole is the result of their integration by the individual person.
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coffee into a cup and I want to carry it across the room (and I have no way to pour out a 
bit of the coffee), I need to attend centrally to movements subsidiary to my focal goal.
If function and awareness are to be severed, it will be helpful to have terminology 
to clarify the distinction. I will continue to use “subsidiary” and “focal” to refer to 
function.26 For awareness, I suggest the following terms, in order of higher to lower: 
central attention, peripheral awareness and subliminal awareness.
The idea that subsidiary particulars can be attended to centrally opposes one of 
Polanyi’s main ideas: thatofinteriorization. As Polanyi explains it, we interiorize 
particulars when we attend from them to a focal whole, in whose meaning they 
participate. If we attend focally to subsidiary particulars, they lose their meaning in terms 
of the whole. In the case o f the hot coffee, this idea would mean that attending centrally 
to each movement involved in getting the coffee across the room would dis-integrate 
their meaning in terms o f the whole. In reality, however, no such event necessarily 
occurs.
That subsidiary particulars can be attended to focally without loss o f their 
meaning in terms o f the focal whole does not invalidate Polanyi’s notion that 
exteriorization of subsidiary particulars (i.e., attending centrally subsidiary particulars) 
tends to disintegrate their meaning in terms of the whole. Rather, this is another instance
26 Although it might seem a good idea to use “focal” as a level of awareness, since attention is 
commonly associated with “focus,” I believe that it is better kept with the notion of function. “Focal 
point” also relates to a force image schema in which diffuse particulars converge on a smaller, more 
focused area, as when a wide river narrows. The narrowing of the river creates greater force in the 
water as it reaches the constrained area. The subsidiary particulars of the water bear on the focal point. 
This force image schema can also be seen in the use of a lever, where the far end of a lever (used 
without a fulcrum) is the focal point of its force.
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in winch Polanyi’s attention to synchronic events and lack of attention to diachronic 
events limits his thinking- If we have, over time, interiorized and integrated a specific set 
o f subsidiary particulars very well, like those necessary to carry liquid across a room, we 
can attend to them centrally without causing their disintegration in terms of the focal 
whole. Through diachronic interiorization, these subsidiary particulars have been 
literally incorporated — integrated with the bodily matter. Their dis-incorporation 
would also require time. Only when we are first learning a task are subsidiary particulars 
so tenuously interiorized that they easily lose their meaning in terms of the whole if we 
attend to them centrally.
In addition to distinguishing between function and awareness and the three 
different levels of awareness, I would like to distinguish between internal and external 
awareness. Both central attention and peripheral awareness may occur internal to the 
person or external or some combination of the two. This means that focal outcomes of 
meaning processes may occur not only in internal peripheral awareness, as when the 
inconsistency between what someone says and how they say it produces a feeling of 
unease, they may also occur in external peripheral awareness, as when my mind is on my 
writing at the same time that I complete the task o f washing dishes.
Distinguishing between function and awareness does not alter the extended 
version of Polanyi’s meaning schema. “Event X occurs to person A, invoking and 
focusing the integration of a set of subsidiary aspects of her energetic matrix B toward a 
focal whole C” still describes the important aspects and functions of the meaning
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process. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that the invoking event may occur 
internally or externally, and both the integration of subsidiary aspects and the focal 
outcome may occur at any level of awareness.
Once we see that the meaning process is less limited in its structure than Polanyi 
suggested, it is easy to see that individual human beings perform continuous, 
overlapping, multi-leveled, nested streams of meaningful integrations. I may perform 
one kind of streaming meaningful integration with my body (walking) while at the same 
time perform a different kind of streaming meaningful integration with my mind (thinking 
through a problem). This, of course, is in addition to (and made possible by) the 
meaningful integrations my body continuously performs biologically. If we accept 
Polanyi’s understanding o f meaning then, since human beings are the creators of 
meaning, we live lives permeated by meaning.
Summary
In this section, I have examined symbolic meaning in light of the extended version 
o f Polanyi’s theory of meaning, finding that symbols invoke the metonymic integration of 
self with a transcendent reality. When we open ourselves to the action of the symbol, we 
vividly live our part in that transcendent reality for a period of time. Living one’s part in 
a reality that transcends one’s normal felt boundaries of self creates a change in 
perspective, a focal outcome that occurs in the tacit realm, more than the explicit
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realm.27 From a different perspective, alterations and new connections may be made in 
and between many aspects o f the energetic matrix, e.g. understandings, perceptions, 
attitudes, values, beliefs, truths, desires, imaginings, emotions and feelings. We 
experience a radical restructuring that can feel very full o f meaning, yet is out of bounds 
or too large for the mind to grasp it. We feel this meaning deeply with our whole selves 
yet cannot speak adequately o f it. We are struck by meaning and it resonates deeply.
Co n c lu sio n
In this chapter, I have developed a philosophical foundation and theory of 
meaning suitable to the task of understanding musical meaning. Musical meaning is not 
transitive in nature; one cannot reasonably ask, “What does this music mean?'28 Rather, 
musical meaning resonates through our whole selves; it is meaning that lives in and 
through us. Music calls forth in the listener the integration o f a set o f subsidiary 
particulars that bear on the focal outcome of transcending normal felt boundaries of the 
self. In that transcendence, we merge with the music itself and/or a transcendent reality 
for which the music stands. Through its power to connect us with transcendent realities 
and thus alter our perspective, music gives meaning to our lives.
In the next chapter, I will explore musical meaning in more detail. That 
exploration will set the stage for me to propose the idea of resonant meaning, a semiotic
27 O f course, every experience of symbolic meaning does not necessarily change one’s perspective from 
the point of view of a transcendent reality. It may merely reinforce an existing perspective, as when a 
patriotic person lives patriotism while hearing their national anthem. However, if the person is really 
involved in that experience of symbolic meaning, her perspective will be changed for that period of time 
from one of dealing with ordinary, everyday life, to one of living a transcendent reality.
28 One might ask “What does this music mean toyauT  This, however, is an entirely different question.
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process in which an energetic meta-medium effects the unity of people with signs, and 
through signs, with each other.
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m
M u sic al  M eaning:
Resonance
Intro d u c tio n
In this chapter, I explore musical meaning in detail, recognizing three levels of 
the meaning process: 1) the neuro-biological integration of sound waves toward a 
bearing on hearing musical sound, 2) the integration of the embodied musical senses 
toward a bearing on making sense of the musical sound and 3) the symbolic integration 
in which the listener becomes the medium in which the music lives. This discussion will 
set the stage for me to propose the idea of resonant meaning, a semiotic process in which 
an energetic meta-medium effects the unity of people with signs, and through signs, with 
each other. The idea o f resonant meaning expands the idea of “communication” beyond 
the schemas o f expression, representation, and reference to a model o f meaning capable 
of bringing people together through common experience.
M u sic al M e a n in g
Polanyi’s Ontological Levels
Meaningful musical integrations occur on multiple levels. If you recall, one can 
interact with a nation’s flag in a way that the meaning process invoked recognition o f the 
flag as a patriotic symbol This meaning process involved the integration o f the sight of 
the flag with the patriotic experiential gestalt toward the focal outcome of recognition of
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the flag. One could also interact with the flag in a way that the meaning process 
involved more o f the self, one could open oneself to the possibility of actually living 
one's part in the larger patriotic scheme for which the flag stands, with the feelings and 
change of perspective entailed by such an experience.
Polanyi calls these different levels o f experience “ontological levels” and suggests 
that they involve principles of control that occur on multiple levels of complexity.1 The 
subsidiary particulars o f any meaning process are controlled by their own natures but 
when integrated toward a focal whole, they also become controlled by the more complex 
principles that serve to integrate them. Polanyi illustrates with the levels of a machine.
Viewed in themselves, the parts of a machine are meaningless; the 
machine is comprehended by attending/rom its parts to their joint 
function, which operates the machine. To this structure of knowing there 
correspond two levels controlled by different principles. The particulars 
viewed in themselves are controlled by the laws o f inanimate nature; while 
viewed jointly, they are controlled by the operational principles of the 
machine (Polanyi 153-54).
Meaningful integrations take place at each of these levels, under a nesting system of 
control2
Musical experience involves at least three different levels of meaningful 
integration, each of which I will discuss in detail below. First, the act of hearing tones 
integrates the sound waves hitting each ear with the body’s neuro-biological principles of 
perceptions. In a tonal context, we are not normally aware of this level as an isolated
1 Concerning the image schema of “levels”: What I mean here is levels of complexity, from simple to 
complex, with complex involving more factors in varying relations to one another than simple. No 
other associated valuation is implied.
2 Polanyi suggests the notion of dual levels of control, emphasizing the relationship between successive 
levels.
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IeveL We can be aware o f it in the context of a psychological experiment involving 
isolated tones, a hearing test, or m an atonal context in which no pulse can be discerned. 
In a tonal context, we normally become aware of hearing in terms of the second level, 
which involves making musical sense o f tones. Making musical sense integrates the 
results of the first level (tones) with the higher principles of basic level musical concepts 
such as melody, gesture, momentum, mood, dynamic quality o f motion, and rhythm as 
they operate in embodied perception toward a bearing on experiencing the musical 
sound as “notes.” The third level, experiencing “music,” integrates the results o f level 
two (“notes”) with the higher principle of an intent to be moved, with its concomitant 
opening of self to integration with music.
The levels involved in musical experience are not merely a matter o f a nesting 
system of greater complexity, as might be the case with a mechanical model. They are 
also a matter of level of involvement o f self As such, they are better thought of as a 
continuum of changes in a human experiential state, which places a human agent at the 
center of the model. If we think o f the situation as nesting, hierarchical levels, the agent- 
patient relationship is reversed: in order to change from one level to the next, the 
listener must “climb” a “ladder” from one level to the next. The experiential context is 
static, while the person moves through it. If we think of the situation as a continuum of 
changes in human experiential state, the agent-patient relationship rings true to 
experiential evidence: although the listener is intimately involved in creating the change 
from one level to the next, it is still an experience that occurs to him.
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However, this continuum of states should not be imagined as “an uninterrupted 
ordered sequence” (Merriam-Webster, 181). Such an image would suggest that each 
person must progress through the exact same, minute incremental changes of state on his 
way from hearing tones to experiencing music. Rather, three prototypical levels o f this 
continuum may be defined: 1) hearing tones, 2) hearing “notes” and 3) experiencing 
“music.” However, within limits, individuals will vary in the ways that they experience 
each of these states and move from one to another. In addition, although we can define 
three prototypical levels, it must be kept in mind that these levels are not discrete, but 
interactive: as one experiences higher levels, lower levels can gain greater meaning in 
the higher level context (as when realty being “into” the music allows you to hear sounds 
you had not noticed before).
Level One: Hearing Isolated Tones
In the terms I developed in chapter three, the process of hearing isolated tones 
involves the following: sound vibrations invoke and engage with our neuro-biological 
hearing mechanism in an integration that bears on hearing tones. We attend from  this 
integration to hearing specific tones.
That tones are an integration of physical sound waves with human beings can be 
seen from the fact that the properties o f sound waves and the properties of tones are 
similar and related, but not the same. Physical sound waves have the properties of 
frequency, duration, amplitude, and complexity. In contrast, tones (sound waves as 
heard by a person) have a related, but somewhat different set of properties: pitch,
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duration, volume, ami timbre/consonance/dissonance/location correspondingly.3 Of 
these two lists, the only property in common is that of duration.4 The three remaining 
properties differ and therefore the human experience o f them must be a result of an 
integration of the sound wave with some aspect o f the human being hearing it.
The change in one of the properties o f sound waves — complexity —results from 
an integration o f the sound wave with only the neuro-biological hearing mechanism.
With one exception — dissonance — it is not culturally inflected. Sounds reach our ears 
as a single, continuous, complex wave. From that single, complex wave, the hearing 
system determines location through the slight time delay from one ear to the other. 
Through that sense of location, the hearing system distinguishes the number of sound 
sources that make up the single, complex wave. The complex wave also creates timbre 
through both the harmonics present and how those harmonics vary over the course of the 
duration of the note. (Thus, timbre results from the integration of aspects of the 
complexity o f the sound wave with duration.) Psycho-acoustic dissonance is created 
when two or more tones are played together in which the harmonics do not match 
creating acoustical beats, which are experienced as unpleasant and thus may create
3 Consonance and dissonance are obviously not characteristics of tones that are totally isolated, but of 
tones in combination. By “isolated tones,” 1 mean musical tones heard outside the context of music.
4 Clearly, the duration of a tone as experienced and the physical duration of a tone are not one and 
exactly the same thing. The physical duration of a tone might be described as “onset -> steady state -» 
decay—Kiflfeet,” while the duration of a tone as experienced might be described as “articulation -> steady 
state —y decay.” (The hearing mechanism does not tend to note exact offsets, but does hear the decay.) 
However, they do not differ in a way that I understand to be germane to my argument, so I will not 
discuss them here.
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tension in the body.5 These properties are all matters of the processing of the single, 
continuous complex sound wave by the human hearing mechanism.
The ability to process that complex wave into location, separate sound streams, 
and timbre is learned in the course o f interacting with the ordinary hearing environment. 
Even in a music-free environment, an ability to discern these properties is adaptive. Any 
human being with ordinary hearing, in any culture, will leam these abilities in the course 
of maturing physically in their environment. In other words, they are not in themselves 
culturally inflected. They are sensitive to training and thus may be improved by either 
environments humanly structured to improve them or natural environments that demand 
more of them.6 But the meaningful integrations that produce these abilities are not in 
and of themselves culturally inflected.7
In contrast, the integrations that produce the experiences of “pitch” and 
“volume” are culturally inflected. This is because the integrations that bear on the
51 am using “dissonance” more as it is used by psychologists more than as it is used by musicologists — 
simply combinations of sounds that do not sound good together and thus can cause muscular tension in 
the body. I do not speak here of anything more musically complex, such as large-scale harmonic 
dissonance.
6 In terms of cultural inflection, the matter of consonance and dissonance is somewhat different. It 
would seem that, since this ability is a matter of discerning harmonics that either match or do not (and 
therefore create beats), this would be a “natural” and “unlearned” part of our hearing ability, as natural 
and unlearned as discerning location, separating sound streams, and identifying timbre. However, the 
sense that something is dissonant or “out of tune” is clearly learned culturally, since acceptable scale 
steps and judgments of consonance and dissonance vary from culture to culture. An interval that is not 
dissonant or out of tune to an Indonesian person may seem so to me, and vice-versa. I would surmise 
that, since it is the presence of acoustical beats that creates the sensation of dissonance (and any 
accompanying muscular tension), human beings have the ability to become accustomed to varying levels 
of beats.
7 Timbre preferences vary from culture to culture and with those preferences a special timbral 
environment arises. A person in a particular culture may become better at distinguishing variations in 
timbre in their particular sound environment, but this is a matter of specialized training, not basic 
ability.
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experience o f pitch and volume involve culturally determined metaphorical concepts. 
“Pitch” involves the metaphor o f musical height, while “volume” involves the metaphor 
o f musical substance that can be present in varying amounts. In other musical cultures, 
tones with fester and slower frequencies may be understood not as high and low, but in 
different manners: Temiar musicians speak o f small and large tones (Roseman 1991), 
ancient Greek texts o f sharp and heavy tones (Zbikowski 1998). Suya Indians do not 
indicate frequency directly, but speak of the small and large throats necessary to produce 
them (Seeger 1987). It is true that faster frequencies do seem “higher” than slower 
frequencies, but they can also seem small, sharp, narrow, tense or even light in 
brightness or weight.8 In certain musical contexts, high notes do suggest any of these 
qualities: musical experience exceeds the technical terms we use to speak of musical 
sound.9 However, despite the different experiential qualities that fest frequencies 
suggest, we choose to call them “high” and “low.” Similarly, loud and soft sounds could 
reasonably be spoken of in a number of ways. The most obvious alternative to volume 
(big or small) is distance (near or fer), but in an analogy to human behavior, one might 
also experience louder sounds as more aggressive or dynamic and softer sounds as less 
so. However, in the culture of Western art music, we call loud and soft “volume.”10
8 Some of these qualities, such as “bright,” are a matter of frequency as it varies with timbre.
9 Thus, in these other cultures that call differing frequency rates by names other than high or low, 
experience may sometimes exceed those terms.
10 It is true that in listening to music, we might experience loud and soft as near/far or 
aggressive/passive. However, the fact that we speak of it as “volume” is significant in that it relates in a 
coherent manner to a whole set of other metaphors used to conceive of the sound of Western art music. 
The same can be said of “pitch.” I will discuss this further in the next chapter.
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We do not only speak o f these aspects of sound waves as having height and 
volume, we experience them as having height and volume. This suggests that these 
metaphors are not just a convenient way to speak of “frequency” or “amplitude”; rather, 
they are each one of the subsidiary particulars integrated toward a bearing on hearing 
pitch and volume. And in this way, although it may be theoretically convenient to speak 
o f them as metaphors, one might argue that they are not really metaphors. In 
experience, the tones really are high or the sounds big. We do not “map” height or 
volume onto the sound, as metaphors are usually thought to operate. It is simply there in 
our experience of the tones because we integrate it in the very act of hearing them.11 
Experientially, musical tones embody the qualities of pitch and volume.
The lowest level o f musical experience — a level that does not normally occur in 
isolation from the second level (hearing “notes”) — involves the integration of the 
physical sound wave with the human neuro-biological hearing system. Hearing is not 
simply a “mechanical” neuro-biological operation that can occur without learning.
Rather, it involves the integration of culturally based, learned concepts, such as “pitch” 
and “volume.” As a part of the tacit integrations involved in hearing, we are not aware 
of pitch and volume as something we “add” to the sound wave. Rather, we simply 
experience the tones as high or large.
The notion that fast frequencies are high and slow frequencies low, large 
amplitudes large in volume and small amplitudes small in volume is a part of our
11 This fact suggests that perhaps recent metaphor theory should be rethought in light of Polanyi’s 
theory of meaning.
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culturally based tacit knowing system from which we attend to sound. That tacit 
knowing system involves what I earlier called embodied perception and imagining. We 
bear music not just with our ears, but with embodied perception and imagining, which 
are informed by what Mark Johnson calls “image schemas.” In order to clarify 
terminology, it would be useful at this point to discuss image schemas and their 
relationship to embodied perception (“senses of X”) and experiential gestalts, all of 
which are aspects o f tacit knowing.
Image Schemas, Embodied Perception and Experiential Gestalts
As I explained in the introduction to this dissertation, kinesthetic image schemas 
are gestalt patterns (such as co n tain m ent , force, or so u rce- path-g o a l) learned 
through bodily interaction with the world. They can be seen as the “general terms” 
formed by the integration of like physical experiences in the world, similar to the way 
that the general term “dog” is an integration of experiences with animals o f like kind.
We can make the analogy image schemasrrich, concrete images::general terms:specific 
experiences with what the terms refer to. Like general terms, image schemas are not 
concrete, but are more abstract in nature. Just as we attend from general terms to 
specific situations in the world, we attend from image schemas to specific situations in 
the world. Just as general terms direct our attention toward specific stimuli and away 
from others, image schemas can direct attention toward specific stimuli and away from 
others. In other words, like the “senses of” in embodied perception, image schemas help 
us to construct order in perception. As Johnson states the case,
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(1) Schemata are structures of cm activity by which we organize our 
experience in ways that we can comprehend. They are a primary means 
by which we construct or constitute order and are not mere passive 
receptacles into which experience is poured. (2) Unlike templates, 
schemata are flexible in that they can take on any number o f specific 
instantiations in varying contexts (29-30, emphasis in original).
Formed from the diachronic integration of the generalities o f physical experience, 
image schemas are a kind of experiential gestalt. As generalities, they are not reducible 
to any one specific instantiation, or to the sum of all o f the specific instances that were 
integrated to make them (although they can be exemplified by a single instantiation). 
They are more than the sum of their parts. They are also experiential gestalts in that, as 
simple as they may seem, they all have specific structures that may be brought to bear on 
a focal whole through metonymic invocation. Consider, for instance, the simple 
CONTAINMENT schema, which involves a bounded space with implied in and out 
orientation, or with an implied ability to withstand a force that is in pushing outwards (or 
vice-versa). One can understand this whole schema from a simple line drawing:
Or from the words: “Okay, so you’ve got a bounded space...” or “Then I went in.” One 
need indicate only one part o f this schema to invoke the whole. Thus, image schemas 
are experiential gestalts not only in how they are constructed in the first place but in the 
way that they construct experience and our understanding o f it.
“Senses o f X,” too, are experiential gestalts, formed diachronically through 
experiences of like category, such as “honor” or “things to expect from an opponent 
when playing tennis.” As experiential gestalts, and like image schemas, “senses o f X”
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can be invoked into a meaningful integration metonymically. For example, if you recall 
the story I related earlier about the fearful woman, her sense o f fear was so salient in her 
being that it was invoked by very weak evidence that I was someone who ought to be 
feared: my greater height and a position o f slight, but indirect authority (which I never 
exercised over her or any other people in her position). Kabylian adults, viewing the 
world through then sense of honor, require very few clues to recognize another adult as 
honorable or not. One part o f the schema can invoke the whole in an integration toward 
a focal outcome.
If image schemas and “senses of X” are both diachronically formed experiential 
gestalts from which we attend in creating meaningful integrations, how do they differ? 
“Senses of X” are experiential gestalts o f like category — e.g. “patriotism” or “honor”
— but not necessarily like kind — e.g., intellectual, emotional or physical. In contrast, 
image schemas are experiential gestalts of like category — e.g. “height” — and like kind
— physical This would suggest that a “sense o f X” might involve but not be limited to 
one or more image schemas. The sense of height, for example, includes the image 
schema of height, but is not limited to it. It also includes cultural and emotional 
associations with height. To see how this occurs in a specific example of perception, 
consider a photograph o f a very tail man taken from a camera angle that begins below his 
knees and looks upward. Attending from our sense of height to the photograph, our 
perception of it will involve image schemas of height, creating an understanding that the 
photograph emphasizes the man’s height because it was taken from such a low level.
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However, viewing this photograph from the sense of height, our understanding of it may 
also involve emotional or cultural associations with height — an emotional association of 
looking up at a young age at one’s father or a cultural association of height with 
authority and power. Thus, the term “image schema” can be useful in isolating those 
aspects o f embodied perception that relate to integrating the generalities of physical 
experience in a meaning process.
In addition to “image schema” and “senses of X,” I will be using the term 
“experiential gestalt.” Although image schemas and “senses of X” are experiential 
gestalts, I will not use “experiential gestalt” to refer to them. “Image schema” and 
“senses o f X” are involved with embodied perception. We attend from them to events in 
the world and they help us to make sense of those events. In contrast, I will not use 
“experiential gestalt” to refer to aspects o f the self integrated toward a bearing on 
making sense o f the things we attend to. Rather, I will use it to refer aspects of the self 
integrated toward a bearing on experiencing the things we attend to. By “experiential 
gestalt,” I mean gestalt-like aspects of the self integrated toward experiencing the world 
that are not simply those used in making sense of it. These gestalts may be an extension 
o f those used to make sense, but they are not coextensive with them. For instance, if, in 
looking at the photograph of the man taken from below, one experiences a feeling of 
looking up at one’s own father and the concomitant emotions involved, then a personal 
experiential gestalt has been integrated into a bearing on the meaning of the photograph. 
When this experiential gestalt is integrated into the meaning of the photograph, one does
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not report, “It’s like looking up at my father”; rather, one reports, “It feels like looking 
up at my father.” That personal experiential gestalt may include other memories and 
feelings as well, memories and feelings associated with one’s father at a young age. In 
this case, the simple image schema invoked by looking up at a man from below has 
metonymically invoked a whole experiential gestalt.
To summarize, all three of these terms refer to experiential gestalts and thus, 
those experiential gestalts may be invoked metonymically. I will use “image schema” 
and “sense of X” when I want to invoke the idea o f bodily perceiving and imagining, but 
will save “image schema” for referring specifically to generalized gestalts of physical 
experience. I will use “experiential gestalt” to invoke the idea of richer schemas of 
experience, schemas that may include memories o f specific feelings and experiences.
Level Two: Making Sense of the Musical Sound
Earlier, in “Hearing Isolated Tones,” I discussed the physical properties of 
isolated musical tones and how those properties changed in the listener’s experience due 
to the integration of two aspects of tacit knowing: 1) hearing skills developed in the 
course of normal maturing, such as finding location and distinguishing sound sources and
2) culturally acquired tacit knowing about the HEIGHT or v olum e  of musical sounds. I 
also noted that, although musical height and volume can be theorized as metaphors 
“mapped onto” the musical sound, since these notions are part of the integration that 
produces the tone as actually heard, experientially the tones really are high or the sounds
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big.12 In our hearing of them, these qualities seem embodied by the musical tones. 
Height and volum e involve the image schematic understandings of up/dow n  and 
LARGE/SMALL, respectively. Thus, image schematic understandings acquired through 
embodied experience in the workl operate at even at the lowest level o f musical hearing.
In terms o f Polanyi’s “ontological levels,” in the lowest level o f musical 
experience, the single complex sound wave integrates with both neurobiological and 
cultural principles o f hearing to produce the experience of sounds that embody certain 
qualities: pitch, duration, volume, location, timbre, consonance and dissonance. These 
principles operate at the level o f what we would consider our “ordinary” hearing. 
Moving up a level, then, in a musical context, these qualities would integrate with some 
other principle or set o f principles in a bearing on making sense of the music. These 
principles operate at a higher level o f perception than the neurobiological involved m 
hearing isolated tones — what I earlier termed “embodied perception.”
Malang Sense with Embodied Perception: Metonymic Invocation
Embodied perception involves “senses of X.” In a musical context, these senses 
would include the senses o f melody, rhythm, gesture, momentum, dynamic motion and
12 In my experience, however, the association between frequency and height is stronger than that 
between amplitude and amount Amplitude often seems simply what it is — soft and loud. Only in 
certain contexts does it seem small or large (those contexts that emphasize the feeling of music as a 
flowing substance). In contrast fester frequencies always seem high and slower frequencies low. High 
and low notes may also embody other qualities, such as lightness or heaviness respectively, but they do 
not stop seeming high and low because they also embody those other qualities.
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mood.13 This would mean that, at this, the second ontological level of musical 
experience, the tones perceived in the first, neurobiological level invoke and engage with 
the embodied senses o f melody, rhythm, gesture, momentum, dynamic motion and mood 
in an integration that bears on making musical sense.
Note that, since “making sense” proceeds from  embodied perception, it is always 
rooted in tacit knowing and the “sense” made, while always beginning as tacit and 
embodied in nature, may or may not be made explicit and intellectual in nature. This fact 
means that any intellectual action operates on information obtained through bodily 
feeling. In this way recognition o f a musical event or quality is a matter of distinguishing 
through the body. Recognizing through the body may be accomplished by individuals 
with no training in music theoretical language as well as it is by those with training. 
Naming and discussing musical events and qualities require training in theoretical 
language; feeling and recognizing do not. Music may make complete sense to a listener 
even if that listener has no training in the language needed to make that sense explicit. 
Training in music theoretical language can allow us to communicate the sense that we
13 Note that these senses are the same as what I earlier termed basic level musical categories. If you 
recall, in this way of thinking, which stems from LakofFs work on basic level categorization, “basic” 
refers not to physically primitive building blocks, but to psychological simplicity. In the context of 
interaction with the world, basic level categories are those categories at the level that human beings find 
easiest to learn, process, remember and use. Melody, rhythm, gesture, momentum, dynamic motion and 
mood are aspects of musical experience that human beings find easiest to learn, process, remember and 
use. Thus, they are basic as categories. In addition, the relationship of these basic level categories to the 
“senses of” used to make sense of musical sound suggests that, in musical perception, the level of 
embodied perception is psychologically more basic than the level of “ordinary” hearing.
However, even though these basic level categories or “senses of” are simple psychologically, 
they can be very complex intellectually. These are the musical concepts that I find most difficult to “put 
into words” when I teach. Fortunately, I can usually say “Melody. Well, you know what melody is. It’s 
the tune that you feel like humming along with.” With notions like gesture and momentum, it is 
generally easiest to define them by example. The students then recognize a kind of event that they have 
already experienced and note the association of word with event
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make of the music with one another thereby enriching our experience, but musical sense 
must first be rooted in tacit, embodied experience.
The invocation and operation of each of the musical senses is metonymic in 
nature. In other words, the properties o f musical tones (as experienced) — pitch, 
duration, volume, location, timbre, consonance and dissonance (first level phenomena) 
— act as clues that invoke these second level meaningful integrations, similar to the way 
that a series o f dots placed in a circular arrangement can metonymically invoke the 
CIRCLE image schema in an integration that bears on the perception o f a circle.
For example, consider the quality of musical motion. This quality can occur in 
varying degrees o f complexity. As the complexity of the kind of musical motion 
increases, the metonymic invocation o f that motion involves more of the first level heard 
properties. In the most simple of these, musical motion is a matter o f musical “lines” 
metonymically invoked by the first level property of HEIGHT. Just as discrete visual 
points can be integrated toward an understanding of a visual line, first level pitches 
(discrete “points” in an image schematically structure up/dow n continuum) integrate 
with our understanding o f visual “lines” in a bearing on the second level experience of 
hearing musical lines moving through musical space.
In a more complex version o f musical motion, one in which the seemingly 
insubstantial moving pitches discussed above manifest SUBSTANCE and FORCE, the 
integration involves not only the first level property of HEIGHT, but that of volum e as 
well. As embodied creatures, we have all had experience with moving substances of
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various masses (volumes). We have felt that moving masses have kinetic force (or 
require our force in order to move them). We know, for instance, that when a large 
object hits the body, it does so with a greater force than when a smaller object hits the 
body. Thus it is with music. A single tone that varies in volume from soft to loud will 
metonymically invoke a feeling of growing musical force. Sounds with greater volume 
will generally be more forceful (depending also on timbre and other aspects of the 
musical context) and vice-versa.14
In an even more complex kind of musical motion, if the first level experiential 
property of duration is integrated with PITCH and volum e (as they integrate to FORCE), 
the second level quality momentum  can be invoked. However, before I discuss that, I 
must consider musical PULSE, which is an image schematic phenomenon that involves 
first level duration and VOLUME and integrates on the second level with FORCE toward a 
bearing on a feeling o f musical momentum. We are formed in an environment that 
includes the sound and physical feeling of regularly reoccurring pulses: our mother’s 
heartbeat and concomitant circulatory sounds, as well as our own. In other words, we 
are bom already tuned to the beat of a heart.15 As we grow, we learn other physical 
motions that embody PULSE, such as walking and running. Because of the association 
with walking and running, when it is integrated with musical motion (either up/dow n 
and/or FORCEful motion), musical PULSE can create a sense of forward motion. Musical
141 will discuss musical force further in chapter four.
151 would guess that the pulse image schema is the first one that we learn, even before we become 
aware of containment, since an awareness of containment may be predicated on an awareness of the 
sudden lack of containment that occurs at birth.
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pu lse  involves the  first level properties o f  duration  and volum e as they occur in a  series 
o f  tones, w hich in tegrate w ith  th e  sense o f  pulse into a  bearing o n  feeling th e  pulse in  the  
m usical sound.
Pu lse , then, becomes an integral part o f the more complex musical motion 
MOMENTUM. Part of our embodied knowledge of pu lse  is that it can occur at varying 
tempos and can thus accelerate or decelerate. The varying musical pu lse  can integrate 
with forceful musical motion (pitc h  integrated with v olum e) into a bearing on 
experiencing musical MOMENTUM. Musical momentum varies with the amount o f speed 
and volume. As the tempo or volume increase, generally, so does the momentum. If the 
volume remains the same while the tempo increases, momentum is created, and vice- 
versa. If a sense o f momentum is desired while the tempo decreases, the volume must 
increase a great deal more than if the tempo remained the same or increased along with 
the volume. These are the same kinds of variations in volume and speed that we have 
experienced with moving objects or substances (water or wind, for instance). From 
those experiences, we learn the sense of momentum. When we attend to music from that 
image schematic sense it integrates with the first level phenomena of pitch , VOLUME, 
and PULSE, in a bearing on the experience of musical momentum. Thus, musical motion 
can occur in varying degrees o f complexity, depending on the number of image schemas 
integrated in creating the experience.
The same could be argued of pulse, which occurs in simpler degrees o f 
complexity, such as the simple level of the beat (integrating duration, volume, and
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timbre), to the more complex levels o f meter (integrating the basic PULSE schema with 
time/space and containm ent schemas or, alternatively, the basic pulse schema with 
SUBSTANCE and FORCE schemas) and harmonic rhythm. While metered pulse integrates 
in a bearing toward a sense o f forward motion that moves from beat to beat, harmonic 
rhythm is an integration of many qualities experientially embodied by the music toward a 
larger scale sense o f forward motion. Those qualities include (but are not limited to) the 
tension of harmonic dissonance as it moves to the relaxation of consonance, the sense of 
harmonic/metric points o f rest and their particular quality (open or closed),16 and the 
melodic line as it interacts with the harmony and meter.17 The enculturated listener 
integrates these qualities with his sense o f large-scale expectation of form to produce an 
experience in which the music does not just go, as in simple forward motion, but goes 
somewhere, toward a goal In this way many, if not almost all, o f the second level image 
schemas that can possibly be invoked by the simple first level properties of pitch, 
duration, volume, location, timbre, consonance and dissonance are brought into the 
experience o f making sense of the musical sound.
Although it explains how we can hear a complex, physical phenomenon such as 
momentum in a varying sound wave, the notion o f metonymic invocation presents a 
model o f making musical sense in which the listener passively reacts to active music.
This may ring true to experience, as for as it goes. However, it is also true to experience
16 The image schemas of o p e n  and c l o s e d  in an aural context probably relate to hearing linguistic 
statements that are open or closed.
17 All of this assumes a tonal context I suspect that tonality is sensed and constructed image 
schematically, but have yet to decipher it in any conclusive way.
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that making sense o f music requires an active listener. That activity involves 
expectation, which works in tandem with metonymic invocation to create the listener’s 
entrainment with the music.
Making Sense with Embodied Perception: Expectation and Desire
As I discussed earlier, expectations are embodied images based on past 
experience with similar situations that help to create coherence in the perceptual cues we 
receive from the environment. Unless expectations are thwarted, they generally operate 
in tacit knowing — without our conscious awareness o f them. Thus we live in and 
through expectations as the present moment unfolds into the future. Expectations are 
our sense o f what will happen next and thus direct our attention accordingly. In an art 
form in which time is integral to meaning, embodied expectations are integral to 
attending and making sense.
A concern for the place o f expectation in musical experience is not new. Music 
students learn about expected harmonic progressions in beginning theory classes. Recent 
theories have involved expectation, notably those of Meyer, Narmour and Hasty. 
Narmour bases his theory on Meyer’s work and thus adopts his theory of expectation, 
which involves a spatialized, linear model of time. Hasty’s model of time emphasizes 
experience in the now, as it is conditioned by the past. Although a thorough discussion 
of these theories is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I would like to discuss them 
briefly.
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If you recall from the first chapter, Meyer binds his view of expectation with the 
objectivist schema of reference, which implies the three termed representation schema.18 
Meyer’s referential^ based model o f intramusical meaning involves a triadic relationship 
between 1) the presently sounding music, which stimulates 2) the listener’s expectation, 
based on past experience that 3) a specific musical consequent will occur. As he states 
it,
I f  on the basis of past experience, a present stimulus leads us to expect a 
more or less definite consequent musical event, then that stimulus has 
meaning.
From this it follows that a stimulus or gesture which does not point to or 
arouse expectations of a subsequent musical event or consequent is 
meaningless (35).
Meaning involves realization or denial of expectation. When expectation is realized, we 
are satisfied, when denied, surprised. Unexpected events create interest, while too many 
expected events create boredom. The stuff of musical experience, then, is satisfaction 
and surprise, interest or boredom. A good composition gives us enough of what we 
expect to create coherence, but also enough surprise to create interest.
Since it is based on a theory of expectation, Meyer’s explanation of musical 
meaning, along with Narmour’s development of it, is a major step toward an experiential 
account. This step is made possible since meaning, rather than being a matter of a
18 The terms are I) object represented, 2) representation, and 3) result of representation in the observer. 
This three-termed schema is also present in more general semiotic schemas in which the nature of the 
relationship between the terms varies, but the general structure (1, thing in the external world, 2, thing 
that stands for that thing and 3, results in inner world of observer) is maintained. The most often used 
such schema is Peirce’s 1) object, 2) sign, and 3) interpretant (in all of its many permutations).
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mechanical set o f operations performed by a human being, is characterized in terms of 
the nature and experience o f the listener. Expectation is a human experience, not 
something that is mechanical in nature.
Nevertheless, although Meyer attempts to base his theory on human experience, 
since he is working in the objectivist framework, he distorts that experience in order to 
fit the framework. As noted in the first chapter, Meyer characterizes expectation and 
meaning as mental in nature. He can thus only make a credible claim to explaining 
intellectually oriented feeling responses such as surprise or interest. This limitation 
discounts more bodily oriented feeling responses to music, such as mirth, melancholy or 
desire as less important and not worthy of consideration. In my experience, while I 
sometimes feel satisfaction, surprise, interest and boredom while listening to music, they 
are only a few o f a gamut of responses I might feel.
Additionally, because of the limitation of experience to the mental field, 
expectation becomes a matter of mentally matching a mental representation of an implied 
musical event with an actual musical event. This, too, does not ring true to experience. 
For me, expectation in the musical situation is quite bodily in character. More than 
thinking that the present sounding musical event implies a specific musical consequent, I 
feel that the present musical event will or should go to another. In order to bring that to 
thought, I must first feel it bodily and then make the effort to bring it to mind. While it is 
true that I sometimes anticipate a favorite section in a piece I know well, looking ahead 
mentally when the section is coming up, that is not the kind of low level event-to-event
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framework that Meyer and Narmour work in. Anticipating a favorite section can only 
occur in an already known piece. Meyer and Narmour’s theories are built on expectation 
in new musical contexts, expectations built on both past experience and human 
psychological nature.
As theories based on a version of expectation that centers on not knowing 
exactly what will happen next, Meyer and Narmour’s theories do not apply quite as well 
in cases where one feels meaning and pleasure in listening to a piece that one already 
knows well. When one listens to a piece one knows very well, as when a pianist listens 
to a piece he has memorized, one knows exactly what musical event will occur next at all 
times. Unless one happens to hear a sound or a relationship that one has not heard 
before, no real surprise occurs. And yet, it is still possible to both delight in those events 
that one found surprising at first and to continue to feel the music as meaningful.19
The problems with the Meyer/Narmour theory of expectation discussed above 
are all fairly obvious. My final problem — the linear, spatial metaphor o f time at its base 
— is not as apparent. In this metaphor time is a line or path, with the present moment 
being a point on the line or path that moves forward. The past is behind that point, the 
future in front. Time is a territory and the present moment is our temporal “location.” 
One logical entailment of this metaphor is that, just as every location in a physical 
territory actually exists, every location in the temporal territory actually exists. Due to
19 An additional logical problem arises if we interpret Meyer’s definition of musical meaning strictly. 
According to that definition, if a now sounding musical event does not create expectation of a future 
one, it is meaningless. By this definition, the final chord of pieces that end with a sense of finality is 
meaningless.
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the natures o f the human capacities of observing, remembering and imagining, each of 
the temporal territories may exist with a different character the present may have a 
more solid existence than the past, the past a somewhat hazier existence than the present, 
and the future may still be forming in front o f us. Nevertheless, even given their different 
characters, this metaphor lends credence to the feeling that all of these times actually 
exist. That past and future actually exist is not true to feet. All that actually exists is 
now. Of the past, only traces actually exist in the now; of the future, only possibilities 
actually exist in the now. Nevertheless, because o f our pervasive use o f this metaphor, 
we speak and act as though the past and future actually exist. In this way we can speak 
of “the past stretching out behind us” or “the future unfolding in front o f us.”
This characterization of the three temporal “realms” — a solid, actual present, a 
determined, but partially forgotten past, and a still-forming future in front o f us — 
creates a tendency to locate the quality ofpotential totally in the future, leaving little 
possibility for potential to occur in the present. The future, as unformed, seems full of 
possibility. The present, as solid and “not absent,” tends to seem more actual than 
potential. Since we are “there” now and can see how things are, the present often takes 
on a fiilly determinate character. Only in unusual situations such as emergencies do we 
tend to be fully aware of the indeterminate character of the present. Emergency 
situations can make clear that the future does not actually exist, but that our experience 
of future “nows” is contingent upon the choices that we make in the current now. When 
we become aware that the future does not actually exist, we can see that actual potential
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exists only in the present. Possibilities for future potential exists in the present as well, 
but actual potential racists in the now.20 Although under normal circumstances the now 
may appear to be determinate in character, it is actually the now that unfolds, not the 
future before us.
The Meyer/Narmour theory of expectation characterizes the future as potential 
and the now as actual The listener attends to determinate music sounding in the present, 
responds with a mental representation of potential in a future moment, and then attends 
to how that representation compares or contrasts with the actual music sounding when 
that future moment becomes present. This schema not only does not take into account 
the indeterminacy of the present, it defers attention away from the present moment 
toward a future moment. Even if you think of it as a chained structure (event A refers to 
representation b, which either does or does not match event B, which refers to 
representation c, which either does or does not match event C, and so on) the listener 
must constantly split his attention between the presently sounding event and the possible 
future event. If we believe that actual potential exists only in the now, we can create a 
model o f expectation that is truer to experience — one that involves the entire listener 
and rivets his attention to the now-sounding music.
In response to the spatial metaphor of time employed by most music theorists, in 
Meter as Rhythm, Hasty develops a finely nuanced description of musical temporality
20 As we envision it in the future “potential” takes on a substantial quality, almost as if it were a hazy 
substance out of which the future appears in front of us, like an mirage in the desert As it is in the 
now, I mean to indicate the possibility, due to forces both within and out of our control, inherent in a 
current event for it to unfold in varying manners.
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from the point of view of an unfolding now. Rather than treat meter as a structure or 
template he regards it as process, a course of thought fraught with difficulty.
The difficulty Iks in standing outside process to distinguish parts, take 
measurements, and draw comparisons. Since we must freeze the flow of 
rhythm to treat it as an object for analysis, we may be inclined to conceive 
o f time itself as something arrestable (68).
Theorists usually overcome this difficulty by characterizing time as space, which, while it 
may pin down the slippery “now,” also creates other problems, as I have been discussing.
In contrast, Hasty characterizes past and future from the point o f view of their 
effects on an ever present now.
If there is to be anything approaching an analysis of rhythmic process, 
there must be found some way of speaking of future and past as they 
contribute to a presently evolving situation — a future that is potential 
rather than actual, undetermined rather than already determined (and thus, 
in effect, past); a past that, in its effects, is not fixed and immutable but 
that, in itself is dead and gone and cannot be returned to (as if present)
(69).
Hasty characterizes the now not as a place, but as an awareness of the becoming of 
present events.
To avoid equating now with the event itself and to avoid calling now a 
time point, I suggest that now might be regarded as a continually 
changing perspective on becoming. Now is continually changing and ever 
new, because becoming is ever new and never fixed or arrested (76).
This perspective on time and the now makes it a matter of human experience and 
capacity. The now is not a instantaneous point on a line, but is more like a bubble of
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awareness conditioned by the human capacity for memory and embodied imagining.21 In 
this way, while an event in the past is already determined, its potential may still be 
unfolding in the now. Through memory, the past is still present in the unfolding now. 
While the future does not yet exist, its possibilities are also present the unfolding now as 
embodied imagining entrains with the musical sound. Human experience of the now is 
conditioned by our fully embodied perceptual capacity.
In this version of time, rather than referring me to unfolding in the future, 
expectation keeps me riveted as I participate in the process o f potential becoming actual 
in the now unfolding event. I  am no mere bystander or mental matcher in this process, 
but a fully active participant in creating the event in the now. As I described above, in 
the physical world, music is only part o f the single, complex sound wave that exists in 
the physical environment at any one geographical location. Any other quality that music 
has (including eventfulness) is a result o f its encounter with an active, enculturated 
listener. Expectation is a matter o f the listener meeting the sound wave in the now in 
active and folly embodied anticipation of supplying his part in the integration with the 
sound wave toward the experience o f music. That anticipation is based on how he has 
been conditioned as a listener both diachronically and synchronically by experience. 
From that tacit conditioning, he feels where or how the music might go.
211 hesitate to use the metaphor of”bubbler> because it invokes an idea of space. However, a better 
metaphor has not yet occurred to me. Just keep in mind that this is a bubble o f awareness, which is not 
spatial in the way that it is experienced. Awareness may be of an object or event in space, but awareness 
is not itself spatial.
246
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
More than feeling like a mental matching o f possible to actual, this expectation 
feels more like how one feels in the midst o f an emergency (assuming one feels very 
present and fully functional, not panicked). If we are very present and fully functional in 
the midst of an emergency, without planning we integrate ourselves with the needs o f the 
moment toward a beneficial outcome. We are “on our toes,” ready for whatever occurs, 
living in the potential o f the moment. With music, that potential relates to such events 
as the particular sounds and relationships we attend to, the coherences that we create 
from them, the way that we allow them to invoke experiential gestalts in us (both musical 
and non-musical), and so on.
This kind of expectation is not consistent with the kind of expectation suggested 
by the Meyer/Narmour schema. Rather than involving the future, it occurs in the now. 
Since “future” is a fiction, it requires mental involvement. An expectation that occurs in 
the now is more felt in the body than thought by the mind. I feel the present event as it 
unfolds in the ongoing stream o f nows, my body entrained with what feels to me like the 
forward motion of the music. Rather than referring attention from the present event to a 
possible future event, bodily expectation keeps us riveted to the event as it unfolds in the 
now.22 Since it is no longer a matter of mental knowledge of what comes next, but a 
matter o f supplying parts of the self toward meaningful integration, understanding how 
compositions we know well can feel meaningful is no longer a problem. Even if we 
know a composition well, so that what happens next is not a guess but secure
22 One could even consider this “riveting” literal, rather than metaphorical. Through expectation, we 
integrate parts of ourselves with the sound wave, thereby creating our musical experience.
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knowledge, we still need to “keep on our toes” in order to effectively supply our part in 
the integration.23 We can also try to attend to the music with a different approach, or 
allow it to invoke novel experiential gestalts — both of which require a present, fully 
functioning listener.
If we place expectation in the now, we do not need to eliminate the future from 
the equation. It simply means we work with a different notion o f future. The future 
becomes part o f the potential of now, as it operates in embodied imagining. Listening to 
the music from my musical senses, I have a bodily sense, a bodily prediction, in the now 
of where the music might go or what it might do next. I am not looking for or imaging 
an event in the next moment, but feeling in the now, how the music might go. The 
potential musical event actually exists in the now in my bodily sense of what will occur 
next. It does not exist in a non-existent future moment.
Despite my misgivings concerning certain dimensions o f the Meyer/Narmour 
theory of expectation, I have found Narmour’s method of melodic analysis useful in 
understanding how particular pieces of music makes me feel. Even though I believe that 
his philosophical framework has faults, Narmour draws on his own tacit knowledge in 
his explicit theorizing and thus compensates for those faults.24 Although Narmour limits 
his thinking to the mental field o f the listener and such associated feelings as surprise and 
interest, his method can also reveal how music might create desire in a listener. This
23 In addition, even if we know explicitly (mentally) what will happen next, the expectations we feel are 
so rooted in our bodies that we can still feel them regardless of what our minds tell us.
24 Musicians using his theory will also draw on their own tacit knowledge in applying it, thus helping to 
correct for philosophical errors.
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potential is demonstrated by one of his key terms: denial If his theory were truly 
limited to mental expectation and not rooted in tacit bodily knowing, the term “surprise” 
would be sufficient in order to describe the experience o f not getting what was expected. 
In contrast, “denial” implies desire, a much more bodily feeling. If  I don’t get what I 
expect, I feel surprised; if I don’t get what I desire, I feel denied.
Narmour speaks of strong or weak implication or implication that builds from 
weak to strong over the course of a musical event (as in, “the music strongly implies x”). 
This locates implication as an inherent quality of the music, rather than something that 
involves the listener. “Implication” masquerades as a substance or energy that interacts 
forcefully with the listener. His theory might be more accurate if instead of 
“implication” he spoke of “inference.” Rather than locating the action “out there” in “the 
music itself” “inference” locates it inside the listener, where he integrates the complex 
sound wave with parts of himself toward a bearing on the experience of music.
Inference and expectation are the same process seen from different points of view; if we 
feel that A infers B, we expect B to follow A. If we locate the action in the listener, we 
can more easily see that it is not some inherent quality o f the music “out there” that is 
weak or strong or builds. Rather, these qualities are located in the listener’s involvement 
with the musical sound. The force that builds is not implication, but desire. Having the 
benefit of working within a theoretical framework that makes possible a discussion of 
desire, I would support a greater attention to the role o f desire in musical meaning.
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Expectation and desire are closely related experiences. Expectation consists of 
being aware (either tacitly as a bodily feeling or explicitly in central awareness) of 
something (an event, object, quality, etc.) that might exist (based on what has already 
occurred), but does not exist now. Desire consists o f both being aware and feeling the 
lack of something that might exist but does not exist now. If music invokes our 
involvement metonymically, desire may arise because it combines expectation with 
feeling lack. Because of diachronic and synchronic conditioning, both tacit and explicit, 
a listener feels expectation. That expectation invokes the experiential gestalt o f desire — 
we not only are aware o f something that might be, we feel the lack of it, too.
While mental expectation splits attention between the current now and one or 
more future nows, desire keeps listeners rooted in the now. As a mind-made fiction, 
only the mind can “visit” the future, the body cannot. The body is rooted in the now. As 
a feeling grounded in the body, desire keeps us fixed in the now. We may mentally 
imagine from desire to a future tune when the object o f the desire is present, but the 
desire itself is clearly present and in present time. It is from desire, rooted in embodied 
expectation in the now, that we entrain with musical sound. When desire is denied, its 
force builds. Rather than simply being a matter of cognitive interest and surprise, good 
composition creates a balance between giving us what we expect and denying what we 
desire. Getting what you expect creates coherence; being denied what you desire creates 
a context in which building desire roots you in the now, actively anticipating the pleasure 
o f finally getting what you want. This pleasurable anticipation exerts a force that draws
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the listener forward toward that future now when desire will be satisfied. A good 
composition not only surprises and interests, it tantalizes and teases, as well.
Music is an ephemeral, insubstantial phenomenon, yet it exerts such force! That 
force is felt as bodily and in the now. In order to fully understand that force, we must 
work from a philosophical basis that rings true to experience, one that includes the 
whole, involved person and occurs in the only time that really exists — the now.
Kinds o f Tacit Knowing Brought to Bear on Making Sense o f Music
The tacit knowing brought to bear on making sense of music consists of at least 5 
different kinds: I) the systems of metaphors that ground the understanding of music, 2) 
the image schemas learned through embodied experience in the world, 3) expectations 
and desires based on past experience with similar music, 4) the metaphoric system of the 
culture, and 5) personal experience with emotions and mood.
Western art music is grounded semiotically by a culturally defined system of 
metaphors. All signs have multiple aspects, any of which might serve to convey 
information. In Peircean terms, the ground is the particular aspect of the sign that is 
attended to as it functions as a sign.
The sign always presents its object as that object in some regard or 
respect, and so serves to present its object aspectrvally and partially. [...] 
However, it presents these qualities or characteristics of the object in the 
sign in an abstract form. The ground of the sign is an abstract quality or 
form of the sign, somewhat in a quasi-Platonic sense o f form. [...] The 
ground, as the presentation of the object, thus serves as the basis upon 
which the sign can represent its object (Liszka, 20).
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For instance, as I explained in “Hearing Isolated Tones,” as listeners hear them, sound 
waves o f different frequency and amplitude have multiple aspects, any of which might 
function semiotically. In the case of frequency, fester frequency tones might seem high, 
small, narrow, sharp, or light in weight or brightness. Of these possibilities, our culture 
has chosen HEIGHT as the semiotic ground of music, while other cultures have chosen 
other aspects. In the case of amplitude, sounds with larger amplitude might seem large, 
near or aggressive. We chose to speak of them as large (although in certain musical 
contexts, they can also seem near or aggressive).
These two basic culturally chosen metaphors — PITCH and VOLUME are the 
metonymic seeds for two complex metaphors that I will explore in detail in chapters four 
and five of this dissertation: I) music as pitches m oving through m usical space 
and locations and 2) music as flow ing sound  substance. “P itch” and “volum e” 
can be seen as giving rise to whole sets of logically consistent metaphors, such as 
“D iscrete m usical figures moving  through m usical space or location” and 
“Flow ing  m usical substance creating  force and  instability” respectively. In 
level two integrations, these two complex metaphors create the musical context in which 
isolated metaphors, such as motion, FORCE, INSTABILITY, and REST make sense. I will 
explore this further in the next chapter.
For my purposes here, the point is that these metaphorical systems, which ground 
our understanding and experience o f the music do so through embodied expectation. 
Someone from another culture who hears Western art music without knowledge of these
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metaphoric systems will have a very different understanding and experience o f it. They 
will use expectations based on the musical metaphors learned from experience with the 
music o f their own culture and thus will make a very different kind of sense than 
someone enculturated in Western art music. While listening to a slowly ascending scale, 
someone whose understanding of rising frequencies is of broader to narrower sounds 
may feel an expectation and sense o f narrowing, while a Western musician will expect 
and feel a sense of ascension. In this way, musical expectations are based on these 
metaphoric semiotic grounds.
With the grounding of the basic metaphors, musical expectations stem from 
simple image schemas learned through embodied experience in the world, as well as from 
past experience with similar musics. For instance, even if listeners had never heard music 
before, once they were oriented to the sense o f the beat, they might reasonably be 
expected to be able to follow the beat because they had had many other experiences with 
steady pulse phenomena before. If  the tempo began to accelerate, they might even be 
able to follow the accelerando because they had had experience with other kinds of 
accelerating pulses. This ability stems from the simple sense of pulse. In contrast, more 
complex musical pulse phenomena, such as metered pulse or harmonic rhythm require 
experience with musical sound in order to create a sense of expectation. Although these 
more complex pulse phenomena integrate image schemas learned through normal, 
everyday embodied experience, as complex experiential phenomena they originate in the 
musical realm and thus must be learned there.
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In addition to relating to the musical grounding metaphors, making sense of 
music can relate to other cultural metaphors that are part o f the general cultural system 
of tacit knowing. For instance, in our culture, we have a metaphor that important is 
BIG. This is a value-based metaphor that may play out in the choice of car or house, or 
when actors’ agents attempt to get their client’s name put in larger letters on a movie 
poster. In certain musical contexts, this metaphor can be integrated with a “big” musical 
sound (based on the first level VOLUME image schema) into a bearing on creating a sense 
of importance in the music. In another example, the cultural metaphor heaven is 
up/m ortal is DOWN might play out in music through the “higher” tones of an angelic 
choir hovering over lower, more earthly music. In addition, making sense of music 
integrates more complex cultural metaphors, such as the event structure metaphors 
that I will explore in chapter four. These cultural metaphors are all a part of the tacit 
knowing system that we integrate toward making sense of and understanding our world, 
including music.
Finally, m aking sense o f  m usic in tegrates personal experience w ith em bodied 
em otions and m oods. E m otions and m oods m anifest in the  body in w ays that relate to  
im age schem as. F or instance, cheerfulness m anifests th rough  a  high level o f  positive, 
relaxed energy, w hich crea tes a  feeling o f  UPness o r BRJGHTness, an  outw ard-looking 
view point (i.e ., ex troversion), and m ovem ents that are expansive, relaxed and o f  a  
m oderate tem po. In  co n trast, sadness m anifests th rough  a  low  level o f  energy that is 
negative in  character, w hich creates a  feeling o f  DOWNness o r  DARKness, an inw ard-
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looking viewpoint (i.e., oriented toward self), and slower movements that are not 
expansive in nature. Some o f these image schemas— tempo, range of movement, 
general level of energy, kinds of movements — and qualities — brightness or darkness 
— can be embodied by musical sound. If  a listener hears some of those image schemas 
or qualities in the music, they can integrate them with their own embodied experience of 
these moods toward a feeling that the music is the mood, Le., “The music is sad.” Of 
course, the attribution o f a mood to a piece of music does not indicate a belief that the 
music actually feels that mood. Rather, it indicates the recognition that the music 
embodies patterns or qualities of that mood. The point is that moods and emotions 
involve image schemas and qualities that can be embodied by musical sound. Thus, 
when a listener hears those image schemas and qualities he can allow them to 
metonymically invoke either a recognition o f the mood or an actual feeling of the mood. 
Embodied experience with moods and emotions, then, are part of the tacit knowing we 
bring to bear on making sense o f musical sound.
Summary
Making sense o f musical sound is the second of the three ontological levels of 
musical experience. As such it involves integrating the outcomes of the first level 
integration — the heard properties of pitch, duration, volume, location, timbre, 
consonance and dissonance — with higher-level principles. Those higher-level principles 
involve the metonymic processes o f embodied perception: metonymic invocation of 
more complex image schemas and musical senses, as well as metonymic invocation of
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expectations. In addition to image schemas, the higher level embodied perceptual system 
brings to bear at least four other different kinds of tacit knowing: 1) the metaphorical 
semiotic ground of music, 2) expectations based on past experience with similar music,
3) the cultural metaphoric system, and 4) embodied experience with emotions and 
moods.
Level Three: Living the Music
Each ontological level is more complex than the last; each level integrates more 
aspects of the listener with the sound wave and thus creates a greater number of 
meaningful relationships between different aspects o f the music and between the music 
and listener. On the first level, only neuro-biological and simple cultural aspects of the 
listener are integrated with the sound wave to create the perception of tones. 
Theoretically, tones are isolated, so they do not relate to one another.25 On the second 
level, image schematic aspects of embodied perception, as organized by the musical 
senses, are integrated with the sound wave to make sense of the notes. Isolated tones 
become related to one another in varying ways and with varying degrees of complexity 
by metonymically invoking and integrating with image schematic aspects of the 
embodied musical senses. On the third level, experiential gestalts related to more 
complex aspects of the energetic matrix integrate with the sound wave in a bearing on
25 In a tonal context, the separate existence of this first level is hypothetical only. If the listener is 
enculturated, he cannot help but make some sense of what is heard, showing that second level 
integrations are already occurring. Something like an experience of this first level of hearing might 
occur in an atonal context, especially if the rhythm is particularly free so that not even a sense of pulse 
can be discerned.
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the experience of music. Unlike the second level, where the primary engagement is with 
image schematic perception, the third level engages broader aspects o f the energetic 
matrix, including (but not limited to or necessarily) emotions, feelings, memories, 
understandings, values, beliefs, imaginings, and desires. On this level, the musical image 
schemas created by metonymic invocation on the second level go on to metonymically 
invoke these more complex experiential gestalts.
Experiential^, on the third level, the sounds of the music do not simply relate to 
one another as they do on the second level, they relate to and invoke the participation of 
the inner life of the listener, as well It is this invocation of the listener’s inner life that 
creates the most salient experiential difference between hearing “notes” and hearing 
“music” — the sense (in hearing “music”) that one is immersed in the musical sound. 
When the musical sound is experienced as “fust notes,” it is experienced as more external 
to the self than internal.26 It is true that we must integrate aspects of our inner selves 
(the musical senses) with sound waves in order to hear notes. However, these are parts 
of our selves that are normally tacit and o f which we are peripherally aware, if at all.
The parts o f our inner selves that integrate with the music on the third level — such as 
emotions, imaginings, and desires — are parts that we are more likely to experience in 
central awareness.27 Thus, on the third level, since the musical sound integrates with
26 This difference is particularly noticeable when one would like to “get into” the music but, because of 
mood or mental distraction, cannot.
27 The experience of merging with the music can involve what Csordas (1996) calls “imaginal 
performances”: internally experienced imagery that is not only visual in character but may involve any 
of the senses, including the kinesthetic sense. He argues that the imaginal performances of Catholic
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aspects o f our inner lives that we are often centrally aware o f it seems as if the music is 
no longer “out there” but “in here.”28
From the point o f view of the music, the difference between second and third 
level can be described in the following manner. Non-musical qualities whose patterns are 
embodied by the musical form, such as melancholy, only exist in potential form  on the 
second level. Melancholy does not actually exist until a listener feels melancholy while 
listening. The listener can hear the potential melancholy “in” the music and identify it 
when listening at the second level Musical events, such as melody, harmony, and 
rhythm do actually exist on the second level but only in the sound medium (as made 
coherent by the listener). On the third level these musical events exist also in the living 
medium o f the listener and thus, through that medium, come to life.
To demonstrate the differences between these three levels I will illustrate with a 
piece by the Finnish accordionist Maria Kalanieml who plays on this particular recording 
with the Finnish group “Aldargaz.”29 If I were able to listen to this particular track, 
“Iho,” only at the first level I would hear a series o f tones in various combinations and 
timbres — tones that did not relate to one another and thus did not make sense. At the
Charismatic patients (which are guided by healing practitioners) effect a resolution of problematic 
aspects of self through positively transforming memories of the experiences that gave rise to them.
28 Note, however, that since these “levels’' only describe prototypical experiential states on a relative 
continuum of experiential states, it is quite possible to be somewhat “into” the music. In other words, 
this is not an all or nothing situation. In addition, since making sense of the music involves feeling with 
the body, the body must get “into” the music to some degree in the process of making sense. The 
distinction I am making hare involves those parts of ourselves that we usually refer to as our “inner 
lives” — primarily emotions, imaginings, and desires. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to feel really 
“into” the music in a primarily bodily fashion. Bodily involvement creates the continuum from level 
two to level three, making sense of the musical sound on level two while metonymically invoking 
emotions, imaginings, and desires on level three.
29 Maria Kalaniemi: Iho. Hannibal/Rykodisc LC 7433. 1997.
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second level, with all o f my embodied musical senses engaged, I hear particular 
instruments — acoustic guitar, bass, accordion, flugelhom, trumpet, electric guitar, and 
saxophone — playing particular melodic patterns in particular meters. I can hear/feel the 
piece alternating between different, distinct sections, sections that make up the over all 
form (which I can recognize as the form ABABCAB). In each section, I hear particular 
rhythmic/melodic gestures repeated and sense specific mood qualities: A feels intense, 
brooding and conflicted, B feels more resolute, C feels dreamy and moody. I feel the 
tension in momentum and dynamic motion created by the alternating complex and 
sometimes conflicting metric patterns. In the A section, the melody (accordion) and 
accompaniment both play an asymmetrical 9/8 pattern, but each divides the measure 
differently.30 In contrast, in the B and C sections, the meters are asymmetrical and 
complex, but not conflicting, leading to a greater sense o f unity and less tension. All of 
these are observations that I can make without being “into” the music, that I could have 
made after the first few times that I listened to it casually.31
At the third level of musical experience, I engage with this piece in a much more 
personal manner. I not only recognize the varying moods of the different sections, I feel
30 As I hear the A section, the accompaniment divides the measure into S beats: quarter note, eighth, 
quarter, quarter, quarter. The melody divides the measure into 4 beats: quarter note, quarter, quarter, 
dotted quarter. In listening to the piece, you can either entrain with the accompaniment (which sets its 
pattern in the introduction before the melody enters) or with the melody, leading to a sense of conflicting 
meters. Alternatively, you can entrain with the eighth note as a beat, leading to a somewhat frenetic 
feeling, due to the speed of the eighth note (m.m. = 152) and a sense that, even though the beat is 
constant, larger aspects of the meter do not come together. Either way, the meter lends to the sense of 
intense, brooding conflict
31 After a few casual listenings, I could not have described the conflicting meters in section A with 
specificity, but could have said, “It sounds like the pulses in the melody and accompaniment conflict” I 
also could not have described the complete instrumentation with great confidence, since the instruments 
blend quite well in places and must be listened to carefully for a full identification.
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them emotionally and physically. I am with the melody of A, as it worries the same 
melodic phrase over and over in an indistinctly minor mode, the accompaniment pulling 
at it with its different meter. I live the resolute quality o f the B section — the resolution 
of metric tension and the brightness that comes with the change to a more major 
sounding (yet still not quite distinctly major) mode. The C section takes me to a dreamy 
state, where the reverberant, sliding melodic gestures o f the electric guitar suggest 
images of the Aurora Borealis to me. I imagine myself in the cold night air experiencing 
the beauty o f the northern lights. Beyond these more direct experiences, I experience 
this music as distinctly Finnish and feel a connection to it because my mother is Finnish. 
In its moods and moodiness, I recognize and experience some o f the Finn in myself. As 
a flute player, I am also often aware when Maria Kalaniemi is playing her accordion as a 
wind instrument, rather than as a keyboard instrument. Having experienced the 
expressiveness of my own lungs and breathing apparatus many times as I played my 
flute, I entrain with the wonderfully expressive, sensual way that she uses her 
accordion's huge lung-like bellows. In this the “highest” ontological level of musical 
experience, I open more of myself to the music. I am most involved and in so being, I 
create the greatest number of relationships between aspects of the music and between 
aspects of the music and myself.
Another way to understand the difference in complexity between these different 
levels is through the notion of “higher organizing principles.” At each successive level, 
the higher organizing principle involves more of the listener’s self. On the first level, it
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involves the neurobiological principles o f hearing (which are more complex than a sound 
wave and thus “higher”). On the second level, it involves the principles o f embodied 
perception, as they occur in the musical senses. Those principles involve expectation, 
metonymic creation o f whole gestalts from partial clues, and imaginative entrainment.
On the third level, the higher principle involves an intention or desire to be moved by the 
music, a conscious choice by the listener to not just make seme o f the patterns and 
qualities embodied by the musical sound, but to actually live them as the music unfolds in 
the now. In this way, what might be understood as “an ascending line” in level two 
mode might be experienced as “a feeling of ascension” or “a feeling like when the wind 
whooshes upward” in level three mode. What might be understood as very soft, high, 
last pizzicato notes in level two mode (creating image schemas of swift lightness) might 
be experienced as “a feeling o f light rapidity” or “a feeling/image o f fairies” in level three.
As level two principles involve metonymic invocation and imagination, so do 
level three principles, but with a difference. On level two, we saw that aspects of 
isolated tones (heard on level one) could be used as partial clues in the invocation of 
image schematic wholes. On level three, those image schematic wholes invoke larger 
experiential gestalts that may be of varying natures: physical or emotional feelings; 
sonic, visual, or narrative imagery or associations; physical actions; or even a memory 
associated with a particular piece or style. Because of the intention or desire to be 
moved, these experiential gestalts are invoked in such a way that we not only recognize 
the patterns and qualities the music embodies, we actually dwell in or live those patterns
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and qualities as the music plays. Rooted in level two imagination, which is more tacit 
and embodied in character, level three imagination can be more focal in character, as 
when a listener associates sounds with visual or narrative imagery or with personal 
memory. This kind o f imagination does not merely entrain with the musical sound, it 
amplifies it.
In this way, when a listener experiences music (in contrast to hearing notes), the 
music actually plays him, in a sense. This idea can be seen in an analogy to the process 
o f sound production on a violin. The sound of a violin arises from the interaction of 
several properties: 1) a vibration is initiated by exciting the strings with either a bow or 
through plucking, 2) the energy of that vibration is transferred through the bridge to the 
body of the violin, which acts as an resonator or amplifier, 3) the body of the violin has 
its own acoustic properties, which are transferred to the vibratory pattern, and 4) the 
acoustic environment further modifies the vibration.32 It is this third factor that is of 
special interest here. Each individual violin has its own individual acoustic properties, 
depending on the kind of wood it is made o f the nature of the finish, its shape and 
thickness, etc. The vibration from the string passes through the bridge, driving the body 
to begin to vibrate in its own particular way. The two vibratory patterns, one from the 
string and one from the body, join one another and resonate together. In the process, the
12 This simplified description makes it appear that the vibration moves and is influenced in linear 
fashion. In reality, the vibration does not move linearly from the strings across the bridge to the violin 
body and then out into the environment Rather, the bridge unites the strings and body in such a way 
that they are interdependent and produce the vibration in a non-linear manner. In addition, 
environmental conditions will affect the condition of the violin, thereby affecting the sound they 
produce.
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body both amplifies (increases the amplitude) and modifies (changes the pattern of) the 
vibration initially produced by the friction o f the bow on the string.
Transferring the sound production schema to the listening situation, gives rise to 
the following set of equivalencies: 1) the musical sound (as produced at level two) is the 
initial excitement of energy on the strings, 2) the energy is transferred through the bridge 
o f the listener’s attention and corresponding perceptual abilities (both the “portal” senses 
and the musical “senses of”), 3) the listener is the body of the violin, and 4) the individual 
vibratory tendencies o f violins correspond to the individual experiential gestalts of 
listeners. Just as the friction of a bow on violin strings invokes a resonating response in 
the body of the violin, when musical sound and listener are coupled through the listener’s 
attention, the musical sound may invoke a resonating response in the experiential gestalts 
o f the listener. Just as each individual violin, through the way that its history 
(experiences in the world) have shaped it, will resonate in its own individual manner, 
each individual listener, through the way that his history (experiences in the world) have 
shaped him, will resonate in his own individual manner. Just as the production of a violin 
sound is driven by the person playing the violin, the production o f musical experience is 
driven by the music. The player plays the violin; the music plays the listener.
At the third level o f musical experience, just as each individual violin differs from 
all others in the way that it resonates and amplifies the sound wave, each individual will 
differ from all others in the way that they resonate with and amplify the musical sound. 
Because of the different ways that experience has shaped him, not every listener or even
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every wind player will feel the lung-like expressiveness of Maria Kalaniemi’s accordion 
playing.33 In other words, because interpretation is a matter of individually and 
differently formed resonating entities, on this level, interpretation will differ to varying 
extents. At level two, with its more concrete image schematic principles of organization 
and coherence, interpretation will differ less than on level three. It is easy to agree that a 
set of pitches coheres as a specific image schema — a gathering of momentum as a line 
descends rapidly, for instance. But that image schema can invoke many different 
experiential gestalts: a sense of flying downward on a roller coaster, a narrative about 
children rolling down a hill, a comparison to a similar passage in another piece of music, 
or a memory o f how difficult it is to play the particular passage in question. The
33 An interesting example of the way that different experiences shape individuals to resonate differently 
occurred to me recently. I went with my sister, who was a professional dancer for about IS years, to a 
dance performance. I took dance lessons for about 10 years, until I was IS and decided to quit dance to 
concentrate my time and attention on music. I am primarily a musician, but one who enjoys and 
experiences music in a very bodily fashion. My sister is primarily a dancer, but she also loves music.
For me to enjoy it, dance must be musical, that is, express the movement evoked by the music. My sister 
enjoys dance that is musical, but can also resonate with dance that is accomplished in silence. One of 
the numbers in the avant-garde performance consisted of a single woman dancing without music. For 
me, it was torture to sit still and not fidget My sister, however, found the number quite engaging. I 
could not understand her response, since the (fence had been incoherent for me, given its lack of musical 
coherence: The dancer did not even move to a consistent beat (In other words, the dance failed at level 
two fix’ me.) My sister explained that she entrained with the woman’s body, the way it moved, the way 
she used her weight and balance. I can and do entrain with a dancer’s body when the dance is musical, 
but need the music as a bridge of coherence between myself and the body. My sister, with her more fully 
developed dance experience, does not need the musical bridge.
Another striking example of the way that people’s experience shapes their listening differently 
occurred to me when I was talking with Laura Caramelino, a harpist from Curtis. She spoke of really 
feeling and resonating with the resonance of the music. It had never realty occurred to me to attend 
specifically to resonance. Being a harpist, who feels the resonance of the harp in her chest through 
physical contact with the resonating chamber, she felt it to be a natural aspect of the music to attend to. 
As a dancer and flutist first, and later gaining some skill on the piano, I had been conditioned to attend 
to motion, force, momentum, melody and rhythm, and later, harmony. Although it occasionally came to 
my attention, it had never occurred to me to listen fo r  resonance. However, once Laura’s comment 
pointed out this gap in my listening habits, I began to listen fix’ resonance and now find it to be a 
wonderful part of my listening experience.
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particular interpretation will depend on the specific listener and how they have been 
shaped as a listener and interpreter by their own nature and past experiences. However, 
since level three experience-interpretations often relate to the more concrete level two 
image schematic perceptions, even though they may differ, they will relate to one another 
image schematically. Even though I may experience a descending musical rush as simple 
a musical “whoosh” downward, I can easily understand someone who says it feels like a 
roller coaster ride.
The musical senses function in an expanded fashion on level three. On level two, 
they function to make sense of the sound — to create coherence. On level three, they 
facilitate the integration o f the listener with the musical sound so that the listener lives 
the qualities and events embodied by the musical sound. For example, on the second 
level, the sense of rhythm creates rhythmic coherence in the music and plays a part in 
recognizing meters and rhythms.34 On the third level, the sense of rhythm facilitates the 
listener’s entrance into the “musical realm” that the rhythm helps to create. It is similar 
to the experience of jumping rope when other people are turning the rope for you. You 
can stand outside the rope and entrain with its rhythm, or you can use the coherence 
gained by that entrainment to enter into interaction with the rope and actually live its 
rhythm in whole-bodied fashion. In addition, on the third level, emotional sensibilities do 
not simply help us to recognize the sense of a particular emotion “in” the music, they
34 Remember that this recognition occurs first and foremost on a bodily level, through bodily feeling. It 
may or may not occur mentally, depending on the training and intent of the listener.
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facilitate the actual living o f that emotion.35 In this way, recalling the analogy between 
the resonating system o f a violin and that of a listener, on the third level, the musical and 
emotional senses function as the “bridge” that connects the coherent musical sound with 
the listener’s experiential gestalts that then resonate along with the musical sound.
Comparison to Symbolic Meaning
On the third level of musical experience, in an experiential^ real sense, musical 
sound and listener actually integrate to become one. This is similar to what occurs in 
symbolic meaning, as illustrated by the case of the flag earlier in this chapter. If you 
recall, at that point I argued that symbolic meaning was of a specific kind. The basic 
meaning schema is o f the following structure: event X occurs to person A and invokes 
and focuses the integration of a set of subsidiary aspects of their energetic matrix B 
toward a focal whole C. I stated that symbolic meaning followed this general structure, 
but with two specifications: I) event X involves a part of a larger experiential gestalt 
(such as patriotism) standing in for the whole and 2) the focal whole of the meaningful 
integration is a matter o f metonymic integration of self with that larger experiential 
gestalt, with a concomitant living o f one’s part in that larger experiential gestalt. In 
other words, the flag stands for the larger patriotic schema in the world. A person who
35 Unless a listener is listening for therapeutic reasons (and even sometimes in that situation), the living 
of emotions tends to be qualitatively different when they are invoked by music and when they are 
invoked by a situation in ordinary life. Emotions invoked by ordinary life have a highly personal quality 
about them, whereas emotions invoked by music tend to be more impersonal. I will write more on this 
subject later in the chapter.
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opens themselves to the action of the flag metonymicaUy integrates with that larger 
patriotic schema in the world and actually intensely lives their part in the whole.
Musical meaning on the third level is both similar and dissimilar to symbolic 
meaning o f the kind that the flag exemplifies. It is dissimilar in that the music does not 
necessarily stand for something in the world other than itself. It may relate to 
something in the world other than itself as when a composer writes program music or 
listeners relate music to their own programs or impressions (such as an impression of 
“Finnishness” or witnessing the Aurora Borealis). But it does not necessarily stand for 
that thing in the world.36 The sounds of the music do not necessarily have to be 
integrated with that thing in the world in order for listeners to create lived musical 
meaning in the same way that the flag must necessarily be integrated with the larger 
patriotism schema in order for viewers to create lived patriotic meaning. One can still 
live qualities, images or narratives evoked and invoked by a piece of program music even 
if one does not know the program. The qualities, images or narratives invoked in a 
particular listener may not be the specific ones intended by the composer’s program, but 
they will relate to the program through their image schematic structure.
Third level musical meaning is similar to symbolic meaning in that it, too, 
involves the integration of self with something outside o f and in a sense, larger than self.
36 Typically, when Western art music relates to something in the world, it is to a program, either 
explicitly stated or provided by the listener himself. However, Western music (art or other) can also 
relate symbolically to transcendent social realities, as when a singing woman performs the female 
gender. In this case, she may stand symbolically for “woman.” If the listener experiences her singing as 
a symbol of “woman,” he will metonymicaUy live his part in the transcendent social reality of gender, 
experiencing a heightened feeling of himself as a male in relation to “woman.”
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The focal outcome of both symbolic meaning and musical meaning on the third level 
involves a shift in the participant’s perspective in which the participant becomes and lives 
for the duration as a metonymic part of a larger whole. In the case of the flag, at the 
moment of being moved by the sight o f it, the participant lives his part in the larger 
patriotic scheme in the world. Internally, he feels a sense of connection with that larger 
scheme. In addition, he exists fo r that moment as a part of the larger patriotic scheme 
for external viewers. Similarly, on the third level of musical experience, experientially, 
the meaningful integration that occurs is between music and listener, with the focal 
outcome of that integration being a shift in perspective in which the listener enters into 
(“gets into” or is “immersed in”) the music as an integral part of it.
Third level musical and symbolic meaning are both examples of what I call 
resonant meaning, of which I will write more shortly. Being examples of the same kind 
of meaning, musical and symbolic meaning might be better thought of as existing on a 
single continuum, rather than being different in kind.
Attending in Level Three Experience
As in the case of the flag, the focal outcome of third level musical experience 
does not occur in central awareness, but in peripheral awareness. In fact, when I am 
“into” the music, if I shift my central attention to my integration with the music for any 
length of time but a brief moment, Le., if I become too aware that I am “into” the music 
and focus my attention on that quality of being, the integration foils apart. I am no 
longer into the music, but just hearing notes. Attending to music must occur on multiple
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levels. Level three experience depends on attending at level two to the music itself If I 
attend too much to the level three integration, the level two integration disintegrates and 
therefore, so does level three. In other words, the level three integration disintegrates 
because a vital subsidiary particular (the focal outcome o f level two integration) 
disappears from the mix. So most o f the time, central attention must be with the music 
itself (the focal outcome o f level two), while being into the music stays in peripheral 
attention. Experientially, we integrate with the music — become a part of it — but must 
allow that integration to exist as a tacit aspect of the experience.
For me, the integration tends to foil apart when I try to engage with it mentally.
In other words, if I label, judge or analyze that state, the state will surely dissolve. If I 
want to label, judge or analyze the state, I can do so only in hindsight. In contrast, such 
mental activity can be entirety appropriate and beneficial for the creation of level two 
integrations. However, once the experience changes to level three (the musical sound is 
no longer merely “notes” and is now “music”), mental labeling, evaluation, and analysis 
tend to go to the background of experience, if not cease altogether. Some small measure 
of such mental activity operating on level two may be a subsidiary particular to the focal 
outcome of integrating the self with the music, but it must remain subsidiary and not 
become an aspect of the focal outcome.
And yet, if mental activities like labeling, judging and analyzing do not interfere, 
it is possible to briefly notice the feeling of being into the music without the integration 
with it falling apart. This experience indicates the existence of a non-mental observing
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self that is the aspect o f awareness most involved in peak level three musical experience. 
In The Observing Self, Arthur Deikman posits the existence of two types o f human 
selves: the object self and the observing self.37 The object self is made up of the thinking 
self the feeling self and the functional self. The observing self is that impersonal part of 
awareness that can observe thoughts and feelings without identifying with them. In my 
experience, during ordinary experience, the observing self tends to be obscured by the 
activities o f the object self (thoughts, feelings, practical matters). However, during peak 
experiences of various kinds (most obviously physical, emotional, artistic, or spiritual) 
the object self may become quiet, allowing the unfettered operation of the observing self. 
When we speak o f “losing ourselves” to or in the music (or to any peak activity) we 
speak of momentarily losing awareness o f the activities o f the object self (especially its 
mental and emotional aspects), which is usually our constant companion and with which 
we identify.38
Deikman terms mental, emotional, and functional aspects of self "object” because 
they can be observed, described and measured to a certain extent. As he describes it, 
they are the contents o f our consciousness. In contrast, the observing self is that which 
can observe those contents. The observing self cannot itself be observed, because as it
37 For more on the observing self see Epstein (1995 and 1998) and Tolle (1999).
3S This loss of mental and emotional activity is not an ail or nothing affair; it is an experiential 
continuum, especially in regards to mental activity. In my experience, a totally quiet mind is a rather 
unusual occurrence, tending to occur only in the midst of truly intense experiences or through 
disciplined practice of a spiritual exercise such as meditation. However, it is possible to quiet the 
activity of the mind, without stopping it altogether, through engaging in an activity that distracts 
attention from mental activity, such as watching television or listening to music that is soothing, but not 
engrossing.
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tries to observe itself, it must step away from itself, thereby removing itself from its “field 
o f vision.” Since it cannot be observed, its limits are unknown; it transcends the contents 
of consciousness. It is consciousness itself, the ground o f our experience. Deikman 
goes so far as to say that awareness is limitless and, having no boundaries, is ultimately 
connected with the awareness of some larger purpose. Depending on one’s perspective, 
that larger purpose might be understood as a supernatural phenomenon, like God, or it 
might be a wholly natural phenomenon, like Life, in all its myriad manifestations on the 
earthly plane.
Deikman makes an analogy to demonstrate the relationship between these two 
types of selves. Awareness, the observing self is likened to the surface of an ocean.
The individual consciousness is a tidal pool whose surface (awareness) is connected with 
the ocean but whose depth is discontinuous with that of the ocean. The object self is 
represented by disturbances in the pool When there are a lot of disturbances on the 
surface, the surface tension is less and therefore the connection with the larger awareness 
is less perceptible. When the pond is calm, the surface coheres and seems more 
connected with the larger ocean o f which it is a part.
The two selves manifest themselves in two different modes of consciousness: the 
object self in the object mode and the observing self in the receptive mode. The purpose 
of the object mode is to act in the environment. It perceives the world in terms of sharp 
perceptual and cognitive boundaries, absolute time, linear causality, logical thought and 
reasoning. The perception o f the world in terms of absolute time and linear causality
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lead to the perception o f past and future. The purpose o f the receptive mode is to 
receive the environment. It perceives the world in terms o f blurred boundaries and 
diffuse attention, process, relative time, simultaneity, intuition and imagination. Time 
emphasis in this mode is "now.”
In the shift from level two to level three musical experience, when we open 
ourselves to integrating with musical sound, we shift from the object mode to the 
receptive mode. This is the shift in which we “open” ourselves to be moved by the 
music. The evidence o f being emotionally moved, however, seems to present a logical 
problem. Deikman aligns the emotional self with the mental self in the object mode, not 
with the observing self in the receptive mode. This problem can easily be addressed by 
noting the difference in nature of emotional responses in object mode and those in 
receptive mode. As I noted earlier, the emotions felt in level three musical experience 
tend to be not o f a personal nature, but of an impersonal nature. Personal emotions are 
a response to an individual’s thought-filled perspective on a situation in the world. Two 
people might have very different emotional reactions to the same situation, depending on 
their perspectives and attitudes. The impersonal emotions felt in third level musical 
experience have nothing to do with thoughts on a personal situation. They are invoked 
directly in the integration with the music and thus are not necessarily connected with
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personal situations or thoughts.39 The impersonal quality o f emotions experienced 
during third level musical experience relates to the beauty and ineflability o f music.
Beauty and Ineffability
In this dissertation, I am not writing about what music means (the focal outcomes 
o f musical meaning processes), but about how it means. Beauty and ineflability are two 
possible focal outcomes o f musical meaning processes on the third leveL Even though, 
as focal outcomes, they are not the main subject of this dissertation, I want to address 
them briefly to suggest how they might be investigated from the perspective I have been 
developing.
In my experience, feeling beauty is intimately bound up with being in the 
receptive mode (as defined by Deikman). The shift from object mode to receptive mode 
is the difference between seeing that a flower is pretty and feeling its beauty. In that 
shift, we open ourselves to the qualities of the flower — its colors, shapes, textures, 
aroma, the way its petals sparkle in sunlight. Experiencing those qualities through the 
embodied and culturally inflected sense o f beauty, we do not experience them as we do 
with ordinary senses — as outside o f ourselves. Rather, we live them vividly. Through 
living its qualities vividly, we become one with the flower. Thus, beauty is not a quality 
inherent to particular objects, but a quality individuals create in meaningful relationship 
to those objects.
39 Except, of course, if the listener listens with a therapeutic intention. By this, I mean listening to 
something that makes one sad in order to bring up sad emotions about a particular life situation that 
need to be processed.
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Recalling Deikman’s analogy between aspects o f awareness and aspects of an 
ocean, becoming one with a flower or any other experience o f beauty may facilitate the 
extension of self from the individual tidal pool to the larger ocean. It is true that we 
must make the effort to shift from object self to observing self (we must “open” 
ourselves to feeling beauty). However, the integration o f the presence of a pleasant 
object with the memory of the experience of beauty is a powerful enticement to effect 
that shift in consciousness. In the shift from our own individual tidal pool of awareness 
to that of the undivided ocean, we become alive to a greater magnitude and depth of 
experience than we ordinarily feel The magnitude and depth seem to exist not only 
outside ourselves — in the greater purpose Deikman speaks o f (perhaps God or Life). 
They also exist inside ourselves — in a seemingly greater capacity for awareness than we 
ordinarily have. Feeling beauty is a matter o f living for a time from  this greater capacity 
to an awareness both one’s own place and the place of the object of beauty in that 
greater purpose. In this way, a flower becomes not just a vegetative reproductive organ 
that looks and smells pleasant, but also a bridge to connection with both a greater 
purpose and the profundity o f one’s own part in it.
This connection with greater magnitude and depth demonstrates why experiences 
of beauty are often ineffable. Ineffability occurs when the depth and magnitude o f an 
experience are beyond the reach of the grasping mind. The problem in describing 
ineffable experiences is not so much that, in the terms o f the conduit metaphor, we 
cannot “put it into words.” Rather, we can generally put it into words, but the words
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lack sufficient capacity to convey the depth and magnitude of the experience. If  we 
consider ineflability from Polanyi’s position and think of words as guides to experience, 
we can point with words in the general direction o f ineffable experiences, but their 
magnitude is too vast for a simple verbal arrow to hit any but a small portion of it. The 
more we try to describe the inefiable, the more language’s inadequacy becomes 
apparent. This profundity is simply too great to “contain” in words or mind; it can only 
be felt with the whole, greater capacity of the observing self Again, Deikman’s ocean 
analogy is useful. If the object self (in this case, the mental ability) is contained within 
the tidal pool and has access to the magnitude and depth of the ocean only through the 
surface tension of the water, it simply has no way to directly glimpse or indicate its 
depth. Only when the tidal pool is still is the surface tension great enough that a good 
connection can be made with the larger awareness (the surface of the ocean), which is 
more capable of sensing the greater depth.
The perspectival shift involved in level three musical experience — integrating 
with the music, as well as connecting with both larger awareness and purpose — creates 
a situation in which even experiences normally considered negative can be experienced as 
beautiful. For instance, people who normally would avoid feeling melancholy or 
desolation in ordinary experience might seek out feeling them in musical experience, if 
the feelings are invoked by a piece they particularly love. In the musical context, these 
feelings become part of something beautiful and, indeed, can be felt to be beautiful 
themselves. As I stated earlier, these feelings are experienced as impersonal in nature.
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That is, they do not belong to the tidal pool, but to the greater ocean. If an emotion 
churns the waters o f the tidal pool causing a lessening o f surface tension with the greater 
ocean; the observing self cannot operate as easily. Without the connection to larger 
awareness, the emotion is threatening, experienced as overwhelming and unpleasant. In 
contrast, if the same now relatively small emotion chums the waters of the vast ocean, 
the observing self can remain still and observe. With the connection to the larger 
awareness in place, the emotion does not threatened and can easily be experienced for 
what it is — a part o f the larger phenomenon of living a human life. I cannot say why 
this situation makes something that is not pretty into something that is beautiful I can 
only surmise that the perspectival shift reveals a beauty that is always there, but is 
normally covered over by personal reactions to negative emotions, such as fear and 
anxiety. In the impersonal musical context, melancholy is beautiful because it is 
revealed to be a part of living, which, in the larger perspective, is overpoweringly 
beautiful.40 And we are always a part of living, which we feel in intensified fashion 
through the connection with the beautiful melancholy music.
Relationship of the Three Levels of Musical Experience
The three levels of musical experience I have described are not three distinct 
levels, but a continuum of experience. As I stated earlier, only under very special 
conditions, such as an atonal context with very little indication of a pulse, will listeners 
hear tones as isolated. They will almost always experience them as a part of level two.
40 We can sometimes glimpse the beauty of life in peak experiences such as birth, death, or deep 
suffering. At times like these, even “negative” emotions can be felt to be beautiful.
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In contrast, an experiential difference does occur between levels two and three, however, 
which is what the distinction between hearing “notes” and “music” indicates. However, 
even though it is possible to distinguish between these levels experientially, the line 
between them is not at all clear.
For instance, I often listen to music as I write. In so doing, most of my attention 
is still on the writing and not on the music. The music is background, although I 
occasionally attend to it primarily, especially if I am anticipating some part of the music 
that has moved me in the past. Even though I am not really attending to it, I find that the 
presence of the music frees me up to write when I am having trouble doing so. It puts 
me in a state in which I can write. In Deikman’s terms, I find that I do my best writing 
when I am using my mental abilities (labeling, judging, analyzing, etc.), but still 
somewhat in touch with my observing self. If my mental self is too prominent in the 
process, its judging faculty dominates the situation and shuts down my creative faculty.
I can’t get the ideas out if I criticize them as they flow. If I put on music and check in 
with it now and then, I am more in touch with my observing self which allows the 
creativity to flow unfettered. If my analysis is correct, this would mean that I am 
experiencing this unattended to music in a manner consistent with level three, in which it 
is the observing self that is most engaged. This level three experience is nowhere near a 
peak musical experience, and yet, in helping me to be in my observing self, it draws on 
past peak musical experiences I have had. It is lower on the continuum between levels 
two and three than those peak musical experiences.
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I would not liken this continuum to a line on which one could locate a musical 
experience at an exact point. Instead, as I stated in the introduction to this section, it is a 
relative continuum of experiential states. In order to better understand those states, 
however, it is useful to image the continuum as nesting levels, with the smallest level 
being the first. Higher levels of experience involve all levels underneath them. In 
addition, the level of awareness expands as the levels progress, from no awareness or 
control on the first level, to active mental awareness and participation on the second, to 
the greater awareness o f the observing self on the third. Not only does awareness 
expand, access to the individual listener expands as well, from the involuntary 
participation o f the neurobiology at the first level to the voluntary opening of the inner 
self on the third level. The expansion from level one to level three creates a condition in 
which the lower levels, when experienced from a higher level, can be magnified. For 
example, when I listen to a new piece, especially if that piece is complex, I often need to 
listen to it multiple times before I can relate to it on level three. I need to listen 
repeatedly on level two so that I can create the level of coherence necessary to “get into” 
the music. Once I do reach a level three relationship with the music, I can then begin to 
hear even more coherences and qualities of the music. The ability to hear new things in 
the music occurs in part because if I am “into” the music, I tend to attend more closely 
than if I am not; my attention is less likely to wander. However, it also stems from the 
greater perspective I bring. For instance, I can attend to multiple melodies at once and 
feel the passage of harmonies in a way that I cannot if they seem like ‘just notes.” As
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Deikman explained, the observing self perceives the world in terms of blurred 
boundaries, difiiise attention, and process. If “pure” level two involvement operates 
from the mental self with its preference for sharp boundaries and focused attention, then 
that operation omits important aspects of coherence that can then be received by the 
observing self when the listener enters into the music. These levels of musical 
experience, then, operate as a whole, interactive system.
In order to complete my discussion of musical meaning, I would like to turn 
attention back to the comparison between language and music, examining it from the 
perspective of the extended version of Polanyi’s theory of meaning.
Music and Language Revisited
Comparing music and language in light of the extended version o f Polanyi’s 
theory of meaning can help us to understand some important experiential distinctions 
between music and language. These distinctions are 1) the lack in music of anything that 
is experienced like a linguistic general term, 2) differences in attention (the sounds of 
language direct attention away from themselves, while the sounds of music direct 
attention toward themselves), and 3) differences in experiential results of repeated 
listening (whereas listening to the same linguistic phrase repeatedly tends to disintegrate 
the meaningful integration, listening to the same musical phrase repeatedly tends to 
deepen it).41
41 In this statement, I do not mean to assert an exact equivalence between linguistic and musical phrases. 
I do believe that they are similar in certain relatively superficial ways. For instance, they are both 
elements of communicative media and share a length and sense of completeness relative to other
279
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Polanyi explains that general terms result from diachronically integrating specific 
experiences that associate a sound with its referent, similar to the stereoscopic picture 
that is produced in the integration of information from two eyes. He indicates a curious 
quality o f general terms:
[T]here is ... an important difference... to which we must attend. It lies 
in the curiously unsubstantial character o f the joint meaning ascribed to a 
group o f objects by a general term. Compared with optical illusions or 
stereoscopic images, general conceptions are abstract, featureless. The 
focus in terms o f which we are aware o f the members of a class appears 
vague and almost empty (168).
Music does not create an analogous experience. Certain intervals, such as fifths and 
octaves, may feel hollow to a listener, but not in a way that is abstract, featureless or 
vague. Rather these intervals feel vividly and definitely hollow. The only analogy that 
might be drawn to Polanyi’s observation about general terms is to the concept of a 
particular piece — thinking about “Prokofiev’s Classical Symphony” as a general class 
rather than a specific performance has a similar feeling o f abstract vagueness. However, 
“Prokofiev’s Classical Symphony” is a general term about music, not music itself.
Does music involve a level of generality that is in some way analogous to general 
terms? Earlier, I made an explicit analogy between image schemas and general terms — 
image schemasrrich, concrete images:rgeneral termsrspecific experiences with what the
aspects o f their respective communicative media. However, they are very different in ways that matter 
most to how they mean, which I will elaborate on in this section. The truth is, since music and language 
are not equivalent in most ways, it is difficult to choose a unit in each to make a comparison. One might 
choose by minimal meaningful unit, in which case the language unit might be words (or perhaps 
morphemes) and the musical unit a motive. Or one might choose by the smallest unit that has a sense of 
completion — a linguistic sentence or a musical period. Whatever one chooses, even if the units could 
not be argued to be equivalent, the points that I will make remain the same.
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terms refer to. In the context o f the earlier section, in which I was arguing that image 
schemas are experiential gestalts, that analogy still pertains. However, in this context, it 
is problematic. If it pertained here, then the musical sound would direct our attention 
away from itself toward something else, one possibility o f which might be an image 
schema. We would experience that image schema like we experience a general term, as 
vague and empty. In contrast, in the context of musical experience, I do not experience 
image schemas directly, as I can a general term, and even if I try to experience image 
schemas directly as I listen, they are in no way vague and empty feeling.
Both general terms and image schemas are experiential gestalts formed over time 
by integrating experiences with specific instances. As such, they have been abstracted in 
some way away from those specific instances. However, because they do not Junction in 
the same way, we can see that the way that they have been abstracted is probably 
different. In order to unravel this problem, I will make use of Peirce’s ontological 
modes.
Peirce suggests that there are “three modes o f being. [...] They are the being of 
positive qualitative possibility, the being o f actual feet, and the being of law that will 
govern facts in the future” (Buchier, 75). He calls these modes of being Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively. Secondness is the mode of actual being — of 
specific instances of living beings, events or objects.
Both Firstness and Thirdness exist in the realm of possibility, a realm abstracted 
from specific instances. However, they do so in different manners. Firstness relates to
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the abstraction of general qualities from specific instances o f living beings, events or 
objects. Those qualities might be the qualities o f objects (blueness, softness, smallness, 
or containability), o f events (lateness, acceleration, invigoratingness, or swiftness), or of 
living beings (vitality, intelligence, even-temperedness, or calmness). These qualities are 
generalizations abstracted from specific instances. They do not exist in and of 
themselves, but only in the form of examples of Secondness.
In contrast, Thirdness relates to the abstraction o f general rules from specific 
instances o f living being, events, or objects. In Peirce’s words, a rule is a prediction “to 
which future events have a tendency to conform” (76). Thirdness “consists [...] in the 
fact that future facts o f Secondness will take on a determinate general character” (77). 
For example, as a rule, compact discs are of a metallic color on at least one side, 12 
centimeters in diameter, and circular with a hole in their center. As a rule, a concert by 
the Philadelphia Orchestra will begin at 8:00 p.m., will last until approximately 10 or 
10:30 p.m. with at least one intermission, and will involve multiple pieces taken from the 
repertoire of Western art music. These are predictions to which compact discs and 
Philadelphia Orchestra concerts generally conform. They are generalizations abstracted 
from specific instances.
Generality, then, can be of more than one kind: positive or negative. According 
to Peirce,
Generality is either o f that negative sort which belongs to the merely 
potential, as such, and this is peculiar to the category of quality; or it is of 
that positive kind which belongs to conditional necessity, and this is 
peculiar to the category of law (90, emphasis mine).
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Firstness, or qualitative possibility, consists of negatively abstracted generalities while 
Thirdness, or predictive possibility, consists of positively abstracted generalities. In 
addition, Thirds necessarily involve Firsts, but Firsts do not involve Thirds. For 
example, the general rule about compact discs stated above involves the qualities of 
metallic color and circulamess. However, the qualities exemplified above (blueness, 
vitality, etc.) do not involve rules of any sort.
To return to the question at hand, both image schemas and general terms exist on 
a general level However, image schemas are qualities abstracted negatively (a 
Firstness) and general terms are predictions abstracted positively (a Thirdness). This 
distinction accounts for their differences in both function and the way that we experience 
them. That image schemas are qualities (and not rules) can be seen relatively easily, 
especially when one considers a partial list of possible image schemas: containm ent, 
BLOCKAGE, FULL-EMPTY, PART-WHOLE, BALANCE, FORCE, ATTRACTION, SOURCE-PATH- 
GOAL, PROCESS, link, etc. Each of these terms could easily fit into a discussion in the 
following sentence, “If you look at the quality o f in this situation....”42
That general terms are rules, however, is not as evident. Remember that Peirce 
defines a rule as a prediction “to which future events have a tendency to conform.” If I 
hear a sentence that uses the word “dog,” the word comes to me in the form of a general 
term. As I hear it, the sound o f the word functions as a general term that directs my
42 Although image schemas in and of themselves are qualitative possibilities, our embodied use of them 
involves predictive possibility, as well. For example, the quality of balance may come into play in a 
game that involves building a structure with cards. In this game, balance is an important quality to 
achieve. In achieving that quality, players would invoke predictive possibilities learned in embodied 
experiences of balance toward a bearing on creating a balanced structure.
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attention to either the general idea o f “dog” or to a specific instance o f “dog,” depending 
on the context in which it is used. In directing my attention, the general term functions 
as a rule. That is, when he utters the word, the speaker intends for it to function in a 
rule-like fashion, in which case he would predict that my behavior would conform to his 
expectation that I either attend to the general idea of “dog” or to a specific instance of 
“dog.”
As an experienced quality, the difference in feeling tone between image schemas 
and general terms cannot be argued but merely indicated. Considering the examples of 
qualities mentioned above — blueness, smallness, lateness, swiftness, vitality, or 
calmness — creates no feeling of vagueness or emptiness. Rather, they seem distinctly 
fa ll o f the qualities they indicate, as do image schemas. In contrast, considering 
examples of rules does create the same sense of vague emptiness that Polanyi describes 
in association with general terms. “As a rule, compact discs are o f a metallic color on at 
least one side, twelve centimeters in diameter, and circular with a hole in their center.” 
Or “For much of the United States, the school year begins in September.” These 
statements have the same vague, empty feeling tone as the general terms “dog,” or 
“flower.”
Although music does not involve Thirdness through image schemas, it does 
involve it in other ways. Tonality, for instance, is a complex set of predictions “to which 
future events have a tendency to conform” that play out in the listener through 
expectation and desire. Expectation and desire play out through the musical senses,
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w hich exist in  the  realm  o f  thirds. T he musical senses involve image schem as o f  various 
sorts, but a re no t m erely image schematic in character. Consider, fo r instance the image 
schem a o f  p u ls e  and the  sense o f  rhy thm  P u ls e  is a  general qualitative pattern  learned 
in various situations, bo th  non-m usical and musical, which the  listener integrates with the 
sound wave to  create  m usical coherence. The sense o f  rhythm  is a  set o f  expectations 
learned in various musical situations that involves pulse but is not limited to pulse.
Those expectations are stylistic in part, having to do with the specific kinds of rhythms 
and meters that articulate the pulse, as well as the specific kinds of interactions one might 
expect between rhythm and other musical aspects, such as melody and harmony. The 
sense of rhythm a listener brings to and uses from moment to moment within a ragtime 
piece differs greatly from that o f a Brahms piano piece.
The Thirds operative in music are qualitatively different from general terms. 
General terms are in the form of a single, ordinarily short sound that is, in turn, usually a 
combination o f shorter sounds. General terms are normally used in combination, but 
occasionally are spoken singly (“Dog!”)- They act as general rules that direct the 
hearer’s attention away from themselves. Nothing analogous occurs in music.43 The 
Thuds that occur in music are a matter of combining sounds as they are played together 
and in succession. These rule-governed combinations of sounds create qualities of sound 
and musical motion that attract the listener’s attention to themselves. They do not direct 
attention away from themselves. To be sure, syntactic rules operate in language in order
43 Except, of course, a musical sound that imitates a non-musical sound, as when a piece involves 
animal noises. In that case, the sound functions like an onomatopoeic word.
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to create coherent combinations of sound. However, the focal outcome of meaningful 
linguistic syntactic integrations is not the creation of qualities of sound and motion, but a 
specific coherence that can direct attention to specified general ideas or situations in the 
world. While one focal outcome of linguistic Thirds is to direct the hearer’s attention 
away from sound, a focal outcome of musical Thirds is keeping the listener’s attention 
focused on sound.
In addition to differences in attention, musical and linguistic experience evince 
differences in repeated listening. Words in a linguistic phrase become subsidiary 
particulars in the hearer’s peripheral attention, while he attends centrally to the situation 
or idea. In other words, the words become transparent as their integration reveals 
whatever they are indicating.44 If we repeat the same phrase over and over again, 
focusing attention on the sound of the words, the sound becomes the focal outcome of 
the integration we are performing. No longer subsidiary to a more complex integration, 
the word sounds lose their connection with the usual focal outcome o f their integration. 
They become meaningless, except as sounds in and o f themselves.
In contrast, rather than losing meaningful integration through repeated hearing 
and attending to particulars focally, music can gain in meaning under such conditions.
As a phrase is heard repeatedly, the interiorization deepens: more qualities embodied by 
the music can be heard and more relationships between already heard qualities can be 
made. If the listener makes the switch to third level observation (opens himself to living
** This is clearly a description of linguistic communication as it occurs on the second level (as 
analogized to musical experience). I will write about linguistic communication on the third level 
shortly.
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the qualities and events embodied by the musk;), more qualities and events are available 
to be lived; the experience deepens and intensifies. Of course, if a listener overdoes the 
repeated listening, either over-stimulation or boredom will result, leading to a lack of 
meaningful integration with the music.43 These conditions, however, are not analogous 
to what happens when we repeat a word and destroy its connection with its meaning. 
They are, rather, limits o f the human nervous system.
Conclusion
I have compared music and language from the viewpoint o f a general theory of 
meaning — a theory that is based in bodily interaction with the environment and 
principles o f evolution —  rather than a theory of meaning based on mental manipulation 
of linguistic packages. The comparison looks rather different from this viewpoint.
While it is apt in that music and language are both examples o f communicative meaning 
(as Dewey defines communication — as “the process o f creating participation, of making 
common what had been isolated and singular”), it is not apt in many other ways. It is 
clear from experiential evidence that the details o f the processes o f musical and linguistic 
meaning do not match one another. Music has nothing analogous to the general terms 
that are so central to linguistic meaning. Although both have syntactical functions, the
45 By “leading to a lack of meaningful integration” I mean the integration of the person with the music.
I do not mean the integration of isolated sounds into coherent musical sound. Once a piece makes sense 
to me, it does not lose its coherence. The only situation where I can imagine a piece losing coherence 
would be if I had not heard in some time a particular atonal piece that I had to originally struggle to 
make sense of. Since atonal music does not make use of tonality in its manner of coherence, we have to 
create coherence for each piece. This coherence created for each individual musical context is more 
easily forgotten.
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syntaxes integrate toward very different focal outcomes. Although poetry does adopt 
some concerns o f music (the beauty of the sounds involved, their rhythm, etc.), it has 
nothing analogous to the qualities o f dynamic motion we experience in music. A more 
extensive comparison from this viewpoint would reveal other important differences. 
However, such a comparison is beyond the scope of this work.
Having revisited the music/language analogy, and in conclusion to this chapter, 
I’d like now to further develop the notion of resonance. In so doing, I will suggest how 
the understanding of musical meaning I have developed in this chapter can enrich our 
understanding of communicative meaning in general
Re so n a n t  M e a n in g
The three basic ontological levels of musical experience are not necessarily 
exclusive to the realm o f music, but may hold true for communicative experience in 
general Level one would involve the neuro-biological act of perception, level two the 
fully embodied act of making sense, and level three the energetic resonance of the 
system created between the observer and the communicative sign, person generating the 
sign, or transcendent reality for which the sign stands.
If we view communication as the creation of participation, an act of making 
common, a schema very different from that of the conduit metaphor arises. This 
definition suggests a schema where separate parts (people Le., relevant aspects of their 
energetic matrices) are merged together into a participatory whole. The question, then, 
is what is the nature o f the connection? All communicative acts involve a physical
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connection, through one or more o f the “portal” senses. As portrayed by the conduit 
metaphor, linguistic communication also makes use of an intellectual connection: the 
transfer and matching of “content” from the mind of one person to another. Musical 
communication on level three also shows that communicative acts connect us in ways 
other than transfer of intellectual content. Both linguistic and musical communication 
can involve emotional connections.
The connection created in effective communication can involve all of these 
aspects of self: physical, intellectual and emotional However, in peak communicative 
experiences, such as those that can be created in an artistic situation, the connection 
transcends these aspects o f self to something that seems beyond self. These kinds of 
experiences can take us beyond the boundaries of our individual “tidal pools” into the 
greater “ocean” that we all share. I think of this level as being energetic in nature, 
because I have observed that peak communicative experiences create energy in the 
people who participate fully in them. In addition, in these kinds of communicative 
experiences, a particular quality o f energy (cheerful sad, high, or low) can be passed 
from person to person. These experiences are not necessarily artistic in nature; they can 
range from a great conversation with a friend, to a really good class discussion, to an 
exciting basketball game, to a wonderful walk on a fine day when one “communes with 
nature.” Peak communicative experiences can create a level of participation that leaves 
the participants with more energy than when they started. They may be physically 
depleted (as at the end of a basketball game), but they are energized psychologically.
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Experientially, in contrast to the more “normal” occurrences of everyday life in which the 
self feels separate from  the situation, these kinds of circumstances create a sense that the 
self resonates with the situation.
The Nature of the Resonant Connection
The process o f resonance involves the coupling of two or more bodies, each with 
their own vibratory characteristics, into a more complex energetic system. By 
themselves, the separate bodies of a sound system may be very limited in the amount of 
sound energy they can produce. For instance, when struck or bowed as separate parts, 
the two sound bodies of the violin (the strings and the body) create very little sound 
energy. However, once united by neck, pegs, tailpiece, bridge, and sound post, these 
parts become a single system capable of creating greater amounts and kinds of sound 
energy. In this system, by allowing sound vibrations to move from one sound body to 
the other, the bridge acts as the primary structural medium between the two sounding 
bodies.
However, once the string is excited, another medium arises that behaves 
differently from the structural medium. That is the medium of energy, which creates 
different relationships between the parts than that created by the bridge alone. The 
energetic pattern (sound vibration) is begun in the string and passes through the bridge 
to the sound body, which then vibrates sympathetically with the patterns of energy 
transferred from the strings. However, the vibration does not move through the system 
in a purely linear fashion, but in a more complex manner. Because the strings are
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structurally coupled with the body through the bridge, the vibration not only moves from 
string to bridge to body, but also moves back across the bridge from the body to the 
strings.46 The final effect o f the system— the complex sound vibration that reaches our 
ears through the air — results from energetic patterns echoing from one part to the 
other. In their echoing, the sound vibrations link all parts o f the system into a single, 
larger system that is not only structural in nature, but energetic, as well.
Thus, as a system, the violin exists on two ontological levels: that of physical 
structure and that of physical energy. Each o f these levels creates different kinds o f 
relationships between the parts o f the violin. On the level o f physical energy, through 
the dynamic medium of the energetic pattern, each part is “in touch” with all other parts 
— “in touch” because through the action of the vibration, each part has a forceful effect 
on the other through the whole. On the level of physical structure, without the action of 
sound vibrations, when a violin is at rest, only parts adjacent to each other touch each 
other. That touch is merely an aspect of adjacency, a structural relationship of passive 
force, not an effect o f dynamic force. Through the action o f the vibration, all parts of the 
violin are brought into relationships of dynamic force. The violin is no longer merely 
structurally united; it is energetically united as welL Through the medium of the sound 
energy, instead of only those parts of the system that are adjacent to each other being in 
contact, all parts o f the system are effectively in contact with all other parts. Set into
46 The degree of coupling between the driving vibrator and the driven vibrator constitutes a variable in 
the system. A system may be tightly coupled, in which case the pattern of the driving vibration 
dominates the system. Or it may be loosely coupled, in which case the driving vibration is less 
dominant and the driven vibrator affects the system more. For more, see Handel, p. 45.
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resonance with one another, each part does not merely exist as a part of the violin.
Rather each part behaves in a coordinated fashion with all other parts, thereby producing 
more energy than both the energy that began the sound and the energy that each part 
might produce on its own.
The nature o f the structural connection in the violin is different horn the nature 
of the energetic connection. As I said above, the structural connection is the bridge, 
which acts as a link between two sound bodies. Structurally, the bridge, as a medium, 
comes between the two sound bodies and acts to link them in such a manner that they 
may act as one. The energetic connection is the sound vibration. As a medium, this 
connection is more analogous to the media used by biologists to grow bacteria: once the 
sound vibration is set in motion (assuming the player is capable of making a solid, 
resonant tone), the entire violin is awash in the vibrating medium. As media, the bridge 
connects the parts o f the violin by spanning a separation while the vibration connects the 
parts of the violin by creating an energetic medium though which all parts of the violin 
affect each other. Another way to think of this is that at the structural level, the violin is 
the medium for the vibration, while at the energetic level, the vibration is the medium in 
which the violin, as a united sound body, comes into existence. Without the vibration, 
the violin does not exist as a sound body, but only as a structural body. Thus, the bridge 
connects two separate entities while the vibration creates and envelops a united entity. 
Despite their differences, these two media work in tandem. The bridge is a structural 
medium through which an energetic meta-medium can be created. The bridge does not
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act merely as a structural medium for the two parts of the violin; it also acts as an 
ontological medium, so that the vibrational unity o f the instrument can come into 
existence.
The Resonance Analogy Applied to Semiosis
The semiotic process is usually modeled along the lines o f the structural level of 
the violin, with the sign acting as a link between two separate entities. The semiotic 
situation has been mapped out in various ways, with perhaps the best developed being 
Peirce’s object-sign-interpretant (with all of its complex permutations). In my recent 
reading, I have seen this triad called “thing/event/reality-form-concept” (Radden and 
Kdvecses 1999) and “thought-symbo 1-referent” (Ogden and Richards 1923, cited by 
Radden and KQvecses 1999). Whatever the semiotic triad is called, the middle term (the 
sign) is mapped and analyzed as a structural link between two separate things. The 
structural nature of this relationship can be seen in the typical statement made to explain 
the relationship between the terms, such as “A stands for B to C,” which describes a 
linear geometric relationship.47 The relationship between the two terms (usually a person 
and some aspect of the outer world) is always already mediated, with no possibility for 
the creation of a more immediate relationship between them. This model limits the 
potential of the sign to acting as a bridge between two terms. It does not take the 
further step toward recognizing that the sign can also act as an ontological medium that
47 In Polanyi’s restatement of the relationship between semiotic terms — “The person A can integrate 
the word B into a bearing on C” — we can see an energetic aspect added.
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creates the possibility for an energetic meta-medium might arise that unites the two terms 
in a more immediate manner.48
I propose that semiosis involves a resonant level in which an energetic meta­
medium effects the unity of people with signs, and through signs, with each other. The 
“energy” involved in this process is not just physical energy we take in through our 
“portal” senses, such as sound or light waves. Rather, because it is a human process, it 
primarily involves the energetic matrix as it is accessed and affected by the embodied 
“senses of.” Through the ontological mediumship of signs and the energetic meta­
medium they make possible, we can access and resonate with each other’s energetic 
matrices, creating a sense o f participatory connectedness.49 We can also access and 
resonate with transcendent social realities. This process occurs through the transfer of 
patterns of energy, which metonymically access, activate and/or affect aspects of the 
energetic matrix.
Although at first glance, the term “energetic meta-medium” may invoke the idea 
of some sort of mysterious “ether,” that is not what I mean. Rather, by “energetic meta­
medium” I simply mean a patterned energy that can access a whole system at once, thus 
uniting it through acting similarly on all parts simultaneously. In the violin, the energetic
48 At this point, a distinction between Peirce and those who use his thought must be made. Peirce does 
not speak of the semiotic process as if it were only a structural in nature. Rather, he speaks of it as 
dynamic. However, as Peirce’s thought is applied, it very often seems to emphasize this structural level 
to the detriment of the dynamic level. In either case, as far as I have been able to determine, although 
he spoke of semiosis as dynamic, Peirce did not speak of an energetic medium at work in the semiotic 
process. His semiotic process was always directly mediated by the sign, never making the leap to a more 
immediate connection.
49 The process of communicative resonance is not always successful. Thus, it can create a feeling of 
extreme disunity when different people try to resonate with one another, but cannot coordinate.
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meta-medium is the patterned vibration — a patterned energy that begins with the 
friction o f the bow on the strings, crosses the bridge, creates sympathetic vibrations in 
the sound body and then, changed by its encounter with the sound body, echoes 
throughout the whole system. In a musical situation, the patterned energy (the energetic 
meta-medium) begins as sound waves, which, on the first level, undergo neuro-biological 
transduction to become tones. On the second level, the patterned energy (as tones) is 
transformed by the embodied musical senses and other aspects of embodied perception 
to become musical sound. On the third level, the patterned energy (as musical sound) is 
transformed into actual fe lt (or lived) qualities and events. In this way, through the 
ontological mediumship of the musical sign and the energetic medium it makes possible, 
the listener resonates with the musical “sign.” When he shares this “musicking” with 
other people, they resonate with each other through the shared musical event.
I will not attempt a detailed analysis of the energetic patterns (energetic meta­
media) of other kinds of communicative signing, except to suggest parallels between 
musical experience and experience in shared conversation. In language, energetic 
qualities and events are most often shared through paralanguage as much as or more 
than by actual words. Through word choice and especially the way words are spoken, 
through body stance and other visually sensed aspects of muscular tension, qualities of 
energy are passed back and forth between interlocutors. Just as a listener entrains with 
musical sound, interlocutors entrain with each other physically (mirroring muscular 
tension and fecial expressions), emotionally (detecting emotions and empathizing with
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them) and intellectually (sensing where the speaker is going with a particular thought).
In a good conversation or a good class discussion, the level o f involvement is especially 
high. The participants have opened themselves in a manner similar to the way that 
listeners open themselves to living the qualities embodied in musical events, as well as 
the musical events themselves. Just as we can become the living medium for an emotion 
whose patterns are embodied by music, we can live feelings and thoughts along with the 
people with whom they originate. Through the ontological mediumship of signs (which, 
in a conversation includes everything we can sense, not just words), an energetic meta­
medium can arise and echo throughout the whole linguistic situation, uniting those 
involved and creating a resonant energy.
As in the musical situation, this patterned energy operates through metonymic 
access of aspects o f the energetic matrix. I have already discussed how word sounds 
access experiential gestalts interiorized over time. In addition to words, we take other 
sensory cues as clues and integrate them with interiorized experience toward a bearing 
on involvement with our interlocutor. If we see a certain fecial expression and body 
posture, hear a certain vocal timbre, breathing pattern, and pattern of forceful emphasis, 
and smell a certain odor, we integrate these patterns with our own personal experience 
toward an understanding and feeling of the particular emotion our interlocutor is 
experiencing. Through this metonymic process, accomplished by embodied imagination 
and “senses o f” our energetic matrix resonates with that of our interlocutor.
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In linguistic communication, the aspects with which we resonate are very often 
quite tacit — either in peripheral awareness or out of awareness altogether. It is 
relatively easy to repeat someone’s words. The way that they are said is a bit more 
ephemeral Other aspects, such as breathing patterns or patterns of pupil dilation, are 
even more difficult to bring into central awareness. However, we are tacitly aware of 
them and they become part o f the subsidiary integration toward the focal outcome of 
resonating with our interlocutor.
Human Reality as Energetic in Nature
The view of signs as structural rather than energetic media is entirely consistent 
with the objectivist framing o f the relationship o f the human internal world to the 
external world. This view emphasizes the boundedness of the human internal world, 
trusts the outer world to be more “real” or “true” than the inner, and distrusts the ability 
of the individual to gain access to that true reality without distortion. Objectivism 
necessitates the operation of a stabilizing bridge between inner and outer. According to 
this view, our interaction with many important human realities is always mediated, never 
immediate.
What the objectivist view ignores is the feet that much of human reality — such 
as the social political educational economic, aesthetic and religious — exists only 
within living human beings. It is true that traces of these realities exist in the physical 
environment. However, as aspects of human life, these realms of human life themselves 
would cease to exist if their human media ceased to exist. Only physical traces o f them
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would still exist. If  archeologists from another time or place found these physical traces, 
they might begin to reconstruct the realities they stemmed from, but might do so quite 
imperfectly. The point is that there is an energetic aspect, as well as a physical aspect, 
to these human realities that exists only in and through human beings. Through our 
energetic matrices, we are the medium for their energetic existence.
Thus, when we a have third level communicative experience and feel that we live 
our part in some larger existential reality — patriotism, beauty, life, femininity, the value 
of clear understanding, the unity of all people, etc. — we are not only living our part, we 
are giving existence to that reality. We are not connecting only with something outside 
ourselves that exists in other people and in physical traces, but creating it from within. 
Our connection with it is not mediated. We may, then, leave traces o f that larger 
existential reality in the environment that might act as an outer sign of it to another 
person. Through sharing experiences o f this kind, we commune not only with these 
larger aspects o f life that can give it meaning, but also with other people. Through the 
semiotic flow, we co-create these energetic aspects o f human life.
The Power of Resonant Communication
Although tacit, resonant aspects o f communication are quite powerful. 
Bourdieu’s Outline o f a Theory o f Practice evinces a strong concern for metonymic 
invocation o f wholes through transfer o f partial patterns. He suggests that tacit aspects 
o f communication, beyond the reach of central awareness, may even be more powerful
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than those that we can examine critically. Whole tacit schemas o f understanding are
easily, stealthily accessed through invocation of seemingly insignificant parts:
If  all societies and, significantly, all the “totalitarian institutions”, in 
Goffinan’s phrase, that seek to produce a new man through a process of 
“deculturation” and “reculturation” set such store on the seemingly most 
insignificant details o f dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners, the 
reason is that, treating the body as a memory, they entrust to it in 
abbreviated and practical, i.e. mnemonic, form the fundamental principles 
o f the arbitrary content o f the culture. The principles em-bodied in this 
way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be 
touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, cannot even be made 
explicit; nothing seems more ineffable, more incommunicable, more 
inimitable, and, therefore, more precious, than the values given body, 
made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of 
an implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a 
metaphysic, a political philosophy, through injunctions as insignificant as 
“stand up straight” or “don’t hold your knife in your left hand”. The logic 
of scheme transfer which makes each technique o f the body a sort o f pars 
totalis, predisposed to function in accordance with the fallacy pars pro 
toto, and hence to evoke the whole system of which it is a part, gives a 
very general scope to the seemingly most circumscribed and 
circumstantial observances (94).
Social reality reproduces itself in the living medium of individual people through 
metonymic access and resonance of complex, but tacit schemas. For instance, a simple 
order to “Sit like a lady!” resonates deeply with a little girl’s tacit knowing about herself, 
her socially defined notions o f femininity, and her personal relationship to those notions. 
She either resonates positively — with the notion, or negatively — against it. If she 
resonates positively, the power o f the order and the social reality that it attempts to 
maintain create in her a desire to override any personal tendencies or desires she may 
have to sit with a slouch or with arms and legs akimbo. Thus, the socially defined reality 
of the feminine values of neatness, self-control and modesty continue their existence in
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the living medium of the little girl The quality o f energy that we call “feminine” — 
controlled, yet alluring in its beauty— lives in the physical medium o f the little girl and 
becomes stronger as she matures. She may, in time, transmit that same energetic quality 
to other little girls through orders to “Sit like a lady!” With or without conscious 
awareness of exactly what she is doing, she thus reproduces it not only in herself but in 
others, as well. Femininity covertly reproduces itself by working through those parts of 
the self that are least accessible to examination, but powerfully felt.
These kinds o f existential realities are the stuff that our resonant bodies — our 
energetic matrixes — are made of. Resonating soundlessly with strokes from outside 
ourselves — “Sit like a lady!” or “What a guy!” — they are deeply felt. Always there, 
though they resonate, their resonance becomes the atmosphere in which all other 
thoughts and feelings play out. The foundations o f how we live with and through each 
other, they remain hidden, but can strike us powerfully when revealed:
The aspects o f things that are most important for us are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something — 
because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations ofhis 
enquiry do not strike a man at alL Unless that feet has at some time 
struck him. — And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is 
most striking and most powerful (Wittgenstein, 50).
Although resonant communication may be hidden, it can be striking and powerful. Thus, 
it behooves us to pursue a clear understanding o f it.
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IV
Musical Event Structure Metaphors
In tro d u c tio n
English speakers make sense o f the flux of experience through two complex 
metaphors, which Lakoff (1994) calls “event structure metaphors.” Both of these 
metaphors integrate structure from a kind of bodily experience in the world with current 
percepts toward a bearing on making sense of a current event. In one, the “location” 
version, the bodily experience integrated with current percepts is that of moving through 
the world from one location to another. In the other, the “object” version, the bodily 
experience integrated with current percepts is that of receiving, possessing, and giving 
away objects. In this chapter I will demonstrate that making sense of musical events 
involves integrating these two, basic event structure metaphors with simpler musical 
percepts such as pitch , m otion , loca tion , passage , bridge , rests and v olum e , 
blend , FLOW, MODULATION, so me o f which were described in the last chapter. In other 
words, simpler musical percepts metonymically invoke these more complex metaphors 
toward a bearing on making sense of the music as eventful.
Since the listener integrates these metaphors with the sound wave in the process 
of perceiving music, the metaphors are experientially real. Although current metaphor 
theory describes metaphoric processes as “mapped” in nature, musical metaphors do not 
feel as if they have been “applied onto” the music. Rather, they feel like an integral part 
o f it, as Polanyi’s theory o f meaning demonstrates. In and of itself the sound wave does
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not embody patterns o f motion and mood, but when a listener transforms it in her 
experience into musical notes, it does.
Not only the metaphors that people use to speak o f music, but how they use them 
must thus be examined. In the linguistic context, verbal cues such as aspect, deixis, and 
nominalization give clues as to how the speaker positions herself with respect to the 
musical event. By integrating such verbal cues with analyses of metaphors we can better 
understand the whole constellation of the event, not just how the music “out there” 
appears to the listener. In this chapter, I will focus on analyses o f musical metaphors in 
speech about music gathered in rehearsals, classes, and informal discussions with 
students at the Curtis Institute of Music.
I begin my exploration by describing linguistic evidence that suggests the 
existence of two different ways o f making sense o f music: in many cases, for a single 
musical phenomenon, two different metaphors may be used to refer to it. These words 
dichotomize into two groups, logically consistent within the group, but inconsistent 
between groups. This pattern suggests the existence of two separate ways of making 
sense of music. After introducing this suggestive evidence, I discuss LakofFs analysis of 
event structure in English. After laying this theoretical foundation, I will examine the 
linguistic evidence for the existence of two music event structure metaphors. In the next 
two sections I describe the two musical event structure metaphors, and then summarize 
my conclusions.
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P it c h  a n d  Vo lu m e  -> M u sic al E v e n t  S tru c tu re  M e ta p h o r s
Language about music often employs two or more metaphoric expressions for 
the same musical phenomenon. In the table below, I have demonstrated how these 
expressions dichotomize into two internally consistent groups.
phenom enon 
musical sound:
group A group B
discontinuous: continuous:
PITCHES, LINES, TEXTURES sound STREAMS, BLENDS
subjects, figures, m otives su rg es , w a v es  o f  sound
frequency change: MOTION by STEP or leap
beginning & ending: entering , exiting
MOTION by FLOW
o pen in g , clo sin g
cadences: 
temporary stops: 
amplitude: 
harmonic change
gate like: OPEN or CLOSED valve like: w ea k  or strong
RESTS
dynamic levels
PROGRESSION, BRIDGE, 
TRANSITION to new key area
Table 4.1
SPACE, or CUTTING o ff  the sound
VOLUME
MODULATIONS
Group A emphasizes discontinuity: individual pitches move by step or leap in lines that 
together form textures. Group B emphasizes continuity: musical substance flows in 
blends, surges, or waves. Group A structures the sound as motion through locations: 
figures move, ENTERING and EXITING different key a r ea s  by way of b ridg es. Group B 
structures the sound as a FLOWING SUBSTANCE that m o d u la tes , thereby changing in 
quality.
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Each of these groups o f words could be seen as being metonymically invoked 
from one of the two first level metaphors: PITCH and v olu m e . The musical term “pitch” 
relates to pitching a ball or the pitch of a roofline through the image schema of graduated 
height. Although ball or roofline pitches are continuous, in musical language, “pitch” has 
come to mean a specific location on a continuous scale and thus is discontinuous in 
nature. We speak of those locations as separate “pitches.” Thus, beginning with this 
metaphor, one could metonymically invoke a system that emphasized discontinuity in the 
musical flux. If “pitches” are separate “things,” they can be separate height locations to 
which the music, as agent, moves — “The music goes up here.” If pitches are separate 
things that move in space, then musical space exists. I f  separate pitches are locations, 
then complexes of harmonically related pitches, like keys, can be locations, as well. In 
addition, complexes of melodically related pitches can be agents that move through those 
locations — “This figure enters in A, but when it exits, it is in E.”
In contrast, beginning with the first level metaphor volume, one could 
metonymically invoke a system of metaphors that emphasizes discontinuity. “Volume” 
is used in the musical context in the same way that it is used in other contexts — as a 
measure of mass. In and of themselves, sound waves do not have mass. However, the 
use o f the term “volume” in relation to sound indicates that the listener has integrated the 
structure of a mass (uncountable) substance with the sound waves. Since change in 
musical pitch is seen as movement, this particular mass substance moves, and it does so 
in a flowing manner. Thus, the musical substance can behave like liquid or gas —
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flowing forcefully against the body o f the listener. It may even MODULATE from one 
state or quality to another.
It is possible, then, to see the two first level metaphors, PITCH and volum e, as 
the invoking qualities for two modes o f experiencing music's eventfulness. These two 
modes, one that structures the event as movement o f an agent through locations, and the 
other that structures the event as the movement o f a flowing substance, are consistent 
with Lakoffs general event structure metaphors.
Th e  Ge n e r a l  E v e n t  S tru c tu re  M e ta p h o r s
As Lakoff explains it, “Various aspects of event structure, including notions like 
states, changes, processes, actions, causes, purposes, and means are characterized 
cognitively via metaphor in terms of space, motion, and force" (1994, 59). In addition, 
one of his students, Jane Espenson, discovered that in general, English has not one, but 
two separate ways o f structuring events metaphorically, summarized in the table below. 
“location” version “object" version
1. states are locations (bounded I. attributes are possessions,
regions in space).
2. changes are movements (into 2. changes are movements (of
or out o f bounded regions). possessions, namely, acquisitions
or losses).
3. causes are forces (controlling 3. causes are forces (controlling
movement through locations). the movement o f possessions,
namely, giving or taking away).
4. actions are self propelled 4. actions are self-controlled
motions. acquisitions or losses.
5. purposes are destinations. 5. purposes are desired objects
(Lakoff 1994,65-66).
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6. means are paths (to 
destinations).
7. difficulties are impediments 
to motion.
8. expected progress is a travel 
schedule; a schedule is a 
virtual traveler who 
reaches prearranged 
destinations at prearranged 
times.
9. external events are large 
moving objects.1
10. long-term, purposeful 
activities are journeys (Lakoff 
1994,62).
To which I would add:
6. means are actions taken for 
the purpose o f acquisition or 
loss.
7. difficulties are impediments 
to acquisition or loss.
8. expected progress is an 
account ledger.
9. (no correlate)
10. long term puposefiil 
activities are periods of 
increase or decrease of 
attributes.
Table 4.2
To exemplify how these metaphors operate to structure our understanding of an 
event, I will examine the way that we talk about the “time” event, which is summed up 
by the metaphor TIME PASSES. The notion that time passes requires two things: I) an 
observer for whom tone can pass and 2) an abstract concept “time” that can be 
conceptualized as something concrete enough to be observed.
If we think about time using this first version o f the event structure metaphor, by 
STATES ARE locations, times are static locations that the observer, by changes are 
movements, passes through. Specific periods of time are locations, which the 
observer is ON when the two are conceptually present at the same time: “On Thursday, I 
will meet with my advisor.” The observer moves from one TIME-LOCATION to another
1 To me, this particular entailment does not seem to fit with the rest In feet, in some ways it seems 
more consistent with the object dual, described next
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“By the time I get to Tuesday, I should be finished with that task.” Long term, time 
oriented activities become journeys for the observer “As we move on through the 
years...” Extended periods of time become a path that observers move through toward 
their final destination: “On Monday we’ll plan the party. On Tuesday we’ll buy the 
party favors and decorations. On Wednesday we’ll buy the food.” etc. Because it 
conceptualizes the abstract as location, Lakoff calls this version of the event structure 
metaphor the location dual}
The second version of the event structure metaphor, rather than conceptualizing 
the abstract as location, conceptualizes it as an object, and thus is called the object dual. 
In the case of TIME PASSES, periods o f time are no longer locations, but are objects that 
the observer can possess or lose: “I have only one hour to complete this.” or “We’re 
losing time just sitting around and dithering about this.” Changes are still movements, 
but rather than movements of the observer through locations, they are movements of 
objects into and out o f the observer’s possession or vicinity. In this version of TIME 
PASSES, the observer becomes stationary and time objects pass her: “As I lie in bed sick, 
one hour after the other passes by and I accomplish nothing.”
Just as we integrate time percepts with these event structure metaphors toward a 
bearing on making sense of a time event, we integrate musical percepts with these event 
structure metaphors toward a bearing on making sense of a musical event. If English 
speakers have two distinct ways to structure thought and speech about the non-musical
2 In calling this a “dual,” I am following a convention Lakoff sets in his writing. He and his students 
have noted that metaphors often have a counterpart that accomplishes the same conceptual task, but does 
so in a qualitatively different way. He calls these matched metaphors duals of one another.
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events o f their lives, it is logical to hypothesize that they use the same, or similar, two 
ways to structure eventful musical experience.
Indeed, I did find evidence of the presence o f two such distinct musical event 
structure metaphors (hereafter called “MESMs”) in the language of the musicians at 
Curtis. The rest o f this chapter will explore those two MESMs and how they might act 
to lend structure to abstract musical sound. The next section explores the linguistic 
evidence that suggests that in the two MESMs the relationship between the observer (the 
listener) and the observed (the music) differs. From there, I will move on to detailed 
descriptions o f each of the two MESMs.
Th e  Re l a t io n sh ip  o f  th e  Ob se r v e r  to  th e  Ob se r v e d  in  t h e  T wo  MESMs
The linguistic evidence points to two different conceptualization of observer to 
observed in the two MESMs. In the location MESM, which corresponds to Lakoff s 
location dual, the listener, viewing from afar, observes musical figures moving from one 
musical location to another. In the substance MESM, which corresponds to Lakoffs 
object dual, the listener is anchored, deictic center, as a musical substance flows past 
her.3’4
3 As it will become clear, in the case of musical events (as contrasted with events in general), it is more 
appropriate to call the “object” dual a “substance” dual. This change in terminology is due to the fact 
that rather than integrating the structure of experience with contained objects with musical sound, 
enculturated listeners integrate the structure of experience with flowing substances.
4 Since the point I am making here involves speech about music, I have not included musical notation. 
The reader should not be concerned if he or she is not familiar with either of these pieces and thus does 
not know what the examples refer to. I will be referring the reader rather to the language of the 
examples.
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With the following description of Lizst’s Piano Sonata in B Minor, pianist Amy 
Cheng illustrates the location MESM, in which the listener views musical figures moving 
from one musical location to another.5
The beginning theme actually comes (plays first theme). It’s 
very poetic. And it comes in, it larks around in many different places.
This is (plays same theme). It comes back in the very, very end. It ends 
the same way it begins. (Plays same theme, beginning on pitch a M3 
higher.) So I think, in a way, he* is completing the piece like that.6 He 
goes back to the beginning. He begins that way and then he goes to 
allegro part and in between, you know, there’s a slow part, lyrical part 
and it develops to a very typical fast part again. And then the real second 
movement comes in with the recitative. It’s like recitative, where it’s 
very dramatic, vocal, romantic, dreamy, sentimental, ail this kind of 
quality. But in between with, you know, a lot o f striking (plays the third 
theme), brings back the memory of the opening (indecipherable word} 
and then after all this lyrical you know passionate thing, goes into a 
fugue. He* used the opening two themes in allegro and incorporate, it’s 
very, it’s actually a very amazing composition. And then, you know, it 
goes into a transition part, it’s up and up up and it, it returns to the 
allegro, which is, you can say is the first movement. Or I call it a recap, 
because it’s really a one-movement piece. Close to a recap. And more or 
less the same thing, it’s oh...you know, the same thing. The same 
cantabile part comes back.
Example 4.1: Amy’s speech (location dual)
The second example, which illustrates the substance MESM, in which the listener 
is anchored in the center of the musical flow, is from a conversation I had with violinist 
Sara Bittloch about Brahms’ Sonata for Violin in D minor, the first movement.7 
D: What’s the basic mood of this first theme?
51 will explain the differing fonts in these examples later in this section.
6 At times she uses the word “he” to index Lizst Note that, except for the two uses of “he” marked with 
an asterisk, where she clearly indexes the composer, she could have just as easily said “it,” indexing “the 
music.” Most of these uses of “he” are metonymic, substituting the composer for the composed.
7 This is a condensation of part of a conversation I had with Sara. The bracketed ellipses indicate 
digressions or back channeling removed for the sake of brevity.
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S: For ME, it’s very nostalgic music. [...] Do you know what I mean? [...]
D: Well, it’s odd because it’s, you know it seems urgent. [...] There’s an urgency
to it. And yet {the basic rhythmic flow} is not really two beats to the measure. 
Tome, it’s one beat to the measure most of the time except you have these little 
spots where it isn’t. And yet at the same time There’s this urgent sort of (duh 
duhduhduh}. [...] But I’m interested in your saying that it’s nostalgic. [...]
S: It’s like, yeah, like a kind o f memory, but with this urgency which you are saying
which, um... You know like, I feel it may be like when if you have a [...] time 
that you remember that vou maybe miss or something. [...] You know, you feel 
you could jive that again, you wish you could liye that again or something, you 
know? [...]
D: So it’s, the nostalgia’s sort o f generalized, it’s not for a specific time and place.
S: Oh, it’s in the, you know, it’s in the music, actually. [...]
D: So, what is it about that that makes you have that feeling of nostalgia?
S: I, for example, I don’t like so much this performance, but I think he plays the
beginning so well, exactly for that. I just love the way he (sings first 2 notes) you 
know how he goes to that note and, it’s like crying.
D: How he sort o f builds toward it?
S: No, I mean not so much in dynamic. I think in sotto voce you can’t
[indecipherable word] so much but like in feeling you can feel so much. [...]
D: Urn...so it’s sort o f {a building o f intensity} ?
S: Yeah, mm hm.
D: rather than {a building of volume}.
S: Yeah, mm hm. [...]
D: So you sort of felt like A SENSE OF nostalgia and yearning here.
S: Yeah, I really...
D: How do you think [...] that the piano line, van...contributes to that?
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S: Yeah, it’s so...octaves. You know they have THIS SENSE OF like um...bareness,
you know? [...] And... it, FOR ME, it fits definitely. I can’t really explain it. It’s 
like, urn...yeah, a little bit empty feeling. Not really wanting to put harmony, but 
you know, just {a continuation} o f sounds or whatever.
D: Uh huh. What about the rhythm, the rhythmic
S: And that’s what creates the urgency I think, (sings the syncopated effect and
mimics it with hands) that they are not... [...] And it’s all one long phrase which 
like grows here a little, you know it gets more intense.
D: Uh huh. So why does it, how does it get more intense? Is it just the um
S: It’s going up, I think that’s mainly and also the, you know, the [development] of
this {(sings m9 and through mlS, though skips crescendo in 11-12)} [...]
D: Right. Okay, and then you’ve got this, the same. How do you feel about these
little things?
S: It’s the same kind of thing. It’s also intensity very much.
D: To ME it seems even a little more urgent.
S: Yeah.
D: um...Why does it seem a little more urgent? I mean I think the fact that this is a
smaller interval, just a half [...] step and these are large intervals and There’s just 
this push
S: There’s also this
D: and you’ve got {(sings triplets in the right hand of the piano part)}
S: the triplets against two [...] makes a very big...you know, three against two? [...]
That’s like, really unstable, (sings)
D: Right, so that...huh. Okay, so then it goes on and [...] at the end of the phrase
S: It just dies quietly.
Example 4.2: conversation with Sara (substance dual)
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In each o f these examples, which illustrate the two MESMs, the listener situates 
herself differently with respect to the musical sound. Linguistically, this difference in 
situatedness is accomplished in two main ways: verbal aspect and deixis.
In linguistic scholarship, “aspect” is a very complex and much debated category.8 
I am using “verbal aspect” to refer to a difference in quality of situation conveyed by 
verbs, which can be categorized as either conveying a dynamic or a stative quality. 
Dynamic and stative verbs can be distinguished from one another both semantically and 
grammatically. In general terms, dynamic verbs express
activity [e.g. run, walk], process (e.g. change, grow), bodily sensation 
(e.g. feel, hurt), etc. (Crystal, 103).
On the other hand, stative verbs
express states o f affairs, rather than actions, Le. the expression of 
relational processes (e.g. be, belong to, involve, seem) or of inactive 
perceptual or cognitive processes (e.g., know, mean, realize, suppose)
(ibid, 287).
Grammatically, dynamic verbs
occur in the progressive form (e.g. I’m running, He’s playing) and in the 
imperative (e.g. Run!)” (ibid, 103),
whereas stative verbs usually do not (e.g. *1 am supposing; *Suppose!) (ibid, 287). 
Some English verbs can be used as either dynamic or stative, including the verb “sound”:
8 Laurel Brinton (1988) suggests that the confusion lies, at least in part, in the failure of scholars to 
differentiate between “aspect” (whether a speaker portrays an event as completed, ongoing, beginning, 
continuing, ending, or repeating) and “aktionsart” (“the inherent nature of the situation portrayed”). In 
Brinton’s terms, I am concerned with aktionsart here.
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e.g. “The trumpet shall sound” (dynamic) or “It sounds like you want to go home” 
(stative).
In the two examples o f speech about musical events above, I highlighted the 
aspect o f the verbs: dynamic with italicized text and stative with underlined text.9 If you 
look at the mam verbs of each sentence, you will see that in Amy’s description (which 
illustrates the location MESM), dynamic verbs predominate (It goes, It comes, It 
develops, etc.), while in my conversation with Sara (which illustrates the substance 
MESM), stative verbs prevail fit’s like. There is, You have. It seems, etc.). This 
predominance o f one aspect over the other gives the utterances either of two general 
qualities: dynamic or static.
In addition to aspect, debds plays a part in shaping the differing qualities o f these 
two examples. Debds refers to
those features of language which refer directly to the personal, temporal 
or locational characteristics o f the situation within which an utterance 
takes place, whose meaning is thus relative to that situation; e.g. 
now/then, here/there, I/you, this/that (ibid, 86).
In other words, deictics anchor the speech to the situation. Listeners who become 
confused about what the deictics in an utterance refer to may feel disoriented and will 
generally stop the speaker to clarify. Without clarification, the rest of the words in the 
utterance cannot easily be made sense of.
91 highlighted only those verbs that described the musical event In addition, I did not highlight verbs 
that were functioning as auxiliaries.
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I have marked the deictics in the examples with a bold font: it.10 Looking again 
at Amy's description (the location MESM), note that the most common deictic is “it,” 
paired with a dynamic verb. Along with “it dynamic verb” she also uses “then” fairly 
often, adding up to a manner of presenting the situation that suggests a series of actions 
happening to a figure over a period o f time and outside of Amy. She seems to be at a 
distance, observing these actions happening to that figure and narrating them for 
someone who cannot observe for herself.
As Sara and I converse (illustrating the substance MESM), we use a variety of 
deictics (it, you, me, I, that, they, this), indicating a less unified conception of what we 
are talking about. Rather than watching something that is outside ourselves at a 
distance, we seem more to be in the middle of a variety of things that are occurring, 
noting what we are sensing and feeling about the them. The various deictics are paired 
most often with stative verbs. We are not talking about a single thing going and doing, 
but about multiple things, and how they are or seem. We use “then” only once, 
suggesting less concern with a series o f events taking place through time. Instead, we 
use existential “there” many times, pointing rather to existence in time, rather than 
location in time. (These are marked with an underlined, bold font: there's.) These 
combinations o f verbal aspect and deictics suggest that, rather than experiencing this 
event from a distance, experientiaHy, Sara and I are inside the event, an integral part of 
it.
10 Sometimes deictics refer internally to a sentence; not externally to a situation, e.g. ‘‘Somebody that is 
revealing to you a secret...” I have not marked these.
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In addition, we use constructions that suggest we are in a mode o f identification 
with both the music and each other. For example, Sara began talking about the music 
with the statement, “For ME, it’s very nostalgic music.” to which I later responded, “So 
you sort of felt like A SENSE OF nostalgia and yearning here.” Rather than sitting outside 
the musical event, observing it from afar, as Amy’s speech indicates she is, Sara seems to 
have a closer relationship with the sound, as if she were inside the stream of sound, 
sensing its qualities. I have marked all o f the words that indicate this mode of 
identification with italicized, small capitals, e.g., A SENSE OF. This mode of identification 
extends beyond the relationship Sara describes with the music to her relationship with me 
as her interlocutor. Her use of the indefinite pronoun “you” includes me, herself and 
anyone else who might be listening.11
These two examples also differ in the kinds of metaphors employed. Amy’s 
musical event concerns the motion o f a figure in and through space and time: “[I]t 
comes in, it lurks around. [...] then it goes into a transition part, it’s up and up up.” In 
this and other ways, it resembles LakofFs location dual o f the event structure metaphor. 
For that reason, I will refer to it as the location dual o f the musical event structure 
metaphor..
In contrast, Sara and I conceive of the musical event as the flow of a substance 
that can have particular qualities, including temperature, mood and force: “There’s an 
urgency to it. And yet {the basic rhythmic flow} is not realty two beats to the measure.
111 think this mode of identification causes this mode of speech about musical events to happen in an 
interactive mode. My conversation with Sara, which was my best extended example of this kind of 
speech, was completely interactive.
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To ME, it’s one beat to the measure.” “[I]t’s like crying.” “It’s so...octaves. You know
they have THIS SENSE OF like um...bareness.” “And it’s all one long phrase which like
grows here a little, you know it gets more intense.”
In this substance oriented MESM, the active “flow” of musical “substance” is
packaged in nominalizations, which are nouns (static in nature) made from verbs (active
in nature). These are marked with brackets: {a building o f volume}. Sung or played
12 - ■ ■»demonstrations o f the music are nominalized and used in sentences as nouns. These 
“packages” of musical process can be temporarily “possessed” by the listener (you’ve 
got {(sings triplets in the right hand of the piano part)}) indicating, again, a mode of 
identification with the music. Having is possessing, which conceptually maps the 
CONTAINMENT schema onto a person, with the person becoming a field of containment 
and the possession becoming the contained. All o f these qualities mark this as similar to 
LakofFs object dual o f the event structure metaphor. However, although the musical 
substance is packaged by nominalizations in language, it is experienced and spoken of as 
a flowing substance rather than an object. For this reason, I will refer to this as the 
substance dual o f the musical event structure metaphor.
From the linguistic evidence regarding the relationship of the listener to the 
music, we can see that the two MESMs differ in their figure-ground orientation. In the 
location MESM, the music acts as both figure and ground, with a musical figure moving 
against a musical ground. The listener sits outside this action and observes it. In
12 In contrast, in the location MESM, sung or played demonstrations tend not to be nominalized and 
made an integral part of sentences. Instead, they are used to illustrate what the musical figure is doing.
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contrast, in the substance MESM, as the music flows past the listener, it is the figure. At 
the .same time, the listener, situated in the center o f that flow, experiencing and sensing 
its qualities, becomes the ground. For example, consider Sara’s statement: “Yeah, it’s 
so...octaves. You know they have this sense of like um...bareness, you know? [...] 
AncL.it, for me, it fits definitely. I can’t reaDy explain it. It’s like, um...yeah, a little bit 
empty feeling.” As the octave figure “passes” Sara, it plays out in her, as ground, as a 
sense of bare emptiness.13 The substance MESM situates the listener in the center of the 
musical flow, where she becomes the ground for the action of the music as figure, while 
the location MESM situates the listener at a distance from the music, with both figure 
and ground located in the music “out there.”
Each o f these MESMs relates to different aspects of embodied imagining. 
Situating the listener at a distance from  the music, the location MESM relates to the 
imaginative sense o f vision. A listener operating in this mode will speak as if she sees the 
event in the music, as when Amy said, “It comes in and lurks around in many different 
places.” If she elaborates what she sees imaginatively, she will describe visual 
metaphors, such as when pianist Anna Polonsky called the broken arpeggios o f the first 
movement of Beethoven’s fourth piano concerto “lacy.” Situating the listener inside the 
music, the substance MESM relates to the imaginative sense o f touch (or taste), the 
kinesthetic sense, and the emotional senses. A listener operating in this mode will speak 
as if she touches the music (e.g., when Sara said “They have this sense of bareness” or
13 See Lakoff and Johnson (1999), pp. 198-200, for more on the relationship between the general event 
structure metaphors and figure-ground.
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describing a timbre as “silky”), feels its force (e.g., when I said “There’s this push”), or 
senses a particular mood (e.g., when I said “There’s an urgency to it”). If she elaborates 
what she sees imaginatively, she will describe metaphors based on these senses (e.g., 
being on a roller coaster ride).
In summary, we can see that the two different relationships between observer and 
observed render these two MESMs logically distinct from one another. In the location 
dual, the observer is outside looking at a figure moving through a series o f locations. In 
the substance dual, the observer is inside the flow of musical sound, sensing its qualities.
I am not suggesting here that people commonly use only one of these MESMs to 
experience or talk about music. In feet, it is quite common to observe both metaphors 
used even in the same sentence.14
I now turn to detailed descriptions of these sets of metaphors, exploring first the 
location MESM. I invite my readers to imagine as they read that they are listening to 
music and are situated in relation to the music in the ways that I describe as characteristic 
of the two MESMs. I also ask that you actively imagine being in the experiential modes 
that I describe for each MESM. Such imaging may make my argument clearer.
M u sic al  E v e n t  S tru c tu re  M e t a p h o r — L oca tio n  D u al
The source domain o f the location MESM is the m otion  of a discrete FIGURE or 
figures in and through space as observed by a listener. Such motion unfolds in  time 
through a series o f MUSICAL locations. The specific time event dual that operates here
14 For example, in my conversation with Sara, we switch from the object dual to the location dual for our 
last two utterances.
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is the location dual, where time is conceived o f as a journey through various time 
locations. In the location MESM, the listener is located outside the musical action, 
VIEWING it, as if it were on a stage.
Given the fact that this MESM lends itself to an analogy with a dramatic event on 
a stage, for the purposes of clarity in my exposition, I will employ some of the terms o f 
dramatic action, such as “setting” and “action.”
Setting I: Extended-Static Musical Time-Space
For Amy Cheng, the first theme of Lizst’s Piano Sonata in B Minor has a way of 
“lurking” around a stage-like setting, returning again and again.
The beginning theme actually comes (plays first theme). It’s very poetic.
And it comes in, it lurks around in many different places.
The first clue that Amy gives to indicate that this musical event takes place in a 
limited space is her statement that the first theme “comes in.” This, and the commonly 
employed term “entrance,” suggests movement into a particular location.
The basic setting Amy suggests, with the listener situated outside the musical 
event viewing something that moves through a limited space, emphasizes three of the 
usual four constructs that we call “dimensions”: height, width, and time. Recall that 
time in this MESM is metaphorized as location, so that one o f the entailments of this 
conception of time would be TIME EXTENDS in  space .15 This entailment stretches time 
out to various static locations, and so the third dimension could also be consider to be
15 This metaphor is evident in such linguistic constructions as “A long time ago...”
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length. The distant observer can view a relatively long portion of that time, making this 
musical event structure more diachronicalty than synchronically ordered.
The setting, then, for the ACTION in this musical event structure is a visual space, 
rather analogous to a stage. In our culture, we metaphorically project a containm ent 
schema onto a location, with the sides o f the container mapping onto the boundaries of 
the location. Once something moves past the boundary, it is metaphorically in the 
location container.
The nature of the containment o f the musical location is rather complex.
Although the metaphor of viewing action on a stage suggests three dimensions (height, 
width, and depth), musical space is comprised, rather, primarily of height and width. 
However, even this description is inadequate, because the “width” does not exist all at 
once, but unfolds in time. The emergence of musical space in and through time 
complicates my discussion of the metaphorical projections involved in its conceptual 
construction.
One o f the entailments of the location dual o f the time event, in which time is 
conceived o f as a journey through various time locations, is the metaphor tim e is 
e x te n d e d  sp ace, which I will refer to as extended-static time-space. If we examine this 
metaphor, we can see that it has two versions. The first is a kinesthetic version, in which 
the person speaking is located in the time event, with the past behind her and the future 
in front, e.g. “As I head toward the future....” The second is a visual version, in which 
the person speaking is located outside the time event observing something inside moving
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from one time location to another, e.g. “That project will go on from one day to the 
next.” This version o f the time event metaphor operates in many o f our visual 
representations of time, such as most calendars, which represent days as a series of 
blocks to be read from left to right.16
Although both kinetic and the visual versions of extended-static time-space can 
operate in this musical event structure, the visual version is most prevalent in speech 
conditioned by it.17 Thus is evident in Amy’s speech, which places her outside the event, 
looking in at it.
[It] begins that way and then [it] goes to allegro part and in between, you 
know, there’s a slow part, lyrical part and it develops to a very typical 
fast part again.
This version o f time-space also appears in musical notation, where the viewer sees 
representations of a musical event stretching out across the page, moving through 
various locations.18 The extension of musical time-space in a manner that suggests width 
and height is reinforced by the notion that music has a horizontal axis and a vertical axis, 
common metaphorical expressions for melody and harmony. The setting, then, for 
musical action is an extended-static musical time-space limited by the viewer’s field of 
vision.
16 While it is true that the day blocks on a calendar do not move continuously from left to right, but 
instead are represented in a fashion that requires the reader to move her eyes to the next line, this is only 
an artifact of the technology of paper.
17 However, the kinesthetic version is very evident in rehearsal speech. It is also evident in talk about 
musical momentum, which I will discuss in the next chapter.
18 Again, the same limitations of paper technology apply to representations of music as do to calendars.
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Action I: Melodic Motion
This conceptual setting provides the ground against which visually oriented 
melodic motion takes place.19 In a visual form, the idea of motion suggests the logic of 
figure and ground.20 When detecting motion with our eyes, we know that something is 
moving because we see a figure moving across some sort o f background.
Within extended-static musical time-space, notes move to variously placed 
positions with respect to height. Discussing the Lizst Piano Sonata in B minor, Amy 
says the music “goes into a transition part, it’s up and up up.” As discussed earlier, 
musical height results from integrating the UP/DOWN image schema with the sound wave. 
Although this metaphoric integration can be explained in a number of different ways, the 
most experientially basic explanation is one that stems from the physical experience of 
singing: the vibrations of low notes are produced lower in our throats and high notes 
higher. As the musical event unfolds the lowest and highest pitches delimit the overall 
range. The feet that musical pitches are experienced as high and low entails some sort of 
GRAVITY in this MESM. “Up” and “down” exist with respect to gravity. In gravity-free 
space, they do not exist.
Musical motion through this range can be accomplished in a variety of manners. 
If the vertical SPACE between notes in a moving series is smaller (a whole note or a half 
note), they are described as moving in STEPwise fashion. If the SPACE covered is larger,
19 For more on musical motion, see Lochhead (1989/90). For early cognitive semantics work on motion, 
see Talmy (1975).
20 Vision is not the only way to detect motion. If you are in a car and close your eyes, you can certain ly 
detect changes in motion through your kinesthetic and proprioceptive senses.
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it is described as a leap. If a series o f notes are sounded on the same pitch, with the 
same rhythm, unless a static quality is desired, the player must take special precautions to 
ensure that the sound goes somewhere and does not give the impression o f stagnation.
As pitches move through extended-static musical time-space, they describe 
melodic LINES in it. Although perceptually, musical pitches moving through the 
horizontal axis are usually discrete (with exceptions for vocal, string or trombone 
portamentos), due to the integration o f  a PATH schema, these pitches are connected into 
melodic LINES. Multiple LINES weave together into different musical textures, which 
can be described as dense or open, depending on how many lines are involved and how 
close they are in musical space/time. The different LINES may be more easily 
differentiated if  they are drawn with different timbres, or tone colors.
Direction I: The Harmonic Path  Image Schema; Harmonic Locations
Multiple lines do more than simply create different musical TEXTURES. Taken 
together, they create vertical harmonies that move in harmonic progressions. In the 
tonal system, we understand those progressions as a PATH image schema that constrains 
the movement o f the melody. Melody notes must correspond with concurrent harmony 
notes most of the time. When they do not, they are called nonharmonic tones and are 
carefully resolved back on to the harmonic PATH.
In tonal harmonic theory, the tone, chord, and key that constitute both source 
and goal o f this path is the tonic, which the music theory book used during my research 
time at Curtis defines in this way:
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The tonic, the central tone of the key, forms the point o f departure from 
which the other tones move and the goal to which they are directed 
(AldweD, Schacter, 1989,5, emphasis in original).
This quote suggests two things: 1) that, in the tonal system, the melody alone 
constitutes a PATH image schema, and 2) that the tonic note is both source and goal for 
the melodic path. The tonic note is the center o f GRAVITY from which all STEPS and 
leaps originate and to which they must eventually return. In addition, the notes o f the 
tonic triad, considered the most stable in a key, are often the source of some of the more 
important tones in a melodic line. The tonic key, often called the “home” key, 
constitutes both source and ultimate goal o f the harmonic path.
The progression of harmonies constitutes a path for the melody by constraining 
their movement. As the harmonies progress, the composer must choose important 
melody tones from the notes of the changing triads, taking care in the treatment and 
resolution of nonharmonic tones in both the melody and the harmony parts. 
Alternatively, the composer may write the melody first and add complementary 
harmonies later. However, even though in this version of the composition process the 
melody constrains the harmony, conceptually speaking, the harmony is still the path for 
the melody. No term, such as “nonmelodic,” exists for discussing how a melodic path 
might constrain harmonies.21
21 Usually, if harmonies are added to a melody, they are considered harmonic “support” for the melody. 
This metaphor seems architecturally oriented, and may very well be simply a projection of architectural 
thought to musical thought However, along with statements such as “I found her interpretation very 
convincing,” it may also be part of a metaphor that conceptualizes music in terms of arguments, which 
in our culture are often talked about in architectural terms. I have yet to examine either the 
music/architecture or the music/argument connections.
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The harmonic path winds its way from the home key location to various other 
harmonic areas, such as closely or remotely related keys. Keys are CONTAINED 
LOCATIONS made up of a certain set o f pitches; a melody is IN one key or another. When 
a melody moves from one key to another, it may make its transition by way o f a 
BRIDGE. In a rehearsal, after a stop for discussion, the group might reconvene at a 
particular key location, usually at the boundary, where one key changes to another.
Direction II: The Extended-Static Musical Time-Space Path  Image Schema
Paths and locations are not only harmonically oriented, however. They are also 
defined by extended space/time. As stated at the beginning of this section, the time event 
structure metaphor operational in this version o f the musical event structure is the 
location dual, where time is conceived of as a journey through various time locations. 
This involves a PATH image schema. The source and goal of extended space/time, in 
general, remain relatively abstract, but are somewhat concretized by the notion of past 
and future. The path is made up of different time locations, such as hours, days, weeks 
and months. Those locations are traversed by a virtual traveler who advances forward 
into the future, from one moment to the next. Depending on whether the kinesthetic or 
the visual versions are in operation, the virtual traveler is either the speaking observer or 
“now.”
In this version of musical time, the beat is a virtual traveler who passes through 
different metrical locations. Players must be careful to “keep up with the beat,” but not 
to “rush” or “drag” it. Metrical locations are broken up similarly to time locations: a
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whole piece has numerous sections (variously defined, sometimes called periods); 
sections are broken up into measures. Often times a whole section will be in a single 
tempo. Tempos are LOCATION-CONTAINERS at which, in rehearsal, players begin. As the 
sounding beat moves through metric locations, it encounters RESTS — places where it 
stops sounding. It also encounters cadences, which function similarly to gates that are 
OPEN or closed . Cadences function as boundaries from one location to another. These 
various metric locations, along with rests and cadences are drawn up in the score, which 
acts as both a travel schedule and a map for both the beat and the players producing the 
sound.
In that musical map, contrary to what I have said above about a single beat, 
multiple beats exist. Players may begin at or on the fourth beat o f measure. Does this 
musical event structure have a single beat that advances into the future or multiple beats 
that function similarly to the “moment to moment” path “stones” of the time event 
structure? This question might be answered in two ways. First, recall the two versions 
of the operational time event structure: kinesthetic and visual. In the kinesthetic 
version, a single beat advances toward the future; in the visual version, multiple beats lay 
out a path on which the musical figure advances.22 Second, if the music is both figure 
and ground in this MESM, the beat is single when it is the figure (the virtual traveler 
moving forward), but multiple when it is the ground (the PATH stones upon which the 
virtual traveler trods).
22 This advancement, analogous to walking, can be seen by the fact that we say that a sound begins on or 
off the beat
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Action 11: Melodic F ig u r e  Contrasting with Harmonic/Rhythmic G r o u n d
The FIGURE/GROUND logic o f musical motion takes a more complex form in that 
of the melodic or rhythmic figure that moves against a harmonic/rhythmic ground. This 
kind of musical motion is quite complex so I will not be able to cover all o f its possible 
aspects. Instead, I will suggest the basic principles involved, followed by examples.
Amy Cheng calls the opening figure in the Lizst Sonata a theme:
The beginning theme actually comes (plays mm. 2-3). It’s very poetic.
And it comes in, it lurks around in many different places.
In addition to “theme” and “figure,” the word “motive” is often used to describe the 
most perceptually prominent, moving musical sounds. What all of these words 
accomplish, conceptually, is to take a series o f separate pitches and “solidify” them into a 
single, gestalt “object.”23 “Figure,” for which the main entry in the Oxford English 
Dictionary reads “The form o f anything as determined by the outline,” does so by 
emphasizing the process of containment involved in the gestalt perception. “Motive,” 
which Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary traces back to Latin motus, the past 
participle of movere, “to move,” emphasizes the motion the gestalt figure contains.24
The ground is comprised o f musical sounds that, perceptually, are less prominent 
than the figure. Usually, the ground has both harmonic and rhythmic components. The 
harmonic component may be static, such as a drone, or active, Le. a harmonic
23 Lakoff and Johnson (1980,25-32) refer to this metaphoric gestalt projection as an ontological, 
metaphor. See Narmour (1990) for more about gestalt perception of melodic figures.
24 The word “theme” is part of another set of metaphors that liken musical composition to linguistic 
composition.
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progression. The rhythmic element is usually organized by meter, which in this version 
o f the musical event structure, is conceptualized as a container that organizes the beat. 
The metric function of containment is important here in that it lays out a regular 
background motion against which a less regular foreground rhythmic motion may be 
perceived. Alternatively, melodic or rhythmic musical motion may take place over a 
more meiodicaily oriented ostinato figure, Le. a ground bass, or a rhythmic ostinato.
When talking about the second movement of Schubert’s String Quartet “Death 
and the Maiden” (Example 4.3, next page), Chinese violinist Chen Zhao told me
[T]he second violin and the viola have the background (sings triplets).
And then the cello has the pizzicato with the first violin. In some ways 
this is more of a melody here. But it’s put in the background. Whereas 
the violin has the ornaments um... And.... like the maiden goes through 
some kind of struggle here.
In this case the second violin and viola background is rhythmically and metrically 
extremely regular, providing a background pulse of triplets. The cello provides a soft 
pizzicato bass line that continues the same rhythmic pattern set by all instruments in the 
first two sections of the movement. Together, the three lower instruments provide a 
harmonic background that moves at the same pace as it has since the beginning of the 
movement. The first violin stands out on the top, because of range, relative pace, a 
difference in metric organization (duple against the triple background), a very different 
rhythm, and dynamic change. Considered diachronically, this figure is also very different 
from anything heard up to that point in the movement. Chen characterizes it as going 
through some kind of struggle.
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Chen’s example demonstrates how figure and ground may be differentiated from 
one another in various ways, some more active and others static. The active methods 
have to do with motion and variation. Inchided in this group is the relative pace of the 
figure against the ground, as when a quickly moving melodic figure stands out against a 
slowly changing harmonic ground. Another active method is the relative amount of 
motivic change, as when a melodic figure is varied against a background of a melodic 
ostinato. The static methods include such musical elements as timbre, range, and 
dynamic levels.
The figure may not always move at a fester pace than the ground. Describing the 
beginning of Ravel’s Daphnis and Chloe, Suite #2, (Example 4.4, next ten pages) Min 
Park, a young flutist, characterized it as “the sun rising against the murmurs of the 
forest.” In this case, extremely rapid, but metrically strict and rhythmically even, 
passages played by the woodwinds, harps and celesta, as well as sustained tones in the 
upper strings and horns provide a static background for the gradually rising lower 
strings. These lower strings, which describe the motion of the rising sun, are 
differentiated from the background by timbre, range, and a varied rhythm and melodic 
line.
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Sometimes, rather than a figure and ground, the music contrasts two figures of 
varying character. Concerning the first trumpet figure o f Hindemith’s Sonata fo r  
Trumpet and Piano (Example 4.5, next page), written around the time that Hitler was 
first coming to power, Jason Gamer exclaimed:
It’s like “Verve!” you know, “Life! Life is starting!” with all the vigor and 
passion that that embodies. And at the same time there are these Nazis 
marching along, trying to squash it. (Sings rhythm o f first measure of 
piano score.) uYum puh dum pum pum pum pum pum.” You can just see 
them, you know?
Rather than being mere background, the piano part is a figure unto itself. Played at a 
march-like tempo, its block chords stride on, bounding off the downbeat of one measure 
and on to the next. Even without fitting these figures into a historical program, 
considering them wholly on musical grounds, they clearly constitute contrasting figures. 
Besides timbre, they differ in rhythm, articulation and kind of motion, with the trumpet 
part constituted primarily of leaps and the piano part primarily steps. The piano part 
could actually be considered both as a figure and a ground. While it is distinct enough to 
be a figure, it is also more rhythmically repetitive than the trumpet, and so might stand 
out somewhat less for some listeners.
Musical Jigure/ground schemas can take varying forms, but the basic principle 
remains: a figure stands out against a ground because o f some perceived difference 
between them.
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Setting II: Regions of Musical Space, Terrain
The notion o f FIGURE/GROUND is very complex and takes many forms. I’d like 
here to examine one o f the implications of this notion, the relationship between ground 
and extended-static musical time-space. I will argue here that, just as we conceive of the 
physical space we live in as having varying regions and terrains — such as underground, 
ground, above ground, and sky — so we conceive o f musical space as having varying 
regions and terrains. To understand this, we must consider both musical figure/ground 
and gravity.
While we commonly use the term “ground,” since figure/ground is fundamentally 
a phenomenon viewed from afar, “ground” is better understood as “background,” rather 
than the earthly ground. This suggests that, at times, in this musical event structure, the 
more static ground visually “fills up” extended-static musical time-space in a particular 
fashion, serving as a backdrop for a more active figure.
For instance, at the beginning of Ravel’s Daphnis and Chloe (Example 4.4, p. 
332), two woodwinds execute extremely fast, relatively parallel passages that undulate in 
small to medium intervals. These passages are so rapid that they present a blur o f sound 
to the listener; it is nearly impossible to pick out individual notes. According to the 
program written in the score these passages represent the sound of minute brooklets 
running over rocks: “Aucun bruit que le murmure des ruisselets amasses par la rosee 
qui coule des roches ” (“No noise but the murmur o f the rivulets collected from the dew 
that runs down from the rocks” translation: Maribeth Clark). While in their blurred
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rapidness they do index the idea of fluidity, the notion that they iconicaQy represent the 
sound of brooklets is somewhat implausible. The way a brook sounds depends on a 
number o f factors, such as the kinds of rocks involved, the speed and amount of the 
water, and the way that the water and rocks interact. However, in general, the sounds of 
a brook are much steadier in pitch than Ravel’s passages are. Brook sounds can be a 
steady stream o f white noise, a relatively steady treble sound or bass sound. Although 
they do fluctuate to some degree in pitch, those fluctuations do not tend to cover a wide 
range.
To my mind, Ravel’s passages do a much better job oficonically representing the 
visual effect o f a brook.25 The structure o f the visual effect o f a brook maps quite neatly 
onto the structure o f the aural effect of these passages. The undulating intervals suggest 
water moving around rocks, with some rocks being larger than others. The aural 
blurring depicts the visual blurring of rapidly moving water. In this way, Ravel “fills in” 
(visually oriented) musical space/time with a background against which the “lines” 
described by the rising sun can be “seen.” Indeed, we do sometimes talk about 
instruments “filling in.”
In the spatial relationships between the different instrumental parts in the Ravel 
example, musical time-space is used in a fashion that is iconic with our visual experience 
of these things in the world and in a manner that is consistent with the gravity present in
25 Knowing little of the program of this piece, these figures have always reminded me of wind swirling 
through morning mist, another visually oriented metaphor.
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this MESM.26 At dawn, the sky lightens somewhat before we can actually see the sun, 
indicating to us that it is somewhere below the horizon. In the Ravel, the sun, depicted 
by the lowest strings, is placed in musical time-space below the ground created by the 
brooklets and the sustained tones. It lurks below the horizon for a while, indicating its 
presence but not showing itself (basses & second cello, mm. 1-7). While the ground 
stays at the same pitch level, the sun theme gradually rises from the bass, through the 
cellos and violas, finally cresting the horizon (passing the ground passages) with the 
second violins two and a half octaves later (rehearsal #157). As the sun gets nearer to 
the horizon, the “space” above it is filled with the iconic sounds o f birdcalls, which 
gradually rise in pitch so that they are always above the sun.
Another example o f the iconicity o f “regions” of musical spaces/time with space 
the world is provided by Beethoven’s Piano Concerto no. 4 (Example 4.6, next page). 
Talking about it, young Russian pianist Anna Polonsky said,
It comes to a thing foil of fiats and totally unexpected (m 105). And what 
it comes, on the very top and the very bottom and this is supposed to ring 
(plays very high note) and this is supposed to be kind of like this deep 
under the sea kind o f dynamic. Not necessarily thinking that this is under 
the sea. But just the dynamic that you would “Ooo,” that kind o f sound.
Clearly, Anna is not saying that this music represents the ocean in the way that Ravel’s 
music represented a nature scene at dawn. Rather, she suggests that it shares some 
dynamic quality with the sea. Looking at the score, we see that the melody floats very
26 Note that this holds true whether you imagine the “brook” lines as an aural depiction or a visual 
depiction. Either way, if you were in a forest, you could locate the ground by this image (aural or 
visual).
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high above a much lower bass line that undulates up and down in even waves. At the 
same time, the orchestra plays sustained tones in the low to medium register, with the 
bass part a pedal B flat below a slowly changing harmony (B flat to F dominant seventh 
back to B flat). The left Hand piano line incorporates notes of both the treble orchestra 
part and the pedal bass. When Anna played this for me, she used the sustaining pedal in 
the bass, which made the sounds run together. She explained, “The pedal is intentional. 
That’s what makes it murky and kind of shaded and kind of hazy.” In addition, when 
listening to it, I find that the pedal bass in the orchestra, when it contrasts with the 
changing harmonies, contributes to a harmonic “murkiness.”
All of this adds up to an impression of murkiness in the lower parts contrasting 
with the melody line, which rings with “bell-like clearness” in a very high register. Anna 
called this a “deep under the sea kind o f dynamic.” Whether or not she meant to use this 
metaphorical expression literally, it is clear that the “murky” lower parts map to the 
deep, dark, shaded, hazy floor of the ocean, and that the bell-like melody line maps to 
the ocean’s surface.
Earlier in our conversation Anna had talked at length about how spiritual she felt 
this movement was, likening the opening passage to angels.
Well, this particular part to me, to my teacher, who actually gave me the 
idea, is religious and kind of um..., it’s peaceful, it’s like clouds. And it’s 
extremely loving, to me, it just has such a warm emotion to it, that... It’s 
so angelic, that’s the word. I’m not religious, kind of? Well not 
particular, I don’t believe in angels, but if I was an angel, it would be like 
this. An angel would be peaceful and warm, like all protective and 
beautiful, but not refined, exquisite kind ofbeautiful? Not like Gothic 
architecture but more like... just warm and....
348
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
After she played the “ocean” passage for me, I commented, “It is really neat the way 
you have the murky left hand then the bell-like clearness o f the right hand.” “O f angelic 
melody,” she immediately responded. For Anna this high, floating melody line not only 
maps to the surface o f the ocean, but to the angelic heavens, both o f which could be seen 
as weightless and shining. Although she did not say it, it is not a leap to suppose that the 
murky bass then might map to the murky, messy world of human beings on the earth, 
which, along with the murky depths of the ocean, could be seen as heavy and dark.
The point is that the “regions” of musical space can map iconically onto the 
regions of physical and cosmological space that we live in. As in the physical world, in 
the musical world certain kinds o f events, “objects” and personas exist in lower realms 
and others, higher.
The above also implies that “terrains” o f various sorts can exist in musical time- 
space. When we call large intervals “leaps,” what do we imply the sounds are leaping on 
to or over? I am not suggesting that this “terrain” exists for us conceptually in a positive 
sense, but rather in a negative one. What I mean by this can be clarified by an analogy to 
the activity o f drawing. If a person draws a chair, she can attend to and draw the lines of 
the chair. In addition, she could also attend to the negative space, the shapes in between 
the legs or the slats o f the back. In perceiving a chan, while we do not usually attend to 
the negative space, it is there, shaping our perceptions o f the positive characteristics of 
the chair. I suggest that when we listen to music, while we do not normally attend to the 
musical time-space terrain unless a program directs us to it, it is still there, shaping our
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perceptions and conceptions of the positive characteristics o f the music. I win take this 
idea up again in the next chapter in relation to musical momentum.
Summary
To summarize, the location MESM dual, exemplified by Amy Cheng’s speech 
about Lizst’s Piano Sonata in B Minor, is set in an extended-static musical time-space 
limited by the viewer’s field o f vision. This conceptual setting provides the ground 
against which visually oriented melodic motion occurs. Melodic movements up and 
down are constrained by a harmonic PATH schema, and pass through various harmonic 
locations. Those musical paths and locations are also conditioned by the location dual of 
the time event structure metaphor.
Moving through the musical locations, more active figures stand out against 
more static grounds. The grounds can visually “fill up” extended-static musical time- 
space in a particular fashion, serving as a “backdrop” for more active figures. Those 
figures use the “regions” of this musical space in a manner that is consistent with our 
gravity-oriented experience in the world. Musical motion can negatively imply various 
kinds of “terrains”.
M u sic a l  E v e n t  S tru c tu re  M e ta p h o r — S u b sta n c e  D ual
Mot all musical events are visually oriented. Another kind o f musical event is 
oriented more toward “feeling.” Rather than being concerned with the movement of 
figures through musical space, it is concerned with the movement of the protean musical
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substance as it flows around a sensing listener. Speeches from my conversation with 
Sara illustrate:
D: Well, it’s odd because it’s, you know it seems urgent [...] There’s an urgency
to it. And yet the basic rhythmic flow is not really two beats to the measure. To 
me, it’s one beat to the measure most o f the time except you have these little 
spots where it isn’t. And yet at the same time there’s this urgent sort o f duh duh 
duh duh.
S: Yeah, it’s so...octaves. You know they have this sense of like um...bareness, you
know? [...] AncL.it, for me, it fits definitely. I can’t really explain it. It’s like, 
um...yeah, a little bit empty feeling. Not really wanting to put harmony, but you 
know, just a continuation of sounds or whatever.27
Situated in the middle o f the flow of musical sound, Sara and I sense its qualities, not
visually oriented qualities but those oriented kinesthetically, tactilely, and emotionally.
As indicated earlier, the language that signals this musical event structure is
stative in aspect. In addition to stative verbs, other aspects of the language signal that
the speaker is in a mode of identification with the music and with her interlocutor: the
indefinite pronoun “you,” reports of “a sense o r  or “a feeling o f” comparative
phrases—“It’s like crying” or “For me it’s like an empty feeling.” Reported speech
describes the listener’s reactions to the musical forces affecting her or her “You go, 'Oh,
(sigh), okay.’” Existential “there” describes states o f musical existence, rather than
pointing to specific things — “There’s an urgency to it.” or “There’s a little bit of angst
in it.”
27 Comments made in orchestra rehearsal also suggest that musical sound is sometimes conceptualized 
as a  substance. “Give me a lot o f sound on that lower p art” “Those hairpin swells 
[crescendo/decrescendo]—don’t  overdo i t  it becomes maudlin. Just make a slight lean into it.” “Give 
me just a little bit more substance.” “Careful that the eighth notes don’t get too heavy in the legato.”
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The source domain of the substance dual is the FLOW and FORCE of musical 
substance as they occur in time to a listener. The specific time event dual that operates 
in this metaphor is the object dual, which conceives of time as a flowing substance or a 
series of objects that flow toward and past the observer. In this musical event structure, 
the listener is located inside the structure, sensing the flow o f musical substance with her 
feeling self (comprised o f “senses of x”).
That feeling self includes at least three aspects of the potysemous verb “to feel”:28
1) the (metaphorically projected) tactile/sensory self, which detects sensuous qualities in 
the musical substance such as temperature, surface texture, solidity, shape, weight, taste, 
purity, and illumination; 2) the (metaphorically projected) kinesthetic/proprioceptive self 
which senses conditions and states of force of the musical substance, such as intensity, 
stability and instability; and 3) the emotional feeling self which senses the mood of the 
music.
In the last section, since it was appropriate to the nature o f the location MESM, I 
organized the exploration by concepts of staged narratives (action, direction). But these 
notions do not suit the substance MESM, since its basic nature is more about interaction 
between the listener and the musical sound. Therefore, after describing the setting in
28 Eve Sweetser (1990) has traced the etymology o f words for “to feel”  in Indo-European languages and 
discovered that in all o f these languages the verb for tactile sensation becomes generalized to indicate 
general sensory perception (35-36). In addition, she says, “the sense o f touch is not only linked with 
general sense perception, but is also closely tied to emotional ‘feeling.’ [...] [TJt is most commonly the 
case that a  given language has at least one basic ‘emotional-feeling’ word which comes from the domain 
o f physical feeling” (37).
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which these interactions take place, I will present the exploration as a series o f 
interactions between the music and the feeling self as outlined above.
Setting
This basic setting, with the listener situated inside the musical event, feeling the 
flow of musical substance around her, emphasizes three constructs that might be called 
“dimensions”: 1) a domain internal to the listener, 2) a domain immediately external to 
the listener, and 3) a version of time that emphasizes an awareness of the eternal now, to 
the exclusion of the distant past or future. For the listener, the action takes place either 
internally or in her immediate environment, with little regard for what has happened in 
the distant past or will happen in the distant future. Rather than an extended and static 
time-space, this musical event occurs in the immediate and dynamic time-space of the 
object dual o f time PASSES. This time-space is more synchro nicaliy oriented, with 
location awareness radiating outward from the listener at deictic center. The setting is 
not experienced as a container schema (or a series o f container-Iocations), but is limited 
only by the “reach” of the listener’s senses within the external musical realm.
In this immediate-dynamic time-space, the listener does not advance forward, but 
is anchored deictic center the musical substance, which flows, along with dynamic time, 
past her. At deictic center with the listener is the beat, now singular and cyclical, rather 
than either multiple and linear or singular and advancing forward. The beat, singular and 
cyclical, marks the ever-present “now.” In rehearsal, rather than producing statements 
about “on” the beat or “off” the beat, this produces seemingly illogical statements about
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tilings happening between a single beat For instance, on 2/21/95, speaking about a 
syncopated passage in Brahms’ Symphony no. 1, fourth movement measure 384, 
Wolfgang Sawallisch said to the Curtis orchestra, “If you [the lower strings] are not with 
me on the beat nobody [the upper strings] can play between the beat.” This apparent 
illogic does not however, appear illogical to the enculturated player, since they 
understand it in relation to the substance MESM, where the beat is cyclical
Flowing around the listener at deictic center (where Sawallisch and the Curtis 
orchestra are “on the beat” together) is the musical substance. The listener can be 
“immersed” in the sound substance; it can “lift” her or “leave her hanging.” Gravity acts 
as an orientational force in this MESM as well and exerts an influence on the substance, 
giving it weight at times. As the substance flows past the listener, she might temporarily 
possesses it, since its flow and action can be packaged as objects in verb 
nominaHzadons—“Here you have a rising, a building o f intensity, a relaxation.”
Interaction I: Tactile/Sensory Self and Musical Su b st a n c e
What is the nature of the musical SUBSTANCE? The feet that in language it is 
“packaged” as nominalizations — a “resolution,” “a quickening o f the pace” — points to 
its basic nature as a mass noun. A mass noun refers to something that is conceptualized 
as a continuous entity, that is not conceptually contained, e.g. beef, cheese, water, or 
land. In talking about these nouns, one must specify a particular portion: a pound of 
beef a  piece o f cheese, a glass o f water, or an acre o f land. The nominalizations used in 
this MESM specify portions of musical substance. Note by contrast that the nouns that
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refer to musical sound in the location MESM are not nominalizations: notes, pitches, 
melodies, lines, chords, intervals, figure, or motives. In addition, these nouns indicate 
that in the location MESM, musical sound is countable (not mass) in nature, contained 
by non-continuous containers. In the substance dual, rather than talking about dynamic 
levels (which index discrete, almost countable, contained levels o f loud and soft) as in 
the location dual, we talk about the volume of sound: ‘Horns, give me more!” (which 
indexes an amount of sound substance).
The status of the musical substance as a moving, mass noun lends logic to the 
sense that it is conceptualized as a liquid, or alternatively gaseous, substance. When 
listening and making sense of music form this point of view, listeners integrate the 
“structure” (or “non-structure”) of liquids with basic musical percepts. Thus music, like 
liquid, becomes a mass noun that moves in a flowing fashion. A number o f common 
metaphorical expressions support the notion that musical substance is liquid: music 
flows, one can be immersed in the sound stream, an instrument playing too loudly 
drowns out others, and in order to ask a friend to turn up the CD player, you can shout 
“Pump up the volume!” The musical substance does not simply flow unabated, but is cut 
into smaller portions by articulation. Those articulations may be legato and flowing or 
staccato and detached, e.g. “Let the sound flow” or “I want you to cut off the ends of 
the notes.”
Besides being present in larger or smaller amounts, the musical substance can 
have various qualities, many of which we refer to by the term timbre. In this musical
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event structure metaphor, rather than functioning to delineate different visually-oriented 
musical lines, timbre concerns the quality o f sound substance, which varies not only from 
instrument to instrument, but also within the possible range of sounds that a single 
instrument might make.
We have no well-defined set of technical terms that refer to timbre; unless we use 
terms like “oboe sound” or “violin sound,” talk about timbre is metaphorical As far as I 
can teU, most o f the metaphors stem from the involvement of what I have called above 
“tactile/sensory self” which detects sensuous qualities in the musical substance, such as 
temperature, surface texture, solidity, weight, purity, illumination, shape, sensuality and 
taste. Musical sound may be warm or cold (such as a percussive “clank” on an anvil), 
smooth or grating, diffuse or solid, light or heavy, pure or rich, bright or dark. It may be 
lush, round, sweet, or plummy.29 Not all o f the timbre metaphors I heard at Curtis 
stemmed from the involvement of the tactile/sensory self. I heard one (non-American) 
conductor at Curtis say to some trumpet players “The quality o f that E flat is too pushy, 
like an American salesman.” This struck me as a rather anomalous statement, one that 
not only communicated information about a sound the conductor did not want, but also 
conveyed his displeasure in hearing it.
This kind of mapping o f terms across sensory modalities is usually attributed to 
the process of synesthesia.30 I would explain this cross-sensory phenomenon with the 
same process that I have used to explain musical meaning: metonymic invocation.
29 In addition to single notes having certain sensual qualities, some intervals also have them. For 
example, octaves and fifths can sound hollow in some contexts.
30 For more on synesthesia, see Baron-Cohen and Harrison, 1997.
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These cross-sensory terms apply to sound because a pattern or quality embodied by the 
sound for the listener invokes the experiential gestalt o f that term. As Mark Johnson has 
argued (1987,44), experiential gestalts are not internally undifferentiated. Rather, they 
have structure. Consider, for instance, the experiential gestalt o f “warmth.” If you recall 
sitting by a warm fire on a cold day, the most striking aspect o f that memory is probably 
feeling of warm temperature on your skin or watching the dancing flames. Just thinking 
about that, it is difficult to see how the word “warm” could apply to a sound. However, 
recalling other aspects o f the experiential gestalt “warmth,” it is not so difficult to see the 
connection. The warmth o f a fire not only makes our skin warm, it also warms the 
muscles under the skin and relaxes them. In that more relaxed state, it is easier to feel 
happiness or contentment. A “warm” sound is one that makes the listener feel relaxed 
and happy, thus indexing the relaxed, contented state she might feel when her body is 
warm. This index of part o f the “warmth” experiential gestalt brings the whole gestalt to 
mind. That gestalt is called “warm” and so we apply the word “warm” to something that 
has no physical temperature. In similar fashion, a “grating” sound rubs nerves the wrong 
way, a “solid” sound can “hit” with a stronger force than a “diffuse” one, and “bright” 
sounds attract attention just as bright lights do.
Metonymic invocation can explain many of the words that we choose to describe 
timbre, but not all. Sometimes these immediate impressions are mediated by other 
conceptual metaphors o f the culture. For instance, we associate warmth with emotional 
involvement and expressiveness: “She is a very warm person.” We may feel that warm
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colors (red, yellow, orange) are more expressive than cool colors (blue, silver). These 
can be summed up by the metaphor warm is expressive. It is also true that we 
consider a warm sound to be more expressive. Thus, calling a musical passage 
“expressive” may be the result o f integrating the metonymic invocation of warmth with 
the cultural metaphor WARM IS EXPRESSIVE.
Sometimes these sound qualities might be combined in a way that stems from 
experiential gestalts derived from embodied experience. As players, we might want to 
produce a heavy, concentrated sound or a light, diffuse sound. It would make less sense 
to try to produce a heavy, diffuse sound or a light, concentrated sound.31 This is because 
o f our embodied experience with substances in the world: assuming a similar amount of 
material, concentrated substances will be heavier and diffuse substances lighter.
Interaction II: Kinesthetic/Proprioceptive Self and Musical Fo r c e
Since the musical substance is moving, it would logically exert a FORCE on the 
listener, who is, in this MESM, at its center. Many Curtis students commented about 
sensing force in music: “There’s a turmoil going on; turbulence. [...] It’s very, very 
unsettling and full o f argument and the struggling.”32 “There’s just like something about 
it that I can’t explain right now, that just like has a big whoosh on you like you know
31 Actually, musicians do conceive o f a  light, concentrated sound. Especially in situations where a quiet 
sound must project (e.g. a pianissimo solo passage in an orchestra piece), the sound must be very soft, 
but have an intensity that makes it project However, I remember this skill being very hard to learn on 
the flute, partly because it just seemed counterintuitive to attempt to make a soft, but intense sound.
32 Amy Cheng, o f Lizst’s Piano Sonata in B Minor
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you’re like‘Wow!’”33 “There’s a sense of surging lushness.”34 These comments 
indicate that this flow o f musical substance can exert FORCE on the engaged listener.
Again, this experience of musical force is best discussed with reference to 
metonymic invocation o f experiential gestalts. In concrete physical reality, musical 
sound has very little real physical force. It exerts force on our eardrums and, if played at 
a loud enough volume, can cause other bodily tissues to vibrate. However, in listening 
to music, we sometimes fee l a sense offorce that is not physical in the same way that 
vibrations hitting the eardrum are physical, but that in some fashion embodies the 
patterns of the gestalt experience o f physical force. As with the experience of timbre, we 
feel musical force because it is metonymically invoked.
Musical force is very complex and understanding some aspects of it, logically, 
requires more than an understanding of only the location dual or the substance dual of 
the MESM. Here I will confine myself to those aspects appropriate to the substance 
MESM: intensity and stability/instability o f the musical substance. I will cover other 
aspects o f force in the next chapter.
Intensity
It is not uncommon in rehearsals for the conductor to index the INTENSITY of the 
musical sound. Considering the physical quality of musical sounds and how they interact 
with human bodies, it is evident that pitches can be intense because they are toward the 
upper or louder limits o f our hearing ability. However, musical intensity can occur at
33 Min Park, o f Ravel’s Daphnis and Chloe, Suite 2
34 Deanna Kemler, o f Ravel’s Daphnis and Chloe, Suite 2, in conversation with Min Park
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any range or volume level, and can strike us as emotional, sensual, kinesthetic or even 
spiritual in nature. Since it can involve so many aspects o f human experience, musical 
intensity is a very complex phenomenon, which I cannot explore fully here. I would, 
however, like to think about degrees o f power or intensity as they relate to musical 
sound substance in this MESM.
As I established above, we can integrate aspects o f our “liquid” experiential 
gestalt with simple musical percepts toward a bearing on experiencing music as a flowing 
substance, with many o f the characteristics of flowing substances. One of those 
characteristics is that intensity can vary. Three main factors go into making the physical 
force o f a liquid more powerful or intense: 1) volume, 2) speed o f flow, as it varies with 
volume and 3) size o f aperture, as it varies with volume and speed of flow. The greater 
the volume and speed of the liquid, both of which can be changed by manipulating 
aperture, the greater the intensity of the flow. The same principles hold true for varying 
the intensity o f the musical sound substance.
Think about playing outside with a hose when you were a child. If you wanted 
to make the stream more powerful or intense, you could do a number of things. You 
could turn the water on harder, which increased the speed and so the volume. 
Alternatively, you could put your thumb on the end of the hose or use a nozzle. Doing 
so decreases the volume o f the stream but, given the feet that the volume and speed 
inside the hose stays the same, it increases the speed of the water outside the hose. If 
you varied the position o f your thumb on the end of the hose or changed the nozzle, you
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could also produce a diffuse spray, which had less intensity but covered more area. 
Another way to alter the intensity o f a stream of water can be seen if we think about a 
showerhead with various settings. If  you do not turn the water on any harder, but put 
the showerhead on the “pulse” setting, you will experience the stream as more powerful 
or intense. These same principles hold true for intensification of musical sound. The 
following will increase its intensity: I) more volume, 2) a fester flow, 3) a more 
concentrated flow, and 4) pulsation o f sound.
For example, consider a musical phrase in which a single pitch is held, but should 
grow in intensity, for instance, the first entrance o f the flute in Mozart’s Flute Concerto 
in D Major
The flute begins on the D below, on a weak beat, and floats up to the higher D, where it 
sits for four full bars. Underneath the flute, the orchestra repeats the same theme that 
opened the concerto. On the score, it is marked piano. The usual way to play this high 
D is to begin softly and unobtrusively and gradually increase the intensity of the sound, 
until it almost feels like the intensity can no longer be contained by that note and so it 
must “spill over” into the next set o f notes.
A number o f methods or a combination o f methods could be employed to create 
that intensity. You can start with a more diffuse sound with less volume and gradually
Example 4.7
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add volume and concentration of sound (like “focusing” a water nozzle at the same time 
you turn it on harder at the spigot).35 You can also begin with a narrower, slower 
vibrato and gradually increase the speed and breadth o f the vibrato (like a variable speed 
“pulse” setting on a shower head, with a concomitant increase in speed/volume). If you 
wanted to take liberties not usually taken with this note, you could add a trill that started 
slowly and increased in speed (again, the “pulse” phenomenon). If you went further 
beyond the boundaries of the Mozart style, another way to instantiate the “pulse” 
phenomenon would be to add a tongued rhythm that increased m speed but suggested no 
particular meter. To add even greater force to the tongued rhythm, you could begin with 
a softer tongue and gradually increase the force of your attack (like gradually increasing 
the amount of water while the pulse setting is on). To go even further beyond the 
boundaries of the usual Mozart style (and way beyond the bounds of the Mozart 
aesthetic), you could do any one of the above, plus sneak in another flute player every 
beat, so that the volume is really pumped up by the end o f the note. The aesthetic effect 
o f these varying strategies aside, they could all be employed to increase the intensity of 
the musical sound substance.
Just as the action of a thumb, a nozzle or a showerhead can greatly affect the 
force o f the flow o f water, so can articulation. We can hear a direct effect on the musical 
force from the manner that the player articulates. In general, the more forceful the sound 
desired, the more forceful the articulation necessary. In rehearsals, this effect is
33 On the flute, varying sound concentration is accomplished by varying timbre.
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conceptualized as a metaphor MANNER OF SOUND pr o d u c t io n  is  m a n n e r  o f  
s o u n d in g . This produces such statements as, “That pizzicato is not just chimp, clump, 
chimp. Make sure it has vibrato” (which the conductor said to the basses at the same 
time he m im ick ed  walking heavily with his hands) and “Don’t just percuss! Kiss!” 
(which the conductor said to the cymbals to elicit a lighter sound).36
We integrate aspects of our ‘liquid” experiential gestalt with simpler musical 
percepts toward a bearing on the sense that the musical sound has intensities of varying 
levels.
Stability/Instability
If the moving musical substance has force, separate forceful streams might 
combine to create a situation of STABILITY (balanced forces) or INSTABILITY (unbalanced 
forces). In itself, in physical reality, musical sound is not inherently stable or unstable.37 
We conceive of musical sound as stable or unstable because the experiential gestalt of 
stability/instability can be invoked metonymically from simpler musical percepts.
Experiences of stability/instability always occur with reference to the 
foundational force in our experience: gravity. Stability is linked to either balance with 
respect to gravity or a balance of forces with respect to gravity. If I stand with my body
36 The “pizzicato” statement was made by David Hayes to Curtis Orchestra, 2/18/95, o f Brahms’ first 
symphony, first movement, m. 158. The “percuss” statement was made by Otto Werner Mueller, 
2/23/95, o f the overture to Wagner’s Gotterdammerung, rehearsal number 41.
37 This is not, o f course, taking into account the instabilities o f sound production. For instance, on my 
flute, alone amongst all o f the notes o f its register, the middle E does not sound with great certainty. It 
often “cracks” to  a higher overtone if I “push it” too hard (play too loud) or if  I attack with too much 
force.
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perpendicular to the plane o f the earth's surface, my body is balanced and stable. If I 
lean against another person while they lean against me, we can arrange our bodies in 
such a position that, though each of our bodies would fell if it were in that position 
alone, together the gravitational forces our bodies exert on each other balance out into a 
stable system.
Instability relates to either lack o f balance with respect to gravity or lack o f a 
balance of forces with respect to gravity. If I am standing outside on a windy day and a 
huge gust of wind hits me, I may struggle with it, temporarily unstable because the forces 
on my body (gravity from below and wind from the side) are unbalanced. In addition to 
these obvious physical manifestations of instability, other physical characteristics can 
occur in experiences of instability. First and foremost, instability causes a momentary 
physical disorientation with respect to gravity, that most orienting of forces. In addition, 
it might cause muscular tension, a rise in heart rate and blood pressure, or a feeling of 
anxiety or elation (e.g. on a carnival ride).
The tonal musical world, as experienced in both MESMs we have discussed, also 
has a fundamental orienting force — the tonic, which is often metaphorized as a center 
o f gravity.38 Other tones, when played in relation to the tonic, are felt to be stable (e.g. 
the tonic to the dominant) or unstable (e.g., the tonic to the leading tone). In addition, 
intervals that do not involve the tonic note, when played in the tonal system, can feel 
relatively stable (e.g. the fifth from the dominant to the supertonic) or unstable (e.g., the
38 See Glickman (1983).
364
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
tritone from the leading tone to the subdominant). Musical passages in which a tonic is 
clearly identifiable are felt to be stable, whereas those without a clearly identifiable tonic 
(usually passages in the process of modulating to a different stable key area) are 
unstable.39
I have played a game with students in introductory music classes, both history of 
western art musk: and world musk:, that illustrates to them that, despite a wide range of 
experience with musical training, most of them can readily feel this stability and 
instability. I begin by playing a piece of tonal music for them that includes both stable 
and unstable passages. I stop the recording at random spots and ask whether it feels 
stable or unstable to them. A great many of them are usually able to respond correctly.
I then explain the notion of the tonic as the center of gravity and play some scales and I- 
IV-V-I progressions in various keys on the piano, sometimes stopping on the V and 
asking them where it should go next. After this preparation, I play a number of 
recordings o f stable, non-modulating passages for them and stop the recording at 
random and ask them to sing the tonic, to give them experience in orienting themselves 
to the tonal gravity. Once they understand tonal gravity and have practiced orienting 
themselves, I play the original recording again and ask about stable and unstable spots. 
After the minimal preparation that I give them, most students are able to respond 
correctly.
39 Note that the change from one key to another would logically be called a  modulation in the substance 
dual, rather than a bridge or a  transition, as in the location dual.
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I am not suggesting that this ability to identify musical stability/instability is due 
to some inherent property o f all human brains to do precisely that, nor to the minimal 
training that I give them. Rather, I suggest that it is due to two main factors: 1) the 
early encuituration about musical sounds and meanings these students have received 
through various channels: singing, television, movies, radio, recordings, live 
performances, etc. and 2) their embodied experiences with stability/instability and the 
basic human ability to understand one realm o f experience in terms of another. Once 
they understand that musical stability is a matter o f orientation with regard to musical 
gravity, just as physical stability is a matter of orientation with regard to physical gravity, 
and are able to orient themselves with regard to the gravity of tonal music, most students 
are able to detect musical stability or instability.40
Musical stability is not onfy a matter o f harmonic stability with regard to the 
tonic. It is also a matter o f metric flow, which is more a matter of basic balance than a 
matter o f a balance of differing forces. In our embodied experiences in the world, we 
have all felt wind blowing. If it gets to a certain speed, we must lean into it to keep our 
balance. If it were to come in short, violent gusts at unpredictable intervals o f time, it 
might succeed in knocking us over because we could not adjust the lean of our bodies 
quickly enough to compensate for the force o f the wind. In an analogous fashion, a
40 The fact that being solidly in a key is felt to be stable leads me to the notion that harmonic 
progressions within a key somehow embody a  system o f balanced forces or a process o f balancing forces, 
whereas modulation entails imbalanced forces that deflect the harmonic substance onto another path. 
The question o f how harmonic progressions within a  key embody a balancing o f forces is beyond the 
scope o f this investigation, but it is a very interesting question.
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regular metric flow gives us a stable pattern o f pulses o f the sound stream to adjust to, 
and so an irregular pattern feels unstable.
Interaction III: Emotional Senses and Patterns and Qualities of Mood
Although the musical substance is conceptualized as a liquid, the musical “liquid” 
is not like any ordinary liquid. We have seen that, imaginatively, it is quite protean in 
nature, able to take on many different sensory qualities, such as light, weight, and surface 
textures. In addition, it can take on qualities that, when sensed from embodied 
perception, can integrate with emotionally oriented experiential gestalts toward a bearing 
on recognizing and feeling emotions and moods. These qualities include, but are not 
limited to: tension/relaxation, restraint/abandon, energy/lethargy, ease/uneasiness, 
activity/inactivity, excitation/calm, and expansion/contraction. As with INTENSITY and 
stability/ instability, qualities o f musical flow that relate to mood or emotion are not 
inherent in the sounds o f music themselves. Sounds, alone or in combination, sustained 
or articulated, cannot be tense, restrained, energetic, uneasy, excited or expansive. They 
can, however, metonymically invoke the experiential gestalts of these qualities in a 
listener. The listener may integrate aspects of these experiential gestalts with the musical 
percepts toward a bearing on recognizing or feeling the qualities that may in turn invoke 
experiential gestalts o f moods or emotions.
Consider, for example, the experiential gestalt o f “activity” and how musical 
sound might metonymically invoke it. In our daily lives, since even before we were born, 
we have experienced activity. In its most concrete sense, “activity” refers to physical
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motion, which entails movement through space. We think about this on a relative scale 
and call relatively greater amounts o f motion “active” and relatively smaller amounts of 
motion “inactive.” We measure amounts o f motion (and therefore action) with respect 
to amplitude and speed — the greater the amplitude and speed, the greater the amount 
o f motion; the lesser the amplitude and speed, the lesser the amount of motion. As 
discussed above, in this MESM, the musical substance can move up and down with 
regard to gravity and at greater or lesser speeds. Those “movements” may 
metonymically invoke the “activity” experiential gestalt. A listener might then call 
musical motion that embodies greater amplitude and speed “active” and that which 
embodies lesser amplitude and speed “inactive.”
Another quality that might be sensed in the musical substance is energy, which 
relates closely to activity. In recalling the experience o f feeling energetic, the most 
salient characteristic for me is a sense of potential force in my body. Recall that the basic 
definition of force posed above is “any cause that changes the motion or the shape of an 
object.” Potential force would then be a sensation felt in the body that can be channeled 
toward activity. That activity would either begin motion or change the motion or shape 
o f the body (and possibly other objects interacting with it). Thus, the experiential gestalt 
o f “energy” would include 1) potential force directed toward 2) activity. The amount of 
that potential force and the ensuing activity can vary — from very little, which we 
usually term something like “lethargic,” to more than usual, which we usually call 
“energetic.”
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How can musical sound embody the patterns o f the experiential gestalt o f 
“energy” outlined above? I have already established that musical sound can index 
gestalt patterns o f a listener’s embodied experience with force and activity. Since the 
gestalt pattern o f “energy” is a matter o f potential force being directed toward activity, 
when both come into play, the sound indexes the patterns of our remembered 
experiences with the quality o f energy and we “sense” that the music “has” energy.
Not all experiences with the patterns o f energy are equal, however. In addition 
to the possibility that the amount o f energy varies, the quality of the directed energy — 
the focus — can vary, from very focused to diffuse. For example, “excitement” can be 
considered a kind of “energy” or energetic state. The main difference between “energy” 
and “excitement” is that “excited” entails a lesser amount of focus than “energetic.” An 
excited person will make movements that are not as focused as a purely energetic one; 
they may also have a harder time focusing mentally. On the other hand, lethargy and 
calm, which are opposite on a continuum from energy and excitement respectively, have 
an inverse relationship with regard to focus. Lethargy is less focused and calm more so. 
In the musical event, the patterns o f energy, excitement, lethargy and calm would follow 
the patterns of those experiences in embodied experience.
I have also suggested that in this MESM the listener can sense that the musical 
substance is “expanding” or “contracting.” One of the most basic embodied experiences 
of e x pa n sio n  is found in breathing patterns: the chest expands and relaxes, usually 
outside our conscious awareness. If we cough, our chest muscles contract with great
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force. The experiential gestalt o f e x pa n sio n  and c o n t r a c t io n  both involve a 
contained substance or field. In e x pa n sio n  that state o f containment is made larger, in 
c o n t r a c t io n  smaller.
Although the image schema o f CONTAINMENT has not yet been explicitly 
introduced into the substance MESM, it is evident in a number of its elements. Simply 
referring to the musical substance requires a process o f containment. Since musical 
substance is a mass noun, it must be referred to by words that contain it. This is 
accomplished through the process of nominalization, which temporarily contains the 
processual verb. In addition, in discussing musical intensity, we saw how pulsing, the 
rhythmic containment and release o f sound substance, increases intensity. Furthermore, 
the top and bottom of the sound substance can be considered a container just as the top 
and bottom of water in a lake is a container that contains fish, e x pa n sio n  of the 
containment field of musical substance can occur in a number of ways: 1) outward in 
amplitude (two streams, one moving upward, one moving downward), 2) forward in 
space (a single stream projecting outward from the general sound mass), or 3) through 
the passage of tune (a rhythm that gradually expands). CONTRACTION involves the 
opposite processes.
The senses o f restraint and abandonment in musical substance also depend on a 
feeling of containment or lack thereof. However, in this case the containment is not of 
the mass o f the substance, but o f the force of its forward movement. Restraint is a 
matter o f energy whose forward motion or force is contained. This containment can
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occur in varying degrees. In this MESM, meter and tempo function to contain (in a 
sense, discipline) the forward flow o f musical substance. Restraint can be sensed when 
the forward flow has been moving at a particular rate of speed and then is held back. It 
can also be felt when substance that logically should be moving foster, such as downward 
flowing substance, moves at a slower rate of speed.
Not all of the modal qualities are a simple mapping of physical qualities o f speed, 
force and direction of the musical substance. Rather, some metonymically index gestalt 
structures of bodily experience — for example tension and relaxation, which are often 
linked with h arm onic instability and stability or dissonance and consonance. We saw 
above that physical tension is a part o f the gestalt structure of experience with physical 
instability. When we experience musical instability, rather than calling it “unstable,” we 
may say it has some tension. Through the word “tension” we metonymically index the 
whole experiential gestalt structure for “instability.” A reference to tension, however, 
may just be a reference to one’s reaction to the quality of the sound substance. Some 
sounds do simply make us tense, such as screeching chalk, birds, and babies. Dissonant 
intervals would seem to both refer metonymically to the “instability” gestalt structure 
and have the direct action of making us tense.
To conclude, I would like to describe a concrete example of how these “modal 
qualities” might play a part in giving the music a sense of a particular emotion. I will 
illustrate with an example suggested by my conversation with Sara — the sense o f 
urgency that we both felt at the beginning of the Brahms’ Violin Sonata in D Minor.
371
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Violin Sonata in D Minor
Brahms
Violin
Piano sotto voce
9
Example 4.8
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The noun “urgency” is a nominalizatkm o f the process expressed by the verb “to urge,” 
which, in its most concrete form, means, “to force or impel in an indicated direction or 
into motion or greater speed.” So, “urgency” would have a gestalt pattern that included
1) at least two “players” or objects, one of which 2) forced the other to 3) move in some 
direction or at greater speed. Sara and I agreed with one another that the piano part was 
what created the sense of urgency. Looking at that part now, we can see that it has 
certain qualities that correspond to the gestalt pattern o f “urgency” described above. It 
is made of 1) two “players” (the left and right hand notes), one of which (the right hand)
2) forces the other (the left hand) to 3) move in some direction or at greater speed. Until 
measure 11, the right hand notes are almost always exactly an octave higher than the left 
hand notes, and they enter the sound stream a half a beat behind the left hand notes.
Since we perceive notes an octave apart as being essentially “the same” as one another, 
this configuration gives the sense that the right hand is directly “behind” the left hand, 
urging it forward. An even greater sense of pressing forward is created by the 
downward motion o f the figure, which adds the force o f musical gravity to the sense of 
urgency.
At the same time, the tempo, steady at about mm. 80-84 until the 3 against 2 
figures in measures 11-12, acts as a field of containment for the press of forward moving 
musical sound, giving the sound a sense o f being “bottled up.” During the 3 against 2 
figures in mm. 11-12 and 16-21, the tempo slows down noticeably to mm. 72, further 
containing the press of forward motion.
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Contrast the above characterization of the exposition with the piano part in the 
recapitulation, which begins at rehearsal letter D (Example 4.9, next two pages). The 
notes involved are essentially the same, but with extra notes added in between the 
original notes, so that each hand is playing a steady stream o f (non-syncopated) eighth 
notes with the right hand in large part imitating the left in tandem an octave higher. 
While we felt that it retained some o f its urgency, Sara and I characterized this as less 
urgent than at the beginning. Sara agreed with my characterization that the beginning 
seemed more “bottled up” while this part evoked more the feeling of a person up and 
moving, perhaps feeling restless. She called this part more “flowing.”
The image schema of FLOW stems from embodied experience with water.41 
The gestalt pattern includes an 1) uninterrupted continuity that is 2) smooth. Since in 
the recapitulation version of the piano part, the two hands are moving together at a 
steady eighth note pace, and since it is played in a smooth (legato) fashion, this part 
embodies the gestalt pattern of “flow” more than the piano part at the beginning. If the 
part were played staccato, it would not embody the patterns of “flow” as well A 
staccato playing would emphasize, rather, the large intervals involved, and would seem 
more energetic and active than flowing.
In contrast with the tempo in the first statement of this theme, the tempo in the 
recapitulation is slightly slower (mm. 72), but is steady throughout. This does not lend
41 The etymology given for “flow” in Webster’s is “ME flowen, fr. OE flowan; akin to OHG flouwen to 
rinse, wash, L pluere to rain, Gk plein to sail, float”
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Violin Sonata in D Minor
(recapitulation)
Brahms
Violin
Piano <
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to a sense o f restraint or containment, but supports the feeling of uninterrupted, smooth 
continuity.
As for the sense o f urgency that the recapitulation retained for us, we agreed that 
it was more a sense of “restlessness” than “urgency.” “Restlessness” involves continual 
movement, with no rest, which this piano part certainty embodies. Does this mean that 
every piano part that evokes continual movement with no rest is apt to be called 
“restless”? The answer is obviously “no.” Listeners experience the patterns of the music 
in the context o f what they know about the genre, as well as what has happened earlier in 
the piece. In this instance, we experienced the “continual movement” in the context of 
our memory o f the sense o f urgency and nostalgia we felt at the beginning of the piece.
In that context, continual, smooth motion is more likely to be sensed as “restlessness” 
than as some other quality that involves “flow.”
Summary
More kinestheticalty oriented than the observation oriented location MESM, the 
substance MESM is founded on metaphors that index the interaction o f the listener with 
the MUSICAL substance. The structure o f musical substance, including basic structure 
and the structure o f force interactions, is projected from embodied knowledge of liquids, 
as can be seen by such metaphors as musical immersion, pumped up volume, and sounds 
that drown out other sounds.
The listener, who is deictic center, attends to the flow o f substance with differing, 
but unified aspects of her feeling self: the tactile/sensory, kinesthetic/proprioceptive, and
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emotional selves. Through these aspects o f herself, she detects variations in the quality 
of the protean substance: sensory variations like timbre, variations in force and stability, 
and variations in modal qualities.
S u m m a r y  Co m p a r iso n s  o f  th e  T w o  M ESM s
To clarify the contrast between the two fundamental MESMs, I will present two 
different tables. The first summarizes the two sections above in a manner that allows the 
reader to compare them. The second contrasts them in terms of generic level, abstract 
notions that are involved in the conceptualization o f events.
Location MESM
observation oriented
time ordered by location dual: 
diachronic
listener oriented outside event
“stage-like,” contained, setting created by 
unfolding of extended space/time limited 
by virtual “visual field.”
listener attends to  figure w hich m oves 
in con trast to  ground
gravity  exists, p itches m ove up  and dow n, 
“regions”  o f  m usical space can  be iconic 
w ith regions o f  physical space, negative 
“terrain” exists
p itches m ove STEPwise o r in leaps, 
creating lines
Substance MESM
“feeling” oriented
time ordered by object dual: 
synchronic
listener oriented inside event, deictic 
center
setting not contained, bounded only by 
reach of listener’s senses. Oriented 
toward I) an internal domain, 2) an 
external domain and 3) immediate 
space/time.
listener attends to varying qualities o f the 
musical substance
gravity exists, musical substance flows up 
and down
substance is m ass noun, FLOWS like liquid
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pitch movement creates forward motion 
through various locations defined by 
both harmonic & rhythmic elements
single beat, deictic center moving forward 
or multiple, linear beats
meter measures extent of time-space
melody moves through space, on path 
constrained by harmonic progressions
harmonic progressions create different 
locations, remote or close. Bridges 
and transitions link different locations
multiple lines create textures 
tension
timbre helps to differentiate different 
lines
loudness conceived in terms of dynamic 
levels
event spoken o f in narrative fashion: 
dynamic verbs
substance flow  creates musicalforce, 
which increases & decreases in intensity 
in the same m anner  that liquids can
single, cyclical, stationary beat
meter measures flow of musical substance
harmonies creates stability/instability with 
respect to tonal gravity
harmonic flow modulates from balanced 
forces to unbalanced forces to balanced
relationships between sounds create 
timbre part of system of musical force 
loudness conceived in terms of volume
event spoken of with stative language that 
places the listener inside the event: 
stative verbs, comparative phrases, 
existential “there”s, reports of “a sense 
of” or “it feels like,” reported speech 
giving experiencer’s reaction to events, 
verb nominahVations
Table 4 J
Note that it is in the metaphors that provide basic orientation that these two 
systems are most clearly inconsistent with one another:
1) Conception o f time-space—extended/static vs. immediate/dynamic.
2) Position o f listener with respect to musical event—outside observation vs.
inside “feeling.”
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3) Difference in setting—contained, “stage-like” vs. uncontained, limited by
reach o f senses.
4) Basic kind of action—figure moving through locations vs. substance flowing
past listener.
Note also that the two systems are internally consistent.
For the second summary table, I return to Lakoffs general notion o f the 
metaphoric structuring o f events. If you recall, he argues that human beings structure 
certain generic, abstract notions involved in conceptualizing events metaphorically. 
Those abstract notions are states, changes, processes, actions, causes, purposes, means 
and difficulties. He then suggests that in English we have two specific ways o f doing 
this: one that emphasizes locations and one that emphasizes objects and their qualities. 
The following table shows how the two MESMs instantiate those generic qualities 
differently.
Location MESM Substance MESM
states are locations observed by listener states are attributes possessed by musical
substance and sensed by listener
changes are movements to or from 
locations observed by listener 
sensed by listener
process is progression from location to 
location as observed by listener 
sensed by listener
changes are differences in quality, 
condition or state o f sound substance as
process is modulation of quality, 
condition or state of musical substance as
actions are self propelled motions on the actions are self propelled productions of
part o f a musical gestalt figure or the sound on the part o f the musical
composer, observed by listener substance or player, sensed by listener
causes are forces controlling movement 
to or from locations
causes are forces controlling the flow, 
quality, condition, or state of musical 
substance
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purposes (goals) are destinations purposes (goals) are qualities, states or
conditions desired by listener
means are paths to destinations means are relationships between dynamic
musical qualities that produce conditions
or states
difficulties are impediments to movement difficulties are impediments to changes in 
o f musical figure quality of sound substance
Table 4.4
The narratives below illustrate the differences in language produced by these two 
different MESMs. I have narrated the first 24 bars of Brahms’ Violin Sonata in D Minor 
(Example 4.8, p. 372) using first the location dual and then the substance dual As you 
read or alter you read each narrative, you may want to relate its specific language to 
both of the summary charts.
The passage begins quietly, but urgently, with the violin on a somewhat sustained A, 
while the piano moves downward in quarter notes, with one hand imitating the other at 
the octave. From there, the violin leaps up to a D and floats down to an A, where it 
lingers for a couple of measures, while the piano continues its urgent, imitative figure. 
After that, it does pretty much the same thing for the next four bars, only starting on an 
F and moving down to a C#. The main difference is that the piano has a denser texture 
for the first two bars, since extra octaves come in and imitate at the third instead of the 
octave. Once it gets to the C#, the violin labors to move upward, leaping up to a B flat, 
only to fa ll back down again. Then in m. 11, on the D, it begins to press forward again. 
The piano line changes there, too, in that place where it presses forward. It’s got block 
chords, with the right hand in 3, against 2 m the left hand. In measure 13, while the 
piano goes back to the urgent, imitative figure, the violin begins on tbs CM again and 
begins to move toward the climax of the phrase. From the C#, it leaps back up to the B 
fist, fa lls down to an F and then with one big leap, reaches the highest note, an E, which 
then fa lls down to the climax notey a B natural From there, it winds gradually 
downward until in m. 24, it finally reaches a resting point, the A an octave below the 
first A.
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Here, at the opening, there's a sense o f urgency in the piano, with the octaves imitating 
one another—“duh, duh, duh, duh...” And the violin, it’s Hke crying, the way it 
intensifies when it changes to the D. Next, you have a part that is like the beginning 
again, only it starts on a lower note and the piano sound is heavier, since it adds extra 
octaves that imitate at the third instead of the octave. It helps to pull the violin sound 
down to the C# in m. 9. From there, the sound begins to intensify again. The piano part 
continues to move in octaves, but the sound is energized because the intervals coming 
up are larger than the ones at the beginning. The violin part builds and swells gradually 
upward, intensifying especially in mm. 11-12. The piano part in mm. 11-12 changes to a 
really unstable pattern, 3 against 2. It helps to keep the violin sound going, which just a 
few bars earlier (ram. 10-11), seemed like it was running out o f steam. The instability 
o f the 3 against 2 helps to propel the sound forward to begin to intensify again. The 
violin part intensifies again until finally, it mm. 14 and 15, it climaxes on a B natural 
From there, the sound winds down until you finally get the A in m. 24 which, to me, has 
a feeling o f being resigned.
Note that these two narratives describe the same musical event, but in a different 
manner, with a corresponding difference in feeling and impact.
Co n c lu sio n
Using linguistic evidence, including both what is said and how it is said, I have 
argued the existence of two distinct complex metaphors that may be integrated with 
simpler musical percepts toward a bearing on recognizing or feeling a sense of 
eventfulness in music. The location MESM, which emphasizes discontinuity of sound, 
involves the movement o f a musical figure through musical space as observed from afar 
by a listener who watches with imaginative vision. The substance MESM, which 
emphasizes continuity o f sound, situates the listener in the center of a musical flow, 
feeling its varying qualities and patterns.
At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced these metaphors as belonging to the 
second of the three levels o f musical experience described in chapter three. I would now
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like to qualify that statement. As I said in chapter three, I do not consider these three 
levels to be distinct levels, but rather a continuum of experience. On that continuum of 
experience, I would place the substance MESM closer to the third level than the location 
MESM. Judging from my experience, it seems to me to be the entry point to the third 
level. If I am experiencing the music in such a fashion that it seems distant, it will strike 
me as ‘just notes.” If I make an effort to let the music “wash over” me, so that I feel it 
in a more immediate fashion, it might still feel like “just notes” — I will recognize the 
feeling qualities of the music without living them. Alternatively, the music might “get to 
me” and will feel like music. In getting to me, the music bypasses whatever resistance I 
have to merging with it and, in a level three experience, I will begin to live the music.
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to comment on the nature of musical 
event structure metaphors with regard to their level o f generality or specificity. In More 
than Cool Reason, Lakoff and Turner distinguish between generic and specific level 
metaphors. Metaphors such as life is a journey are specific because they map 
structure from a fixed source domain to a fixed target domain. They also are very 
specific in that they have a fixed list of correspondences from one domain to another.
For example, the person is the traveler whose goals are destinations and for whom 
important life events are landmarks. Generic level metaphors, on the other hand, do not 
consist of either fixed source or target domains or fixed lists of correspondences.
Instead, they consist o f “higher order constraints on what is an appropriate mapping and 
what is not” (80). Lakoff further clarifies the nature of generic level metaphors,
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suggesting that both causal structure and aspectual structure are preserved in the 
mapping (1994,72). An example of a generic level metaphor is EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, 
which structures situations where an agentless event is conceived of as an action by an 
agent, e.g., “My computer ate my paper!” or “The vengeful wind knocked over the 
weary traveler.”
In building the argument o f this chapter, I have consistently referred to embodied 
experiences in the real world as sources for the musical event structure metaphors, which 
might suggest that these embodied experiences are generic and these musical metaphors 
are specific. While it is true that the structure of the MESMs are borrowed from 
embodied experience, through integration with simple musical percepts, they in turn act 
as structuring metaphors for the musical experience of listeners. In that way, they are 
generic in their operation. While when we discuss music in technical terms, we use these 
metaphors on a specific level, (saying that notes go up and down, figures move from 
place to place, we need a brighter sound, or a passage is unstable), I believe that in our 
experience of music, these metaphors can indeed be generic. They provide structure that 
constrains what we may map onto the experience, but do not specify the actual content. 
They provide causal structure and aspectual structure. In this way, individual response 
to music is individual, but is constrained by the individual's integration of these 
encuhurated patterns.
We have seen one example of this already in an earlier section: “Musical Event 
Structure Metaphor — Location Dual” when Anna Polonsky compared part of
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Beethoven’s Piano Conceit no. 4 (Example 4.6, p. 347), to both the ocean and the 
separation between heaven and earth. These images arise from music in which a melody 
o f bell-like clarity floats high above very low and murky undulating arpeggiated bass line. 
That sound waves can embody these images for Anna and other enculturated listeners 
results from the integration of the basic causal and aspectual structure of the location 
MESM. Aspectually, the musical situation is constructed such that it locates Anna 
outside the musical event, viewing it from afar. Causally, the music is constructed such 
that discrete pitches occupy and move forward with different qualities of motion 
(distinct, as in “bell-like” or murky) through distinct regions of musical space (very high 
and very low). Both pictures suggested by Anna fit the structure suggested by the 
music, since the top of the ocean and angels are very high and shimmering in clarity and 
the bottom of the ocean and the earth are, in contrast, more murky. Had she said to me 
that the top part was somehow similar to Scottish pipers off on a misty hill and the 
bottom was like the families o f the pipers at home by the fire, it would not have made 
sense to me. Although the aspect of height o f this image is somewhat similar to that of 
the music since the pipers are up on a hill, the rest o f the image does not match well. At 
that point, I might have considered the idea that Anna’s way of understanding this music 
was quite different from mine. I certainly would have asked her to clarify.
As generic level metaphors, these MESMs can metonymically invoke novel 
metaphors. The listener integrates partial structure provided by the MESM with other 
experiential gestalts toward a bearing on novel metaphors. The location MESM
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supports novel visual metaphors, e.g. the begimung of Daphnis and Chloe, which could 
be the visual effect o f a brook or a swirling mist. The substance MESM supports novel 
“feeling” metaphors, as when I once described a singer’s voice as “like ketchup”
(because it felt both rich, edgy [like the sour aspect of ketchup flavor], and sweet at the 
same time) or Sara’s “sense o f urgency” in the piano line at the beginning of Brahms’ 
Violin Sonata in D Minor*2
In concluding this chapter, I would like to again point to a limitation of my 
argument. I am not claiming that the members of this linguistic community speak 
exclusively using one or the other of these MESMs to structure their speech. In fact, 
they usually do not. Instead, sentences easily can and do contain traces o f both 
structures, such as this sentence I uttered while talking with Chen Zhao about Schubert’s 
string quartet, Death and the Maiden: “And this chord, these first few bars still have this 
sort of very sad and anguished feeling to them and then it slowly makes it way over to 
the major.” I started out in the substance dual and switched mid-sentence to the 
location dual Even more common than sentences that combine both MESMs are 
paragraphs that combine both.
If we do not speak exclusively in one or the other, what is the point of pulling 
them apart in an analysis? Primarily to begin to understand the part that embodied
42 In regards to gendering of metaphors, I have no indication that the generic level metaphors are 
gendered in any way. However, novel linguistic metaphors grounded in the generic metaphors will be 
gendered in a fashion consistent with the ways that metaphors will be gendered in other realms o f  our 
culture, e.g., “graceful” = feminine while “bounding” = masculine. Anna, the only student who spoke of 
gender, called the “angelic melody”  expressive, but added that it was not expressive in a feminine way, 
but in the spiritually masculine way appropr iate to her understanding of Beethoven’s character.
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Ttnagmmg plays in musical experience. In the next chapter I wQl argue that descriptions 
of the most vivid experiences o f music combine both o f these metaphors into a single 
blend. In order to understand those blends, it is necessary to analyze musical event 
structure into as many logically consistent systems as are evident. If we were not aware 
of those individual systems, it would be difficult to sort through any logical 
inconsistencies encountered in analyzing the blends.
In the next chapter, I will explore the relationship o f these two seemingly distinct 
systems. In addition, I will examine various metaphors that can only be understood with 
reference to both o f these MESMs and therefore play a role in integrating them into a 
single, experientially rich system.
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VM etaphoric  Blends
In tr o d u c tio n
In the last chapter, I explored two music event structure metaphors (MESMs) 
that differed in the kinds o f embodied experience the listener integrated toward a bearing 
on experiencing a sense of eventfulness in the music. They also differed in the way that 
the listener was situated with respect to the action and in the ways that he imagined 
states, processes, actions, causes, purposes, means and difficulties. In this chapter I turn 
to the relationship between these two structures and how they form a foundation for 
other, more complex metaphors that better express the rich possibilities o f musical 
experience.
The two MESMs explored in the last chapter each stem from a folly functioning 
mode of experiencing music. However, the metaphors I will explore in this chapter 
suggest modes of experience that are richer and more complex than either the metaphors 
of “sitting back and viewing musical motion through space” or “being in the flow of 
musical substance feeling varying qualities” would suggest. On the third level, 
experience of musical events is more involved than either of these metaphors describes. 
Metaphors operative on the third level require a blend of the two basic MESMs.
Here, Italian harpist Laura Caramelino describes her experience with Ravel’s 
Introduction and Allegro:
L: Well, it has a lot of light and a lot of color; it’s these explosions o f color and
sound. I think it's one o f the most beautiful things ever written! [...] [I]t’s more 
than the expression of feeling, it’s feeling itself you know? It’s not something
389
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that makes you feel any better, it’s something you are inside that takes you and 
brings you around in this colorful world. It’s a microcosmos, I would say. Yeah, 
we talk the whole time about expression of feelings, but it is feeling by itself, in a 
way. So I wouldn’t be able realty to give a definition of it, because it carries you 
on!
D: Can you tell me some of the places that it carries you? If it bothers you to try
and be pinned down, tell me.
L: (Sings.) Well, you know, the whole cadenza (plays), this is like taking you,
somebody that gives you a hand and then retreats it and starts to run away. 
So...[...] (plays) it’s like a sensation o f being trapped and being led somewhere 
until you run and reach the light. Or you’re curious, you’re just trying to find 
something and all of a sudden you end up being this very (plays) sensual place. 
These chords are just expression of, it’s, what could it express!? (laughs.) It’s 
um... I’m trying to find some words, but I really cannot. It’s just... the flow of... 
either in a beautiful light or in.... say mood, (laughs.) But still I wouldn’t like the 
restrictions of being in a mood, (plays.) It’s practically another person speaking, 
(plays.) Somebody that is revealing to you a big secret, or (plays) I dunno, 
could you think about a mood? It’s so tender, it’s not even having vision any 
more, (laughs)
Her experience is clearly more complex than either MESM could account for and her 
description reflects this complexity. For instance, in saying that the music “carries you 
on,” Laura uses the metaphor MUSIC IS A vehicle, which requires elements of both 
MESMs to be in operation at the same time.
Although in the ways they deal with states, processes, actions, causes, purposes, 
and means these two structures seem rather different, in this chapter, I will demonstrate 
how these differences are complementary. Rather than opposing one another, they are 
reverse images of one another. Indeed, I will argue that the more complex metaphors, 
such as music IS a  vehicle and musical momentum, operate through a process o f 
blending the two simpler MESMs. In addition, I will argue that some more complex
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metaphors, such as direction and SCALING EFFECTS are possible in part because of the 
emergent logic of the blended musical realm. However, I must first explore more 
cognitive semantics theory, specifically the concepts of mental spaces and blending. 
These ideas will help us see how two seemingly disparate musical metaphors can 
combine into more complex metaphors.
RELA TIONSHIP OF THE M E SM S
How are the musical event structure metaphors related? Some of the terms of 
my analysis, such as dynamic/static and contained/uncontained, suggest opposition. The 
image schema OPPOSITION stems from embodied experiences of opposing forces, such as 
the pushing or pulling games children play. This force image schema has also been 
spatialized to mean “set over against something that is at the other end or side of an 
intervening line or space” (Merriam-Webster, 592). However, other terms o f my 
analysis, such as “vision/feeling,” “movement by step-leap/flow ,” and 
“diachronic/synchronic” do not suggest opposition. Rather, they suggest the image 
schema co m plem en ta rity . This image schema refers to two parts that go together to 
complete some whole, such as a hand and glove.
How can two views of the same thing be both OPPOSITE and com plem entary?  
The single image schema that sums up these image schemas and the relationship between 
the two MESMs is that of rev ersa l . T o illustrate the image schema rev ersa l  and its 
relationship with both o ppo sitio n  and com plem en ta rity , consider a thin piece of 
metal that has been stamped with a shape. Imagine a shallow, rounded shape, in bas-
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relief style so that it has a bulge and a flat plane surrounding it. If  you look at the front 
o f the metal, the bulge projects in toward you; if you look at the back, it projects out 
away from you. In a spatial sense, the sides of the object o ppo se  one another: front is 
opposite of back. In addition, when you turn it over, the bulge projects in spatially 
OPPOSITE directions. If you imagine the moment that the flat metal was stamped with the 
bulge, you will see that the bulge resulted from opposing forces: the stamp moving in 
one direction, the metal resisting in the other.
At the same time that this object embodies aspects of o ppo sitio n , it also 
embodies aspects of COMPLEMENTARITY. The front of the object bulges in convex 
fashion, while the back bulges concavely. The front of the bulge is rounded, as is the 
back. It would be very surprising to turn to the back of the object and see a squared 
bulge projecting outward, away from you. The shape of the back side o f the object 
complements the front. If this small object were instead a large building with the exact 
same shape, when you walked inside, you might see internal structure of some sort that 
supports the bulging shape on the outside, co m plem en tin g  it structurally.
rev ersa l  can encompass various spa tia l  relationships: front/back, 
outside/inside, up/down, side/side. If you r ev erse  an object and view it from the 
o ppo site  side, you see c o m plem en ta r y  views, r ev ersa l  also involves relations of 
both FORCE and MOTION. If you are driving a car and go into “reverse,” your car exerts 
force in a backward direction. The car moves in o ppo site  directions by using forces that
392
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
are  COMPLEMENTARY. OPPOSING forces o f  equal intensity a re  co m plem en ta ry , since 
they  add  up  to  a  balanced, stable system .
The relationship between the two MESMs is one of r e v e r s a l ,  and includes 
aspects o f both opposition and com plem entarity . The following table contrasts the 
two in a fashion that shows elements of opposition with underlined words and elements 
of COMPLEMENTARITY as italicized words. Some elements that could be both opposite 
and complementary are underlined and italicized. This table should function something 
like the REVERSE image o f a photographic negative laid next to its positive print. By 
looking from one to the other, you can see which elements are opposite, and which are 
complementary.
Location MESM
setting is contained by listener’s field 
o f vision
listener is uncontained bv setting, 
stationary, viewing from outside
ground is background; static and 
contained
gravity is important with reference to 
UP/DOWN image schema
musical time/space is static and extended 
to locations that music moves through; 
diachronic
multiple contained locations, defined by 
musical aspects (harmony/rhythm/ 
dynamics)
393
Substance MESM
setting is uncontained: limited only by 
reach of listener’s senses," feeling’ sense 
emphasized
listener is contained by setting, stationary, 
a deictic center, experiencing from inside 
as music flows past
ground is grounds dynamic and 
imcontained
gravity is important with reference to 
weight and stability
musical time/space is dynamic and 
immediate and flows past the listener with 
the musical substance; synchronic
single imcontained location, defined by 
reach of listener’s senses
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contained no tes are  singular. countable 
entities
m usic m oves by STEP o r LEAP
chords are spatially contained, vertical 
locations, externally structured , 
can  be  closely o r openly spaced
harm onic/rhythm ic/dynam ic pa th  im age 
schem as imcontained and dynam ic, 
constrain  m otion o f  m elodic PATH im age 
schem a
m elody is top-most PATH schema', 
constrained by harm onic/rhythm ic/ 
dynam ic p a th / lo c a t io n  schem as
beat ordered  by LINEAR, SPATIAL im age 
schem a; each  beat is the “place”  w here 
a  new  “tim e span” begins
m eter m easures extended, static time/ 
space by m eans o f  LINEAR, SEGMENTED, 
SPATIAL o rder
meter contains beats, acts as a  force for 
regularity  th a t can be played against
tem po m easures ra te  o f  speed o f  m usical 
movement, tem po can be a  container- 
location
tim bre helps to  differentiate different 
m usical lines
im contained notes m erge into a  m ass 
substance
m usic m oves by FLOW
chords a re  imcontained forces fo r forw ard 
(horizontal) m ovem ent, structured  
internally by l in k  schem a com bined w ith 
various FORCE schem as
harm onic/rhythm ic/dynam ic pa th  im age 
schem as subsum ed and thus contained by 
m usical substance; linguistically contained 
by verbal nom inalizations
m elody is surface o f sound mass', 
uncontained, but supported by sound 
m ass
beat o rd er by PULSATING FORCE im age 
schem a, grouped by hierarchical scale 
im age schem a; each beat is another 
pulsation o f  m usical force
m eter m easures flow o f musical substance 
by m eans o f  a  hierarchical scale
GROUPING 
beat defines meter
tem po m easures ra te  o f  speed o f  musical 
substance; tem po is a  quality o f the 
musical substance
tim bre is a  quality of the musical 
substance, part o f the system offorce 
intensity
Table 5.1
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By examining these contrasting views o f the MESMs, you can see that they are, 
in large part, reverse images of each other. Note that, besides “contained/uncontained” 
and “static/dynamic,” the contrasted terms are, in large part, image schemas that 
COMPLEMENT one another.
To further develop the metaphor that I suggested just before the table — that of 
a photographic print and its negative — let us consider which of these might be the 
“positive” image and which the “negative.” At first glance, it might seem that the 
location MESM is positive and the substance MESM is negative. The location MESM 
seems to emphasize outlines and an easily graspable overview. The substance MESM, 
on the other hand, emphasizes internal qualities, perhaps more like an x-ray than a 
negative. Like a photographic negative or an x-ray, it can give an impression of 
weirdness, seeing things that are not normally seen. However, if you remember the 
experience o f actually being into the music, o f sensing its qualities and the effects it has 
on you, then the substance MESM would seem to be the positive image, while the 
location MESM is the negative. I would say that, in terms of the dominant epistemology 
in our culture, the location MESM is positive in terms o f knowledge, because we 
associate “knowing” with “seeing” so strongly. In terms of experience the substance 
MESM is positive, because we think o f experience as strongly connected with embodied 
feeling. Certainly, the idea that the location MESM is positive in terms ofknowledge is 
supported by the feet that the academic study o f this music, music theory, dwells much
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m ore in  aspects o f  th e  location  dual th an  the substance d u a l T his is also due to  the fact 
th at m usical D otation is shaped by th e  location d u a l
That the two MESMs are reversals of one another stems from the fret that they 
are special cases o f the general event structure metaphors proposed by LakofF. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999,198-200) note that the general event structure metaphors are 
reversals o f one another in terms of figure-ground orientation. In the location dual, the 
affected entity is the figure, while the effect is the ground (“That line of thought took me 
[figure] down a blind alley [ground]). The reverse is true in the object dual, in which the 
affected entity is the ground while the effect is the figure (“The confusion of that blind 
alley gave me [ground] a great deal of grief [figure]). However, as discussed above, the 
MESMs are reversed in a more complex manner, being complementary in many ways 
and opposite in many others.
In the rest o f this chapter, I will explore how varying elements of the two 
MESMs combine to create more elaborate metaphors. First, however, I will turn to 
some recent theory in cognitive semantics that can help us to understand how two or 
more metaphors can blend into a single more complex metaphor.
M e n t a l  S p a c e s  a n d  B le n d in g
Two concepts from cognitive semantics will help to elucidate how multiple 
metaphors can function as a single system: mental spaces and blending (Fauconnier 
1985,1997, Fauconnier and Turner, 1996, 1998, Lakoff 1987, Sweetser and Fauconnier 
1996, Turner and Fauconnier 1995, Turner 1996). Mental spaces are imaginative
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domains used in meaning construction. Examples o f mental spaces are past or future 
time “locations” (“In the past/future...”), hypothetical situations (“If I were to do 
that...”), places (“At school..”), fictional situations (“In Jane Eyre...”), theatrical frames 
(“In the theatre...”), social situations (“At the dance...), as well as more abstract 
domains, such as academic disciplines (“In ethnomusicology, we do it this way...”).
Mental spaces are not empty spaces that need to be explicitly populated every 
time they are brought up; they are associated with certain actors, activities, objects, and 
so on. For instance, if my daughter says to me “At school..” I know to expect certain 
characters and activities in what she is beginning to talk about. If a colleague says, “In 
postmodern theory...” I know to expect certain writers and ideas. The mental space 
provides a context for understanding. For instance, in the mental space of “postmodern 
theory” I would probably understand the term “universal” in a different manner than I 
would if I encountered it in the mental space of “a sermon in church.”
Mental spaces are not necessarily separate, singularly contained entities. Usually 
a mental space will relate to one or more other mental spaces, and can do so in a variety 
of ways. For instance, “In the future” relates to both “in the present” and “in the past” at 
a basic definitional level if in no other way. Mental spaces can “nest” within one 
another: the mental space “Mozart’s Flute Concerto in D Major” nests within the 
mental space “classic era music.” The flute concerto space shares generic aspects with 
the classical era mental space, but not specific aspects.
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Generally, a mental space will not contain elements that contradict one another; 
in other words, they tend to be internally logically consistent For example, a piano 
player who played a Mozart piano concerto might confuse (or perhaps incense) listeners 
concerned with historical accuracy if the cadenza he performed was in the style of the 
late Romantic period.
“Mental Space” Problematic as a Term
As it is theorized in the literature cited above, the idea o f mental spaces is still 
situated in the objectivist framework, (as is evinced by its name). Mental spaces are a 
matter of imagination. The term “mental” locates the imaginative process entirety in the 
mental field, operating in an explicit manner. The term “space” indicates the “stage” 
upon which these mental imaginings play out. Although “mental spaces” may operate as 
explicit mental imaginings on a sort of mental stage, they may also operate through tacit 
body imagining, which this term excludes. While we may not be explicitly aware of these 
bodily imaginings, I have argued that they operate to shape our lives, nonetheless. In 
addition, in theoretical work on mental spaces (cited above), and in work based on it, the 
term “imaginative” is generally used in a very encompassing manner. It includes not only 
the usual, more mental and visual aspects of the word, but also image schemas we 
understand through embodied experience in the kinesthetic realm, as well as emotional 
experience. This dissonance — between not only the term “mental space” and 
experience, but between the term and explicit aspects o f its theory — suggests that a 
different term be found.
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I propose “imagmal gestalts.” I suggest “imaginal” because it is an adjectival 
form o f “imagine” but does not have the same connotation of visual, mental images 
played out on a mental stage as “imaginative” does. With “imaginal,” I mean to invoke 
the kind of embodied im a g in in g  I  discussed at length in chapter two — imagining rooted 
in bodily knowing and expecting, imagining that can become explicit but may remain 
tacit.
The term “gestalt” retains useful aspects of “space” while relinquishing those that 
are not. “Space” suggests a container for a specific set of “things” (ideas, memories, 
people, places, concerns, etc.) — a whole, contained realm in which those things 
operate. “Gestalt” can also suggest a specific and whole set of things without positing a 
clear boundary around them (as does “space”). In addition to suggesting a specific and 
whole set of things, “gestalt” also suggests specific relationships and processes that 
obtain between those things. In contrast, “space” brings to mind a place that contains 
objects. It does not suggest specific the relationships or processes of those objects. In 
addition, a “space” is something that occurs outside a person; its use in this case is 
metaphorical. In contrast, a “gestalt” is something that already and always occurs inside 
a person. It is already understood to be a psychological, experiential process.
Furthermore, the term “imaginal gestalt” has the advantage, for me, of tying the 
theory of “mental spaces” to the theory of invoked meaning. “Mental spaces” works to 
a certain degree with the theory of invoked meaning — hearing “In post-structuralist 
theory....” calls forth  a certain set o f writers and issues to the “mental stage.” However,
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it limits the results o f the invoking action to the mental stage. “Imaginal gestalts” allows 
the invocation to affect any or all aspects o f the person who is creating meaning. An 
event occurs to that person that invokes and focuses the integration o f an imaginal 
gestalt (a set of subsidiary aspects o f their energetic matrix) toward a focal whole. 
Hearing “In post-structuralist theory...” invokes not only a mental context for 
understanding, but gut reactions and other bodily aspects o f the gestalt, such as tension 
from remembered frustrations with certain writers or excitement at the insight o f others. 
These aspects o f the gestalt are important not only in ami o f themselves because they are 
part o f the total experience and meaning of “In post-structuralist theory....” They are 
also important because it is from this “gut” level (this tacit knowing) that we can bring 
forth new insight and understandings into post-structuralist theory. The “imaginal 
gestalt” o f post-structuralist theory is theoretically much more whole than is the “mental 
space” of poststructuralist theory.
In what follows, I will explain the idea of “blends” of “mental spaces.” However, 
I will not use the original language as Fauconnier and Turner elaborate it. Rather, I will 
use the language developed in chapter two in the discussion o f invoked meaning.
Blends
With this terminology in place, I will now continue with an explanation o f blends 
o f imaginal gestalts. When two or more different imaginal gestalts are integrated 
together toward a bearing on another imaginal gestalt, cognitive semanticists call the 
combination a blend. For example, a recent television commercial for Volkswagen Jetta
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makes use o f blending in order to elicit a warm, fuzzy feeling from consumers for the 
car. One Ttmgmal gestalt invoked by this commercial is that o f a New Zealand sheep 
form. This gestalt is invoked by the accent of the speaker, the scenery, the visuals of a 
sheep form, and general knowledge that one o f New Zealand’s most important economic 
activities is sheep farming. The second imaginal gestalt invoked is that of the 
Volkswagen Jetta, a very small, maneuverable car. In the story implied by the 
commercial, alongside his sheep, the former raises Volkswagen Jettas, which behave 
amazingly like the Border collies known to be stock characters at New Zealand sheep 
forms. By blending the imaginal gestalts of Volkswagen Jettas and Border collies, the 
Jetta marketers hope to invoke in viewers a warm, fuzzy feeling for the Jetta similar to 
what they might feel for a Border collie or for their own dog. The blend implies that just 
as a Border collie is always ready to please, love and serve, so is the Volkswagen Jetta.
This blend of the Border collie and Volkswagen Jetta imaginal gestalts is possible 
because the two input gestalts share some elements in the first place. Figures 1 and 2 
below represent the imaginal gestalts of “Border collie” and “Volkswagen Jetta.” Their 
shared characteristics are typed in normal, non-bolded letters. The characteristics they 
do not share are bolded.
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mobile 
’'eager to please furry 
hardworking appealing 
cute loveable small for category 
reliable high voice loving
owned by a human being 
emotional relationship with owner
good stamina needs fuel 
maneuverable in crowds of sheep 
four-footed cold, wet nose 
^bright-eyed mammal 
animate
metalic
hardworking mobile 
/small for category bright colors
needs fuel long lasting 
owned by a human being 
high horn reliable
maneuverable in crowds of cars 
has four wheels interior seats 
cold, wet air conditioning 
bright head lights 
inanimate
Figure 1: Border collie gestalt Figure 2: Volkswagen Jetta gestalt
Fauconnier suggests that the reason that this connection between the two 
imaginal gestalts is possible in the first place is that they share a generic gestalt 
comprised of their shared elements (1997,149). The generic gestah for “Border collies” 
and “Volkswagen Jettas” is represented in figure 3 below. Note that the elements in the 
generic gestalt are often more abstract than those in the input gestalts. For instance, 
while Border collies have four feet and Jettas have four wheels, the generic gestalt has 
“four appendages for motion.”
hardworking 
mobile size 
reliable long lasting
makes a high sound 
maneuverable in crowds 
owned by a human being 
four appendages for motion 
Jwo appendages for vision 
fuel dependent
Figure 3: generic gestalt
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This generic gestalt both suggests and constrains the blend of elements from one 
gestalt with those in the other. For example, since the generic gestalt contains “two 
appendages for vision,” it suggests the blend of “dog eyes” and “car headlights” that 
becomes “car eyes.” On the other hand, nothing in the generic gestalt would support the 
integration o f floppy ears or a wagging tail into the blended gestalt so, although it could 
be introduced, it might stretch the imagination a bit too for. The reaction o f viewers 
might be that a cute commercial had crossed a line into silliness.
Once the generic connections between the two input gestalts have been made, 
aspects of each may be integrated toward a bearing on a blended gestalt. With the blend 
emerge characteristics and relationships that did not exist before the connection and 
integration were made. The blended gestalt for “Border collies” and “Volkswagen Jetta” 
is represented by figure 4 below.
^ — reliable \
/fiardworking interior seatsV
/  cute loveable appealing \
/  eager to please bright eved mobile \
/  small for category high voice metalic \
I maneuverable in crowds of cars needs fuel I 
I owned by a human being bright colors I 
\  emotional relationship w/ owner I
\  cold, wet nose/air conditioning /
\ .  four footed long lasting /
N. animate s '
Figure 4: blended gestalt — “Border collied” Jetta
Three different processes occur in the emergence of new characteristics and 
relationships in blended gestalts: composition, elaboration and completion.
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Composition is a matter of integrating selected elements o f both input gestalts toward 
the creation o f a new reality in the blended gestalt. In this case, characteristics of Border 
collies, such as “cute, appealing, eager to please” and “capable of an emotional 
relationship with owner,” are integrated with Jettas to produce a “cute, appealing, eager 
to please” car that is “capable o f an emotional relationship with its owner.” In figure 4 ,1 
have indicated these characteristics in italicized print.
Elaboration is a matter of embellishing the connections between the two gestalts 
according to the emergent logic of the blended gestalt.1 I have indicated the elaborations 
in the blended gestalt (figure 4) by underlined text. Consider, for instance, the “two 
appendages for vision.” Although in the commercial, the headlights of the cars are not 
represented as eyes, in the mind of the viewer, the logic that emerges when Jettas 
“become” Border collies makes it feasible to do so. If a car is to become alive and dog­
like, its two bright appendages that relate to seeing might well be bright eyes. Those 
bright eyes, then might indicate the kind o f intelligence that Border collies demonstrate in 
their work with sheep. In the same manner, the high horn of a small car can become the 
high, yapping voice o f a dog, the four wheels can become four legs, and the cold, wet 
air-conditioner can be come a cold, wet nose. These aspects of the blend are all a matter 
of elaborating the logic of the new gestalt that emerges when the two gestalts are 
integrated.
' Note that the logic involved here is more often a tacit, bodily logic than it is an explicit, mental logic.
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Completion involves the invocation of other imaginal gestalts not explicitly 
mentioned in a way that complements the explicit gestalts and creates further emergent 
logic and structure. In this case, the imaginal gestalt integrated is that of animacy. 
According to our everyday knowledge of animate creatures, they move and are capable 
of feeling and thinking- Once the blend of Border collie and Jetta is made and the 
characteristics “eager to please,” “lovable,” and “capable o f an emotional relationship 
with an owner” are introduced into the blended gestalt, the inanimate car develops the 
capacity for animacy. Integrating characteristics of animate creatures with an inanimate 
object invoke animacy for that object. According to the emergent logic of the 
commercial, if the viewer buys a Jetta, he will have the same, satisfying relationship with 
it that he might with a live Border collie.
To summarize these processes, composition involves integrating aspects of two 
imaginal (experiential) gestalts related through a generic gestalt toward a bearing on the 
creation of a blended gestalt. Elaboration is a matter o f using the emergent logic 
invoked by the blend in embellishing it. Finally, completion involves invoking the 
integration of related gestalts with the two original gestalts according to the emergent 
logic of the blend.
Blends of Music Event Structure Metaphors
In my discussion of the two MESMs, I described explicit and detailed pictures of 
two imaginal gestalts that enculturated members of this musical tradition use implicitly to 
think and talk about musical events. These musical imaginal gestalts share at least two
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generic gestalts. Table 4.3 (p. 382) suggests one kind o f generic gestalt. This gestalt is 
made of the abstract notions that Lakoff has suggested make up understanding of any 
kind of event, musical or otherwise: states, processes, actions, causes, purposes, means 
and difficulties. We saw at the end o f that chapter how the two MESMs concretize 
these same notions and the relationships between them in very different manners. Table 
5. 1 (p. 394) suggests another kind of generic gestalt made up o f the musical elements 
that the two MESMs share. That table showed how each of the MESMs metaphorizes 
these elements differently, using OPPOSING viewpoints and c o m plem en ta ry  image 
schemas. In figure 5 below I have shown these two generic gestalts as separate because 
they contain elements that are different in levels o f abstraction. However, they could be 
included in the same generic gestalt, since they do interact with one another. In order to 
suggest this interaction, I have overlapped the circles of the diagram.
states
process
actions
causes
purposes
means
listener w/ senses 
setting ground movement> 
gravity time/space motion 
location notes/sound 
melody chords timbre 
rhythm/meter/tempo, 
beat
abstract notions musical elements
Figure 5
As I suggested at the beginning of the last chapter, each MESM can be seen as a 
logical extension and elaboration o f one of the first level metaphors. The location
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MESM extends and elaborates the image o f discontinuous, moving PITCHES, while the 
substance MESM extends and elaborates the image o f a continuous, moving v o lu m e  of 
musical substance. We saw in the last chapter how most of the metaphoric vocabulary 
used in talking about music relates to these two extensions of the first level PITCH and 
v o lu m e . These terms make sense with reference to their associated MESMs.
Most of the metaphors used in talking about music can be traced back to one or 
the other of the MESMs. These simpler metaphors make sense from the point of view of 
these specific complex metaphors. However, some metaphors cannot. They are more 
complex and require the logic that emerges when the two MESMs are blended. A blend 
o f the two MESMs creates an imaginary musical realm, which the listener cannot only 
“get into” but be “transported” by. Being “transported” by the music constitutes a level 
three experience. The rest of this chapter explores several metaphors that require the 
logic of a  blended musical realm, including MUSIC IS A VEHICLE, MOMENTUM, d ir ec tio n , 
and sc a lin g  effects. While I believe that these metaphors relate to level three 
experience, I do not mean to claim that use of any of these metaphors automatically 
indicates a  level three experience. I will clarify this point in the conclusion.
Ge t t in g  in t o  th e  M u sic
One o f the primary goals in the American conservatory tradition is to “get into” 
the music — to become totally involved with the musical sound or, as I described it 
earlier, to live the music. While this metaphor does not involve a blend o f the two 
MESMs, per se, I include it with this group of metaphors because it describes the
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transition from level two experience to level three. I believe that the substance MESM is 
a transitional mode between level two and level three. The location MESM maintains 
distance between the listener and the music, keeping the music as an “object” “out 
there.” This distance does not encourage the listener to open himself to living the music. 
In contrast, the substance MESM places the listener in the middle of the music, sensing 
its qualities and patterns. This can occur in a fashion in which the listener does not open 
himself to living the music — he simply recognizes qualities and patterns in the music 
through embodied perception. However, he can also, from this position, open himself to 
feeling at one with the music. “G ettin g  into  th e  m usic”  indexes the perspectival 
change involved in not only moving into the music through the substance MESM but 
also opening oneself to living it.
M usic is  a V e h ic le
M u sic  is  a  v eh ic le , which relates to getting  in to  th e  m u sic , gives rise to such 
expressions as being moved or transported by the music or taking a musical journey. In 
general, socially and experientiaily, the primary goal in listening to music in this tradition 
is the experience of g ettin g  in to  it  and being  m o v ed . G ettin g  in to  it  suggests a loss 
of experiential distance, an immersion in the musical substance. Once the listener has 
“gotten into” the musical substance and relinquished experiential distance, he may be 
“moved” by it. Be in g  m o v ed  suggests a loss of agency to the music.2 Grammatically,
2While BEING MOVED is commonly described as an emotional experience, other evidence points to it 
also being a matter of feeling moved by the music physically. When I asked Curtis students how they 
knew they were hearing “just notes,” many of them pointed to a lack of impulse in their own bodies to
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the listener becomes the direct object of the action of the music: “I was listening to the 
music,” which suggests that this listener is in control o f the situation, becomes “The 
music moved me,” which suggests that the music controls the listener.
Grammatical Evidence for M usic IS A Vehicle as a Blend
Being  m oved  relates to the metaphor m usic  is a  vehicle, which is evident in 
such expressions as “musical journey” and “It transported me!” In this metaphor, the 
music acts as a vehicle that picks up the listener and transports him from musical location 
to musical location. Laura Caramelino used this metaphor in describing her experiences 
with Ravel’s Introduction and Allegro.3
L: Well, it has a lot of light and a lot o f color; it’s these explosions of color and
sound. I think it’s one of the most beautiful things ever written! [...] fljt’s more 
than the expression of feeling, it’s feeling itsel£ you know? It’s not something 
that makes you feel any better, it’s something you are inside that takes you and 
brings you around in this colorful world. It’s a microcosmos, I would say.
Yeah, we talk the whole time about expression of feelings, but it js feeling by 
itself, in a way. So I wouldn’t be able really to give a definition of it, because it 
carries you on!
D: Can you tell me some of the places that it carries you? If it bothers you to try
and be pinned down, tell me.
move to the music or a problem with the physical motion of the people playing the music. Either the 
player exhibited no physical motion beyond what was necessary to produce notes, or they exhibited an 
excess of motion, making it seem affected. It was clear that “music” should move the player physically 
in a way that “notes” do not It was also clear in the comments of many of the Curtis students that being 
moved emotionally was an important way to distinguish between “music” and “notes” as well. As I 
emphasized in the last chapter, “feeling” is a polysemous term that covers both kinesthetic and 
emotional sensations. When you hear music, you can feel moved in all the ways that that polysemous 
verb suggests.
^ e  special fonts indicate the same thing that they did in the last chapter, in “Linguistic Evidence of 
Dual Music Event Structure Metaphors.”
Stative verbs = has, are inside 
Dynamic verbs = makes, carries 
Deictics = yon, this
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L: (Sings.) WeD, you know, the whole cadenza (plays.), this is like taking yon,
somebody that gives yon a hand and then retreats it and starts to run away. 
So...[...] (plays) it’s like a sensation of being trapped and being led somewhere 
until you run and reach the light. Or you’re curious, you’re just trying to fin d  
something and all o f a sudden you end u p  being this very (plays) sensual place. 
These chords are just expression o f it’s, what could it expressYl (laughs) It’s 
um... I’m trying to find some words, but I really cannot. It’s just... the flow of... 
either in a beautiful light or in.... say mood, (laughs.) But still I wouldn’t like the 
restrictions of being in a mood, (plays.) It’s practically another person speaking. 
(plays.) Somebody that is revealing to you a big secret, or (plays) I dunno, 
could you think about a mood? It’s so tender, it’s not even having vision any 
more, (laughs)
D: It’s tender and it also seems mysterious at the same time to me, to a certain
extent. This section especially.
L: I dunno, you think it’s that mysterious? Because it has a resolution, it’s not
unresolved tension, any way (plays). It just keeps on rocking (as she continues 
to play). And then yon have (plays) you’re back home somehow... a big cop or 
something if you were lost, don’t worry... until the main theme comes out again.
D: Yeah, that’s sort of a returning home. It’s getting somewhere*
L: Yes! You just have a revelation of a new world! Yeah, I think you have
anything to say about this piece is the revelation that there is something beautiful 
there! And it’s expressed like this!
Example 5.1
Compared with the examples of speech given for the location MESM (p. 309) 
and the substance MESM in the last chapter (p. 311), at first glance it seems most like 
the substance MESM. It is very much like it in a number o f ways. Between stative and 
dynamic verbs, stative verbs predominate as the main verb o f most sentences. In
4The deictics in this utterance refer not to any particular figure in the music, but to the sensation the 
music caused this particular listener to feel. More clearly stated it would read, “That’s a feeling of 
returning home, of getting somewhere.”
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addition, the deictics are quite varied. However, this example also differs from that 
given for the substance MESM in two important ways — 1) use o f dynamic verbs in 
subordinate clauses and 2) lack of nominalizations of the musical flux.
Although the mam verbs of most o f her sentences are stative, Laura uses quite a 
few dynamic verbs, as well When she uses dynamic verbs, they are usually in 
subordinate clauses that describe the effect of the musk: on her, as the listener. “[I]t’s 
something you are inside that takes you and brings you around in this colorful world.
[...] [Tjhis is like taking you, somebody that gives you a hand and then retreats it and 
starts to run away. So...[...] (plays) it’s like a sensation of being trapped and being led 
somewhere until you run and reach the light.” This predominant linguistic structure 
suggests that Laura feels a loss o f agency to the musical event. She voluntarily hands 
herself over to the musical event to be transport by it to varying realms o f sensation.
This voluntary subjection to the forces of the musical event can also be seen in 
the way that, contrary to the manner o f speech exhibited in the substance MESM, Laura 
does not use nominalizations. Recall that in the substance MESM, speakers are 
temporarily anchored, deictic center, in the flux o f musical substance and its force. From 
that position, as they talk about the musical event, they nominalize both the musical 
substance and the forces it presents: “a building o f intensity” or “an expansion o f the 
sound.” In addition, they speak as if  as the musical flux passes them, they temporarily 
“possess” it: “Here, you have a building of intensity.” This “packaging” and 
“possession” of the musical substance suggests that in the substance MESM, the listener
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feels some control of the musical event, or at least does not feel as if they have lost 
control to it. In contrast, Laura does not use nominalizations in this way, nor does she 
“possess” the music.5 Instead of temporarily “possessing” the “packaged” (nominalized) 
musical flux, which would suggest that she was in control o f it, she instead allows herself 
to come under its control, to be “transported” by it.
Although the above two linguistic structures (dynamic verbs and lack of 
nominalizations) are not common in the substance MESM, they are common in the 
location MESM. This would suggest that the operating metaphor is a blend o f parts of 
both MESMs. The linguistic expressions that Laura uses certainly suggest both: the 
substance MESM (“flow, feelings, explosions o f light and color”) and the location 
MESM (“getting somewhere, a microcosmos, a new world”). In addition, she explicitly 
uses the m u sic  is a  v eh icle  metaphor: “[I]t carries you on!”
In considering the metaphor MUSIC IS A VEHICLE, if we were to only consider the 
metaphor, without looking at speech governed by it, we might decide that it is merely a 
kinesthetic version o f the location MESM, rather than the visual one that I have 
described in detail. In a kinesthetic version o f the location MESM, the listener would be 
located inside the flame, moving along with the beat from one musical location to 
another. This is consistent with the metaphor of music as a vehicle. However, we can 
see from Laura’s speech that, if she has used it in a fashion that is consistent with the rest
5Only at one point in her narrative does she say “And then you have” and play the music that comes 
next Since she does it only once; and does not follow it with a verbal nominalization, I take the “And 
then you have” more as an introduction to her playing of the part of the musical event that comes next in 
her narrative and less as an indication of her general relationship to the musical event
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of her speech community, MUSIC is A VEHICLE involves much more than a kinesthetic 
version of the location MESM.
In feet, when the members of this speech community speak of “being 
transported” by the music, it is often to some otherworldly realm, a place that is well 
beyond the pedestrian description of moving from one location to another. Descriptions 
o f this experience often have spiritual overtones. They bring to mind an ancillary 
definition of the word “transport”: strong or intensely pleasurable emotion: ecstasy, 
rapture (transports of joy). People often say that, like spiritual experience, the 
experience of being transported by music is ineffable.6 In feet, to be exact, I should 
probably call this metaphor something like m u s ic  is  a  v e h ic l e  t o  a n  i n d e s c r ib a b l y
BEAUTIFUL AND EVENTFUL PLACE.
Logical Evidence fo r M usic ISA Vehicle as a Blend
The logic of all three of the above metaphors is consistent with logic of the move 
from location MESM to a blend of the both MESMs. “G e t t i n g  i n t o  i t ”  suggests that 
the listener who has been at a distance moves to a point at which he is in direct physical 
contact with the musical substance, as does “becoming immersed in the music.” “Being 
moved” suggests that the listener/music relationship is then close enough that the 
substance can effect the listener on a “feeling” level. Going on a “musical journey”
6Because of this ineffability, I am very indebted to Laura for describing her experience for me. In our 
conversation, I sensed that she felt her description to be inadequate to fully impart the experience. 
However, even if it was a poor match for her experience, it revealed a great deal about that experience to 
me through the linguistic analysis presented here.
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suggests that the flow of the musical substance actually picks up the listener and 
transports him to musical places.
How can sound “transport” a listener? In the last chapter, when I was 
considering the simpler MESMs, I would have answered this question by considering the 
embodied experience of being transported, looking for the gestalt patterns and then 
finding analogues for them in musical experience. For the sake o f argument, let us now 
try to do that and see where it leads.
The embodied experience o f being transported in the world consists o f a person 
stepping into a vehicle of some sort and sitting, more or less passively, as the vehicle 
moves him from place to place. As he is moved forward from place to place, he 
experiences changing locations, events that take place in them, as well as his reaction to 
those events. All o f this is experienced by the rider in a fashion whose immediacy is 
relative to the kind of vehicle he is transported by. Let us assume for the sake of this 
argument that the vehicle is one in which relatively immediate experience can be had, one 
in which the rider is open to the environment, such as a buggy pulled by a horse and not 
one in which the rider is sealed from the environment, like an airplane.
Are the patterns of experience suggested by the above scenario existent in the 
experience o f listening to music? Some o f the patterns definitely are suggested. For 
example, in the last chapter, in my exploration of the location MESM, I established the 
metaphorical existence of various locations in the musical realm. In that MESM, the 
listener watched as a musical figure moved from one location to another. It is not
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difficult to see how a listener could imagine himself into the musical landscape. What is 
more difficult is the notion o f being in a musical vehicle.
What are the patterns o f embodied experience of being in a vehicle? Imagine 
yourself sitting in a horse drawn buggy with your eyes closed and earplugs in so that you 
are less aware of the changing locations you are being carried through and more aware 
of the feeling o f being in a vehicle. What are the patterns o f your bodily experience? 
They would be something like the following: the feeling of your seat pushing into your 
back as the buggy accelerated, vibrations from the movement o f the buggy over the road, 
the wind in your face, and occasional changes in your center of gravity from the buggy 
turning, speeding up or slowing down.
Nothing in the linguistic evidence I gathered at Curtis, or in my own experience 
of music suggests to me that the above patterns o f embodied experience of being in a 
vehicle are present in the experience of music. No one spoke to me of anything 
reminiscent o f the feeling of a seat pushing into his back, vibrations from the movement 
of the musical vehicle, or changes in his center of gravity of the sort caused by a turning, 
accelerating or decelerating vehicle. Neither could I find less obvious linguistic evidence 
for any of these events occurring directly. And yet the operating metaphor here is being 
moved or TRANSPORTED by the music. It is clear that this metaphor operates in some 
fashion other than embodying the patterns of real life experience directly.
Rather than a direct embodiment o f the patterns o f real life transportation, 
musical transportation  is a matter of a blend of the imaginal gestalts o f the two
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fundamental MESMs I outlined in the last chapter. As I described above, when two 
imaginal gestalts are blended, through the process of completion, it is possible to extend 
the blended gestalt further by means of knowledge from a third (or more) separate, but 
compatible, imaginal gestalt. In the case of the “Border collied Jetta,” once the 
similarities between an animate Border collie and an inanimate car became apparent, the 
quality of “inanimacy” could be overridden by “animacy” by completing the blend 
through general knowledge of animacy (not just the knowledge of the animacy of Border 
collies). In the case o f the MUSICAL VEHICLE, knowledge of the compatible imaginal 
gestalt of riding in vehicles is added to the blend of the two MESMs to extend them 
logically. Although the experience of being transported by music does not include 
sensations like feeling a seat push into your back, since it does include patterns that 
suggest some aspects of riding in a vehicle, e.g. movement from location to location or 
experience of more or less stable terrain, our knowledge of riding in a vehicle can be 
used to override those elements that are absent: wind caressing skin, a seat pressing into 
a back from acceleration, etc. Once a blend of two imaginal gestalts has been begun, 
other compatible gestalts may be integrated to extend the emergent logic o f the new 
gestalt. In other words, aspects of the two MESMs, themselves invoked by the first 
level PITCH and VOLUME, may further invoke the integration of compatible imaginal 
gestalts toward a bearing on experiencing music.
In order to illustrate this new gestalt and how it is a blend o f the imaginal gestalts 
of the two MESMs, I will now show how the different generic gestalts look in this new
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blended gestalt. If you recall, at the end o f the last section I suggested that two generic
gestalts could be seen in musical events. The first consisted o f the abstract notions
involved in conceptualizing all events in English, musical or not: states, changes,
processes, actions, causes, purposes, means and difficulties. Below is a table describing
these notions in the imaginal gestalt o f b ein g  m oved  or tra n spo rted  by music. If you
will compare this with the corresponding table of the imaginal gestalts of the two
MESMs in the last chapter (Table 4.2, p. 306), you will see that this gestalt is a blend of
aspects o f those two gestalts. As you may recall from earlier in this chapter, three
different processes occur in the emergence in blended gestalts of new characteristics and
relationships: composition, elaboration and completion (pp. 403-405). In parentheses
following each description, I have suggested the particular process occurring.
States are locations that possess attributes, (composition)
Changes are movements to or from locations that possess varying attributes, 
(composition)
Process is movement from kind of location to a different kind of location by the 
observing listener, (composition)
Actions are self propelled motions that pick up the listener and move him from location 
to location, (elaboration and completion from the imaginal gestalt o f being 
physically transported)
Causes are forces controlling movement o f the listener to or from locations.
(elaboration and completion, as above)
Purposes are destinations with desired qualities, states or conditions, (composition) 
Means are paths to destinations that have dynamic musical qualities that produce 
conditions or states, (composition)
D ifficulties are impediments to the movement of the musical vehicle, (elaboration and 
completion)
Table 5.2
Some of the notions above, such as “States are locations that possess attributes,” 
are very similar to the original MESMs. These are composed of elements of both
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MESMs. Others, such as “Actions are self propelled motions that pick up the listener 
and move him from location to location,” diverge from the original MESMs. These are 
the notions in which the process o f completion from knowledge o f riding in vehicles is 
added.
The second generic gestalt described at the end of the last section consisted of 
elements particular to the portrayal o f dramatic events and specific to musical events: 
observer, setting, ground, movement/motion, gravity, time-space, location, notes/sound, 
melody, chords, timbre, rhythm/meter/tempo, and beat. Some o f these elements can 
easily be seen to be a blend of the same elements in the two MESMs, as they are 
described in table 5. 1 (p. 394). Others present a logical inconsistency that must be dealt 
with before we can accept the idea that m u sic  is a  vehicle is a blend of the two 
MESMs.
We can see the following elements as a blend of the aspects of the two MESMs:
Setting is abstractly contained in that the listener is familiar enough with the whole 
terrain to have imaginal map, yet uncontained in immediate experience, 
(completed by knowledge o f “imaginal maps”)
Listener contained by setting , no t stationary , m oving th rough m usical realm .
(composition, elaboration)
Senses used by listener include both feeling and vision, (composition)
Ground is ground; dynam ic and uncontained.
Gravity im port w / reference to  bo th  up/dow n  schem a and w eight and stability, 
(com position)
Multiple contained locations, defined by musical aspects
Chords are  uncontained and structu red  internally by link schem a com bined w / various 
force schem as.
Tempo measures rate o f speed o f movement of musical vehicle through musical terrain.
(completion and elaboration)
Timbre is a  quality  o f  th e  m usical substance, p art o f  the  system  o f  force intensity.
Table 53
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The elements above present no logical inconsistency that would impede their 
being part o f the same imaginal gestalt. (Remember that imaginal gestalts are generally 
logically consistent.) However, in thinking through this blended imaginal gestalt, I did 
encounter one major logical inconsistency that had to be resolved before I could consider 
MUSIC IS A VEHICLE a blend o f the two MESMs. The inconsistency relates to the 
directional switch in musical flow through time-space between the two MESMs.
Imagine listening to a piece of music in the substance MESM mode. You are 
now in the music and as the musical substance flows past you, you feel what is 
happening, sensing the changing qualities of the substance. Which direction does the 
music flow from? Logically, since it is governed by the object dual o f the time event 
structure metaphor, it will flow toward you from the front. Remember that the object 
dual o f the time event structure metaphor structures time as a series of time-objects that 
approach the observer from his front (future) and flow past him to his back side (past). 
He looks forward to a particular hour that is coming toward him, and back at the past 
that has already passed him by. Similarly, in the substance dual of the MESM, the 
listener looks forward to a particular phrase that is coming, which then flows past him 
and is behind him.
Imagine now that you are listening to the musk; in the location MESM mode — 
sitting back, observing what is happening as the musical “figure” moves through musical 
“locations” unfolding in time-space. If you “get into” the frame and join the figure, 
moving forward with it, which direction would the music be flowing from? Action in
419
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this MESM is governed by the location version of tim e passes, so musical time-space 
would be extending before you and musical force would be coming from behind you, 
propelling you forward. The direction o f the flow of musical force is opposite that of the 
substance MESM.
This change in direction presents a logical problem for blends of the two 
MESMs. If you add these imaginal gestalts together, unless you solve this logical 
problem, you end up with a situation where the listener is forever caught in the midst of 
a major clash of forceful flows, one from the front, one from behind. How can the music 
flow from both front and back?
One way to solve this logical conundrum is to say that only one of these 
directions can be imported into a blend. We saw this solution in the Border collie/Jetta 
blend. The Border collie imaginal gestalt included the notion “animate,” whereas the 
Jetta gestalt included the opposite, “inanimate.” The blended gestalt, however, included 
only “animate.” This was because the emergent logic of the blended gestalt dictated that 
only “animate” be included. Once the notions “cute, lovable, appealing, eager to please” 
and “capable of an emotional relationship with owner” were added to the Jetta gestalt, 
only “animate” would logically fit the gestalt.
We could do the same with the gestalts blended from the two MESMs. For 
instance, with MUSIC is A VEHICLE we could decide that logically, the direction of the 
flow of music must come only from behind and leave it at that. If you only look at the
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m etaphor MUSIC is  A v eh ic le  and  m etaphoric expressions based o n  it, like “m usical 
journey ,”  th is seem s to  m ake com plete sense.
However, when you examine speech based in this metaphor, the situation is not 
so clear. Consider Laura’s statement, “[T]his is like taking you, somebody that gives 
you a hand and then retreats it and starts to run away.”7 Clearly, she is feeling musical 
force o f some sort from in front Recall that she said all o f this in a description framed 
by the statement “It carries you on!” which indicates clearly she feels force from behind 
as well In addition, this experience is clearly so very rich for her that a description o f it 
as the music simply carrying her from location to location seems quite reductionistic. In 
feet, it is less reductionistic and more true to her description of her experience to say that 
this is indeed “a situation where the listener is forever caught in the midst o f a major 
clash offorceful flows, one from  the front, one from behind.” Perhaps this statement 
holds more explanatory power as well. But how can this be true?
We must remember, first o f all, that the sounding musical “world” through which 
the listener “travels” is not pre-existing and static, but dynamically created in time. As 
the “traveler” goes along, the “locations” he “visits” do not exist until “now” hits them. 
When “now” leaves them, they exist only in the listener’s remembered imaginal gestalt of 
the piece. At the same time that this is true, h is also true that a pre-existing condition 
for the listener to be able to “get into” the music and “go on a musical journey” is that he 
have enough experience with the piece or the style to anticipate reasonably what is
7Laura’s use of “retreat” is unusual and is due, I believe, to the fact that her native language is Italian, 
not English. The way I heard it, she means “pulls it away.”
421
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
“around the next corner.” In other words, he must have at least a semblance of a feeling 
for the image schemas he will encounter. This means that, in going on a ‘‘musical 
journey” not only the present time, the “now,” is available to the listener’s awareness, 
but past times, remembered experiences with the music are present, as well. While the 
present sounding music may be “lifting” him and “transporting” him from behind, the 
past virtual music (in the form o f a feeling for definite or possible upcoming image 
schemas) is what he anticipates coming from in front of himself. Vivid musical 
experience emerges at the moment that the sounding time/space encounters the 
virtual/remembered soundscape. A metaphor that illustrates this is that of riding a roller 
coaster. The track is the virtual/remembered soundscape, while the rider in the car is in 
the sounding time/space. The anticipation of the dips and loops of the coming track can 
be just as thrilling to the rider as the experience of the present state of the car. Both the 
present moment of bodily orientation or disorientation and the anticipation of future 
moments shape the experience.
Another way to reconcile the apparent inconsistency of logic in the notion that 
the music flows in two opposing directions at once is to think of it in terms of positive 
and negative. In the last chapter I suggest that there existed a sort of negative musical 
“terrain” that was analogous to the negative space one can see between the legs of a 
chair. While we do not usually attend to the negative space and do not have a name for 
it, it is still there, shaping our perception o f the chair. The negative musical “terrain” is a 
virtual model o f the mental/feeling “map” we have developed of a piece or style. As an
422
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embodied experiential/kinesthetic version of the mental/visual idea of “mental map,” it is, 
perhaps, more appropriate to call it an “imaginal map.” It is similar to the kinesthetic 
operating knowledge we have o f our everyday environment. We aren’t usually aware of 
it, unless someone changes something unexpectedly.
Similarly, our bodies, both physical and emotional, build up a knowledge of a 
particular musical terrain. As we listen, our remembrances of the image schemas of the 
terrain flow toward us from the future, rather like an unprinted negative. As the 
sounding moment that flows from behind and carries us along through the terrain hits 
these remembered image schemas, they come vividly to life, much as exposed 
photographic paper comes to life when it is awash in developer.
I do not mean to suggest that the experience of listening is in any way static or 
totally constrained by past experience. Image schemas are not static forms that act as 
templates, but are part o f a dynamic process that forms and informs our understandings 
and experiences. As the players o f the music encounter the remembered image schemas, 
the rich specifics o f those schemas may be filled out in numerous ways. Similarly, as the 
listener encounters the remembered image schemas of a favorite recording, he is not 
limited to only anticipating and reliving the same past experiences present in his existing 
imaginal map. He may take an exploratory attitude toward the music and direct his 
attention as he wishes, perhaps attending to new relationships or sounds he had not 
noted before. In this way, he fills in and adds more detail to his existing imaginal map of 
the recording. The more detail his imaginal map contains, the greater the number of
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details he can take in at a single time in his experience of the music, the richer that 
experience would be. In addition, his mood may alter his perception and experience of 
the piece.
To return to the notion o f a negative terrain, this idea gives us another way to 
think of a “clash of forceful flows, one from the front, one from behind.” Consider the 
structure of forceful experience. Mark Johnson has identified six aspects to the structure 
of the force experiential gestalt:
1) [F]orce is always experienced through interaction. [...] 2) [0]ur 
experience of force usually involves the movement o f some object (mass) 
through space in some direction. [That is, force has a vector quality.] [...]
3) [T]here is typically a single path o f motion. [...] 4) [FJorceshave 
origins or sources, and because they are directional, agents can direct 
them to targets. [...] 5) [Fjorces have degrees o f power or intensity.
[...] 6) [Bjecause we experience force via interaction, there is always a 
structure or sequence o f causality involved (1987,43-44).
I agree with Johnson’s analysis, but would add to it. With this analysis, he has 
examined the experiential gestalt of active force. His first element, that force is always 
experienced through interaction, suggests a kind o f passive force, as well, one that does 
not necessarily involve the rest o f these elements. For instance, the force that gravity has 
on me involves 1 and 4 (the origin is beneath me). As with the notion of negative space 
and musical terrain, we are not generally aware of these kinds of passive forces as forces, 
but they do shape our experience in the world forcefully.
I suggest that, at the same time that the positive sounding music exerts an active 
force from behind the listener, the negative musical “terrain” exerts a passive force from 
in front of him. Again, it is something tike the tracks of a roller coaster, which divert and
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control the motion of the active force exerted on the car that carries the rider. Another 
example would be a beach, which diverts the force of waves in their forward movement, 
or the terrain covered as a person walks or hikes through it.
With that logical inconsistency reconciled, I can now return to examining how 
the generic elements particular to the portrayal o f dramatic events and specific to musical 
events play out in this blend of the two MESMs. These elements are those involved in 
musical time-space and motion through it:
In the listener’s “mental-feeling map,” positive musical time/space is static and extended 
to locations that music moves through; diachronic.
Negative musical time/space is dynamic, immediate and synchronic. Creates negative 
musical terrain, (composition, elaboration, & completion)
Contained notes merge into a mass substance that FLOWS from behind the listener, 
moving him forward. Negative terrain (from front) moves by STEP or leap. 
(composition, elaboration, & completion)
Beat is ordered by both schemes. The beat ordered by the pulsating force image schema, 
grouped by hierarchical scale image schema, comes from behind, moving 
forward. The linear, spatial beat is part o f the negative terrain coming up in 
front (composition, elaboration, & completion)
Abstractly, meter measures extended static time/space by means of linear, segmented 
spatial order.
Concretely, beat is grouped by means of hierarchical scale grouping.
Meter is defined by beat
Melody is deictic center with the listener.
Table 5.4
The combination of these two sets o f factors from the two MESMs, the event 
structure factors as well as the musical ones, into a single imaginal gestalt creates a 
blended musical realm that is much like the physical realm that we live in. It is a realm 
that we can “get into” and explore or give ourselves over to, allowing ourselves to “be 
moved” or journey in a “musical vehicle.” This blended musical realm has its own
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emergent logic. I now turn to some of the effects of the emergent logic o f this blended 
tmaginal gestalt — momentum, direction, and scaling effects.
M o m en tu m
Just as changes in speed in a vehicle brings the experience of physical momentum 
to the foreground, changes in speed in a  musical vehicle might bring musical m o m entu m  
to the fore. The following description from my notes of a Curtis orchestra rehearsal 
illustrates:
The whole orchestra was galloping along together at a good clip, 
everybody putting their all into it, when all o f the sudden the conductor 
stopped to make a correction. Well, instead of stopping immediately, 
many o f the players kept playing, slowing their tempo gradually, but at 
individual speeds, not as a group. It gave the effect o f gradually 
dissolving momentum—a car that is going at a great speed, crashing into 
something and the picture gradually moving into slow motion, pieces of 
the car flying in different directions. It was really funny. Everybody 
laughed. The orchestra “cracked up” into “pieces,” then in response, we 
all “cracked up” in laughter.
While only one of the players I later spoke with used the term "momentum,” 
evidence of m o m en tu m  as an organizing idea can be seen in the speech of many other 
players.’ Several players talked about keeping the m o m entu m  o f  the music going in 
places where, logically, it could not be done. For instance, in describing how she plays 
the oboe line o f the first two phrases of the first movement of the Mozart oboe quartet in 
F major (K.370, Example 5.2, next page), Janet Miller told me that she plays the last 
note of the antecedent phrase “up” and the last note of the consequent phrase more
*[ thank my colleague Laura Lohman, whose work suggested to me the metaphor of MOMENTUM.
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“down.” This description puzzled me. Although the first note is a G and the second an 
F, I knew she wasn’t talking about relative note height. I asked her to clarify. She 
replied,
... in terms of inflection. Because this [the first phrase] doesn’t sound like 
an end, you know? It sounds like it needs something to finish i t  So 
maybe... sort of in the way you articulate these things? the Gs there.... 
and the way you end the note? This one would have a hair stronger 
articulation, and it would end more definitively. It’s really hard to 
describe those. It’s hard to play it out o f context, too. If I had my oboe 
here, it just would all happen instinctively. Sort o f you’re sort of playing 
through the rests. This [the F] is the end, but here [the G] you want to 
keep it going through the rests.
Even though Janet’s oboe doesn’t sound through the rests in question, she plays the note 
before them in a  manner that suggests that the musical MOMENTUM continues through 
the rests.
Beethoven
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Reza Jacobs made a similar comment while describing how he thinks about 
playing the ending o f the first movement of Beethoven’s piano sonata “Das LebewohL,” 
opus 81a (Example 5.3, previous page). Near the end o f the coda, after a passage that is 
the longest quiet section of the movement, the music lands on a set o f whole note, 
octave Cs in the right hand, with the left hand a brief quarter note followed by rests. The 
right hand whole note is marked “crescendo,” and leads to a set o f louder quarter note B 
flats in the next measure. The B flat then leads to the two final, V-I, forte chords, which 
have a much denser texture than the rest of the coda, consisting of fully voiced chords in 
each hand.
The note in question is the whole note, octave C marked “crescendo,” an 
instruction that is technically impossible to accomplish on the piano. The marking 
“crescendo” suggests that, in some other-than-sounding fashion, the player must build up 
enough momentum on the note to carry the piece through the final denser, more 
energetic chords. As Reza described playing this he said that he solved the problem of 
the “crescendoing” whole note by simply thinking as he held the C that it was getting 
louder. That way, he could gauge the dynamic level of the final three chords. He 
described having seen Rudolph Serkin “think” a crescendoing whole note. As a 
listener/observer, he knew that the whole note was crescendoing because he could see 
Serkin’s face get red and his body posture change in preparation for playing the next, 
louder note. In this instance, rather than suggesting the momentum of forward motion 
across rests, the player must suggest a buildup of momentum in a place where he has no
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way of doing so with the actual musical sound. Reza solved the problem with an 
imaginal process, which then affected the physical process o f playing, and possibly, the 
listener-observer’s process of experiencing the musical event.
How can musk: have MOMENTUM? In chapter three I argued that a sense of 
momentum could be invoked if the listener integrated the elements of pitch, volume, 
and changing PULSE (Le., changing tempo). Here, however, I argue that momentum is 
not a simple matter of integrating these elements — adding them together to the sum of 
momentum. Rather, it involves integrating these elements from  the perspective o f the 
blended musical realm. In order to either recognize or feel musical momentum, the 
listener must attend to the sound from the perspective o f either having been inside or 
being inside the blended musical realm, with its forceful flows and negative terrain.
The Elements o f Momentum
Momentum is learned through walking or running over the earthly terrain, 
interacting with the forces o f gravity and inertia. These forces influence the amount o f 
effort that must put forth in order to accelerate, continue moving forward, and 
decelerate. Negotiating momentum is a matter of judging the amount o f effort or force 
you need to apply to go forward or how much you need to restrain your body against 
the force of gravity or inertia in order to move down a hill or stop safety.
Momentum also involves knowing how different masses will behave at specific 
speeds in interaction with the forces o f gravity and inertia. In addition to learning about 
momentum through moving with our own bodies, we also learn about it through carrying
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and pushing other objects. This kind o f experience gives us a sense of the effect that 
greater or lesser amounts o f mass have on momentum. From carrying or pushing objects 
of different masses over varying terrain, we know that it takes greater effort to gain 
momentum with larger masses, and that once they gain speed, they have more 
momentum than smaller  masses and thus take more force to controL
In my conversations with students at Curtis, ail of the comments concerning 
momentum occurred in the context o f discussing how to play a specific passage. These 
comments involve the question of effort as it interacts with mass and terrain. Rather 
than being stated in the terms I analyzed earlier as integrating toward a sense of 
momentum — PITCH, volume, and changing pulse — they relate to an imagined 
personal interaction with musical mass in musical terrain.
Technical Effort vs. Effort o f Momentum
The effort embodied by musical sound can be a matter of the real, technical effort 
involved m actually accomplishing the sounding of notes or it can be a matter of 
apparent effort — the player making something that is technically simple sound effortful 
for the sake o f musical momentum. Deanne van Rooyen, a harpist who was also an 
accomplished pianist made this clear to me through examples taken from her experience 
with Chopin’s Ballade in G Minor (opus 23). Deanne spoke many times of either 
making passages that were not technically difficult sound effortful or allowing passages 
that were difficult to sound that way. For instance, in the passage from mm. 68-76 
(Example S.4, next page), Deanne talked about the melodic figure that first appears in
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the right hand in measure 69 as an octave leap. Describing why she had to make it sound 
difficult (although it wasn’t technically difficult for her), she said,
you have to get the sense that there’s a big distance from, on an octave 
[playing the figure in 69]. Not [and she plays it again, and the octave 
doesn’t have the sense of difficulty she’s talking about].
She went on to say and demonstrate that each time this figure appeared (in m. 73 from 
the half note G to the dotted quarter note A fiat, in m. 74 as the half note F to the dotted 
quarter G), she tried to make it sound difficult so that it seemed like a larger leap than it 
realty was. When I asked Deanne how she made something that was technically easy 
sound difficult, she replied, “You think it’s difficult.” As with Reza above, this is again a 
situation where embodied imagining of the music affects the sound produced by the 
player and perceived by the listener.
432
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
As her encuhurated listener, I took this all to say something about the momentum 
of the passage. The whole passage is marked piano, so there is not a lot of mass to the 
sound substance. In addition, the melodic line begins low, but leaps upward near the 
beginning and follows a very gentle incline downward from there. Therefore, because 
the music is soft (thus lacking in mass) and the incline gentle, the momentum may be 
generally on the low side. However, in its forward movement, it encounters a number of 
large leaps. The effort made in executing those leaps helps to give the sound momentum 
and propel it forward. To narrate the passage in more detail, it begins on a relatively low 
note, an F, and moves gently down to an E flat. This step down in terrain with a 
relatively small mass does not provide much momentum. The need to make the octave 
leap to the E flat sound effortful stems from the fact that the passage has a low amount 
o f momentum. The effortful sounding octave leap provides a push to the forward 
momentum of the sound. The sound, still quiet and without much momentum, then 
floats gently downward a fourth to a B flat, after which it makes another effortful leap of 
an octave. From that point on, it moves generally downward in stepwise motion, with 
fewer upward motions than downward.
The two other notes in the passage that Deanne tries to make sound “difficult” 
are the A flat and G on the fifth quarter note of measures 73 and 74 respectively.
Instead o f being large intervals like the “difficult” intervals that preceded them, these are 
small intervals, a half step and a whole step, respectively. Why should these small 
upward intervals be made to sound difficult and not other small upward intervals that
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precede them? Since they echo the earlier E flat figure in rhythm, they suggest the same 
kind o f pushing forward that it provided in the effort necessary to cover the distance of 
an octave. Each o f these figures moves down a fourth for the eighth note and then up a 
third. Except for the previous octaves, these are the largest intervals in this melodic 
passage. They momentarily interrupt the gentle float downward, and the effort they 
require provides a boost in momentum that propels the melody finally downward to the 
F in m. 76, where a repetition o f the same passage begins.
In the case above, Deanne described a situation in which a technically easy 
passage must be made to sound effortful in order to suit the requirements of musical 
momentum. Later, she discussed a situation in which a technically difficult passage 
should sound difficult in order to suit musical requirements. Measures 118-124 
(Example 5.5, next two pages) follow a section that is marked fortissimo in which both 
hands are each playing two to four notes at all times, and the sustaining pedal is used 
much of the time. This creates the effect o f a very large sound mass that, in context, 
sounds triumphant and joyful. At 118, the music changes somewhat. It retains the 
quality o f a large sound mass, with the right hand playing in octaves and the left a series 
of fourths and fifths that fill in the octaves to complete the chords. The right hand 
octaves make a series of three ascents up an octave by step, landing on F#, G# and B, 
respectively.
The musical sound at this point embodies the patterns o f someone trying to push 
a large object up a hill. If the player were technically able to make this sound easy, and
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did so, it would not seem right. We know that it is difficult to move large objects op 
hills. To make it sound easy would draw attention to the amazing strength (technique) 
of the player and not to the music o f the phrase. In this culture, where the music should 
be the center o f attention, not the player, this would constitute a musical faux pas.9 It is 
much more musical to allow this difficult passage to sound difficult, to fill the sound with 
the effort made to make it and thus a sense of slowing momentum as the sound moves 
toward and finally “crests” the apex of the passage (the B in m. 122). After the sound 
reaches the apex, it cascades easily downward in measures 124-25 and then for the next 
four measures, roils around, static in forward movement and terrain covered, but still full 
of the momentum o f the effort made earlier in the passage. Whereas in the earlier case, 
technical effort did not equal appropriate musical effort, in this case, the effort it took 
Deanne technically to produce the sound matched the effort it might take to move this 
musical mass over this particular musical terrain.
We can see from the above that producing musical momentum is a matter of 
imagmalty being inside the blended musical realm. In order to be musical, the music 
must not sound effortless. However, the apparent effort must not stem from actual 
technical effort. Rather, it must stem from the imagined effort necessary to move the 
musical mass over musical terrain. In order to accomplish this imagined effort, the 
player must not feel and project the effort of any real technical difficulties involved
’Contrast this with the culture of Indian classical music in which, sometimes, part of the fun of a 
musical evening is witnessing great feats of technique by the players. During a flashyjhala, the musical 
sound is enjoyable, but so is openly sharing one’s amazement at the technical accomplishment of the 
player producing the sound.
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(unless, as in the second case above, the technical effort matches the effort of 
momentum). Rather, they must feel and project the effort o f moving musical mass over 
musical terrain. Through that projection, the music embodies the patterns and qualities 
o f momentum. If a player did not understand musical momentum, and simply played 
through the notes without a concern for projecting it, in places where the technical effort 
matched the effort of momentum, a listener might feel a sense o f momentum. However, 
in places where the technical effort did not match the effort of momentum, the music 
would probably sound like ‘just notes.”
In order to make sense of and engage with (or live) the sense of momentum, the 
listener must also listen from  the point o f view o f the blended musical realm. If he had 
no experience of this blended musical realm, he would simply hear pitches of varying 
volumes at varying tempos. In example 5.5 above, he would hear a very loud, ascending 
passage that slowed. He might take this as effortful, but would take it as technical 
effort, not the effort involved in musical momentum. Making sense o f and living the 
quality of momentum, as well as other such musical qualities, involves not only the 
integration o f invoked elements like pitch, volume and pulse. It also requires integrating 
these elements from a specific, point o f view. That point of view is informed by both 
moving through the real world and understanding the analogy between moving through 
the real world and moving through the imaginal blended musical realm. It is the logic o f 
the blended musical realm that makes the integration o f pitch, volume and tempo bear
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on a sense o f the effort o f momentum and not on a sense o f the technical effort o f 
producing notes.
I tu rn  now  to  tw o o th er m etaphors that are m ade possible by the em ergent logic 
o f  the blended m usical realm: d irectio n  and scaling effects.
DlRECTfON
Once the blended musical realm is in place, other metaphorical qualities, such as 
DIRECTION, are made possible by its newly created logic. In order to examine this, I will 
explore three kinds o f evidence: I) a definition of d irection  and the aspects o f that 
definition that point to its nature as part of the emergent logic of the blended musical 
realm, 2) a diagram of d ir ec tio n  and how it suggests aspects o f both MESMs at the 
same time, and 3) the logical conditions of each MESM and how both must be in place 
at the same time for d irectio n  to occur.
d irectio n  can be correlated with the dictionary definition of “direction.” The 
meaning that it most corresponds to is “the line or course on which something is moving 
or is aimed to move or along which something is pointing or facing” (Merriam-Webster, 
236). This definition suggests a path  schema, with a beginning point and a path that 
stretches before the “thing moving.” It does not necessarily entail an ending or goal 
point. Musical d irectio n , however, entails beginning, path and goal point, which is in 
itself a simple image schema. However, musical direction  does not correspond to only 
the simple image schema o f beginning, path and goal Rather, it also entails the thing 
moving along the path as well. In other words, the “thing moving” is also the course on
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which it moves, so therefore, that course becomes a quality of the “thing moving.” At 
each moment that the music sounds it at once creates a moving “thing” and suggests the 
course that the thing will take.
However, direction is more than just a matter of a thing moving along a path 
that is a quality of that thing. The idea of a “thing” moving along a “path” suggests the 
kind of direction that occurs in the location MESM, where a musical figure moves along 
and is constrained by a harmonic-rhythmic path or moves in an upward or downward 
direction through musical space. Instead, direction indexes a more complex 
phenomenon, one that is a matter of CONSTRAINT of potentially unruly musical flows and 
forces. Both musical momentum and music is a  vehicle suggest that flows of musical 
forces course through the terrain of this blended musical realm. In order for those 
sounds to be considered “musical” (and not just notes), they must “have direction.”
Note that, phrased this way, direction is not just the way a musical object or figure is 
pointing, as in “go in a direction.” Instead, it is a quality possessed by the sounds 
themselves. Musical sounds not only “go” in a direction, they “have” that direction as 
well. Both linguistic constructions are used and generally imply one another. Music that 
“goes” somewhere “has” direction; music that *1138” direction “goes” somewhere. This 
duality o f expression and image points to the blended nature o f the imagmal gestalt of 
this metaphorical construct.
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The complex and dual nature of this construct can also be seen in the diagrams 
used to teach it to students. As a young flutist learning to control volume levels, I first 
learned the concept o f DIRECTION with the aid of a diagram similar to the following:
Diagram 5.1, Bach’s Sonata for Unaccompanied Flute
At first glance, this might be seen to be simply a diagram that suggests the constraint 
of volum e— an aid to disciplining the volume levels o f individual notes so that they 
conform to some overall plan, rather than the disordered series o f volumes that might 
stem from the technical difficulties of sound production.10
However, with a second look it is apparent that the diagram is not just a matter 
o f CONSTRAINT o f volume. Two elements of the diagram suggest that it embodies a 
more complex construct. First, the over-arching line is pointing in a particular direction 
toward a particular note. This indicates that the volume levels are not important in and 
of themselves, but rather as part of a disciplined move toward a particular goal note.
10 On the flute, the lower register, which most of this passage is in, can be difficult to play loudly. If the 
flutist was not proficient in playing the low notes loudly, he would probably fade to the initial F, rather 
than getting louder.
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Second, the apex o f the directional shape shows the CLIMAX of this phrase, while the end 
o f the shape shows the last note o f ft.
As a student, I learned from this diagram to not only discipline the volume levels 
of individual notes, but to also discipline the timbre o f those notes to suggest more or 
less musical INTENSITY. These elements, when included with the “forward motion” of 
the sound indicated by the over-arching arrow, added up to a sense o f musical 
m o m e n t u m ,  so that, rather than a c o n s t r a in t  of v o l u m e / in t e n sit y  as it relates to 
forward movement toward a goal, for me this represents a c o n s t r a in t  of m o m e n t u m .
Either way you consider this diagram, whether as a c o n s t r a in t  of 
v o l u m e / in t e n sit y  as it relates to forward movement toward a goal, or a c o n s t r a in t  
of m o m e n t u m ,  it points to the dual, blended nature of the construct. If you view it as a 
c o n s t r a in t  of v o l u m e / in t e n sit y  as it relates to forward movement, you can see traces 
of the logic of the location MESM in the notion of forward movement. You can also see 
traces o f the logic of the substance MESM in the concern with VOLUME and in t e n sit y . 
Alternatively, if you see the diagram as a c o n s t r a in t  of m o m e n t u m , since m o m e n t u m  
is part of the logic o f the blended musical gestalt, then c o n s t r a in t  of that MOMENTUM 
would also be part o f that logic.
As the above suggests, hnagmal gestalts each have a  logic that CONSTRAINS the 
events that can take place in them. In each of the MESMs, certain conditions are in 
place that govern what happens in the gestalt. If we look at each MESM individually, 
we can see that neither one alone would allow for DIRECTION to occur.
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The conditions o f the location MESM can be summed up as follows: from a 
distance, the listener observes the movement o f a musical figure through musical space. 
He observes that figure moving in various directions (upward/downward), forward to 
various locations. From his embodied experience in the world, he may know, logically, 
that some kind of force is causing that motion, but an awareness of that force is not 
immediate to him. Likewise, he may know that the figure may have momentum, but an 
awareness of it is not immediate. Therefore, he would not be aware of direction, since 
it embodies a constraint of MOMENTUM.
The conditions of the substance MESM can be summed up as follows: the 
listener observes the flows of musical substance from a position in the middle of those 
flows. He is aware of the sensations and qualities of the sound substance. He is not 
immediately aware of the long-term locations that those sounds will reach. Therefore, 
since direction is a matter of a constraint of volume/ intensity as it relates to 
forward movement toward a goal-location, he would not be aware of direction.
Instead, awareness o f direction requires that the blended imaginal musical realm be in 
place for the listener. He needs to be aware of both the flows and forces of the sound, as 
well as the terrain and locations that that sound wQl traverse.
direction is also discussed using a number of other names, such as “line,” 
“shape” and “phrasing.” All of these names, in differing ways, index the kind of 
CONSTRAINT of forces I have been discussing here. This theoretical construct is much 
more complex than I have presented here. My purpose has not been to give an
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exhaustive analysis o f this metaphor, but to argue that it is made possible by the 
emerging logic of the blended musical realm. Without the blended musical realm, with 
its negative musical terrain and the possibility of both the player and the listener “getting 
into” the frame and feeling momentum , DIRECTION would not be possible.
S c a lin g  E f f e c ts
Another metaphor that I have noted as part of the emergent logic o f the blended 
musical realm is that o f scaling effects. While 1 have not heard this specific term used 
at all, many linguistic expressions used in talking about this music make sense only by 
reference to it. The term “scaling effects” refers to the differences in behavior and 
properties of animals and things that are near the limits of the range of sizes.
[S]caling things up or down changes their behavior.... [A]s you scale up 
from bugs to beasts, weight increases as the cube of the animal’s size (its 
volume), while muscle strength increases as only the square o f its size (its 
cross-sectional area). In general, things seem “heavier” in proportion to 
their size as you scale up and “lighter” as you scale down (Hively 1998,
88).
Scaling effects explain why fleas can jump so many times their own height, while 
elephants can barely leave the ground.
In the blended musical realm, scaling effects come into play in the different 
“characters” assigned to instruments of different sizes. For example, consider the 
piccolo and double bass, to contrast two instruments at different ends of the scale for 
size. The piccolo often plays music that could be characterized as “showy”—very fast, 
with many notes, and often with a very light articulation and many trills. It is not
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uncommon to characterize this kind of piccolo music as “bird-like,” or to compare it 
with other light, high, fast-moving phenomena, such as wind or fairies. In contrast to 
piccolo music, the double bass is often given music that is slow and lumbering, with 
many glissandos that exploit the technical difficulties of moving from one note to another 
on this large instrument. As in the case of the piccolo and birds, it would not be unusual 
to see bass music compared to a large, slow-moving animal or other, similar phenomena.
This kind of characterization is made possible, in part, through the emergent logic 
of the blended musical realm. Through this space move musical “objects” or 
“characters” with various qualities—size and physical characteristics. The listener is “in” 
the space, moving through it with the music, sensing the qualities o f that motion. 
Through sensing the qualities of motion, the listener can grasp the size o f a creature or 
moving object because the quality of motion of a “figure” indexes the size of the creature 
or object making that motion.
Co n c lu sio n
In this chapter, I have argued that some of the complex metaphors used in 
describing music and musical experience, such as g e ttin g  in to  i t  and m usic is a  
v e h ic le , are part o f a process of blending the two simpler MESMs into a single, more 
complex imaginal musical realm. In addition, I have argued that other, related complex 
metaphors, such as m om entum , d ire c tio n , and s c a lin g  e f f e c ts  are possible because 
o f the emergent logic o f that blended musical realm and because of the addition of other 
imaginal gestalts based on embodied experience in the real, physical world.
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The logic o f the blended musical realm is the point o f view from which one must 
integrate the musical elements either directly invoked by the sound wave (as in PITCH and 
VOLUME on the first level) or metonymically invoked by the first level elements (as in 
line or INTENSITY' on the second level). That logic is what constrains the integration of 
these elements toward a bearing on living them as “music, ” not on understanding and 
experiencing them in some other fashion (as when a listener hears the effort of 
momentum as technical effort). Thus, the blended musical realm is what makes third 
level musical experience possible. When someone listens from the point o f view of the 
blended musical realm, he is not realty “in” this realm. What is realty true is that this 
realm exists imaginally in him. From the point o f view of this imaginal realm, he can 
recognize and feel musical realities like m omentum , direction , and scaling effects. 
He can also be transported  by the music.
While it may have seemed artificial to some readers whose main experience with 
music at this point in their lives is “being into it” to separate this single, experientialty 
rich and eventful imaginal gestalt into two, separate MESMs, I believe it is theoretically 
necessary to do so for a number o f reasons. First, it explains why we so often have two 
words for what seems to be the same aspect o f musical events, e.g., bridge/modulation, 
notes/sound, dynamics/volume. Alternatively, it clarifies why we have two different 
conceptions of the same word, e.g. “beat” as location on musical path vs. “beat” as pulse 
o f sound substance or “rhythm” as pattern of movement in time vs. “rhythm” as musical
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flow. In addition, it elucidates why those two sets o f words form two groups o f 
metaphors that are consistent with one another.
Second, it helps to explain the varying grammatical modes used in describing 
these experiences. As I argued earlier, varying modes of use of verbal aspect, deixis, and 
nominalizations are consistent with the notion of two separate MESMs and blends of 
them.
Third, separating this musical realm into two parts helps to explain both the 
meaning and cultural centrality o f the metaphor getting into it. Following the logic of 
this metaphor, we know that there must be an “it” to get into and that there must also be 
a different, but related, way o f experiencing the “it” before one enters i t  This suggests 
different levels of intensity o f musical experience that correspond with the notion of 
simpler and more complex musical events. These simpler and more complex musical 
events, in turn, correspond with the events based on MESMs and a blend of the MESMs, 
respectively.
Fourth, separating the blended musical realm can also begin to help us to 
understand the duality of experience some musicians report. Laura Caramelino reported 
losing herself to music, allowing it to carry her on. At the same time, in another part of 
the conversation, she talked about controlling the sound she was producing, attending to 
both what was happening in the moment (synchronic awareness) and where the music 
was eventually going (diachronic awareness) at the same tune. Clearly, she sometimes is 
“into” the musical event experiencing it, and sometimes is “outside” of it producing it.
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When she is producing it, she reports needing to be aware of aspects of both MESMs at
the same time.
In the midst o f a discussion of musical motion, Janet Miller and I came up with
another example o f a duality of experience.
J: The music is in control of the motion. If you listen to the relationship between
the notes like this? This is a big flourish o f a scale. And it, you might even speed 
up a hair at the end and then slow down there. [Sings.] Not necessarily 
noticeably, but just enough to give it a sense of motion.
D: Yeah. A lot of the things you’ve been talking about are sort of having to do with
shaping that motion in one way or another.
J: Because it’s all there. I kind of like it to propel itself.
D: Is that what for you, in large part, kind o f separates playing notes from playing
music? is that sense of motion being there? that you’re going somewhere and 
there’s...
J: Rather than “going somewhere,” “going somewhere” seems to me if that’s the
method, is to go somewhere, it seems to me it’s sort of on the surface? To me, 
urn... thinking about the relationship between the notes sort of results in going 
somewhere.
D: Ah.
J: Because it’s more... I don’t know how to explain it. It’s just more intense.
D: It sounds like a kind of a being there, but a being there that is going somewhere
at the same time you ’re being there?11
"Since /  made this statement and not Janet, [ would like to be quite clear about the chronology of events 
as this conversation relates to the writing of this dissertation. I had this conversation and made this 
comment well before I began to think in terms of two musical event structure metaphors. At this point 
in time, I knew that I was probably going to write about music as an “event,” one that corresponded 
more to the location dual of Lakoff s event structure metaphor. I had not yet made the connection 
between the two sets of metaphorical terms I was encountering and two internally consistent MESMs. 
This statement was only a description of experience that I had had and suspected that Janet was trying to 
describe, not a statement that was in any way influenced by my thinking about two MESMs and Wends.
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J: Yeah.
The notion o f “a being there that is going somewhere at the same time you’re 
being there” corresponds quite well with the idea of the two MESMs, as well as the idea 
that they can blend into a single metaphor. The location dual emphasizes the experience 
of “going somewhere,” while the substance dual stresses the experience o f “being there.” 
If you experience both “at the same time,” the operating metaphor is a blend of the two. 
However, it is still possible in the midst o f the blend to become aware of the different 
elements that produce the blend.
Finally, understanding the complexities of musical experience helps us to better 
understand the complexities o f music. If we truly understand that music is not a free 
standing object, that it exists as “music ” only in the experience o f people who hear it, 
that those people, indeed, become the living media fo r its existence, we will approach it 
differently, both in the way we theorize about it and in the way we teach it. Most 
theorizing about Western art music has been accomplished from the point o f view of the 
location MESM, a point of view that reduces music to something much less than it really 
is. If we teach music, both how to play it and how to appreciate it, from an 
understanding based on that incomplete theorizing, we are teaching from a position that 
undermines the very goals we are trying to reach. The point is that, since music exists as 
“music” only in the experience o f the listener, musical experience and “music” are one 
and the same. We must understand musical experience in order to truly understand 
music.
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Conclusion
S u m m a ry
This dissertation assumes that the process of discovery and explanation are best 
served when the nature o f the epistemology utilized is consistent with the nature of the 
phenomenon being investigated. This assumption stems from an understanding of 
conceptual metaphor, which tells us that when an abstract situation is conceived 
metaphorically as if it were a more concrete situation, the following occurs: the 
structure and logic o f the concrete event are integrated with the percepts of the abstract 
event toward a bearing on understanding the structure and logic o f the abstract event in 
terms o f that of the concrete event. In other words, both structure and logic are 
“mapped” from the concrete event onto the abstract event. Therefore, because structure 
and logic are borrowed from one event and integrated to another, if an epistemology 
uses conceptual metaphor, both the structure and logic o f the concrete event should be 
consistent with the structure and logic of the abstract event. Since we investigate and 
explain in terms o f this structure and logic, if inconsistencies exist between epistemology 
and phenomenon, we will misconstrue both the structure and logic of the phenomenon 
under study.
Both “music” and “notes” are phenomena that exist meaningfully as “music” and 
“notes” only in the experience o f enculturated listeners. Thus, if the basic assumption of 
a necessary consistency between epistemology and phenomenon is correct, the 
epistemology required for investigating “music” and “notes” and any meaning that arises
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in relation to them should center on human experience. The specific kind o f human 
experience must be consistent with the nature o f the musical experience in question. In 
the case of Western art music, for an enculturated listener, although the sound wave 
does not manifest such qualities and events in the same manner as does the music, the 
music manifests qualities and events such as motion, force, tension, relaxation, 
stability/instability, intensity, gesture and momentum. We know these qualities and 
events as non-musical qualities and events through living in and through a body, moving 
through terrains and interacting with moving objects and substances. Therefore, 
integrating them with the sound wave in the process of producing music must, of 
necessity, involve the body. We know the musical sound wave as motion, force, tension 
(and so on) through aspects o f ourselves gained in embodied experience in the physical 
world. The epistemology used to investigate music and its meaning must therefore 
involve the experience of living in and through a body, moving through terrains and 
interacting with moving objects and substances.
The objectivist epistemology at the base of most writing about musical meaning 
involves a specific kind of embodied human experience interacting with the world. This 
epistemology is based on an analogy to visual and manual behavior in the world, 
specifically to the behavior o f building larger structures (buildings or machines) from 
smaller parts. However, when applied to knowing, the structure and logic are not 
mapped in a straightforward manner: the building o f larger structures from smaller parts 
does not involve the whole body. Rather, it involves only the mind and senses.
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Based on the structure and logic integrated from manual manipulation of parts 
into wholes, this analogy gives rise to the following epistemologkal and philosophical 
tendencies: I) understanding phenomena under study as a collection of separate parts, 
each of which has its own essential nature and function; 2) understanding the parts as not 
necessarily relating to or cohering with one another; 3) understanding these separate 
parts as “basic,” meaning the level at which both understanding and explanation should 
begin; 4) modeling phenomena as structural or mechanic blueprints, thereby mapping 
relatively atemporai geometric and/or mechanical logic onto the phenomena under study; 
and 3) trusting only evidence that can be “seen,” “grasped” and “measured.”
The above tendencies condition the way that objectivism models human beings, 
their relationship with one another and the external world, and the process of 
communication. Objectivism models human beings as a collection of parts that are 
relatively separate in function. The mind is the most important part that accomplishes 
the most necessary functions: intelligence, imagination and perception (after the portal 
senses interface with the outer world). The body is a brute slave to the mind. Likewise, 
objectivism models the relationship between human beings and their environment as if it 
were part of a humanly built object. Human beings are seen as relatively separate from 
their environment and from one another and therefore, some manner must exist of 
connecting them with both their environment and each other. That connection is 
supplied by language. Words are “packages” of meaning that correspond exactly to 
natural categories in the world. They therefore can be used to create representations in
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the mind that connect the individual with the outside world in a “true” and “objective” 
fashion. In addition, words can be sent through the “conduit” of speaking or writing, 
transmitting meaning packages from person to person thereby connecting heretofore 
unconnected individuals. By decoding the words, the mind o f the listener recreates the 
mental representation sent by the speaker, thus “seeing” and “grasping” her “true” 
meaning. Communication, then, is understood as a matter o f the mechanical encoding, 
transmission, reception and decoding of meaning-objects that strive toward a “true” and 
“objective” mental representation o f states o f affairs in either the objective or subjective 
world.
Under objectivism, then, as a communicative process, music becomes subject to 
the logic of the representation schema, with its emphasis on reference, truth, and 
meaning as “content.” It becomes a meaning-object to be decoded or understood by 
dissecting it into its constituent parts. The listener performs perceiving, decoding and 
imagining primarily with her brain, in conjunction with ears and relevant nerve pathways, 
which transmit the sound information to the brain.
The objectivist view of the musical meaning situation is in stark contrast to my 
experience and understanding of it. For me, musical meaning occurs in a fashion in 
which the whole body engages intimately with the sound wave, integrating culturally 
defined metaphoric structure and logic with personal experiential gestalts toward a 
bearing on the merging of self with the transcendent reality o f “music,” as well as other 
transcendent realities that the music may symbolize. Human beings become the resonant
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medium for music’s existence and musical experience becomes the energetic medium in 
which transcendent realities come into and maintain their existence. Through integrating 
us as subsidiary particulars toward a bearing on a reality that transcends our individual 
lives, resonant meaning determines, in part, the meaning of our lives.
The nature o f musical meaning, as described above, is inconsistent with the 
objectivist epistemology. Musical meaning is clearly experience centered and thus 
should be explored by means of an experienced centered epistemology, such as the 
epistemology outlined in chapter two, which combines Johnson and Lakoff s embodied 
realism with Polanyi’s tacit knowing. Rather than being based on an analogy, this 
epistemology is grounded in the idea or image o f human beings as creatures who have 
evolved in the earthly and social environments for meaningful action in those 
environments. Based on the experience of a human being who interacts with and adapts 
to her environment, who both creates and is created by her environment, this grounding 
image gives rise to the following epistemological and philosophical tendencies:
1) understanding phenomena under study in a holistic fashion, with the whole being 
logically prior to the parts; 2) understanding the parts as metonymic in nature, that is, as 
subsidiary particulars with the inherent power to integrate toward a bearing on the whole 
(standing in co-creative relationship to each other and to the whole) and deriving their 
meaning from their participation with each other in the whole; 3) understanding “basic" 
as a function of human experience (not a natural category o f the objective world), and 
thus defining it as a matter of human interaction with the world: the level at which that
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interaction is most psychologically simple; 4) modeling phenomena with human-centered 
models, thereby encompassing the diachronic change that human adaptation to the 
environment requires; and 5) trusting not only evidence that can be seen, grasped and 
measured, but also evidence that can be heard, smelled, tasted, and felt (in all o f the 
senses o f the word “to feel”).
This epistemology conditions a view of human beings, their relationship to one 
another and the world, and the process of communication very different from that of 
objectivism. Human beings are not understood as essentially separate from the 
environment; rather we have been (and continue to be) created by and for the 
environment Thus we are already at one with it. In addition, this epistemology takes 
human beings as whole creatures whose parts function and participate co-creatively, as 
when body movement helps a conductor to imagine the music before she conducts. This 
leaves room for an expanded view of such faculties as intelligence, imagination and 
perception. Rather than being a matter o f quickness o f mental storage or 
encoding/decoding, intelligence is conceived of as a matter of how quickly the whole 
organism adapts, tacitly or explicitly, bodily and mentally, to the challenges o f the 
environment.1 Imagination, too, is conceived in a different manner. It is not understood 
as primarily a liminal function of mental representation separate from everyday life. 
Rather, imagination is closely allied with intelligent, whole-bodied adaptation to and
1 Please note that the phrase “tacitly or explicitly” may be misleading to those who have not well 
internalized the tacit knowing schema. It gives the impression that one or the other of these adjectives 
will apply. However, since alt explicit knowledge is rooted in tacit knowing, all explicit knowledge 
involves tacit knowing as a matter of course. To be more exact, I would have to write “tacitly or tacit- 
explicitly.”
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action in the environment, functioning tacitly or explicitly to bring new perspectives to 
that process.2 It can also operate in special, liminal realms of life, but if it is functioning 
well, it is available and operational on an everyday basis. Perception is not understood 
as a matter of breaching the boundary between the inner self and outer world, 
accomplished only with the “portal” senses and the brain. Rather, senses are whole­
bodied organs o f awareness, alertness, and attention that help us to engage with not only 
the natural environment, but the social environment, as well. This definition expands the 
usual list of senses to include such embodied, socially inflected senses as the sense of 
humor, the sense of modesty, the sense of honor and the sense of melody. In addition, 
this definition allows us to see how embodied imagination acts as a sensory organ, as we 
use it to track events in the environment.
The commitment to the ground of human engagement with the world means that 
meaning, and everything related to it — truth, understanding, categories, concepts, etc. 
— are all relative to human experience in interacting with the environment. Meaning and 
truth are human constructions made and used in the course of everyday living. They are 
part of the energetic matrix o f understanding and motivation in and through which we 
conduct our lives. In this way of thinking, it is taken as a given that human beings and 
other creatures evolved in a way that enables them to live meaningful lives in the earthly 
and social environments.
2 Or, as in the case of the fearful woman discussed in chapter two, operating dysfunctionally to keep the 
individual stuck in an old perspective.
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The postulation that both people and animals live meaningful lives suggests that 
meaning is functionally prior to communication; Le., rather than meaning being a 
function of communication, communication is a function of meaning. I f  this is true, then 
the basis fo r understanding meaning will be found not by examining verbal 
communication alone, but rather by examining the land o f meaningful, embodied 
engagement with the environment that we and other animals can accomplish without the 
involvement o f communication.3 Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing provides us with a 
theory of meaning so grounded in embodied engagement with the environment. In this 
theory, meaning arises when an event invokes the tacit, embodied integration of 
subsidiary particulars into a bearing on a meaningful focal whole, which determines the 
meaning of the subsidiary particulars. The invoking event, subsidiary particulars, and 
focal wholes may occur internally and/or externally to the individual who makes 
meaning. Meaning, then, is a creative process that knits together external and internal 
realms at the same time that it integrates parts toward a bearing on wholes. When 
viewed in this light, it can be seen that, rather than meaning being confined to the process 
of communication, the vast majority of meaning processes on the earth are not related to 
communication. Plants and animals, as well as people, perform meaningful integrations 
with their environment constantly, or they die.4
1 In this statement, I do not use the term “communication” in the richer sense that I have been, based on
Dewey’s “process of creating participation.” Rather, I use it in the sense that it has come to have due to
the influence of the conduit metaphor, “a process by which meanings are exchanged between 
individuals through a common system of symbols” (Merriam-Webster 168).
4 And even when living entities die; they become part of the meaningful integrations of other living 
entities.
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Several objections might be made to the above point of view. It might be 
objected that I am simply conflating different senses o f the word “meaning” or 
“meaningful”: being or having purport, intent, purpose, significance, denotation, or 
connotation. However, Polanyi’s schema of meaningful knowing makes it clear that, 
rather than being different in kind, these senses o f “meaning” are different in aspect.
Each of these glosses refers to a different aspect o f the whole meaning process as 
described by Polanyi. Another objection may be that to place artistic or communicative 
meaning in the same class with such biological meanings as ingesting nutrients and 
respiring trivializes their value. To that objection, I would respond that it is simply a 
matter o f perspective. To me, rather than trivializing artistic or communicative meaning, 
this perspective lifts the value of biological meaning to the level where it belongs.
In the human being, meaningful integrations occur in many different areas and on 
many different levels at the same time. Each higher level is invoked metonymically by 
lower levels, with the focal outcome o flower levels becoming subsidiary particulars 
integrated toward a bearing on the focal outcome of higher levels. In musical meaning, 
on the lowest level, the physical sound wave integrates with the listener's neuro-biology 
and tacit cultural knowing toward a bearing on hearing PITCH, VOLUME, duration, timbre, 
consonance, dissonance, and location. These simpler percepts integrate with the 
culturally inflected embodied musical senses and other tacit knowing, such as a 
knowledge o f the two musical event structure metaphors, toward a bearing on making 
sense of musical sound. Musical sound then integrates with the listener’s personal
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experiential gestalts, including experience with the blended musical realm, toward a 
bearing on living the qualities and events embodied by the musical sound. At that point, 
not only does the musical sound give body to these qualities and events, the listener’s 
body does, as welL The listener becomes the living medium for the music, resonating to 
and with it. If she understands the music as symbolic for an aesthetic or social reality 
that transcends herself she will, while living the music, give life to that transcendent 
reality.
Just as “notes” and “music” exist as notes and music only in human experience, 
much of human reality — such as the social, political, educational, economic, aesthetic 
and religious — exists as human reality (not just physical reality) only in human 
experience. However, since these realities involve so many people acting in 
coordination, they seem to, and indeed do transcend the lives o f individuals. We, as 
individuals, stand in co-creative relationship to each other and these transcendent 
realities. We perform these creative acts in part through the semiotic flow.
Semiosis is usually modeled geometrically, with the sign acting as a structural 
medium between some aspect o f the inner world of the individual and some aspect of the 
outer world. Symbolic communication and third level musical communication in which 
the focal outcome involves the integration o f the individual’s sense of self with a 
transcendent reality suggest that, in addition to acting as a structural medium, signing 
acts as an ontological medium for an energetic, resonant level of communication to arise. 
In resonant communication an energetic meta-medium (analogous to the sound vibration
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in physical resonance) becomes the medium (similar to a bacteriologist’s nutritional 
medium) through winch individuals and transcendent social realities co-create one 
another/
Modeling signs as bridging structures emphasizes their nature as mediators. The 
logic of the bridge entails a clear separation between the individual’s inner and outer 
worlds, which signs “bridge.” Arising from this model is a persistent tendency to image 
human beings as always already separate from one another and from their semiotic 
environment. Even in our attempts to connect, mediation is right there, in front of us, 
getting in the way. While it is true that when communication fells, signs do seem to get 
in the way, when it succeeds, signs become either experientialiy transparent, as in the 
case of language, or extremely immediate, as in the case of music.
In contrast to the structural model, modeling signs as ontological media that give 
rise to the possibility o f an energetic meta-medium does not create this same emphasis on 
mediation. For this purpose, the metaphor of resonance serves welL As an energetic 
phenomenon based in material phenomena, the nature of resonance better matches that 
of the energetic level o f communication. In addition, the logic and structure of 
resonance seem to better match that of the experience of successful communication. The 
resonating vibration unites all parts o f the violin in a more immediate fashion than does 
the bridge. Following a -similar structure and logic, the energetic meta-medium made
5 The similarity in function between the energetic meta-medium and the bacteriologist’s nutritional 
medium, in which she cultures colonies of bacteria, suggests the semantic link between the 
bacteriological “culture” and the anthropological “culture:”
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possible by signs unites all parts of the semiotic situation in a fashion more experientialiy 
immediate than that entailed by the structural version of semiosis.
Above, I have summarized the general aspects of the theory of musical meaning 
developed in chapters one through three. This theory is grounded in my own experience 
and in the experience of other members of this musical culture, as it was available to me 
through their descriptions. My hope is that this dissertation and other publications based 
on it will test this theory against the experience of other members of this culture. This 
testing is one aspect of further research that might be accomplished. While this theory is 
grounded in experience with Western art music and other kinds of Western 
communicative media, I hypothesize that this general theory may apply to other kinds of 
communicative media in other cultures.
The general aspect of my theory pertains to the following theory of meaning, of 
which music is one kind: that an internal or external event invokes multi-leveled 
integration o f subsidiary aspects o f an individual’s energetic (and or biological) matrix 
toward a focal whole that may or may not be available to the individual’s awareness.
This general theory involves both metonymic and metaphoric processes. Metonymy is 
involved when an external invoking event supplies only part of the subsidiary particulars 
integrated toward a whole. Metaphor becomes involved when the individual creating 
meaning integrates structure and logic understood from a more concrete situation 
toward a bearing on understanding the structure and logic of a more abstract situation.
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My hypothesis is that these more general processes occur cross-culturalfy. This 
hypothesis remains to be tested.
GROUNDING METAPHORS
More distinct to specific cultures may be the exact metaphors metonymicaily 
invoked. In Western art music, these single metaphors relate to one another through two 
complex metaphors: 1) m u sical sound  as discrete figures m oving through
DIFFERENT MUSICAL LOCATIONS and 2) MUSICAL SOUND AS A FLOWING, FORCEFUL, 
MODULATING SUBSTANCE. These complex metaphors integrate the general of 
understanding of events in English (which is integrated from embodied experience in the 
world) with the sound wave toward a bearing on experiencing the musk: as eventful. 
Each o f the musical event structure metaphors can be logically invoked metonymicaily 
from one of the two first level, culturally defined metaphors: PITCH or volume. In 
addition, the two musical event structure metaphors can be conceptually integrated 
toward a bearing on a blended musical realm into which the listener can enter and be 
transported  by the music, feeling its m omentum  and direction .
These metaphors ground Western art music in three ways: semiotically, bodily, 
and socially. As I discussed in chapter three, musical sounds are multivalent in that they 
can be integrated by human beings in many ways that might function semiotically. Any 
of these aspects o f a sign may function as the sign; the aspect that functions semiotically 
is the ground o f the sign. For example, depending on both their musical context and 
how they are produced, tones of fester and lower frequency can seem higher or lower,
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narrower or broader, lighter or heavier, brighter or darker, or more tense or relaxed.
Any of these perceived qualities of tones might function semiotically. In general, in the 
culture o f Western art music, tones of fester and lower frequency can seem to be any of 
the above. However, o f these possibilities, we have chosen PITCH as primary, with the 
whole location MESM extending logically from it.6 Thus PITCH and the metaphors that 
extend logically from it ground semiotically our perception and understanding of 
Western art music. The same can be said about the other primary metaphor, volume, 
and the complex substance MESM that it entails.
These metaphors ground our experience of Western art music in bodily 
experience in the world. We can experience this music in the way that we do only 
because we have had bodily experience in the world. If we were purely mental beings 
(like the “advanced” creatures that have been portrayed in science fiction fantasies) we 
could not experience this music in the way that we do. Like the idea of purely mental 
beings, the notion o f the “purely musical” is a fantasy grounded in the objectivist 
portrayal of the world o f communication and meaning. It may be true that musical 
events may sometimes direct the listener’s attention intramusically, but the sign’s ability 
to direct attention is grounded in the listener’s integration of the sound wave with 
aspects of herself learned through embodied experience in the world. As an aspect of the 
embodied human meaning process, “the musical” cannot be “pure.” Rather, since it is
6 [f one of these other pairs, such as brightness/darkness were the primary metaphor, a totally different 
set of metaphoric entailments would arise. For instance, instead of being perceived as motion, frequency 
change would entail change of lightness.
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one of the many aspects of the energetic matrix, it is intimately bound up with other 
kinds of meaningful integrations between the individual and her environment.
As we saw in chapter one, working from an objectivist point o f view, Meyer 
discounts the importance in “the musical” o f the participatory body, which he calls 
“anticipatory motor attitudes.” Rather than seeing anticipatory motor attitudes as 
primary to musical understanding, he sees them as secondary — their participation 
stemming from other, more primary mentally or visually-based kinds o f interaction with 
the musical.
Anticipatory motor attitudes [...] are brought into play on the basis of:
(a) information as to composer, style, or form which leads the listener to 
expect a repetition o f past motor experience evoked by the particular type 
of work; (b) program notes or other statements as to tempo, volume, 
mode, mood, and so forth that supply information as to the appropriate 
motor attitude; and (c) visual clues provided by performers in the form of 
gestures and postures, which lead the listener to assume a like attitude...
(79).
He gives no clue as to how these connections can be made in the first place, that is, how 
they are grounded. I have argued that they are grounded in bodily perception and 
understanding through the metaphoric system I have explored in this dissertation.
Finally, because musical meaning is grounded by a set of metaphors learned from 
and shared by encuhurated group members, these metaphors serve to ground individual 
musical experience in group understanding. Musical experience is often portrayed to be 
extremely individual, as if one person’s experience of a piece is likely to differ wildly 
from another’s experience o f the same piece. It is true that, on the third ontological 
level, individuals may elaborate the sense o f the music in different ways. However, on
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the second ontological level, they are perceiving the music with similar embodied musical 
senses and thereby sensing a similar complex o f musically embodied image schemas. The 
image schemas involved are grounded semiotically in the metaphors, and thus these 
metaphors constrain the kind o f musical sense that can be made o f a particular piece. 
Even though someone else may hear that piece in a fashion that, on the surface, seems 
very different from my hearing, since the two hearings share image schematic 
involvement under the surface, I can almost always understand why the other person 
heard what they did. The learned metaphors ground our understandings socially, as well 
as semiotically and physically. We leam them as we interiorize our culture and they 
ground our experience in the semiotic system of the group. Thus grounded, our 
experience is always at least partially understandable to other members of the group.
One further major metaphor is involved in grounding this particular musical 
system: the metaphor o f music as “expression,” which was occasionally used by the 
students at Curtis. The students did not use this in the same way that music theorists 
have: trying to better understand the mechanics of musical meaning through an analogy 
to linguistic meaning. Rather, they used it in a manner that rings truer to experience: 
trying to explain the expressive quality of playing music or the sense that one 
interpretation might be more convincing than another. Of all the students that I spoke 
with, Reza Jacobs used this metaphor most explicitly. He likened a musician interpreting 
the musical notation to an actor interpreting the words of the play, pointing especially to 
the way that each actor will mold the same words to their own personal inflections.
465
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
R: I ask mysel£ now, “How is Reza going to say this? How do I want to say this
musical phrase.” Because that’s, that was like a revelation for me, you know? 
How would I say this for it to make sense for me? Because when I speak, when 
I'm speaking to you now, I'm using my own pauses, my own syntax, my own 
grammar, my own inflection. And it makes sense for me. But I could easily 
write these words down on a piece of paper and give them to someone else. And 
then they'd have to make those words make sense for them. They wouldn't give 
exactly the same inflection and the same timing that I would. So that's exactly 
how I, they're Hke words and I have to make them make sense for me.
D: Uh huh. And when you're playing, do you have a sense that, that same sense of
saying so m ething?
R; Yes, now more than before. Because I'm aware of it now. And although I think
I did it before, unconsciously, but now somehow it's clear in my mind.
In my own musical education, I did not learn this idea as “saying” something with the
music, but rather as the sense that I was “singing” the music instead of playing it on the
flute. Imagining that I “sang” rather than “played” helped me to attend past any
technical problems involved in producing notes to the “music” in those “notes.”
In the process o f interpreting music, this sense that you are expressing while
playing, or hearing expression while listening, relates to those aspects of music most
similar to spoken language, the aspects o f language referred to by the term
“paralanguage.” Paralanguage includes such aspects of speech as variations in
intonation, stress, vocal timbre, rhythm and quality o f articulation. These are the aspects
o f speech that vary most greatly in different emotional contexts; they carry a great deal
o f information about the emotional state o f the speaker. These are also the aspects o f
speech that, unlike words and informational content, do occur in music. Just as emotion
in spoken language may be conveyed by intonation, stress, timbre, rhythm and
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articulation, emotion in music may be conveyed by intonation, stress, timbre, rhythm and 
articulation. For example, just as a feeling o f aggression might be heard in words that 
are forcefully articulated at a fast tempo with a tense timbre, a feeling of aggression 
might be heard in music that embodies these same qualities. Just as a person hearing 
language integrates these qualities toward a bearing on feeling aggression in the speaker, 
a person listening to music integrates these qualities toward a bearing on feeling 
aggression in the musk;.
This link with paralanguage suggests that music as expression is not really a 
metaphor. Music simply uses the same qualities involved in the expressive aspects of 
language, shaping them in a heightened and artistic fashion. We do not “map” 
expressiveness from language to music or integrate the more concrete expressive 
structure and logic from language to the more abstract musical situation. Paralanguage 
and its musical counterparts are equally concrete. Rather than a metaphoric relationship, 
the expressive functions o f music and language relate to one another through being 
specific instances o f general aspects of human expressiveness. These same qualities can 
be expressed in different media, through the body in dance and costume, through 
narrative structure in film and literature, or through visual means in painting and 
photography.
This general expressive function might ground music cross-culturally to some 
degree. To a reasonable extent, and probably dependent on historical cultural 
connections, I can get a sense of the emotions conveyed in a language I do not
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understand through paratinguistic cues. To the extent that a musical system elaborates 
parcdinguistic cues similar to those I  embody in my paralinguistic sense, I might be able 
to understand its emotional cues. However, this hypothesis remains to be tested.
The point here is that, along with the metaphors discussed in detail in chapters 
four and five, music’s expressive function grounds it semiotically, bodily and socially.
The metaphors discussed in chapters four and five direct our attention mainly to the stu ff 
o f music. The expressive function directs our attention to the way that that stuff is used 
expressively. Not only do notes o f particular heights function semiotically, the way that 
those notes are articulated, their rhythm, stress and timbre function semiotically, as well. 
Not only do we perceive note height bodily, we perceive expressive functions bodily, as 
well, through bodies well experienced in personal expression. And as individuals formed 
by interaction with other individuals, our expression is ground in embodied, socially 
inflected experience interacting meaningfully with the environment.
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have explored the question of musical meaning, a question 
that has become increasingly urgent in recent years. Academic music discourse, like that 
o f other humanities and social science disciplines, has been undergoing a re-orientation 
o f focus from “knowledge” to “meaning.” Such theoretical constructs as “hegemony” 
and the “cultural imaginary” re-situate aesthetic processes from the margins o f social life
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to its center.7 “No longer mere fantasy..., simple escape..., elite pastime..., [or] mere 
contemplation..., the imagination has become an organized field of social practices, a 
form o f work..., and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and 
globally defined fields of possibility” (Appadurai 1996,31). We are beginning to realize 
that, far from being inconsequential entertainment, aesthetic processes play an important 
role in the construction of aspects o f social reality like gender and ethnic identity.
Ethnomusicology and related disciplines (such as folklore and performance 
studies) focus on how social meaning is created and maintained through the musical 
experience of the individual. We recognize that performers not only perform a “text,” 
they also perform such social meanings as identity or life possibilities (e.g., modeling 
aspirations that viewers may adopt). We now know that the power of performance 
extends beyond the text and performance arena into the daily lives of participants.
However, although we may recognize that social meaning is created in the 
musical experience of the individual, in attending primarily to the social aspects of 
meaning, we have not yet properly theorized “the musical experience of the individual.” 
That experience is one of meaning, a meaning that resonates through the whole body, 
often out of the reach of words. It is a meaning that connects the individual to social 
realities that dwell both in her and beyond her individual existence. Although we 
recognize that the meaning of performance extends beyond the text, we still often model 
imaginative meaning as “text,” as in “scripts for possible lives” (Appadurai 1996,3).
7 For more on the relationship of imagination to social reality, see Becker and Yengoyan 1979, Caughey 
1984, and Anderson 1991.
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Rather than taking the bodily resonance o f imaginative meaning into account, as well as 
the participation of the body in imagination, we continue to model imagining as the 
action of a mental site for representation — a mental “staging ground for action” (ibid 
7).* A theory of resonant meaning addresses these gaps.
Although empirical evidence has demonstrated clearly to scholars that 
imaginative processes play an important role in constructing social reality, the people of 
our society, in general, still do not understand their importance. Viewed through 
dominant (tacit) theories o f imagination (as discussed in chapter two), a theoretical split 
necessarily arises between everyday reality and imagination: social realities become the 
currency of everyday living, while aesthetic processes become disconnected from 
mundane life, located in a liminal realm. Thus, our society sees the imagination as a 
realm we escape to from time to tune, but that has no particular potency in the mundane 
world. While social realities like gender and race are known to be quite real, with 
concrete consequences for our lives, imaginary reality is seen as more unreal than real, 
with few concrete lived consequences. At most, the imaginary is a reality to be mentally 
“tried on,” but shed and left behind in the performance arena. Because mentally healthy 
people know the difference between “the real” and “the imaginary,” the power o f the
* Ethnomusicology, folklore and performance studies are not monolithic in nature, but rather are Gelds 
made up of individuals diverse in both their thinking and the theories they draw on. It is impossible to 
represent that diversity here. I choose Appadurai to represent my understanding of the general state of 
theorizing about imagination for several reasons. At the time of this writing, his thinking is influential; 
at the2000 conference of the Society for Ethnomusicology he delivered the Charles Seeger Lecture — 
an honor bestowed only on well-esteemed scholars. In addition, die theme of his recent, well-received 
book, M odernity at Large, is the way that imaginative processes construct social reality in a global 
setting. Although my field of “hearing” is necessarily partial, I have heard no outcry against his 
underlying theory of imagination from any of the Gelds that might draw on him. This suggests that it is 
currently acceptable, though perhaps, in its tacitness, unexamined.
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imaginary disappears when the movie theater is behind us, or the CD player, television or 
video game is turned off. This tacit theoretical vision forces imaginative power into a 
ghetto outside the boundaries o f our “real” lives. It may be a pretty ghetto, but it is a 
ghetto nonetheless — a ghetto whose boundaries prevent its inherent power from 
escaping from the margins of society to its center.
As scholars, it is our job to effect the positive social good of guiding society to a 
clearer understanding of the power and importance of imaginative processes. Up until 
this point, we have had no explicit theory of imagination sufficient to the task of helping 
us to do so. As I have argued in this dissertation, a theory of resonant meaning allows us 
to explicitly take the imaginary out of its ghetto and locate it theoretically in our 
everyday lives, where it has been operating all along. Polanyi’s structure of tacit 
knowing enables an understanding of imagining not only as a mental faculty at play in 
special, iimmal realms, but also as a whole-bodied faculty that evolved through daily 
interaction with the environment for the purpose of successful adaptation. This vision of 
imagining makes clear its creative role in perception, which is also viewed as whole­
bodied, a faculty o f alertness, awareness and attention. Especially in respect to living in 
a social world, “how we imagine the world to be” in a tacit, embodied fashion influences 
how we perceive the world through culturally inflected, embodied senses such as the 
senses of humor, modesty, honor, etc. Through perceiving the social world in a 
particular manner and behaving as if it is that way, we can actually create the very 
conditions we imagine.
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That we create reality through imagining suggests a “reality” different in nature 
from our culturally defined “realty real” Our usual version o f “the realty real” is 
modeled on the objectivist epistemology: reality as solid objects that can be seen, 
manipulated and measured. This is a reality whose philosophical bases are vision and 
touch — modeled after seeing and touching objects that, though they may fide in time as 
does a rose or may have a fleeting temporal presence as does flowing water, are 
relatively atemporal in their solidity. We can see these objects and prove their existence 
through having seen them, touched them, and measured them. This reality is at a 
distance from us, just as objects must be at a certain distance for us to see or manipulate 
them. It is not an internal reality, but the external reality o f “cold, hard feet” that would 
continue to exist even if we did not. This reality corresponds roughly to Peirce's 
“Secondness” — the being of actual feet — of specific instances of living beings, events 
or objects.9 In this kind o f reality the “imaginary,” such as an imaginary friend, becomes 
opposed to “reality,” thereby taking on the role o f “the unreal.” We cannot see or touch 
the imaginary friend, therefore she is unreal.
If, rather than sight and touch, our idea o f reality stems from hearing and 
kinesthesia (by which I mean the feeling of the lived body), a different version of reality 
emerges. This is a more immediate reality, one that does not occur at a distance but as 
experientialiy unmediated, just as we experience hearing and kinesthesia more
9 1 say that the correspondence is a rough one because events, such as the event of having a thought or a 
feeling, can seem very immaterial though they have a material basis. And indeed, having a thought or 
feeling cannot be reduced to their material bases.
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immediately than we do seeing and touching with the hands.10 Unlike the material reality 
described above, this reality does not exist outside human experience of it — it is a 
matter of human interaction with the world and would cease to exist if human beings 
did." Traces of it exist in the material environment, just as sound waves exist physically, 
but this kind of reality exists, as itself, only in human experience, just as music exists as 
music only in human experience. Based in material reality, this reality requires the 
organized energy of a human being to actually exist. It is an energetic reality that dwells 
in and through us at the same time that we dwell in and through it. The stuff o f this 
reality is not material, but energetic pattern — subsidiary particulars integrated by an 
individual in a meaningful way toward some larger whole. This stuff is not solid and 
atemporal, but exists in the flux of temporality — highly changeable as the individual 
interacts with and adapts to her environment. In its own way, this reality is just as real as 
the “objective” reality described above. In certain ways, this reality can seem more real 
than the material objective reality, as is true in the case o f hearing, where the lived reality 
(actual hearing) takes complete precedence over the material reality (neuro-bio logical 
transduction o f sound waves).
This reality corresponds to Peirce’s Firstness (qualitative possibility) and 
Thirdness (predictive possibility). Qualitative and predictive possibilities do not exist as
10 It may be obvious to a listener that a sound source is at a distance, but the experience of actually 
hearing seems more immediate than does seeing. Fix' more on the spatialization of sound, see Feld 
1982, Stoiler 1989, and Roseman 1991.
11 To be more exact, this kind of reality can also exist in the experience of animals.
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possibilities outside human experience of them.12 I may have an awareness of the 
possible quality o f balance and the predictive possibility that in building a house of cards, 
certain combinations will be balanced and other will not. Outside my experience, in the 
material world, exist cards, gravity and surfaces upon which a house o f cards may be 
built. From my embodied experience, I bring to the situation a sense of balance and from 
that a predictive sense of what combination o f cards will produce a balanced structure. 
These two realities interact in the process of building the house of cards. My sense of 
balance and predictive feeling for the situation are no less real in their own way than the 
cards, gravity or surface are materially real The results of the building session will exist 
not only in the material world, as whatever structure I create, but also in the energetic 
world, as I integrate this particular experience with cards toward a bearing on my general 
sense o f balance.
Corresponding to Peirce’s predictive possibility (Thirdness) is Polanyi’s definition 
of reality. He places reality on a continuum from specific instances (Peirce’s 
Secondness) to predictive possibilities, with predictive possibilities being “more real” 
than the specific instances that integrate toward a bearing on those predictive 
possibilities. He illustrates with the process o f coming to know a person:
[A]s we move to a deeper, more comprehensive, understanding o f a 
human being, we tend to pass from more tangible particulars to 
increasingly intangible entities: to entities which are (partly for this 
reason) more real: more real, that is, in terms of my definition of reality, 
as likely to show up in a wider range o f indefinite future manifestations 
(168).
12 Again, animals also exist in and through these kinds of possibilities as well as do people.
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In Polanyi’s way of thinking, the existence of the general concept of “dog” as a 
predictive possibility operative amongst a group o f English speakers is more real than an 
actual dog. I would not say that it is more real; rather that it is real in a different way. 
Both of these kinds o f reality — material and energetic — are necessary for life on this 
planet and exist in synergistic relationship.
To return to the initial concern of this conclusion, although the “imaginary” is 
clearly “unreal” when seen from the point of view of material reality, it can clearly be 
“real” in energetic reality.13 For the fearful acquaintance discussed in chapter two who 
imagined me to be threatening, I was really threatening. Her general concept of the 
world as threatening, her reality o f the world as threatening was so strong that it skewed 
the evidence in specific instances to conform to itself. I have no doubt that this woman 
truly felt me to be a threat. To a little girl who has an imaginary friend, in certain ways, 
that friend functions just as a materially real friend might function. She may feel just as 
real as a real friend. In an energetic way, she is just as real
Social realities are energetic in nature. Given the latent hegemony of objectivism 
in our thinking, we tend to project social realities outside ourselves, reifying them in the 
process. We nominalize them into objects: gender, race, education, politics, economy, 
social class, age, religion, etc. As objectified realities that exist outside ourselves, we 
have little “real” responsibility for them. To be sure, these realities have some material
13 Bateson (1972) presents the paradox of the real unreal clearly with the following diagram:
All statem ents within this frame are  untrue]
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basis: bodily structures, skin colors, buildings, papers, and so on. However, in their 
most powerful form for human beings they are, rather, energetic — a matter o f 
qualitative and predictive possibilities diachronically integrated and synchronically 
instantiated. Just as my sense o f balance guides my behavior in building a house of 
cards, my general sense of particular social identities — gender, race, age, social class — 
guides my behavior when I interact with specific people who embody them. As 
culturally inflected senses o f qualitative and predictive possibility, these social realities 
dwell in and through us as we dwell in and through them. The way we imagine the 
possibilities creates the sense o f the way things are, while the sense o f the way things are 
can create how things come to be in material reality.
This view of imagination and its link to material, lived reality suggests its very 
real power. Societies that have existed or do now exist in which the objectivist point of 
view is not hegemonic easily recognize this power. In these societies, the power of the 
individuals responsible for imaginative technologies has been acknowledged through 
position — a position associated with the gods, such as a priest or shaman, or with 
kings, such as the court jester — or through fear, by forcing players and singers to the 
margins o f society, inviting them to the center only for specific rites and occasions in 
which their power is deemed useful. In contrast, in our society, objectivism holds sway, 
leading us to label the imaginary as “unreal,” “trivial,” and “mere entertainment.” As a 
society, we are bewitched by a dazzling array of imaginative technologies, but unaware 
of their power to create. In energetic reality, decisions about what and how we imagine
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as individuals resonate throughout the entire social reality, because we are that social 
reality — it lives in and through us. As scholars — social leaders charged with shaping 
the way the people o f oar society imagine their world to be — we should make the 
power o f performance explicitly and exquisitely clear.
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